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This thesis is about the boundaries of domestic immigration law and international human 
rights regarding polygamy. It considers how polygamous wives are treated, and why.  
 
Polygamy has traditionally been viewed in the West as ‘harmful’, both to women and society. 
Western legal systems do not allow domestic plural marriage, and international human rights 
institutions recommend the prohibition of polygamy. Despite that, valid foreign polygamous 
marriages are recognised in the United Kingdom, particularly where it would be more harmful 
to do otherwise—except in immigration. The Immigration Act 1988 and Immigration Rules 
exclude additional polygamous wives from reuniting with their families. No exception is made 
and any harm that women are likely to suffer as a result is irrelevant. 
 
This thesis argues that the treatment of additional polygamous wives, particularly in the refugee 
context where women are more likely to be exposed to insecurity and harm, presents a 
‘polygamy paradox’. While formal objections to polygamy are apparently based on harm, they 
are likely to cause more harm than good. This work interrogates the stance on polygamy to 
consider not only its paradoxical effect, but what informs this outcome. Applying a critical 
legal understanding, this thesis exposes not only the unintended consequences of the law. It 
also highlights what has shaped legal boundaries, historically and more recently, revealing a 
hidden bias that undermines the legitimacy and efficacy of laws and rights. 
 
This work concludes by offering a renewed feminist framework for the consideration of 
polygamy; one which takes account of gender, history and power. Ordinary epistemological 
foundations for the treatment of polygamy are disturbed, so the voices of women who have 
occupied a neglected space at the centre of laws, rights and reality as a relentlessly excluded 





My acknowledgements here are much more than the performance of a required ritual, and 
represent my heartfelt and genuine gratitude to all of those who are mentioned, who have 
supported me through to the completion of this research. I have written this thesis during a 
period of both profound grief and ineffable happiness, latterly experienced in isolated 
surroundings. It is the support and encouragement of those people mentioned here that have 
made getting to this point possible.  
 
My principal thanks go to my primary supervisor, Dr. Prabha Kotiswaran whose intellectual 
rigour and on-going commitment to this work have added so much to the final product. I am 
immensely grateful to you for your willingness to support me following my return, for your 
extraordinary critical insight and for holding me to account, right to the very end. I have 
learned so much from you and I am in no doubt that this work is immeasurably improved as 
a result of your discernment and dedication. It has been an enormous privilege to work with 
you, and one I have enjoyed very much.  
 
I wish also to thank from the bottom of my heart my second supervisor, Professor Aileen 
McColgan. Having your academic contribution has been a fantastic privilege from the start of 
this project and the intellectual guidance you have provided has been invaluable. The gratitude 
I feel at the kindness and patience you’ve shown in supporting me through some terribly tough 
experiences, from start to finish, is also immense. I will always owe you an enormous debt of 
heartfelt thanks.  
 
I am also grateful to other colleagues at King’s College London for their support over the 
course of completing this work. To Dr. Lorenzo Zucca and Professor Penny Green for their 
initial confidence in me and this project, as well as their kindness and patience when Lola was 
born. Also, to Professor Ann Mumford and Lindsey McBrane for their help and 
encouragement following my return to King’s, after parental leave with Indie. On each of 
these occasions, I was so grateful to benefit from practical assistance, with a welcome dose of 
kindness and understanding. To other academic and administrative staff at King’s, including 
Professor Maleiha Malik, Professor Rob Wintemute and Dr. Vanja Hamzic, who I enjoyed 
teaching with very much, and others who have provided much needed help along the way, my 
thanks. I am also grateful for the full-time studentship provided by King’s as well as the 
generous scholarship from the New Zealand Vice Chancellor’s Committee. 
 
Outside of the institutional support I have received, my thanks must go to my dear colleagues 
and friends who spent time and energy encouraging me and commenting on this project. 
Foremost thanks go to my dearly loved friend, Dr. Ned Djordjevic, for his incredible 
generosity and insightful feedback, and to his wonderful husband, Dimitar Panov, for his 
incredible technical expertise and help, despite his despair with my rubbish formatting; I owe 
you both so much. To Professor Shaunnagh Dorsett for your inspiration and your on-going 
faith, kindness and friendship, which I treasure. To Gerrit Pulles, Claire Mullord, Dr. Dean 
Knight, Catherine Callaghan, Professor Claudia Geiringer and Dr. Laura Lo Coco; you are all 
adored in equal measure and your support, at various points along the way, have been so very 
much appreciated by me. To the very lovely Dr. Claire Charters, thank you for being there in 
the days of those early losses, to encourage me. To my second favourite black letter, doctrinal 
 4 
lawyer, Chris Hare, thank you for taking the time to listen to someone speak ‘at’ you about all 
of this stuff, for listening with such good grace and for giving me such sound advice. And last 
but not least, to Dr. Dr. (I still can’t believe you have two) Lucy Cutler for some of the best 
practical advice and the warmest emotional support I could wish for.  
 
Special thanks must also go to those friends we consider Godparents to our girls, and our own 
guardian angels. Our dearest friends who supported us through our grief after Lola’s loss and 
shared our joy following India’s safe arrival; Mark and Rach, Heather and Hayds, Amanda and 
Chris, Claire and Sally, and to Lucy and Tom, and Dr. Sinead Agnew and Kathryn Purkis, who 
also provided such a warm and welcoming homes for me in England to finish things off. You 
are all very dear and cherished friends.  
 
And so to other friends. Far, far too many kind souls to mention all of you separately, so 
forgive me for expressing my thanks, mostly, in small groups so that I have some hope of 
including everyone who is dear to us, and who has been a great support. Thanks to the 
Kennington crew, the warm-hearted Grouville Gang, the delightfully mad St George’s Mamas, 
new and no-less cherished Helvetia chums, other dear chums in Blighty and Jersey and my 
precious people and extended whanau back home, in Aotearoa, New Zealand. Each one of 
you is loved and appreciated, and those who are not here to see this day are sorely missed. 
And to those who have provided love and support to Indie, when I could not: most especially, 
our dear Torie, KB and the lovely Clearys, Sof and Ange and Nina, but also Maia, Olivia, Kylie 
and others, thank you so very much. Thanks also to those who helped to keep me physically 
and mentally functioning, including Alex Jones, Martin and Mandy Bonhomme, Janicke 
Michael, Laura Storey, Tom Faulkner and Adrienne. 
 
Many thanks also to the various organisations and people who assisted with enquiries for 
information or feedback, including Anna Musgrave (Refugee Council), Tirana Hassan 
(Amnesty International), Danielle Bell (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), 
Adrienne Davis, Pascale Fournier, Melanie Raymond, Werner Menski, Katharine Charsley, 
Jeremy Bierbach, Ian Sumner, Jacob Beswick, David Ryken, Sameena Dalwai and the 
Women’s Refugee Commission. Thanks also to the Maughan Library for their willingness to 
help with the desperate requests of an isolated academic stranded on a small island, the Jersey 
Law Institute for providing such a welcoming space for me to work at and retreat to on island, 
and to Marco at Jersey Public Library for the warm local welcome. And to Messers MacMillan, 
Henderson, Braiden and to Graham Sinclair, I thank each of you, too, for showing early faith 
in me; it meant an awful lot. 
 
And, to family. To mum for repeatedly telling me when I was little that I could be whatever I 
wanted to be; thank you for believing in me, right from the very start. To my dear old dad, for 
being there and being so proud, in the end; it means the world. To Richie’s dear whanau for 
your love and support; you are a special and wonderful bunch of (bonkers) people and I 
absolutely adore you all.  
 
Finally, to Richard, India, Lola, Rosie and Daisy, you are my blessings and have kept me going, 
each in your own way. Thank you, Richie, for being so willing to take on much more of the 
load at home, to allow me the time and space to do this. You are still the most infuriatingly 
messy person I know, but I am in awe of your limitless kindness, your love for me and your 
skill for creating ‘happy chaos’. And thank you, dearest Indie; your strength, support and 
 5 
patience at your mummy being absent so much of the time for so very long has been 
impressive, and truly appreciated. You are one delightful human being, my darling daughter, 






For my dearest daughter, India, for the indescribable ray of sunshine you are in our lives, and 
in the hope that you will be inspired to be whatever you wish to be.  
 
 
For Richie, for your loyalty, kindness, and your love, which mean everything. 
 
 
For Rosie, my dear and cherished companion throughout so much. It breaks my heart that 




Lastly, for my daughter Lola, to keep my promise to you. E te mōkai, aroha nui ki a 
koe.  Haere atu rā, e hine, ki tō moenga roa. Kāre rawa koe e warewaretia. Little One. Much 
love to you. Go now, to your eternal rest. You will never be forgotten.  
 
 7 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ............................................................................................. 10 
1.1 The Prompt: the Polygamy Paradox ....................................................................... 10 
1.2 The Scope, Method and Aim of this Work ............................................................ 12 
1.3 The Wider Narrative: The Refugee Experience for Women ................................ 18 
1.4 The Local Narrative: Immigration Exclusions for Polygamous Wives................ 23 
1.5 The Relevance of Human Rights ............................................................................ 26 
1.5.1 What’s Wrong with Rights? .............................................................................. 26 
1.5.2 The Utility of Rights Talk ................................................................................. 27 
1.6 The Significance of a Feminist Understanding ...................................................... 30 
1.6.1 Feminist Generations ........................................................................................ 30 
1.6.2 The Utility of Postmodern Feminism .............................................................. 33 
1.6.3 The Challenge of Relying on Postmodern Feminism..................................... 35 
1.7 Outside the Scope of this Work .............................................................................. 38 
1.8 The Structure of this Work ...................................................................................... 40 
Chapter 2 - The Opposition: Polygamy and Harm.................................................. 42 
2.1 The Scope of this Chapter ....................................................................................... 42 
2.2 The Origins and Evolution of Polygamy ................................................................ 43 
2.2.1 ‘Polygamy’ Defined ........................................................................................... 43 
2.2.2 The Evolution of Polygamy .............................................................................. 45 
2.3 Polygamy in Islam ..................................................................................................... 49 
2.4 The Problem of Polygamy and Harm ..................................................................... 53 
2.4.1 Harm in Western Society .................................................................................. 54 
2.4.2 Harm to Women ................................................................................................ 61 
2.4.3 Harm and Human Rights .................................................................................. 64 
2.4.4 Harm and Traditional Feminist Discourse ...................................................... 68 
2.5 Harm and the Regulation of Polygamy ................................................................... 71 
2.5.1 Regulation in Permissive States ........................................................................ 72 
2.5.2 Regulation in Combined States ........................................................................ 74 
2.5.3 Regulation in Prohibitive States........................................................................ 76 
2.6 Rethinking Polygamy and Harm ............................................................................. 82 
2.6.1 The Benefit in Rethinking Harm ...................................................................... 82 
2.6.2 The Impact of Not Rethinking Harm .............................................................. 87 
2.6.3 Rethinking Harm in Practice ............................................................................ 90 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 93 
Chapter 3 - The Contradiction: Polygamy in the United Kingdom ....................... 96 
3.1 The Scope of this Chapter ....................................................................................... 96 
3.2 The Validity of Polygamous Marriage..................................................................... 96 
3.2.1 Domestic Polygamous Marriage ....................................................................... 96 
 8 
3.2.2 Foreign Polygamous Marriage .......................................................................... 99 
3.2.2.1 Foreign Polygamy by Domiciles .............................................................. 101 
3.3 The Recognition of Polygamous Marriage ........................................................... 108 
3.3.1 Domestic Rights for Polygamous Spouses .................................................... 108 
3.3.2 Immigration Rights for Polygamous Spouses ............................................... 112 
3.3.2.1 The Early Approach in Immigration ...................................................... 112 
3.3.2.2 The Current Approach in Immigration .................................................. 116 
3.4 Polygamous Refugee Families ............................................................................... 120 
3.4.1 Refugees and Family Reunification ................................................................ 120 
3.4.2 The Impact on Polygamous Wives ................................................................ 124 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 125 
Chapter 4 - The Problem: The Promise and The Failure of Human Rights ....... 127 
4.1 The Scope of this Chapter ..................................................................................... 127 
4.2 The Promise of Rights ........................................................................................... 128 
4.2.1 International Human Rights ........................................................................... 128 
4.2.2 Regional Human Rights .................................................................................. 130 
4.2.3 Domestic Human Rights ................................................................................ 134 
4.2.4 The Future of Rights in the United Kingdom .............................................. 135 
4.3 The Efficacy of Rights ........................................................................................... 136 
4.3.1 The Efficacy of Refugee Rights ...................................................................... 138 
4.3.1.1 The Scope of Human Rights for Refugees ............................................. 138 
4.3.1.2 The Trouble with Refugee Rights ........................................................... 142 
4.3.2 The Efficacy of Women’s Rights ................................................................... 148 
4.3.2.1 The Scope of Human Rights for Women .............................................. 148 
4.3.2.2 The Trouble with Women’s Rights ......................................................... 151 
4.3.2.3 Women’s Rights and Polygamy ............................................................... 155 
4.3.2.4 Why Women’s Rights Get Polygamy Wrong ......................................... 157 
4.4 The Failure of Rights .............................................................................................. 163 
4.4.1 How Rights Fail: Universality ......................................................................... 166 
4.4.2 Why Rights Fail: Culture ................................................................................. 169 
4.5 The Future of Rights .............................................................................................. 173 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 180 
Chapter 5 - The Reply: A Renewed Feminist Approach to Polygamy, Human 
Movement and Human Rights ................................................................................ 183 
5.1 The Scope of this Chapter ..................................................................................... 183 
5.2 Feminism and Islam ............................................................................................... 185 
5.2.1 Western Feminist Concern ............................................................................. 185 
5.2.2 Islamic Feminism from Within ...................................................................... 190 
5.3 A Reframed Feminist Approach to Polygamy ..................................................... 196 
5.3.1 The Basis for a Feminist Re-evaluation of Normative Neutrality ............... 197 
 9 
5.3.2 A Governance Feminist Critique ................................................................... 199 
5.3.3 A Renewed Feminist Reply ............................................................................. 204 
5.4 The Outcome: The Polygamy Paradox and Reform ........................................... 211 
5.4.1 The Basis for Law Reform .............................................................................. 211 
5.4.2 Domestic Law Reform .................................................................................... 214 
5.4.2.1 The Recognition of Polygamy in Immigration....................................... 214 
5.4.2.2 The Bigamy Hurdle .................................................................................. 217 
5.4.2.3 The Public Policy Hurdle ......................................................................... 217 
5.4.3 Human Rights Law Reform ............................................................................ 223 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 226 
Chapter 6  - Conclusion............................................................................................ 231 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 234 
CASES, LEGISLATION ......................................................................................... 261 
AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ............................................................. 261 









1.1 The Prompt: The Polygamy Paradox 
 
The prompt for this research comes from my experience with refugee families seeking 
resettlement.1 I became aware of immigration restrictions that prevent polygamous families 
from reuniting while working with a local refugee resettlement charity in New Zealand in 2006. 
As a result of immigration exclusions on additional polygamous wives, affected women faced 
indefinite separation from their families, leaving them isolated and often unsafe in refugee 
settings. Colleagues who were closer to those families affected told stories of great distress 
among family members and concern for wives and mothers who were left behind. Families 
                                                           
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee 
Convention) art 1A ‘Definition of the term “Refugee”’. Where refugee status is established, the applicant becomes a ‘refugee’ for 
Convention purposes and may not be returned to the home jurisdiction according to the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ and she must 
be treated according to minimum standards (Refugee Convention, Article 33.) For further discussion and explanation, UNHCR, 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees UN Doc HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV 3 (2011). The term ‘refugee’ will be used in this work also to refer to asylum-seekers 
and displaced persons, including the additional wives of anyone seeking asylum. While ‘displaced’ generally means forced to flee but 
remain with in the borders of one’s native country, it too may also be used throughout this research as an umbrella term for displaced 
people and refugees. The terms ‘displaced women’ and ‘refugee women’ are used interchangeably throughout this research to refer 
to women in refugee families who are displaced and whose husbands or other family members have applied for refugee status. 
Similarly, the term ‘refugee settings’ refers to transit facilities, reception centres, refugee camps, places of detention for asylum-
seekers, way-stations during repatriation movements, and centres for communities of internally displaced persons, as well as 
anywhere else more generally on the journey of someone who is displaced and seeking refuge. The term ‘migrant’ is generally used 
to denote people who make a conscious decision to leave their countries to seek a better life elsewhere, although it is accepted here 
that many who do so take extraordinary risks because their day to day lives force them to do so, for themselves and their families. For 
general guidance, see: International Rescue Committee, ‘What is a Refugee? What is a Migrant? Inside the Humanitarian Crisis in 
Europe’ (Report) (24 September 2015). While there is not scope within this work to enter into the debate regarding the relative needs 
and assistance which ought to be offered to those who are considered ‘asylum-seekers’ and those who are considered ‘migrants’ the 
recommendations in this research might properly extend to people who have fled their country of origin without meeting the st rict 
refugee definition, including those who are fleeing natural disasters, war or civil unrest. Although these individuals might not be 
entitled to the strict and increased protection offered under the Refugee Convention, their circumstances may, in practice, s till be 
seeking a form of refuge. For a discussion on definitions of ‘refugee’ see Hathaway, James, The Law of Refugee Status (CUP, 2014) and 
Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who is a Refugee?’ (1984) 95 Ethics 274. 
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already harmed by conflict, violence and fear were deeply affected by the prospect of 
permanent, forced separation. The impact of this restriction, for the entire family but especially 
for those women permanently excluded, made me uneasy. On the one hand I was well used 
to the arguments against polygamous marriage, particularly in a religious context. The women 
generally affected by the immigration exclusions I had stumbled across were Muslim women 
in Islamic polygamous marriages, and the inequality presented by the fact that only men are 
able to take additional wives according to Islamic tradition, along with the potential for 
emotional, financial and other hardship arising out of a collection of women sharing a 
husband, all seemed like sound reasons to me (among others) to reject polygamy. On the other 
hand, it also seemed absurd to exclude additional wives because of fears over the damage that 
polygamy might cause to women, while that very exclusion left these women more vulnerable 
than ever to serious physical and sexual harm, not to mention the emotional trauma of their 
on-going separation. The state’s response to polygamy in immigration presented me with a 
paradox.2 Because of liberal concerns over the harm that polygamy might cause to women and 
society, women were being denied family reunification, and they were being placed ever more 
in harm’s way.3  
 
The fate of those women who were left behind raised many questions. What is the basis for 
excluding polygamy in immigration? Are valid polygamous marriages always treated this way 
by other domestic laws? Is there any flexibility in the immigration system for women who are 
displaced and facing great personal harm as a result of their exclusion? Do rights guarantees 
intervene to offer protection in the shape of women’s rights, refugee rights, anti-discrimination 
standards or any other rights claims that might be made to challenge the state’s unconditional 
                                                           
2 The idea of a ‘polygamy paradox’ is not new, having been referred to in a number of books and articles, particularly recently. Martha 
Bailey and Amy Kaufman in Polygamy in the Monogamous World: Multicultural Challenges for Western Law and Policy (Praeger, Santa 
Barbara 2010) 137 refer to the “…paradox of polygamy” as, however harmful, polygamy can also be the source of rights and 
protections for women and children, so that disapproval may have detrimental consequences. It is not just academics who have spoken 
of a polygamy paradox but also the mainstream media, including Time magazine, see Nancy Gibbs ‘The Polygamy Paradox’ Time (20 
September 2007), writing about the case of Warren Jeffs, who was prosecuted for aggravated sexual assault, including offences 
committed against young girls he considered his ‘spiritual wives’ and sentenced to life in prison, plus a further 20 years), although she 
was concerned with the state’s interest in protecting children versus the right to religious freedom.  
3 The majority of sponsors for family reunion applications are male, while 95% of those seeking reunion were women and children.  
Jacob Beswick, British Red Cross, ‘Not So Straightforward: The Need for Qualified Legal Support in Refugee Family Reunion’ (Report) 
(2015) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/560cfcde4.html> accessed 18 April 2017, 6.  
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exclusion of polygamous wives? Further, given it is only ever women who are excluded under 
laws that restrict family reunification for polygamous families, what does feminist theory have 
to say about polygamy in this context? Are these women viewed as pariahs for their complicity 
in an apparently unequal and odious form of marriage, or does anyone who advocates for 
feminist aims broadly accept the agency and free choice of Muslim or any other women to 
enter into polygamy? Or do those who call themselves ‘feminists’ continue to view the censure 
of additional polygamous wives as acceptable, even when its paradoxical quality becomes 
apparent? Questions like these highlighted the tension between women’s own personal 
experiences of polygamy and its formal treatment according to domestic laws and international 
rights, prompting this interrogation of the legal restrictions on polygamy and the related 




1.2 The Scope, Method and Aim of this Work 
 
My desire to investigate the problem of polygamy is not unique, particularly of late. Such 
investigations have been increasing in a range of Western legal settings.4 Since this work began 
there has been a particularly prolific rise in interest in polygamy in Canada following the 
constitutional referral of criminal prohibitions on polygamy to the Supreme Court of British 
Colombia in the Bountiful case in 2010.5 A range of publications emanating from Canadian 
academic sources have recently investigated topics including the history of polygamy, its 
impact on women and children, as well as the possibility of its de-criminalisation and 
recognition.6 The ‘polygamy question’ has also increasingly been asked across the border, in 
                                                           
4 The term ‘West’ together with other terms like ‘Western’ and ‘global North’ are used in this work loosely to gather together states 
sharing similar political ideologies and legal policies, including North America, Europe, the United Kingdom and Australasia. For further 
discussion and a definition of ‘the West’, see Rex Adhar, Shari’a in the West, Chapter 1, where he also discusses the relationship 
between Islam and the West, a subject which will be picked up in the conclusion to this work.  
5 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588 (referred to here as the ‘Reference’ case, or ‘Bountiful’).  
6 For examples of recent Canadian texts applying a broad investigative approach to polygamy in the West, see Martha Bailey and Amy 
Kauffman Polygamy in the Monogamous World (n 2) and Gillian Calder and Lori G Beaman, Polygamy’s Rights and Wrongs: 
Perspectives on Harm, Family and Law (UBC, 2014). Particularly relevant to this research is the empirical study carried out by Angela 
Campbell which examines the disjuncture between personal narratives of polygamy and official responses to it in the Mormon setting. 
Campbell’s conversations are documented in ‘’Wives’ Tales: Reflecting on Research in Bountiful’ in Provost, René  and Sheppard, 
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the United States, where academics have probed the reasonableness of polygamy prohibition 
by analysing its relationship to the extension of the concept of marriage to include same sex 
couples and the regulation of more informal multiple relationships, such as those that are 
polyamorous.7 Whether it remains fair to outlaw multiparty cohabitation has been questioned 
directly in case law, leading to increasing concern over the criminalisation of plural 
relationships, including in situations where they manifest as religious polygamy.8 Some 
commentators have gone even further, highlighting the positive effects of legalising polygamy 
and offering innovative methods for its regulation, including the application of commercial 
partnership rules to intimate relationships involving more than two partners.9 Polygamy has 
also been a topic of conversation in the United Kingdom and Europe, albeit less 
enthusiastically, where the discussion has tended to focus more on Muslim rather than 
Mormon polygamy owing to its connection with historic and current migration patterns into 
the region and the relative lack of traditional Mormon communities. Here, it is easy to find 
many examples of alarm being expressed in the mainstream British press regarding the ‘swarm’ 
of migrants who threaten ‘British values’, the increasing numbers of Muslims living in Britain, 
and the rise of polygamy as a result.10 In this context, it is legal pluralists who have largely 
                                                           
Colleen (eds) Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer, New York 2013); ‘Bountiful Voices’ (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 183 and ‘Bountiful’s Plural Marriages [2010] International Journal of Law in Context 343. 
7 For a perspective on polygamy and same sex marriage, see Maura Strassberg, ‘Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, 
Polygamy and Same Sex Marriage’ (1997) 75 North Carolina Law Review 1501. She also considers polygamy in the context of other 
plural relationships in ‘The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory’ (2003) 31 Capital University Law Review 43. 
See also Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003), where Justice Scalia pours particular scorn on the idea of allowing gay sex in private for 
fear of the implications of doing so in encouraging other ‘immoral’ practices, including polygamy. The ‘polygamy question’ is asked in 
the eponymously titled book, by north American academics Janet Bennion and Lisa Fishbayn Joffe (eds) The Polygamy Question (Utah 
State University Press, 2016).  
8  See in particular, Bailey, Martha and Kaufman, Amy J, ‘Should Civil Marriage Be Opened Up To Multiple Parties?’ (2015) 64 Emory 
Law Journal 1747 and their discussion on public policy in their jointly authored text, n 6. Brown v Buhman (DC No 2:11-cv-0652-CW) 
(Utah District Court, Central Division) and the appeal, Brown v Buhman No. 14-4117 (10th Cir. 2016) (April 11 2016).  
9 See also Shayna Sigman, ‘Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong’ (2006) 16 Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 101, 
Emily Duncan, ‘The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love Is a Many Splendored Thing”’ (2008) 15 Duke Journal of Gender Law 
& Policy 315 and Elizabeth Emens, ‘Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, (2004) 29 NYU Rev L & Soc 
Change 277. Some academics have written on non-Mormon polygamy in north America, including Adrien Wing in ‘Polygamy in Black 
America’ in her text Critical Race Feminism: A Reader (2nd edn NUP, New York 2003). Regarding regulation, Adrienne Davis,  
‘Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules and Bargaining for Equality’ (2010) Vol 110 No 8 Columbia Law Review. 
10 For some examples, see Rachel Stewart ‘The Men with Many Wives: the British Muslims who practise polygamy’ The Telegraph 
(London 24 September 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/11108763/The-Men-with-Many-Wives-the-British-
Muslims-who-practise-polygamy.html> (accessed 20 January 2015). More recently, efforts by a Muslim man to establish one Muslim 
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made up the body of academics reacting to dispel that alarm, arguing for increasing recognition 
of traditional practices like polygamy, both domestically and in some instances, also in 
immigration.11 Their basis for doing so is more often than not strongly anchored in a 
straightforward pragmatism and the argument that strict prohibition is simply unlikely to be 
successful among migrant communities.12 
 
Although interest in polygamy has undoubtedly been on the rise in a range of jurisdictions in 
the West, and while the discussion in each context bears some relevance to this work, none 
investigates the specific problem of Muslim polygamy in the refugee context in the United 
Kingdom together with the role of human rights institutions and vernacular of feminist 
thinking, as this work will do. This research attempts to offer not only a detailed consideration 
of the paradoxical effect of the immigration ban on polygamy in the United Kingdom, but 
also a critical analysis of the more general response to polygamy in law, rights and feminist 
thought. While the motivation for doing so undoubtedly stems from concern over the harm 
experienced by women who are unable to reunite with their families, this work is occupied 
with more than just challenging formal indifference to the effect of legal and human rights 
boundaries when it comes to polygamous wives. It seeks also to challenge the normative basis 
for those boundaries by deconstructing purely positivist accounts of law and rights regarding 
                                                           
only and another more open polygamy-specialist dating agency, have sparked condemnation and comment, Catherine Bennett 
‘Polygamy is not a cultural conceit. It is an affront to Women’ Guardian (10 July 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/09/polygamy-uk-sharia-law-home-office-review> (accessed 2 May 2017). 
Sue Reid, ‘The truth about polygamy: A special investigation into how Muslim men can exploit the benefits system’ The Mail Online 
(24 September 2011) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2041244/Polygamy-Investigation-Muslim-men-exploit-UK-benefits-
system.html> accessed 11 March 2016 Migrants were referred to as a ‘swarm’ by then Prime Minister, David Cameron, which was 
roundly condemned by human rights groups, see Jessica Elgot and Matthew Taylor ‘Calais Crisis: Cameron condemned for 
‘dehumanising’ description of migrants’ Guardian, 30 July 2015.  
11 Prakash Shah,  ‘Attitudes to Polygamy in English Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 369 and ‘Trans-Jurisdictional Marriage and Family Reunification 
for Refugees in the United Kingdom’ (Research Paper) (2010) Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Stud ies Research 
Paper No 66/2010 and Legal Pluralism in Conflict: Coping with Diversity in Law ((Glasshouse, 2005). Federica Sona ‘Polygamy in Britain’ 
Osservatorio delle Liberta ed Istituzioni Religiose, (Newsletter) n 33/2005  July 2005 
<http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/104/documents/Sona_Polygamy_in_Britain.pdf> accessed 11 April 2017. 
12 Shah, Attitudes to Polygamy (n 11).  
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polygamy, making visible the wider social and political context in which those rules originate 
and function.13  
 
To that end, the first task of this work is to expose the tension between the law and its effect 
in practice. It will also attempt to reveal the influence of particular constituencies and 
institutions when it comes to the content of law and rights; an influence that is all too often 
unseen or considered beyond criticism. In this regard, this critique aims to reflect not only on 
the impact of the law, but on the factors which have shaped the law, both historically and 
today, using feminist, postcolonial and other critical legal discourses to bring to light the force 
of gender, history and power as discernable factors which shape legal and human rights 
boundaries. Ultimately, the aim of this work is to understand not only where legal boundaries 
are drawn and who is affected by them, but also, why they are shaped in a particular way.  
 
In offering a renewed examination of polygamy, this work will bring many different disciplines 
together—refugee law, immigration law, international law, human rights law, critical legal 
thought and feminist thinking—applying them in the context of migration and Muslim 
polygamous marriage, in answering the primary question for review. That is, whether universal 
prohibitions on polygamy evidence hidden bias at play when immigration laws and human 
rights standards are made and implemented, a bias which undermines their legitimacy and is 
likely to have a negative impact on the lives of less powerful and less influential groups of 
women. Here, women who occupy a neglected space between the laws which govern them 
and the day-to-day reality of their lives will illustrate the importance—necessity, even—of 
engaging with other, historically less dominant groups, whose narrative is largely ignored in 
traditional legal, human rights and feminist discourse in the context of polygamy. In carrying 
out this critical analysis, it is hoped this work will make a small contribution to the 
development of laws, human rights and feminist thought. First, in establishing a feminist re-
                                                           
13 Peer Zumbansen, ‘How, Where, and for Whom? Interrogating Law’s Forms, Locations and Purposes’ (Lecture) King’s College London 
(April 2016) 14, discusses the sociological suggestion to deconstruct “… legal positivism’s purported stronghold over lived experiences” 
to recognise the tension between law and lived experiences, suggesting the revival of legal pluralism to engage productively with 
alternative experiences and narratives. See also Zumbansen, ‘Where the Wild Things Are: Journeys to Transnational Legal Orders, and 




understanding of polygamy which offers a new and more thoughtful approach to its regulation 
in law and rights so that the voices of those who are negligently ‘othered’ may be heard. 
Second, by pointing out the potential for rights and feminist aims to do great harm to women 
who are not part of the power mainstream, and call on Western states, international 
institutions and activists to reassess the basis for their unconditional objections to the practices 
of the ‘othered’, such as polygamous marriage.  
 
Because the emphasis of this work is on hearing the voices of a particular group of othered 
women, two important considerations must be noted before proceeding with the substantive 
analysis. First, the common thread weaving throughout each topic for consideration is the 
development of the law with regard to its history and its relationship with wider society, 
including any unintended consequences and contradictions that arise for a specified, 
marginalised group of women. In that regard, the dominant methodology for this work is 
socio-legal because great emphasis is placed on the power that is wielded by law in society, as 
this work questions the relationship between dominance, identity and the legal standards. 
However, in considering the impact of the law in society, this work has had to manage the 
limited availability of empiral and descriptive accounts of those who are the focus for this 
research; that is, Muslim women in polygamous marriages, particularly in the refugee context. 
While there has been a prolific rise in academic interest in Mormon polygamous communities, 
the comparative dearth of material relating to the experiences of Muslim polygamous families, 
particularly those who are displaced, has necessitated some methodological resourcefulness 
on my part. In considering women’s varied experiences polygamous marriage and claims about 
harm, this work has been forced to rely more heavily than desired on the empirical accounts 
of Mormon women. While these accounts are undoubtedly helpful in debunking ordinary 
assumptions about harm and illustrating the possibility of a range of experiences of polygamy, 
the limitations of this approach are also noted. The lives of women in isolated Mormon 
communities in Canada or the United States arguably have little in common with Muslim 
polygamous wives, particularly those whoe are dispersed and separated from their husbands, 
sister wives and families in refugee settings. While I am alive to such distinctions, however, I 
also take the view that any limitations in relying on empirical resources regarding polygamy 
for Mormon families is mitigated by the anaologies that may be drawn between two systems 
of religious, polygamous marriage among largely conservative and often isolated or excluded 
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communities. I take the view that the lived experiences of one group of othered women are 
relevant and hepful in identifying the way in which polygamous wives are more generally 
forced to navigate identity, power and the law when it comes to polygamy, harm and 
regulation. In addition, while domestic, Mormon accounts of polygamy may also have little to 
do with conflict or displacement, this work has sought separately to ameliorate that distinction 
and understand and explain women’s experience of displacement by relying on reports from 
a range of governmental, non-governmental and charitable organisations. In this regard, 
although the methodological framework this work adopts may be imperfect, it is borne of 
practical and unavoidable limitations and, when combined with what little material there is on 
Muslim women and their experience of polygamy, it provides a stable methodological basis 
for further discussion, and to draw sound conclusions.  
 
Second, in addition to the empirical limitations this work has had to grapple with, it is also 
unavoidably grounded in my own perspective, that of a woman of joint New Zealand and 
British descent. The voice driving this work is that of a white, Western lawyer and academic. 
Although anchored in my own experience of jurisdictions where domestic plural marriage is 
outlawed, and where both refugees and Islam are more likely than ever to be feared, this 
research will attempt to understand polygamy without relying on familiar cultural and legal 
principles. In doing so, it is accepted that the contribution made here to the many academic 
commentaries seeking to reduce the invisibility of historically less powerful women must, of 
itself, lack the ‘distinctive voice’ that other women may use to express their own experience 
of subordination.14 While every effort is made to ‘world travel’ as recommended by 
postmodern, postcolonial and other critical feminist theorists, and to treat other cultural and 
legal traditions with equal respect, it is acknowledged that the particular perspective brought 
to this work is also ‘rooted’ in my own experience. As someone who has worked with the 
refugee community but never experienced life as a refugee, even if my perspective may be 
shifted so as to privilege the experience of others, I have no direct experience of polygamy, 
displacement or exclusion. Despite that, there remains value in this work if it is able to assist 
                                                           
14 This work borrows from Adrien Wing ‘Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black America: Global Critical Race 
Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty First Century’ (2001) 11 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, where she refers to Professor 
Mari Matsuda’s notion of a “distinctive voice” in Mari Matsuda ‘Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations’ 22 Harv 
CR – CL L Rev 323 (1987) n 22, 816. 
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even in some small way in translating perspectives on polygamy, human movement and human 
rights, to de-marginalise the lives and concerns of other women.15 In this case, it is hoped this 
work might be accepted as a worthwhile attempt to encourage a refreshed discourse between 
those who are more usually institutionally voiceless and those who are much more likely to 
wield political, economic and social power, by bringing the story of the former to the fore. In 
this role I do not seek to assert any authority to speak on anyone’s behalf. Rather, I simply 
hope to make the constituency I speak about more visible, with the aim of encouraging others 
to hear their eloquence and their experience.  
 
More immediately, the remainder of this chapter will introduce the wider narrative of women 
in refugee settings, grounding the entirety of this research in its socio-legal roots and explaining 
why the experience of human movement for these women is so often more trying than it is 
for men, in the hope also of conveying why this research matters. Next, the local narrative of 
immigration laws which restrict the entry of polygamously married wives and which are the 
focus for this research will be introduced and charted for the reader, laying a foundation for a 
review of inconsistencies in domestic legal approaches to polygamy in a later chapter. This 
introduction will then turn to modern human rights standards, beginning with a brief 
discussion of the origins of human rights and their development over time, with the aim of 
explaining where human rights come from and the ambit and efficacy of rights in their modern 
form. Thereafter, the final topic to be introduced here is feminist thought—the primary 
theoretical thread which weaves through this work— providing a basis for the suggestion in 
later chapters that the laws and standards which prohibit polygamy are gendered, in giving 
effect to disproportionately harmful outcomes for certain groups of women, despite acting 
under the guise of ‘protection’.  
 
 
1.3 The Wider Narrative: The Refugee Experience for Women  
 
It is hard for most people to imagine being forced to run from war. It is perhaps unimaginable 
for anyone that they might, having successfully escaped conflict and insecurity, find themselves 
                                                           
15 Wing (n 14) 813, refers to the task she is assigned to ‘translate’ the practice of polygamy for the American legal audience, in a way 
which is not sensationalist or essentialist but sensitive to the cultural and legal dynamics of the societies in which it operates. 
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at risk of more danger in the very place they had hoped to find safety. This is the experience 
of many female refugees, however.16 Very high numbers of women who become displaced 
experience fear, harm and exploitation, simply because they are women. Where families are 
separated, it is women who are subjected to a particularly heightened risk of harm. Moreover, 
when women suffer physical, sexual and other forms of violence in the refugee setting, they 
often have nowhere to turn. Little relief or support is available and they are regularly too 
frightened to seek help anyway, for fear of more violence by way of reprisal or because they 
will be stigmatised by their own communities. Hardship in the refugee setting is therefore 
compounded because women are scared to report abuse or ask for help because they are 
worried about negative repercussions, such as being humiliated, deported, tortured, or suffer 
some other form of violence at the hands of officials.17 Hardship and fear also mean displaced 
women are often dependent on the kindness and help of others who do offer help, to survive 
and meet their basic needs. In turn, that reliance makes them more vulnerable to additional 
hardship than their male counterparts, whose offers of help may themselves come with 
unwanted conditions and the risk of yet more harm.18  
 
                                                           
16 Although it is widely accepted that women are exposed to greater risks than men in refugee settings, and that life as a refugee is 
generally very difficult, there are competing views about the refugee experience in camps. For an example, see Kirsten McConnachie 
in Governing Refugees: Justice, Order and Legal Pluralism (Oxford Routledge, 2014) where she seeks to challenge ordinary assumptions 
about refugee camps, saying they may be spaces where political, cultural and social lives are lived. However, the prevailing view of 
refugee settings is as a place where life is typically disordered, and insecure, and where women are arguably at a distinct disadvantage, 
because of a structural bias the camps themselves and the entire asylum process, see Alice Bloch and others, ‘Refugee Women in 
Europe: Some Aspects of the Legal and Policy Dimensions’ (2000) 38(2) International Migration 169 where the authors call for a re-
think of policy and legislation in Europe; Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War and the Dilemma of 
Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2005).  
17 United Nations Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 33’ on 
Women’s Access to Justice (23 July 2105) CEDAW/C/GC/33, paragraph 10 discusses women’s unwillingness and inability in certain  
situations to get access to justice, a detriment which is greatly exacerbated in the refugee setting. Also relevant in this context is UN 
Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ‘General Recommendation 32’ on the Gender Related  
Dimensions of Refugee Status, Asylum, Nationality and Statelessness of Women, (adopted 5 November 2014) UN doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/32.  
18 Amnesty International ‘I want a safe place: Refugee women from Syria uprooted and unprotected in Lebanon” (Report) (February 
2016) (file:///Users/Holden/Downloads/MDE1832102016ENGLISH.PDF, last accessed 16 March 2016) 47, saying such conditions 
included sexual activity and ‘temporary’ offers of marriage in return for assistance; and Office of the High Commission for Human 
Rights, ‘Women’s Rights are Human Rights’, (Report) (New York and Geneva, 2014) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/WHRD/WomenRightsAreHR.pdf> accessed 21 February 2017 which discusses the human 
rights framework in practice, and the impact of migration and displacement on women’s rights at Part V, 86.  
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Women in refugee settings have expressed their humiliation and fear at being considered 
available and ‘easy to get’ simply by virtue of their being alone, as well as their frustration at 
being unable to complain because their lack of formal status makes them too vulnerable to do 
anything to stop what is happening to them.19 As explained by the Director of International 
Crisis Response at Amnesty International,  
 
After living through the horrors of the war … women have risked everything to 
find safety for themselves and their children. But from the moment they begin this 
journey they are again exposed to violence and exploitation, with little support or 
protection.20 
 
While refugees hope, and ought to be able to expect, that once they flee conflict they will be 
safe, the truth for many is that they simply face a different type of harm when they begin a 
new existence as a refugee. For women on their own, the risk of experiencing this new harm 
is undoubtedly much, much greater.21 Despite the incredible resilience and strength so often 
                                                           
19 Amnesty International report (n 18) 45, 52. Amnesty interviewed women in Lebanon, who had fled Syria and who reported their 
experiences of sexual harassment and exploitation, which was worse for those women on their own. Women noted their reluctance 
to report any crime for a range of fears. For recent testimony, see Mark Townsend “Women and children ‘endure rape, beatings and 
abuse’ inside Dunkirk’s Refugee Camp” The Guardian Sunday, 12 February 2017 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/12/dunkirk-child-refugees-risk-sexual-violence, last accessed 12 February 2017) 
where one women travelling on her own was reported as saying unaccompanied women and children were viewed as prey, “All men 
see that I’m alone … [M]en see me and they want to rape me.” An NGO worker was quoted in the same article as saying that men 
targeted women and children because of their vulnerability and talked of men in the refugee setting being ‘disconnected from reality’ 
meaning serious violence and abuse was more likely. 
20 Amnesty International report (n 18). For additional NGO commentary on women’s refugee experiences see International Rescue 
Committee ‘Are We Listening: Acting on our Commitment to Women and Girls Affected by the Syrian Conflict’ (Report) (September, 
2014) and Human Rights Watch ‘Welcome to Kenya: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees’ (Report) (June 2010) which highlights the plight 
of refugees at the Dadaab Refugee Camp, in particular the discussion on violence against women without male relative, at page 55.  
21 See also, UNHCR Executive Committee 56th Session ‘Conclusion on Women and Girls at Risk’ 105 LVII (6 October 2006) UN Doc 
A/AC.96/1035. Beswick, Jacob, British Red Cross, ‘Not So Straightforward: The Need for Qualified Legal Support in Refugee Family 
Reunion’ (Report) (2015) also confirms that while 51% of applicants for family reunion were exposed to security risks, 96% of those 
exposed were women and children. The report also notes United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and 
Security (31 October, 2000) which registers “… concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority 
of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and are increasingly targeted by 
combatants and armed elements”. The United Kingdom instituted a National Plan on Women, Peace and Security following UNSC 
1325 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office ‘United Kingdom Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security’ (2014)) calling on UK officials 
to see gender as central to their work on conflict, stability and security and routinely integrate, assess and evaluate the gender 
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displayed by women who are forced to leave their homes, the risk of discrimination and gender 
specific violence is real; a fact verified by United Nations agencies and reported more widely.22  
 
The experiences of women in refugee settings, in particular where gender-based violence 
occurs, is a form of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law.23 
According to international obligations, and following the work of activists to bring the 
structural nature of violence against women into the vernacular of international human rights 
protection, states are obliged to take steps to prevent this type of discrimination, including 
where it is perpetrated by third parties, so that displaced women have protection.24 Yet, in 
practice, isolated refugee women often remain at continued and much-heightened risk, some 
of who will be Muslim wives in polygamous marriages.25 Where their husbands have achieved 
                                                           
implications of policies, legislation and programming ‘where appropriate’. The report by Beswick also confirms at page 15 that “… the 
majority of sponsors [for family reunification] are men and the majority of applicants are women and children – whose vulnerability 
in insecure environments is universally recognised.” The disproportionate harm suffered by women in refugee settings has also been 
known about for some time, see Anders B Johnsson ‘The International Protection of Women Refugees; A summary of Principal 
Problems and Issues 1 Int’l J. Refugee L. 221 (1989) for an early exposition on the peculiar harm faced by women in refugee settings. 
It remains a topic of concern today, see Phoebe Greenwood ‘Rape and Domestic Violence Follow Syrian Women into Refugee Camps’ 
The Guardian (25 July 2015) quoting Melanie Megvand, a specialist in gender based violence at International Rescue Committee on 
the particular predicament of women in the refugee setting. 
22 UNHCR ‘Conclusion on Women and Girls at Risk’ (n21).  
23 UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 19’ on Gender Based 
Violence, adopted at the Eleventh Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1992) UN Doc 
A/47/38, paragraph 6. See also the following report on violence against women by the International Commission of Jurists, ‘Women’s 
Access to Justice for Gender Based Violence: A Practitioner’s Guide (February, 2016), highlighting the description of violence against 
women as a ‘pandemic’ and noting the special challenge to women who are in refugee settings. See also UN Secretary-General, ‘In-
depth study on all forms of violence against women’ UN Doc A/61/122/Add 1 (2006) paragraph 334, where he states women’s physical, 
psychological and reproductive wellbeing can severely be compromised in refugee settings. 
24 CEDAW General Recommendation 19 (n 23), paragraph 9. According to the Committee, under the CEDAW convention states have 
a due diligence obligation to prevent gender-based violence and can be responsible for private acts where they fail to do so. This 
means they must take appropriate measures to prevent such acts by private persons whether they are family members, neighbours, 
landlords or strangers. In Europe, the Council of Europe Convention on Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence 
(adopted 11 May 2011, entered into force 1August 2014) CETS No 210 is the primary tool for protecting women and girls against sexual 
and gender based violence, requiring states in Europe to ensure that gender based violence is recognised as a form of persecution, 
and also requiring states to introduce gender sensitive procedures in the asylum process. 
25 A Freedom of Information request to the Home Office on was made on 7 July 2016, in an effort to establish just how many additional 
polygamous wives might be denied family reunification each year. The Home Office responded by refusing to provide information on 
the number of family reunion applications made by Muslim families, and the number who are refused because of the polygamous 
nature of their family, citing their statutory right to do so pursuant to s 12 Freedom of Information Act, on the basis of cost. Other 
agencies have responded to requests for information by confirming they do not collect or store this information. Responses to 
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refugee status in a safer place it will be their hope to take advantage of their associated right 
to join their families. In the United Kingdom, however, their marital status prevents that 
reunion. Here, despite valid polygamous marriages being recognised for other reasons, 
including in family law and for other matters like inheritance and access to social security 
assistance, in immigration, objections to polygamy trump the harm that such women are likely 
to suffer as a result of remaining displaced and alone. Judgment is passed by the state on these 
women because of their marriages, and laws which directly affect them are seemingly made 
without thought for their impact. Perhaps most remarkably, their transnational abandonment 
by states and the human rights establishment is often carried out in the name of both feminism, 
and women’s rights.26  
 
In addition, while the constituency of women this work focuses on is likely to be relatively 
small, the recent crisis of human movement happening in Europe, Africa and the Middle East 
has ascribed more broad significance to the matters raised in this research.27 At the time of 
writing, approximately sixty million people have forcibly been displaced as a result of various 
conflicts around the globe and an estimated fifteen million people are seeking refuge, with 
those numbers considered very likely to continue to rise as increasing numbers of people 
fleeing conflict today are leaving states which are in deep crisis.28 Exact information on the 
                                                           
requests for information were also received from Amnesty International, Women’s Refugee Commission and American Refugee 
Committee confirmed they do not hold this information. Requests to Women for Refugee Women, Refugees International, the 
International Rescue Committee received no response.  
26 Although it is clear that additional polygamous wives do not qualify for a spousal visa or to come as a dependant of a person who 
has been recognised as a refugee, they are able to submit their own asylum claim and benefit from other types of leave to remain, 
like exceptional leave to remain, discretionary leave to remain, humanitarian protection (which may not necessarily meet the refugee 
definition), and others, including completely separate claims for entry, for example as a student if this were available. In this regard, 
although a polygamous wife cannot be sponsored by someone who has been recognised as a refugee, she can assert a refugee claim 
in her own right, or she can request permanent residence via alternative routes. However, while other mechanisms for entry may be 
available, where the individual circumstances can be taken into account the exclusion of additional polygamous wives for the most 
direct route, that of family reunion, remains problematic, because these women do not benefit at all from their family status (in the 
way the monogamous wives do), and they are forced to rely on the possibility of alternative claims, the criteria for which they may 
not meet. In this regard, while the characterisation of “universal exclusion” might be challenged because other routes are available, 
the easiest, that of family reunion, remains closed to polygamous wives.  
27  See Freedom of Information request  (n 25).  
28 UNHCR, ‘Worldwide displacement his an all-time high as war and persecution increase’ (News report) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html> accessed 16 March 2016 and International Rescue Committee, ‘The Refugee Crisis in 
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numbers of refugee women who are excluded from reunion in the United Kingdom because 
of their polygamous marriage is not available from any official source, be it governmental, 
non-governmental or inter-governmental, as none disaggregates data on women who are alone 
in refugee settings in connection with their marital status.29 However, what is known is that 
four of the five countries with the highest number of applications for asylum to the United 
Kingdom in the year ending March 2016 are states with a predominantly Muslim population.30 
In the same year, asylum applications also increased by 38%.31 The Home Office has 
confirmed these numbers correlate to world events, with the total number of asylum 
applications to the European Union in 2016 estimated to be more than double the number 
from the previous year.32 This sharp rise in the number of people seeking refuge generally, as 
well as the large Muslim population seeking asylum in the United Kingdom suggests that, 
although the numbers contemplated by this research may be small relatively speaking, they are 
not insignificant and they are likely to be rising. 
 
 
1.4 The Local Narrative: Immigration Exclusions for Polygamous Wives 
 
Britain has exercised some form of immigration control since medieval times and with the 
continued expansion of formal rules for immigration management since the early expulsion of 
‘alien’ Jews in 1290, the United Kingdom has gone on to develop a broad and complex scheme 
of immigration regulation. Domestic law, together with international human rights standards, 
now form a modern system controlling the movement of people in and out of Britain, which 
                                                           
Europe and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Report (Summer, 2016) 
<https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/911/irccrisisappealcompositerevaugust.pdf> accessed 19 April 2017. 
29 See Freedom of Information request  (n 25).  
30 See Freedom of Information request  (n 25). Iran, Eritrea, Iraq, Sudan and Syria, with 40% of those who applied being granted 
asylum.  
31 The number of applications went up to 34,687, the highest number of applications since 2004, indicating they are on the rise. In 
addition, 2,441 people were resettled in the United Kingdom having been referred to the Home Office by the UN Refugee Agency, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Number of UK applications in 2016 was 34,687, the highest number of 
applications since 2004, indicating they are on the rise. In addition, 2,441 people were resettled in the United Kingdom having been 
referred to the Home Office by the UN Refugee Agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
32 In Europe, the number of asylum applications went up to 1,392,000, more than double the number in the preceding year of 
684,000.For information on asylum application to the United Kingdom, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2016/asylum (accessed 10 February 2017).  
 24 
extends its reach to managing the flow of migrants, as well as refugees. Today, a range of 
legislation relating to immigration, together with accompanying rules, provides authority for 
the regulation of visitors wanting to enter and remain in the United Kingdom.33 
 
Of particular interest to this work are the 1988 Immigration Act and associated Rules, which 
contain the express prohibition on family reunion for women in polygamous marriages.34 
Although family reunification has been described by government actors previously as a 
“fundamental principle—not a privilege but a right …”, and one which it would not be proper 
to remove, particularly for refugees, it remains the case that additional polygamous wives are 
expressly prevented from enjoying this right. These restrictions are absolute; no distinction is 
made between polygamous wives who are migrating and those who seek refuge. Additional 
wives in polygamous marriages are always excluded, whatever their circumstances.  
 
Because of this restriction, polygamously married women from refugee families are left in a 
transnational ‘no [wo]man’s land’ without adequate protection and, on the whole, without 
consideration, largely because states are permitted, and strongly assert, a sovereign right to 
control migration with a high degree of autonomy. The rejection of this category of women is 
justified by reference to women’s rights, the harm polygamy might cause to society and the 
desire for the preservation of a dominant monogamous culture of marriage.35 This established 
                                                           
33 There is a wide range of legislation currently governing immigration in the United Kingdom, the most recent being the Immigration 
Act 2016. The general trend has been to introduce additional criteria so that those wishing to enter and remain in the United Kingdom 
face increasingly strict conditions when migrating, including limitations on their rights to claim state assistance, as well as to increase 
the state’s right to detain and deport anyone who does not meet that criteria. The 2016 Act also introduced responsibilities on those 
who interact with migrants to monitor their status, including landlords and employers. 
34 S 2 Immigration Act 1988 is still the Act which prohibits the right of abode in cases of polygamy. Any application from a polygamous 
wife must be considered in accordance with Immigration Rules Part 8 (Family Members), paragraphs 278 to 280, which contain 
provisions to restrict settlement to one wife. In the United Kingdom, similar restrictions apply regarding any ‘derivative status’ right 
which might be claimed by dependants of refugees. Such a ‘right’ (albeit not one which is universally recognised by all states) is set 
out in the UNHCR, ‘Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination Under UNHCR Mandate’ which  is governed in the United 
Kingdom by Immigration Rules, Part 11 paragraph 349 (Dependants) together with Part 8 (Family Members) and overseen in 
accordance with the Home Office  ‘Asylum Policy Instruction: Dependants and former dependants’ (May 2014), and Home Office, 
Polygamous and Potentially Polygamous Marriages, Immigration Directorates’ Instructions, Chapter 8 Section FM 1.4 Partners (July 
2012).  
35 Fairburn, Catherine, ‘Polygamy’ (Briefing Paper 05051, House of Commons Library) 6 January 2016, 6 “Immigration issues: It has 
been the policy of successive governments to prevent the formation of polygamous households in the UK. In short, a UK resident 
 25 
dogma in the context of polygamy and public policy is typically not questioned by law makers 
or human rights supporters. Despite the increasing emergence of disapproval for traditional 
responses to polygamy, rights-based objections to polygamous marriage and the lack of any 
express obligation on the state to allow polygamous family reunion are relied on to justify the 
abandonment of displaced, isolated women to their fate. However difficult the experiences of 
these refugee women, their exclusion is treated as entirely reasonable because they do not 
‘belong’ here. Their experiences are of little interest, their situation goes unnoticed, and states 
may legally reject any responsibility for them. 
 
While such arguments maintain a veneer of good reason as a result of their association with 
traditional liberal equality aims, this work disagrees fundamentally with them, echoing calls for 
an ‘epistemological change’ in thinking about forced migration and the management of 
refugees.36 It will show, despite the apparent reasonableness of the United Kingdom’s 
position, its treatment of displaced women from polygamous families has a disproportionately 
detrimental impact not only on women, but on certain groups of women, and is indefensible. 
To that end, this work will seek to offer a renewed perspective on the treatment of polygamy, 
one which aims to privilege the narrative of Muslim women, exiles and refugees. Not simply 
as passive, vulnerable subjects in need of protection, ‘tolerance’ and aid, however, but as 
individuals who possess agency, express resilience and whose own lived experience has 
meaning, even if it has historically been silenced by consignment to a legal and human rights 
vacuum, particularly in the refugee setting. In doing so, the problem with domestic 
immigration law will be explained in more detail and suggestions will be made for ways in 
which human rights and feminist thought might be better used to argue for change, to reflect 
the perspectives of those who are dispossessed and to reject the unhelpful ‘othering’ of human 
beings who are easily marginalised by circumstance. Here, the intention is to counter the 
ordinary discourse of law and rights by urging states and activists to recall the idea of a 
‘common humanity’, so that access to that humanity is meaningfully opened up to those who 
speak with a different voice.  
                                                           
cannot sponsor a non-EEA national for permission to enter or remain in the UK as their spouse if another person has already been 
granted such permission, and the marriage has not been dissolved.” 





1.5 The Relevance of Human Rights 
 
1.5.1 What’s Wrong with Rights? 
 
The success of the human rights idea is reflected in the modern manifestation of rights 
standards in conventions and declarations regulating state behaviour. While this work is 
anchored in a commitment to human rights, it is acknowledged that criticisms of rights have 
long existed, and not without some cause. The failure of human rights law consistently to 
provide protection to those most in need has prompted many critics to conclude that rights 
are flawed, perhaps fatally. In addition, questions over the universality of rights have 
encouraged the argument that they are, ironically, only privileges which are enjoyed most often 
by those with sufficient status to assert them. Overseen by states, and more likely to be enjoyed 
by those citizens of countries who have the means to enforce them, it seems relevant to ask 
whether rights have lost their way as a universal tool to esteem every one of us. Have they 
become false promises—a cruel joke played on the most vulnerable, in a bleakly unequal 
world? 
 
Among the range of concerns expressed about rights is their inability truly to be universal, or 
even to offer help to the most vulnerable and in need, including—ironically and perhaps most 
depressingly—those who are stateless and who are most in need of an overarching system of 
protection.37 Such criticisms, which go to the core worth of human rights, lead naturally to the 
conclusion that rights must overcome serious challenges if they are to have a secure and 
successful future.38 Other criticisms of rights include their proclivity to serve the interests and 
                                                           
37 This is a particular concern of Costas Douzinas, who, referencing the work of Hannah Arendt, has written much in academic 
publications and in the media about stateless minorities, or refugees, who have “…theoretical rights but have no real protections.” 
For examples, see Costas Douzinas, ‘Are Human Rights Universal?’ Guardian (11 March, 2009) and his text, The End of Human Rights 
(Hart, 2000).  
38 Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (CUP, 2006) 1, who articulates various crises of rights in his work outlining various 
suggestions for rights if they are to survive.  
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needs of men39 and powerful states,40 and simply to act as a caretaker servicing the needs of 
their historical progenitor, the colonial state.41  
 
Feminist scholars have also expressed particular concern about the true value of human rights 
to women. Among these concerns is that to focus on rights wastes time on a narrow discourse 
which oversimplifies the hidden power relations inherent in modern rights systems, and that 
this focus does not best serve women’s interests.42 Some critics have gone further, suggesting 
that the use of rights language risks promoting the oppression of women because particular 
rights, such as freedom of religion, may be used to justify discrimination.43 This critique views 
any reliance on rights as an implicit acknowledgment of the overriding power of the state, 
reinforcing the powerlessness of society’s female members.44 In a similar vein, some critics 
have argued that speaking in the language of rights simply serves the interests of the most 
privileged women in society, for most often it is they among women who create, define and 
use the language of rights to serve their own cause. 
 
 
1.5.2 The Utility of Rights Talk 
 
                                                           
39 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press, 
2000).  
40 Makau Mutua explains the basis for this concern in ‘What is TWAIL?’ (Paper) The American society of International Law Proceedings 
of the 94th Annual Meeting, April 5-8, 2000 Washington, DC. For another helpful introduction to TWAIL, see  James Thuo Gathii, 
‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography (2011) 3(1) Trade Law and Development 
26. Mutua also writes authoritatively on this topic in other articles, including ‘Savages, Victims and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human 
Rights (2001) 42(1) Harvard International Law Journal 201; ‘The Ideology of Human Rights’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 590.  
41 See Mutua (n 40). Also Anthony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International 
Law’ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1, James Thuo Gathii, ‘International Law and Eurocentricity’ (1998) 9 European 
Journal of International Law 184.  
42 Charlesworth, H and Chinkin, C (n 39) 209; Kingdom, E What's Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law (Edinburgh 
University Press, 1991). 
43 Charlesworth, H Chinkin, C and Wright, S, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International 
Law 613 examine this concern with using rights.  
44 Charlesworth and Chinkin(n 43).  
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While placing great value in the idea of rights, this work shares, to an extent, the despair with 
human rights guarantees. That despair is perhaps nowhere better represented than in the 
experiences of the women considered here; marginalised Muslim refugee women, whose 
freedoms are defined for them by others and who are barred from asserting their rights 
because they lack the necessary status, either as citizens or acceptable ‘women’ to do so. 
However, rather than abandoning rights as a result of that concern, this research aims to offer 
a solution to rights critics, however limited, to assist in resolving some of their disappointment 
with the efficacy of rights guarantees.  
 
This work relies in the first instance on the important work on the boundaries of international 
human rights law by Christine Chinkin and Hillary Charlesworth, which supports the notion 
of rights as a valuable tool, in spite of their faults, and outlines a collection of justifications for 
using rights as a framework for the improvement of women’s lives.45 Their list includes the 
importance of rights as a normative framework for improvement, however imperfect, and one 
which states are under some pressure to adhere to. Chinkin and Charlesworth go on to outline 
the efficacy and accountability associated with rights claims and their importance in providing 
an objective vocabulary for the most oppressed. This symbolic value of rights and their 
significance as a tangible source of hope has been referred to by other women, writing about 
the role of rights in critical race feminist activism. In support of rights, Patricia Williams is 
clear that those who are subjugated have something to gain from rights talk, which makes it 
possible to elevate the dispossessed to a social being, and to someone who has access to 
tangible protection; 
 
‘Rights’ feels so new in the mouths of most black people. It is still so deliciously 
empowering to say. It is a sign for and a gift of selfhood … It is the magic wand 
of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power …46 
 
While this work takes a different view regarding some of the benefits Chinkin and 
Charlesworth have outlined, it does adopt the overall optimism and hope expressed by 
                                                           
45 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 210. 
46 Patricia Williams, ‘Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights’ (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 401 at 431. 
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Chinkin, Charlesworth, Williams and others like them.47 Although imperfect, this work will 
argue that rights continue to have purpose in the context of oppression, including the 
oppression of women, and for this reason it is helpful to look to international human rights 
standards and to consider their utility in protecting women from discrimination and promoting 
law reform. Assisted by postcolonial, postmodern and other critical feminist approaches, this 
research will offer alternative ways to construct and interpret rights in the context of 
polygamous marriage and forced migration, in the hope of benefitting women who are 
currently let down by the rights project, and to promote the integrity and longevity of rights 
themselves, in the face of strong criticism regarding their failures. In that regard, the aim of 
this work is to show that rights can be what we make of them, to the advantage of women, 
and perhaps even for the long term betterment of rights themselves. 
 
Critics of this attempt at legal reconstruction might sensibly make the point that it is absurd 
to use the same legal and human rights structures this work is critical of to try and rectify the 
problems it identifies.48 However, this work will aim to challenge the idea that legal and human 
rights standards governing polygamy are objective, and make recommendations for alternative 
ways of framing and interpreting law and human rights so that unquestioned norms are not 
only questioned, but answers are also provided.  The purpose of doing so is clear: revealing a 
hidden bias which influences laws and human rights has the potential to prompt change so 
that women are not discriminated against and laws and rights are more accessible for those 
most in need. The alternative is that human rights guarantees and domestic legal rules remain 
a tool, not for citizens or individuals in need, but rather, to promote the interests of the ruling 
class and the state. In the event the elite and the state are left alone, rules are not likely to 
manifest in ways which reflect the concerns of those who rely on them. In the case of human 
rights, this outcome reflects a bitter and unacceptable irony—one that will be challenged in 
this work. 
                                                           
47 Chinkin and Charlesworth highlight the advantage of placing human rights at the forefront of any discussion on women’s 
experiences which automatically prioritises rights over other factors (such as economics, or security, for example) a privileged status 
which is often reflected in the inclusion of international human rights standards in domestic legal arenas. That privileging of rights is 
something this work seeks to question, in later chapters, in particular in the discussion on human rights in Chapter 4 and the discussion 
on feminist approaches in Chapter 5. 




1.6 The Significance of a Feminist Understanding 
 
1.6.1 Feminist Generations 
 
This work is an explicitly feminist project. In that regard, Martha Chamallas’ useful typology 
of feminist thought is adopted, categorising three waves of feminism in modern history.49 As 
Chamallas explains, each feminist generation responds to its own circumstances, with later 
forms of feminism often critical of their predecessors, so that each wave is located in the 
priorities which went before, and new priorities which come after.50  
 
The first generation Chamallas identifies is that of ‘equality feminism’, which is firmly rooted 
in liberal feminists’ aims of the 1960’s and 1970’s and their primary goal of calling for equality 
with men. The focus for these early feminist activists was on access to the system of rules and 
expanding those rules to include women.51 They were not generally critical of the rules 
themselves. Rather, liberal feminists relied on the state in wishing for women to have equal 
access to whatever the rules offered, seeking “audibility in the mainstream.”52  While the 
importance of their claims, for example to equal pay for equal work, cannot be dismissed in 
laying essential groundwork for later feminist agitation, the approach of liberal feminists is 
inherently limited in requiring women to fit into a male paradigm, and for failing to ask the 
rules to take account of ‘essential’ and immutable aspects of women’s difference. 
 
The gaps left by liberal feminist aims created space for the second generation, that of 
‘difference feminism’, to emerge. In this phase of feminist theory and action, feminists both 
built on the foundations of the liberal feminist movement and took account of its limitations, 
                                                           
49 Martha Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (3rd edn Wolters Kluwer, 2013). 
50 Chamallas (n 49) 17.  
51 One could take a longer view, of course. Awareness raising and campaigns for equality undoubtedly occurred in isolated pockets 
much earlier, and in other locations;  for example in NZ in the late 1800s where the first successful campaign for women’s universal 
suffrage was waged. Single issue movements like this signalled the beginning of objections to the different treatment of women and 
men even if they may have occurred a long while before a more broad, feminist legal theoretical vernacular emerged.  
52 Janet Halley and others Governance Feminism: An Introduction (forthcoming, March 2018). 
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becoming occupied with women’s difference, rather than asking for equal rights on the same 
basis as men. General equality aims were replaced by concern for substantive equality, which 
recognised the experiences of men and women were often not the same, and required the law 
to reflect that. Difference feminists sought to highlight that apparently neutral laws were not 
at all gender blind and in fact, they represented an implicit male norm which disadvantaged 
women, making it necessary for them to assimilate to be ‘equal’ and not allowing for their 
distinct difference. In direct contrast to earlier liberal feminists, this wave of feminist activists 
sought formal, legal recognition of the ways in which men and women's lives were different. 
Although the focus for this post-liberal generation was on difference, difference feminists 
expressed their goals in a variety of ways. Dominance and cultural feminists, for example, each 
challenged the requirement that women submit to male legal norms in the law using different 
approaches. While dominance feminists argued that any apparent legal objectivity simply 
reflected the view of the dominant group (in their view, men) using the laws on rape as a 
central theme to illustrate their argument, cultural feminists focused their concern more on 
women’s lived experience.53 They argued that legal norms did not reflect women’s voice or 
their unique, gendered, experience and suggested that the law lacked consideration of women’s 
concerns, for example, as mothers and members of their communities.54  
 
While this second wave of feminist thought was occupied with the difference between men 
and women, it was not really until the third generation of feminism identified by Chamallas 
that the differences between women themselves were acknowledged and considered directly 
relevant to the feminist discussion. The emergence of the third generation of feminism, that 
of ‘unique identities’, is described by Chamallas as being concerned with the varied experiences 
of women and the impact of different identity on women’s lives. Here, the emphasis is on 
recognising women as a diverse group rather than penalising women who do not conform to 
a dominant, or mainstream, women’s norm. Arising out of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement in the 1980s,  ‘identity feminists’ are demonstrably disapproving of the rhetoric of 
                                                           
53 Catharine MacKinnon being the most prominent among radical feminists of this leaning, together with her colleague, Andrea 
Dworkin. MacKinnon’s article ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Towards Feminist Jurisprudence (1983) 8(4) Signs: Journal 
of Women in Culture and Society 635, was seminal in this regard. See also Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 42 and Chamallas (n 49) 
22, 56 on dominance feminism. 
54 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 40, Chamallas (n 49) 22, 65 on cultural feminism. 
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earlier feminist waves for ignoring the influence of a wider cultural conflict. In focusing on 
the differences between women, the priority for this strand of feminist thinkers is to avoid the 
danger of gender essentialism, or peddling the idea that all women are the same. They also 
object to any ‘sameness’ being defined by the most dominant and powerful groups of women 
in society. Identity feminists reject the idea that all women experience oppression in the same 
way, or that all women speak with one voice in relation to men. Rather, this third generation 
of feminist thinkers allows for the consideration of a range of differences in privileging 
women’s experiences, including women’s race, class, sexuality, ethnicity and religion, as well 
as their immigration status. Accordingly, the rhetoric of identity feminists incorporates 
powerful critiques by black, gay and other minority women, who claim their predecessors’ 
theories often have little relevance for them because they are dominated by women who are 
distinctly white, straight and middle class.  
 
This third generation of feminist theory is populated in part by postmodern feminist thought. 
Although difficult to contain in one succinct description, postmodern feminism takes its lead 
from the wider, postmodern intellectual trend, in that it is broadly critical of the preceding, 
dominant feminist ideology and is characterised by an association with relativism. In this way, 
postmodern feminism is anxious to reveal the importance of oppression on the basis of a 
range of factors associated with a woman’s gender, and to examine how gender discrimination 
works in more subtle ways. Martha Minow’s ‘difference dilemma’ theory provides a useful lens 
through which to understand the way in which postmodern feminist thought might be applied 
in practice.55 Minow’s theory suggests that neutral strategies (like liberal equality policies, which 
ignore difference) and strategies which are designed to help women (echoing cultural or radical 
feminist aims, explicitly acknowledging difference) can result in unwanted consequences if the 
varied nature of women’s experience is not taken into account. In outlining the difference 
dilemma experienced by women, Minow confirms the purpose of postmodern feminist 
thought is the importance of acknowledging multiple truths, which themselves arise out of 
multiple perspectives, rather than simply searching for one, apparently objective, truth or 
reality. Minow suggests that when the difference dilemma presents itself in this way, it is 
                                                           
55 Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Cornell University Press, 1990), Chamallas  (n 49) 
cites Minow in her discussion on the rise of postmodern feminism and the assault on the idea of a ‘universal truth’. 
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helpful to look beyond our own experiences and the views which we hold as a result of the 
experiences which are personal to us, and to acknowledge that our views are partial, and not 
necessarily objectively correct or fair. The solution to the challenges arising out of the 
difference dilemma, according to Minow, is to replace the self as the reference point for 
judging the needs or actions of others, and to treat the other not as one would like to be 
treated, but instead, how they want to be treated by listening to their request and deciding 
whether that request is fair, considering the context of their situation.  
 
This work adopts a broadly postmodern feminist path of enquiry in criticising traditional 
feminist arguments for ignoring women’s partial experience of polygamy, and advocates that 
one grand feminist theory be abandoned in favour of embracing a new, more relative formula 
which focuses on the varied lives of women.56 The feminist line of argument in this research 
builds on the innovation of Chinkin and Charlesworth in the international legal context. Here, 
the suggestion by Chinkin and Charlesworth to consider the “illusory necessity” of rules which 
rest on gendered foundations is taken up and adapted to expose the problem of domestic and 
international dialogues on polygamy which operate at the expense of less powerful women.57 
In that regard, this work privileges the difference between women, rather than simply focusing 
on the difference between women and men, to assess the importance of women’s diversity in 
the context of laws and rights.58 
 
 
1.6.2 The Utility of Postmodern Feminism 
 
                                                           
56 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 44 quote Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of the Law (Routledge London, 1989) on the benefit 
of a more relative postmodern feminist theory, that it is better to give up the goal of telling one true story and to embrace the partiality 
of feminist enquiry. 
57 57 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 21.  
58 For an alternative perspective on difference see Martha Fineman, ‘Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of 
Feminism Legal Scholarship’ (1990) 42 Florida Law Review 25, 39 where she presents acknowledging difference as creating disun ity 
which “impedes the aggregation of power necessary for women of all groups to push back the barriers excluding most of us and our 
experiences, suggesting it is better to find common ground.” Fineman discredits the idea of one version of a “gendered existence”, 
while also  deriding the “obsession with differences among women”, a position which appears curiously at odds with itself. 
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The framework this postmodern perspective uses is the method of ‘rooting and shifting’.59 
This term describes being rooted in one’s own experience, while also being able to shift to 
understand the terrain in which others are grounded themselves. Following this method, not 
all misgivings about polygamy are automatically forgotten or abandoned. Rather, it is simply 
that one’s own roots and values remain the starting point, while the experiences of other 
women are not assumed or homogenised according to one’s own norm. The benefit in re-
examining legal standards in this way is explained by Diane Otto, an academic widely respected 
in the field of human rights and gender: 
 
Women’s citizenship within the global community is both limited to, and 
conditional upon, their position within the prescribed normative framework. This 
is contingent upon ‘citizenship’ at the price of women’s diversity and of fundamental 
global change.60 
 
Otto’s concern with the limitations of global norms and rules resonates particularly strongly 
in the context of the women considered here, who do not usually exert great power, are often 
non-citizens in the jurisdictions where they are judged, have limited access to rights, and whose 
particular experiences are not generally reflected in human rights standards. Just as Minow 
used her difference dilemma theory to highlight the way that those in power present difference 
as an unwelcome deviation from the status quo, the intention of this work is to illustrate how 
a broadly postmodern feminist approach is helpful as a way of developing a more thoughtful 
and innovative response to women’s different experiences in the context of marriage, forced 
migration and human rights. In that regard, this work will shift from conventional approaches 
to polygamy to allow a conception of that difference as a typical occurrence, rather than 
something which is automatically deviant and unwanted.  
 
To that end, this work brings together scholarship on polygamy from a range of disciplines to 
suggest that, far from acting in the best interests of women by banning polygamous marriage, 
laws and human rights standards fail certain categories of women. In the case of refugees, that 
                                                           
59 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 54. 
60 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 54, quoting Diane Otto, ‘Holding up half the sky, but for whose benefit? A critical analysis of the 
Fourth World Conference on Women’ 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal (1996). 
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failure is catastrophic.  In building on the work of earlier feminist scholars, this work aims to 
recognise the complexity of women’s experiences of polygamy, and to ask that governing laws 
and rights better reflect women’s unique identities, most especially those of the deviant ‘other’ 
women, whose voices are not so often heard when laws and human rights are promulgated. 
In doing so this work seeks to build on earlier, more traditional feminist projects by pointing 
out that what is silenced and what is not valued is very often not only that which is feminine, 
but more particularly, is that which is not favoured by the feminist ruling class, or those women 
who have long held the balance of power in governing institutions.  
 
 
1.6.3 The Challenge of Relying on Postmodern Feminism  
 
Because the thrust of postmodern feminism is to question the idea of a universal truth and to 
develop a new way of seeing difference, some commentators have suggested it is not ordinarily 
the most obvious tool to employ when lobbying for practical change or legal reform.61 A 
theory that might be described as nebulous in its application arguably has no place in the 
context of suggesting amendments to hard and fast rules which govern many people at one 
time. With its focus on local narratives and the prioritisation of multiple viewpoints and 
contextualised judgment, relating postmodern feminist thought to tangible legal solutions 
combating women’s global inequality may not seem plausible.  
 
As argued in this work, however, postmodern feminist theory is capable of practical 
application, and in a range of contexts too, including the legal treatment of polygamy.62 The 
debate on Muslim head coverings, which has so prominently taken place in a range of states 
across Western Europe and beyond in recent years, provides a useful illustration of this 
possibility. In this example, formal objections to the veil and the headscarf have forced Muslim 
women to negotiate their complex, personal identity as Muslims and as individuals who wish 
                                                           
61 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 39) 45 refer to the suggestion that postmodern feminism isn’t ordinarily concerned with the uncertain 
path of law reform, rather action at a micro level, and to the suggestion that it is better to be a feminist journalist using this method 
or inquiry and revelation, than a feminist lawyer. See also Martha Fineman (n 58).  
62 There are many feminist theories which might be called ‘postmodern’ and it is neither within the scope or the intention of th is work 
to canvass them all, regardless of whether they are relevant to the issue which is the focus for this research.  
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to be free to express all aspects of themselves in the public sphere, something which has been 
difficult for Western states to accommodate.63  Using a postmodern feminist approach, the 
apparently objective truth about these forms of religious dress as symbols of oppression and 
something which is imposed on women and universally detrimental can be refuted. By moving 
on from the traditional religious freedom objections to veil and headscarf bans and taking an 
identity feminist route through this debate, the voices of minority Muslim women in the West 
are able to be privileged to rebut calls for unconditional prohibition. As a result, complex 
personal identities can be woven into the discourse of the mainstream, where they have the 
potential to reveal an experiential bias in the dominant view, adding credibility and legitimacy 
to the views of women who choose not to subscribe wholesale to the views of the majority.  
 
This work will use postmodern feminist approaches in the context of polygamy to assist in 
navigating a similar path through various perspectives and experiences of plural marriage. It 
will acknowledge women’s different experiences of polygamy, and offer recommendations for 
domestic legal change. It will also make suggestions regarding the re-interpretation of 
international human rights standards, so that those whose practices do not reflect the ‘norm’ 
are represented. It will seek to convince the reader of the importance of identifying and 
understanding the concealed discrimination in unconditional objections to polygamy, 
unmasking the claim of objectivity which is so often associated with the universal ban on 
                                                           
63 ‘Veil’ is used in this work to refer to the niqab, or face covering, which may also be worn with a burqa. The word ‘headscarf’ refers 
to the hijab. Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App no 44774/98) ECHR 10 November 2005, Dogru v France (App no 27058/05) ECHR 4 December 
2008, Dahlab v Switzerland (App no 42393/98) ECHR 15 February 2001 and Kurtulmus v Turkey (App no 65500/01) ECHR 24 January 
2006 are leading cases involving students and teachers and the right to manifest one’s religion by wearing a headscarf in schools and 
universities, illustrating the consideration of the headscarf according to European rights standards and the application of a margin of 
appreciation for the state’s concerns in banning the headscarf in each case. Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey (App no 41135/98) 
ECHR 2010 and SAS v France (App no 43835/11) ECHR 1 July 2014 involve complaints against restrictions on wearing religious symbols 
in public spaces more generally. While in Ahmet Arslan, a case involving head covering, a tunic and stick, the court found a violation 
of Article 9 (freedom to manifest religion), in SAS the ECtHR found no violation of Article 8 (right to a private and family life) or Article 
9. This case involved a Muslim woman complaining against restrictions on her being allowed to wear a full face veil in public. The Court 
referred to the state’s wide margin of appreciation in such matters. Such cases are modern manifestation of the debate on head 
covering, going on for more than 20 years across Europe. Early objections to  state restrictions were ordinarily based on claims to 
religious freedom. However, the discourse on Muslim head covering has evolved increasingly to reflect arguments about one’s private 
life, free expression and claims against religious and gender discrimination, in some cases the latter reflecting identity feminist 
arguments which this work will consider. See also R (On the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School [2006] WLR 719 for this discussion in the English context. where an arguably more tolerant approach is taken.  
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polygamy as subjective (however well intentioned) and providing a conceptual framework for 
the re-consideration of polygamy, to avoid unintended, harmful consequences. 
 
The postmodern feminist analysis of polygamy put forward by this work may still be 
problematic for those, however, who, like prohibitive states and human rights organisations, 
adopt a strict liberal equality approach to polygamy and consider non-monogamous marriage 
so inherently unequal it must be antithetical to feminist aims with no possibility for 
redemption.64 It is recognised that the suggestions made by this work will certainly not 
immediately appeal to all feminists. Those who believe unequivocally in the harm of polygamy 
as inherently detrimental, regardless of the circumstances, will likely also continue to feel an 
overriding urge to call for its prohibition. This work will argue vigorously, however, that the 
polygamy paradox highlighted here—in the apparent desire to protect vulnerable women from 
abuse, and the perverse effect of that protection in making women more, not less, 
vulnerable—has value for women, for feminist discourse and more broadly, too. As this work 
will show, the voices of less powerful women are very often barely audible in mainstream 
feminist or human rights conversations. Abandoned polygamous wives are often not the focus 
for feminist activists or those working in women’s rights in civil society, or anyone else who 
may influence the content of laws and rights which reject polygamy. In this regard, the 
emerging ‘governance feminism’ critique, outlined by Janet Halley and her eminent colleagues, 
will be used to illustrate the problem of feminists who hold that balance of power, whether it 
is in legal or human rights institutions.65 As Halley and others have argued, the impact of 
governance feminism is that less powerful women may be marginalised so that their story is 
                                                           
64 Such views have been expressed by various treaty bodies, with responsibility for overseeing human rights standards, including by 
the Committee overseeing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, see General 
Recommendation 21, in particular, discussed in more detail at n 152) and the Human Rights Committee (General Recommendation 
28, discussed in detail at n 153) and referred to in government Briefing Papers on the treatment of polygamy in the United Kingdom 
(Catherine Fairburn, ‘Polygamy’ (Briefing Paper 05051, House of Commons Library) 6 January 2016 which notes the government does 
not support plural marriage. 
65 The term ‘governance feminism’ was introduced by Janet Halley in her book, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from 
Feminism (PUP, 2006). Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran and others have developed the governance feminism critique in ‘From the 
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in 
Contemporary Governance Feminism’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 335, which questions the role of traditional 
feminists in setting standards and making laws, their widespread institutionalisation, their firm grip on normative power and their 
failure to acknowledge it. Such views are also considered in detail in, Janet Halley and others (n 52). 
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not told. In that connection, this research will investigate what it means for some of these 
women to be ignored when laws and human rights standards are defined, and whether there 
is a way to portray a feminist argument which supports a more inclusive approach.  
 
So, while postmodern feminist thinking may be considered by some as too complex and 
eclectic to have practical significance, and polygamy too inherently unequal and odious ever 
to be sanctioned, this work will show how identity feminist thinking and a governance feminist 
analysis of polygamy and its regulation can be put to great use in the long standing feminist 
tradition of placing women’s experiences at the centre of any analysis, to expose and evaluate 
a hidden bias operating in both laws and human rights.  
 
 
1.7 Outside the Scope of this Work 
 
While the scope of this research is broad, there are associated topics that are not investigated 
in detail, either because they are simply not questioned or because they are outside of the range 
of this investigation. The most important of those are noted below.  
 
The merits of different approaches to domestic polygamy, either in the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere, are not considered here in detail. Plural marriage is a controversial issue and the 
increasing numbers of Muslim migrants and refugees in the United Kingdom have made 
polygamy much more visible, causing concern over its practice and regulation. It is not within 
the scope of this work, however, to consider every aspect of the practice of polygamy or its 
regulation and, in seeking to unmask the gendered nature of domestic law and international 
human rights, this research does not include a thorough examination of polygamy in the 
domestic sphere. While the historic and global incidence of polygamy is examined in some 
detail to provide context, with the exception of a brief summary on the domestic practice of 
polygamy in the United Kingdom as well as an introduction in the following chapter to the 
distinction between polygamy and other types of multi-party relationships, the focus is very 
much on the treatment of valid, foreign polygamous marriages in immigration. The marriages 
focused on here are those where one husband with refugee status has multiple wives and where 
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no more than one of those spouses may enter and remain in the United Kingdom under family 
reunification rules.  
 
Despite that, it is acknowledged that the call for recognition of valid polygamous marriages in 
the immigration sphere bears some relation to the issue of whether or not domestic 
polygamous marriages ought to be recognised, and the implications of doing so in the 
domestic sphere. While the consequences of allowing domestic polygamy will not be discussed 
in detail, it is noted that the benefits and detriments of recognising and regulating, as opposed 
to banning, polygamy are increasingly being considered.66 While the relationship between the 
conclusions drawn here and the law against bigamy will be discussed and research which 
discusses the recognition and regulation of domestic polygamy will be referred to and relied 
on throughout this work, this research is confined largely to considering the impact of 
immigration restrictions on women in polygamous refugee families who are left to fend for 
themselves, and whether that prohibition on polygamy can be justified when a feminist lens is 
applied.  
 
In addition, this research does not question the role of the state in legitimising marriage, 
accepting that it is appropriate for the legislature to distinguish a commitment to marriage 
from an individual’s interest in a less formal relationship. Neither the removal of the institution 
of marriage nor the removal of the state as the ultimate arbiter in determining the legitimacy 
of civil marriage, as has been suggested by other commentators, is debated here.67 Instead, the 
                                                           
66 Adrienne Davis, ‘Regulating Polygamy’ (n 9) suggests the use of corporate partnership rules as a framework for managing multiple 
party marriages; Maura Strassberg, ‘The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory’ (n 7) 439 and ‘The Crime of 
Polygamy’ (2003) 12 Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 353 where she considers the necessity of managing  domestic plural 
relationships with the rise of polyamory and the necessity of continuing with criminal prohibitions on domestic polygamy; Mic hele 
Alexandre, ‘Lessons from Islamic Polygamy:  A Case for Expanding the American Concept of Surviving Spouse So As to Include De Facto 
Polygamous Spouses’ (2007) 64 Wash & Lee L Rev 1461, where the possibility of accepting polygamy for a distinct purpose is 
considered; Martha Bailey and Amy Kaufman consider the possibility of domestic polygamy in  ‘Should Civil Marr iage Be Opened Up 
To Multiple Parties?’ (n 8) 1747 as well as more broadly in their book Polygamy in the Monogamous World: Multicultural Challenges 
for Western Law and Policy (Praeger, Santa Barbara 2010); Casey Faucon, ‘Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America’ (2014) 
22 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 1, setting out a process for regulating religious polygamy which reflects the day to day reality 
of its practice in the USA.  
67 For example, Martha Fineman discusses the idea that the state should no longer offer ‘marriage’ to citizens, but rather, such 
relationships that might otherwise be called marriage should be regulated by private contracts between the parties in Martha 
Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge, 1995) 4-5. The role of the state 
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limited focus for this work is whether or not the state has erred in its approach to plural 
marriage in the context of family reunification, and what that means for women and the 
legitimacy of laws and rights. This research does not seek to comment in detail on whether 
the state’s role, or its definition of marriage and the rights and obligations that flow from it, 
are more broadly appropriate. In addition, neither does this work question the right of the 
state more generally to restrict entry for non-citizens. While it is accepted that the denial of 
movement across frontiers may give rise to human rights abuse in particular circumstances, 
this work does not share more general views against border management and immigration 
control per se, and while such challenges are noted, they are excluded from the scope of this 
work.68 
 
Finally, the focus for this work is on Islamic polygamy, largely to the exclusion of other types 
of plural marriage. This is because it is Islamic polygamy that is most likely to be practised by 
families who seek refuge in the United Kingdom today, and as a result, it is additional wives 
from Muslim marriages who are most likely to suffer hardship because of limits on family 
reunification.  Accordingly, while some discussion of other types of polygamous marriage is 
included for comparative purposes and empirical research conducted in other religious 
communities is relied on where it is relevant, this work is concerned primarily with the 
treatment of polygamy which is practised by Muslims according to the tenets of the Qur’an.  
 
 
1.8 The Structure of this Work 
 
                                                           
in marriage is also discussed in the Islamic context by John Witte in Rex Adhar and Nicholas Aroney (eds) Shari’a in the West (OUP, 
2010) 284-286, where the author refers to the arguments for polygamy based on religious freedom, their link to political liberalism 
and the idea of marriage as a pre-political institution. He considers why the state, in the context of the broader social contract, should 
get exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and concludes “[T]here is evidently nothing ineluctable in liberalism’s contractarian logic that 
requires marital couples to choose the state rather than their own families or their own religious communities to govern their domestic 
lives-particularly when the state’s liberal rules diverge so widely from their own beliefs and practices.” While Witte and Fineman’s 
suggestions are undoubtedly interesting, particularly from the point of view of examining the higher incidence of domestic polygamy 
in the United Kingdom, they are not considered in detail here as the focus is on valid foreign polygamous marriages.  
68 For an exposition on such views, see Teresa Hayter Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls (Pluto Press, London 
2002) and Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (Routledge, Abingdon, 2001).  
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This chapter has introduced this this work. Hereafter, Chapter 2 will provide an overview of 
the origins and evolution of polygamy before focusing more closely on the issue of harm, and 
its role in informing policies and laws regarding polygamous marriage. Chapter 2 aims to 
unpack traditional perspectives on polygamy in preparation for their reconsideration 
throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 will examine the treatment of polygamy in the United 
Kingdom, specifically in immigration, exposing inconsistencies in the state’s approach and 
illustrating that the formal response to polygamy in the United Kingdom never has been, and 
continues not to be, uniform. Chapter 4 will review the approach to polygamy in international 
human rights standards. Although rights allow the decisions of states to be reviewed according 
to supra-national rules, the failure of international human rights to offer assistance to 
additional, excluded wives is highlighted, and the normative basis for that exclusion is 
questioned. The paradox of polygamy is most clearly illustrated in this analysis of rights, 
creating a platform for the refreshed, feminist assessment of polygamy which follows. Chapter 
5, the final substantive chapter, applies that feminist analysis, addressing directly the suggestion 
that laws and rights have not considered certain categories of women. Following the 
interrogation in earlier chapters of the relationship between polygamy and harm, 
inconsistencies in the domestic treatment of polygamy and the failure of rights to protect 
additional, polygamous wives, this chapter will offer a feminist re-evaluation of the treatment 
of polygamy. In addition, this chapter re-casts the role of law and rights, offering suggestions 
for their reconstruction and postmodern feminist emancipation, by offering tangible law 






Chapter 2  
The Opposition: Polygamy and Harm 
 
 
2.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
 
This chapter explores the common link between polygamy and harm, examining the practice 
of polygamy as well as traditional objections to it. It sets a foundation for later chapters on 
human rights and feminist thought which will unpack and reconsider the assumptions about 
harm and how it is best managed for women and society. The first part begins with an 
explanation of what polygamous marriage is and how it has evolved. Polygamy and faith are 
then discussed, with particular emphasis on Islam because it is Muslim polygamy in 
immigration that provides the prompt for this research. The second part reviews traditional 
normative approaches to the relationship between plural marriage and harm. The Western 
case against polygamy is outlined and the suggestion that polygamy cannot be reconciled with 
the values of the liberal state is explored. In this discussion, the different types of injury 
thought to be caused by polygamy are considered in four ways. That is, the harm of polygamy 
to society, the harm to women, and the harm of polygamy as understood through the lenses 
of human rights and feminist thought. Here, the human rights orthodoxy with regard to 
polygamy and its close ties with harm are examined, providing the basis for a comprehensive 
re-evaluation of the relationship between polygamy and human rights in a later chapter. 
Conventional feminist approaches to polygamy and harm are also explained, laying a 
foundation for a detailed examination of their efficacy as a method of protecting women, later 
in this work. This discussion on the privileging of harm and its impact in establishing policy 
and legal responses to polygamy sets the scene for a brief examination of the global regulation 
of polygamy in the final part of this chapter, before suggestions are proposed for rethinking 







2.2 The Origins and Evolution of Polygamy  
 
2.2.1 ‘Polygamy’ Defined  
 
Marriage is a pervasive and socially significant institution with great potential to have a life-
altering impact.69 The validity of marriage is important, not least in part, because a wide range 
of legal rights and duties are determined by marital status, including legal claims to inheritance, 
property, social security and rights in immigration. Because so many rights and obligations 
flow from marriage, ceremonies are regulated so that consent is given freely by those who 
have capacity to do so. A lot about marriage regulation has recently changed, most notably, 
with regard to same-sex relationships, which are now formally recognised in many jurisdictions 
across the globe. In the United Kingdom, the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 legalises 
same sex marriage in England and Wales, so that gay couples are now able to marry, as well as 
enter into civil partnerships, illustrating an evolving quality to marriage and family more 
generally.70 Attitudes towards family relationships have undoubtedly experienced significant 
change, having expanded beyond the strictly limited idea of heterosexual marriage between 
                                                           
69 Adrienne Davis (n 9) 1963, describes marriage as a “… dominant and normative institution with life-altering formal and informal 
benefits”. See also the report from Bailey and others, ‘Expanding Recognition of Foreign Marriages: Policy Implications for Canada’ in 
Angela Campbell and others ‘Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications for Women and Children: A collection of Policy 
Research Reports. Final Report, Status of Women Canada (November, 2005) at 27 where they suggest the fact that (in Canada, and 
similar jurisdictions like Australia and New Zealand) legal rights are very often extended to couples in de facto marriages and the legal 
significance of marriage has declined. However, such rights are not extended to non-married, de facto couples in the United Kingdom. 
See also Cheshire Calhoun ‘Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage Calhoun, Cheshire, ‘Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage’ (2005) 
42 San Diego Law Review 1025, where she lists many practical benefits of marriage including immigration, social security, and other 
rights. 
70 The Civil Partnership Act 2004 first introduced the idea of more formal partnerships for gay couples in the United Kingdom, giving 
same sex partners the same legal rights as married couples where they enter into a civil partnership. Nearly ten years later, the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 came into force from 29 March 2014. The Act preserves the Canon Law of the Church of England 
which provides that marriage can be only between a man and a woman, meaning the Church and any individuals working within the 
Church are not obliged to perform same sex marriage ceremonies and any refusal to do so will not be considered unlawful 
discrimination under equality provisions which might otherwise apply. For more information on same sex marriage and how it has 
evolved, objections, acceptance see Stephen Cretney Same Sex Relationships from Odious Crime to Gay Marriage (OUP 2006) and 
Mark Harper Same Sex Marriage and Civil Partnerships (Family Law 2014).  
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two people who share biological children, going some way at least to make the case for English 
legal adaptability regarding the concept of marriage, where it is required to meet society’s 
changing needs.71 Where a more inclusive, pluralistic and functional approach to the definition 
of family is needed, it seems states will recognise additional, important family relationships.72  
 
Unlike monogamous marriage, which binds two people to the exclusion of all others, 
polygamous marriage involves the formalisation of plural relationships with either men or 
women taking more than one spouse of the opposite sex. Plural marriage is known variously 
as ‘polygyny’ and ‘polyandry’. ‘Polygyny’ refers specifically to a man taking more than one 
female spouse, whereas ‘polyandry’ describes a woman taking more than one male spouse. 
Polyandry is comparatively uncommon and polygamy usually takes the form of polygyny. The 
term ‘polygamy’ is used in this research to refer to plural marriage by men with other women 
(i.e. polygynous marriages) as it is the term most commonly used and it is this form of marriage 
in the Islamic context that this work focuses on. All of these relationships are also 
distinguishable from ‘polyamory’ which is a formal commitment to an emotionally intimate, 
sexual relationship between three or more people, who may or may not be of the same sex 
and which does not involve marriage, and ‘pantagamy’ which describes a community where 
every woman is married to every man and vice versa with sexual access to one another, also 
called ‘polygynandry’.73 
 
In the United Kingdom plural marriage may also be considered ‘bigamy’. However, bigamy 
and polygamy are distinguished here, in part because bigamy is recognised as a specific criminal 
offence in the United Kingdom.74 Although both polygamy and bigamy involve plural 
                                                           
71 Nicholas Bala and Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich, ‘Context and Inclusivity in Canada’s Evolving Definition of the Family’, [2002] 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 145, gives an overview of the evolving concept of the family, confirming marriage 
and family have never been static concepts, although the authors argue that strong reasons continue to exist for not extending legal 
sanction to polygamous families, in reasoning similar to that presented in the Bountiful decision. 
72 Bala and Jaremko Bromwich (n 71). 
73 Zeitzen Polygamy: A Cross Cultural Analysis (Berg 2008) 12. Pantagamy is very rare. Examples include the Oneida Community 
founded by Congregationalist minister John Humphreys Noyes in 1848, which functioned as a large group marriage until around 1880. 
A later example is the Kerista Commune in San Francisco where group marriage was practised from 1971 – 1991. This form of marriage 
is not officially recognised anywhere and according to Zeitzen, the inherent, day to day strains involved in maintaining such a complex 
and yet intimate relationship make it uncommon.  
74 S 10 Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 
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marriage, religious polygamous marriages are either celebrated outside the United Kingdom in 
jurisdictions where they are recognised as legally valid, or entered into in the United Kingdom 
only as unregistered religious marriages. Despite involving multiple partners, these types of 
marriages do not offend domestic provisions criminalising bigamy in the United Kingdom 
because they do not involve any attempt to enter into an additional, illegal civil marriage. In 
addition, whereas bigamy ordinarily involves clear criminality and often deception by one party 
over another, religious polygamous marriages are more often openly recognised in some way, 
either by an external state or a religious authority, or both. Finally, while cohabiting with 
multiple spouses is illegal in some Western states, the Attorney General in the United 




2.2.2 The Evolution of Polygamy 
 
Early polygamous marriages are thought to have related directly to the sexual division of 
labour and the economic value of women as producers for a household.76  It is also thought 
that polygamy may have arisen in part as a function of politics, acting as a way of cementing 
alliances through plural marriage.77 Whatever the origins, it has been practised across many 
faiths and cultures over a long period of time and it continues in different traditions, for 
economic political, social, biological, and religious reasons.78 Polygamous marriage has, 
                                                           
75 States where cohabitation, or entering into a marriage-like relationship with more than one person simultaneously, is illegal include 
Canada and the United States of America, where criminal statutes have been tested. In Canada in the Reference case (n 5 above) s 
293(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada RSC 1985 c C-46, was tested against the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with the 
Court concluding that the criminal prohibition on co-habitation did not breach domestic human rights standards. In the USA, in Brown 
v Buhman (Utah District Court, Central Division) (n 9) the Court struck down the State of Utah’s criminal prohibition on cohabitation 
in the Utah Criminal Code Ann § 76-7-101(1) (2013). However, on appeal, in effect because the criminal prosecution against the Browns 
was dropped by the state, the Court deemed the Browns no longer had standing to bring their case against the State and the criminal 
prohibition (Brown v Buhman (10th Cir. 2016)(n 9). More recently and more close to home, religious marriage and cohabitation have 
been outlawed in Germany, see <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-clamp-down-on-religious-polygamy/a-19329733> last 
accessed 25 June 2016. 
76 Zeitzen (n 73) 47 
77 Zeitzen (n 73) 47  
78 Zeitzen (n 73) 50 discusses the reasons for the historical practice of polygamy. For additional considerations see Bailey and others 
(n 69) including more detailed discussions from anthropological and social science perspectives such as ‘male compromise’ and ‘female 
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however, historically been in decline.79 The rise of monogamy over polygamy was likely 
because of practical factors in the first instance, including resource constraints and the limited 
ability for men to support many wives.80 The earliest evidence of what has been referred to as 
‘socially imposed universal monogamy’—that is, monogamy that is not imposed for practical 
reasons, but moral disapproval—is evident in ancient Greek and Roman societies.81 It is 
among these communities that social rather than functional reasons for prohibiting polygamy 
can first be observed, resulting in conscious limitations. Part of the motivation for this early 
regulation of plural marriage is thought to have been a concern for equality, even if that was 
generally concern for equality among men and their access to wives, rather than between men 
and women.82 
                                                           
choice’ theories, as well as political, socio-biological and ecological reasons, for polygamous marriage. Bailey also discusses the 
prominence of polygamy and suggests it is more likely in societies where divorce is difficult (citing Marasinghe 1995: 72-73) and in the 
modern context, a multiplicity of reasons for choosing polygamy is likely (citing Bretschneider (1995). See also, the useful commentary 
in Shayna M Sigman ‘Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong’ (2006) 16 Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 101 from 
144 where she discusses theories for polygamy ranging from demographics and evolutionary biology to economics, politics and 
religion, delving into whether it is driven by grass roots desire or whether it is ordinarily imposed from the top down and t he role 
played by gender. See also the Reference case (n 5) and the evidence of Dr. Walter Scheidel, Chair of the Classics Department at 
Stanford University which is expanded on in Walter Scheidel, ‘Monogamy and Polygyny in Greece, Rome and World History’, Working 
Paper, Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics, Version 1.0 June 2008. John Witte’s account of why polygamy ought to be  
banned, The Western Case for Monogamy over Polygamy (CUP, Cambridge 2015) provides a comprehensive historical account of 
polygamous marriage.  
79 Bailey and others (n 69) 2 where they confirm that polygamy was permitted in most parts of the world at one time but that 
monogamy is now most common in eastern and western Europe, North America, South America, Central America, Australia, New 
Zealand and large parts of Asia including Japan and China. 
80 Zeitzen (n 73) 14, where she confirms the optimum evolutionary strategy for humans is thought to be monogamy when necessary 
and polygamy when possible. This provides for variation.  
81 In his evidence for the Reference case Dr. Walter Scheidel addresses the origins, development and consequences of socially imposed 
monogamy. See also his report on polygyny in world history (n 78).  
82 Walter Scheidel on polygyny in world history (n 78) “… [socially imposed universal monogamy] coupled with chattel slavery served 
to maintain strict (serial) monogamy – ensuring access to legitimate wives for low-resource men and preserving an appearance of 
sexual equality that chimed with concurrent ideals of judicial and sometimes political equality …”  Because ancient Romans and Greeks 
considered polygamy a backward custom, individuals were prevented from contracting plural marriages irrespective of their status 
and power. Witte, John Jr, ‘Why Two in One Flesh? The Western Case for Monogamy over Polygamy’ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 
1675, at 1696 he suggests that well before the advent of Christianity, the ‘ancient law’ of Rome required monogamous marriages and 
treated polygamy as ‘nefarious’ and charts the civil law progress of laws banning polygamy for being unnatural, abominable, 
treacherous. These early objections appear in the modern civil law systems, such as 1794 Prussian Civil Code and the 1810 Napoleonic 
Code, Bavarian Penal Code 1813, 1871 Criminal Code of the German Empire, Spanish Penal Code 1848 (including for its many Muslim 
citizens), which expressly prohibited polygamy. Witte says “… these criminal prohibitions remain part of the criminal statutes and 
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Following the early Greek and Roman transition from polygamy to monogamy, a growing 
tradition of cultural and religious denunciation was reinforced with the expansion of the 
Roman Empire.83 This spread disapproval of polygamy across a wide geographical region, 
including into Europe. The eventual collapse of the Roman Empire around 500 AD resulted 
in the re-emerging dominance of cultures and religions that condoned polygamy, including 
Islam. Subsequent Arab conquests in the Middle East, North Africa and into Spain meant 
polygamy spread again into areas where earlier it had been prohibited. However, Christianity 
largely continued to thrive in regions where former Roman rulers had left and Christians 
continued to uphold early moral objections to polygamy as a cornerstone of biblical guidance 
on marriage.84 Given the prevailing importance of Christianity in the West, this meant 
monogamy, rather than polygamy, has come to be associated with Western custom over time.85 
Because Christian and Western secular norms continued to evolve side by side, this parallel 
evolution of objections to polygamy in the largely Christian West has made it difficult precisely 
to determine the origin of modern, and more secular, objections to polygamy and to 
differentiate those objections from opposition to polygamy arising out of Christian concerns. 
While early opposition to polygamy in the West might reasonably be associated with religious 
objections to the practice of plural marriage, Western objections to polygamy are now more 
accurately linked to the emergence and growing importance of human rights, themselves 
sometimes described as a modern-day, secular religion.86 Whereas once it was religion, now a 
                                                           
codes of most Continental European lands today, though the punishments have lightened and the pace of prosecution has slackened 
in recent decades…” 
83 In the Reference case (n 5) paragraph 150, evidence of Dr. Walter Scheidel. 
84 Christian religious scripture provides authority for Christian objections to polygamy. Genesis 1 and 2 recount God’s creation  of the 
first man and the first woman with the instruction that the “two shall become one flesh”. The New Testament enhances the earlier 
Biblical teachings in Matthew 19, Corinthians 7 and Ephesians 5 which all provide further support in Christian teachings for 
monogamous marriage. See also Reference  (n 5) paragraph 160 where this is discussed.  
85 David Pearl and Werner Menski Muslim Family Law (3rd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1988) 240 and Zeitzen (n 73) 15, where she 
confirms monogamy is the dominant family system in most human societies now. Exceptions exist in the Middle East and in some 
parts of Africa and Asia, where Islam and custom provide the basis for the more widespread legal and moral acceptance of polygamous 
marriage.  
86 Francesca Klug, ‘Human Rights as a Set of Secular Ethics, or Where Does the Responsibilities Bit Fit In?’ (1999) 33:3 Patterns of 
Prejudice 65, where Klug argues that human rights are best thought of as a set of values or secular ethics. 
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social commitment to gender equality and upholding women’s rights is more likely to be relied 
on in the dialogue objecting to polygamous marriage. 
 
Despite a general downward trend in the practice of polygamy, however, there is evidence of 
a significant, new development: the increase of polygamy in the West. The numbers of 
Mormon polygamous marriages are said to be rising, and large numbers of Muslim men and 
women who now live in places like the United Kingdom, Europe and North America have 
come from backgrounds where polygamy is accepted, many of them arriving from former 
colonies as economic migrants or seeking refuge.87 Despite the strict legal prohibition on plural 
marriage in the United Kingdom, it is thought as many as 20,000 ‘underground’ Islamic 
polygamous families may currently reside in Britain with similar numbers in other Western 
European nations.88 In addition to Islamic polygamous families, Mormon polygamy continues 
                                                           
87 On Islamic polygamy, ‘What’s Wrong with Polygamy’ (Asian Network Reports, 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0153rzs> (accessed 20 January 2015) discusses the increased incidence of polygamy 
highlighting the 700 applications to the Islamic Shari’a Council in 2010 citing polygamy as one of the main reasons for women wanting 
a divorce and using this to confirm the belief that polygamy is being practised in relatively large numbers in Britain. More generally, 
there is a reported increase in pro polygamy movements. See Michele Alexandre ‘Big Love: Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a 
True Possibility?’ (2007) 18 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 3 at where she says that, because of the increased interest in plural 
relationships generally it is ‘imperative’ that formal responses to polygamy are reviewed so that a ‘woman centric’ polygamy is aimed 
at. Also Elizabeth Emens, ‘Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence (n 9) 277 in her article on the rise of 
plural relationships, including polyamory, cites the national organisation ‘Loving More’ which she says reports a rate of 1,000 hits per 
day on its website and a circulation of 10,000 for its magazine. Finally, see Pro-polygamy.com, 'Polygamy Rights' Movement Not Re-
Defined by Homosexuals, Mar. 31, 2006, available at: http://www.propolygamy.com/articles.php?news=0040 (accessed November 6, 
2006) which highlights the number of pro-polygamy movements in the United States. In addition, there has been recent media 
coverage, on CNN's Anderson Cooper 360 and Larry King Live for example, showcasing pro-polygamy women advocating for their 
rights to live the polygamous lifestyle. Whatever the actual rise in numbers, the increasing visibility of polygamy and those who practice 
it is indisputable.  
88 On Mormon polygamy, Duncan, Emily J ‘The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love Is a Many Splendored Thing”’ (2008) 15 
Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 315 where she disputes the suggestion that Mormon polygamy is rare and cultish, saying it is 
practiced by around 30,000 – 100,000 in North America. She cites Jason D Berkowitz ‘Beneath the Veil of Mormonism: Uncovering the 
Truth about Polygamy in the United States and Canada’ 38 U Miami Inter-Am L. Rev. 615, 617 (2006-2007) 332 saying “… the number 
of polygynists in the United States is climbing. In Utah, the polygynous community grew tenfold over the last fifty years, and polygynists 
now constitute two percent of the state’s population.” Duncan says simply of polygamy, it is ‘here to stay’. On polygamy in the United 
Kingdom, see Rachel Stewart ‘The Men with Many Wives: the British Muslims who practise polygamy’ The Telegraph (London 24 
September 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/11108763/The-Men-with-Many-Wives-the-British-Muslims-who-
practise-polygamy.html> (accessed 20 January 2015). The article confirms that Shari’a law is used to perform wedding ceremonies 
which are not recognised as legal marriages.  In Europe, Witte (n 78) says there are around a million people practising polygamy in 
Europe, although only estimates can be made because no exact numbers are available, where he cites Veronica Federico, Europe 
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to be practiced in North America, and conspicuously enough to prompt direct legal interest, 
with estimates of around 30,000 to 100,000 polygamous families in North America, and 
climbing.89 The steady rise of polygamy and its increasing visibility in various forms in the 




2.3 Polygamy in Islam 
 
At various times in human history, polygamy has been practised by followers of most of the 
world’s major religious groups, including Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Mormons, Jews, 
Christians and native cultural and faith groups.90 While polygamy continues to be practised 
according to more than just one religious or cultural tradition, because of the current 
geographical context of conflict at the time of writing and the movement of migrants and 
refugees, very often it is Muslim families who seek to enter and remain in the United Kingdom, 
and it is additional Muslim wives who are likely to be prevented from taking advantage of 
family reunification provisions.  
                                                           
Facing Polygamy: Italy, France and the UK Accept the Challenge of Immigration (presented at the IACL IX World Congress, Oslo, June 
16–20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-
events/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws6/w6-federico.pdf (Federico notes there are thousands of cases of 
bigamy and polygamy in France, the United Kingdom, and Italy).  
89 See Brown and Bountiful (n 78 and n 5). For a comprehensive historical analysis and more general discussion of the response to 
polygamy in the United States, see Stephanie Forbes ‘Why Have Just One?: An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws Under the 
Establishment Clause’ (2003) 39 Houston Law Review 1517. 
90 In Judaism polygamy was practised by ancient Hebrews, and also in some cases, by Jews in Europe into the Middle Ages. Today, 
polygamy is not ordinarily practised in Judaism, and most Jews live according to state laws which prohibit polygamy.  The Bible provides 
some evidence of polygamy being practised in Christianity by Lamech (the grandson of Adam and Eve), Abraham, David and Solomon.  
It was also practiced by small groups of Christians in the late medieval period and has been tolerated from time to time among Christian 
communities throughout history. For more on Christian and Jewish polygamy see Zeitzen (n 73) and Cheshire Calhoun (n 69) 1028. 
However, polygamy has never really be considered wholly legitimate for most Christians and where Christians exist in large numbers, 
state laws have ordinarily banned polygamy outright. Generally, among Christians today, polygamy is widely considered unacceptable, 
although there remain a few minor exceptions, such as the Christian communities in Cameroon. As already discussed, related to the 
Christian tradition, Mormons, have historically taken a different view of polygamy. Originally widely practised and encouraged it is 
now banned and criminalised throughout the North American region where Mormons are most prominent, although  polygamous 
marriages continue commonly to be entered into, albeit only by members of fundamentalist Mormon communities. Polygamy is 
sometimes also practised by members of the Hindu, Buddhist and cultural traditions.  
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The Qur’an is the core basis for the tenets of Islamic practice and worship, following its 
revelation near Mecca to the Prophet Mohammed over many years in the early part of the 
seventh century.91 The Qur’anic revelations came to the Prophet at a time of great unrest in 
the region and the Qur’an is said to have urged a pathway through the ‘spiritual malaise’ and 
injustice that had characterised the behaviour of earlier pagan, Arabian tribes and their 
traditions by recommending a single God and community, governed by justice and equity.92 
All aspects of Muslim life are potentially holy and therefore liable to assessment according to 
the Qur’an. The Qur’an instructs Muslims to build their communities by prioritising 
compassion and social justice, virtues said to be crucial to Islamic ideals.93 In particular, the 
lives of women were said to have been of great concern to the Prophet Mohammed and, 
considered in context, it is likely the Qur’an sought the emancipation of women from their 
position of relative oppression under early Arabian practices.94 For the first time, the Qur’an 
offered women protection and rights, including the right to inheritance and divorce, doing so 
long before women in the West were granted recognition and protection inside the framework 
of marriage.95 While Islam has been criticised for advocating veiling and segregation for 
women, when it is read with some awareness of the limitations of its time, it seems the 
revelations received by the Prophet anticipated that women in Islam would play a full part in 
community life.  
 
                                                           
91 Armstrong, Karen Islam; A Short History (Phoenix Press London, 2006) 
92 Armstrong, (n 91) 7. 
93 Armstrong, (n 91) 5.  
94 Armstrong, (n 91) 14. See also L Beck and N Keddie (eds) Women in the Muslim World HUP (1978) 25, where they make the point 
that customs often associated with Islam existed in the Middle East long before Islam was born, including veiling, polygamy or other 
practises some often associate with Islam and the domination of men over women. In the context of polygamy, Islam might therefore 
be seen as attempt to regulate its on-going practice for the benefit of women rather than a starting point which introduces and 
proscribes the practice of plural marriage by men. See also Abdullahi An-Naim Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human 
Rights and International Law (Syracuse University Press, 1990) 66.  
95 Under the common law doctrine of ‘coverture’ women lost all legal personality on entering monogamous marriage, in line with the 
wife’s legal status as ‘feme covert’. The process of making marriage more equal began in the late nineteenth century, starting with 
the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, although many, although it was only the start of a long struggle for women in monogamous 
marriage to achieve full equality. For example, abolition of immunity for rape within marriage only a full century later under s 142 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, extended in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
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Marriage is central to the Muslim way of life.96 Ordinarily, it is the only way Muslim men and 
women can have intimate contact and it is considered important not only in terms of 
relationships within families, but also between families as well.97 At the time of the Qur’anic 
revelations polygamous marriage was practised on a widespread basis, including by 
Mohammed himself. Although it is not obligatory for Muslim men to practice polygamy, it is 
said to be permitted by the following verse: 
 
Sura 4:3  
And if you fear that you cannot act equitably towards orphans, marry such women 
as seem good to you, two and three and four; but if you fear that you will not do 
justice between them, then marry only one or what your right hands possess: this is 
more proper that you may not deviate from the right course.98   
 
There is much discussion and disagreement over the true nature of approval for polygamy in 
the Qur’an and, like other religious or legal texts, it is possible for multiple interpretations to 
arise.99  Despite that, in practice, the generally accepted view in the Islamic tradition today is 
that the Qur’an permits polygamy under certain conditions, provided the number of wives a 
                                                           
96 Manazir Ahsan ‘The Muslim Family in Britain’ in Michael King (ed) God’s law versus State Law: The Constructions of an Islamic 
Identity in Western Europe (Grey Seal Books, 1995) 22.  
97 Ahsan (n 96) 24. Marriage is described in the Qur’an as a strong and binding contract (‘mithaqan ghaliza’). It is possible for Islamic 
marriages to be dissolved by either spouse, albeit in more limited circumstances for women. Women can divorce in special 
circumstances (“khula”), and if a woman has been delegated the right in the marriage contract (“tafwid”), where her husband is 
impotent (“innin”), or where he fails to maintain her or deserts her. Despite these limitations, Ahsan suggests Islamic law encourages 
Muslim husbands to be good and generous to wives in divorce (see Qur’an Sura 4:20). 
98 David Pearl and Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law (3rd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1988) 240. A fifth wife may also be 
accommodated, even if not in exactly the same way as the four ordinary wives in Islam. This is a ‘Fasid’ marriage. See also Sura 23:32. 
“Marry those among you who are single, or the virtuous ones among yourselves, male or female: if they are in poverty, Allah will give 
them means out of His grace: for Allah encompasseth all, and he knoweth all things” which is sometimes also used together with Sura 
4:3. 
99 For an in depth discussion on Islamic jurisprudence and the possibility of different manifestations of polygamy, including the 
potential for polygamy to be reformed, see Michele Alexandre ‘So Long a Letter: Toward a Women-Centric System of Islamic Polygamy’ 
1 (2006) All in the Family–Islam and Human Rights, Atlanta Law School, Georgia 3,4 March 1, where she confirms the potential for 
alternative interpretations of Islamic texts, offering ideas for reform which are based on earlier analyses of Islamic law’s treatment of 
women so far, as well as women’s experience of Muslim polygamy. 
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husband has at any one time is expressly restricted to four.100 It is also widely accepted that 
the Qur’an requires fair treatment on the part of a husband vis-à-vis each of his wives. The 
exact nature of that obligation of fairness continues to be debated, but it is a requirement that 
bears some relationship to the link between polygamy and the potential for it to cause misery 
and hardship to multiple wives. Rightly or wrongly, in order to avoid harm arising for women 
out of polygamous marriage, the dominant view among Muslims today appears to be that 
financial rather than emotional equality among wives is generally enough.101  
                                                           
100 Kecia Ali, ‘Marriage, Family and Sexual Ethics’ in Rippin, Andrew (ed) The Islamic World (Routledge, 2008) 611, at 620 has created 
a typology of traditional views relied on to justify polygamy in Islam, referring to them in three broad categories. Javaid Rehman ‘The 
Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq’ (2007) 21 
International Journal of Law Policy and the Family 108 argues “[G]iven the changes in the social, political and legal environment, the 
continuation of the practice of polygamy demands a substantial explanation. Many of its historic reasons within the Islamic world for 
justifying polygamous marriages (for example, the surplus of women and loss of men through battles and armed conflict) are no longer 
tenable (2007: 115).” See also Beck and Keddie (n 94) who talk about the ‘legitimacy of marrying up to four wives’ being in the Qur’an, 
and Ahsan (n 96) where the ability to marry up to four wives is described as a permission, not a recommendation. See Aqil Ahmad, 
Mohammedan Law (23rd Edition Central Law Agency, Allahabad, India, 2010) 143; any passages in the Qur’an which appear to provide 
support for the practice of polygamy ought to be read and interpreted in a qualified way and restricted so that Sura 4:3 merely confirms 
monogamy as the norm, while allowing for the possibility that polygamy is permitted in very limited circumstances.  
101 Pearl and Menski (n 98) 239. There are many different opinions as to how the requirement of justice and fairness might be satisfied 
so as to meet the requirements of Sura 4:3; rather like the references to polygamy in the Qur’an, it is possible for the obligation to 
treat wives fairly to be interpreted in more than one way, perhaps by the equal division of goods and financial resources, or equal 
distribution not only of practical resources, but also of intimacy, sexual relations and affection. However, this more onerous obligation 
in respect of fairness in polygamous marriage is not universally accepted. Islamic objections to promiscuity in the West also play their 
part in the dialogue on approval for polygamous marriage. Because extra marital relations are tolerated in Western societies,  or at 
least very much more so than among Islamic communities, the suggestion is that monogamy is not actually a reality in practice for 
many Western or Christian men. Supporters of polygamy in Islam make the point that it is a complete fiction to assume Western and 
Christian men are monogamous, the corollary being that laws which ban polygamy and uphold monogamy as the only model for 
familial relationships are a misleading and dishonest attempt to hide the true nature of intimate relationships, masking the practical 
reality. The lack of tolerance towards meaningful, open and committed plural relationships in the West seems both hypocritical and 
morally questionable. For more on this see Ahsan (n 96) 26. Similar arguments have also been used by Mormons in their fight to have 
polygamy legally recognised in the United States. Jonathan Turley, who acted for the Browns in their case against the criminalisation 
of polygamy in Utah, has argued that the prohibition on polygamy is a unjustifiable limit on sexual freedom and it is hypocrisy, because 
we don’t outlaw informal affairs (‘Polygamy Laws Expose Our Own Hypocrisy’ USA Today  3 October 2004 
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/2004-10-03-turley_x.htm> accessed 11 March 2016). Using due process 
privacy protections and the ruling in the US Supreme Court overturning Texas sodomy laws, Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003), 
establishing a right to privacy extending to private consensual acts, Mormons have argued that if one can engage in a sexual act or 
relationship with any number of partners, it can’t be fair that a person can live with and have as many children with any num ber of 
partners as long as they do not marry, when they make a commitment as spouses, they are jailed. This argument had previously been 
dismissed on the basis the state has an interest in practice of monogamous marriage. In the first instance, the Court in Brown 




2.4 The Problem of Polygamy and Harm 
 
Whatever the debate within Islamic discourse, given the Qur’an refers expressly to plural 
marriage, it is likely some Muslim women will have a strong wish to remain faithful to their 
religion and be open to polygamy, even if others will continue to have doubts about whether 
being one of multiple wives is right for them.102 This, together with the rise of Islamic 
polygamy in Western Europe and the increasing visibility of polygamy more generally, suggests 
there is merit in re-examining traditional objections to polygamous marriage, which range from 
conservative and religious opponents whose traditional sense of family it offends, to women’s 
rights activists and feminists who rely on concerns about exploitation and subjugation.  
 
The traditional, Western view of polygamy and its relationship with harm is expressed 
succinctly by Professor John Witte in material that began as an expert opinion for the Attorney 
General of Canada in the Bountiful case and which developed into a substantial work presenting 
the Western case against polygamy.103 Witte takes the view that the many historical arguments 
                                                           
102 Lori Beaman discusses the range of arguments in ‘Is Polygamy Inherently Harmful’ in Calder and Beaman (eds) Polygamy’s Rights 
and Wrongs (n 6) 3. 
103 Witte, (n 78). In the Reference case, the Chief Justice of the British Colombian Supreme Court found polygamy harmful to society 
as it engenders higher rates of poverty and institutionalises gender inequality (paragraph 13). In a case where the Attorney General 
asked the Court to rule on whether s 293 of the Canadian Criminal Code criminalising polygamy was inconsistent with the Canadian 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the Court ruled the criminal prohibition on polygamy does offend the Charter but is 
saved by s 1 because it is a restriction which is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Justice Bauman also concluded 
the criminal code breaches s 7 of the Charter (relating to the liberty interest of children between 12 and 17 who are married into 
polygamy) and that it be read down so that such children are not prosecuted. Finally, the Court concluded s 293 does not offend the 
Charter provisions relating to freedom of expression (s 2(b)) or freedom of association (section 2(d)). Justice Bauman also confirmed 
s 15 of the Charter, relating to marital status, is not breached by the s 293 prohibition on polygamy because there is no religions or 
marital status discrimination. The amicus curiae appointed to argue against the criminal code in response to the Attorney General’s 
referral has indicated the decision will not be appealed. The decision might have been appealed by either party within the federal 
system – for example, the state Attorney General together with the federal Attorney General might have expressed an interest in 
appealing to a higher court for finality and clarity, but they did not do so. Accordingly, for now, the ruling has application only in British 
Colombia. In addition, for useful summaries, see Angela Campbell ‘‘Bountiful’s Plural Marriages [2010] International Journal of Law in 
Context 343, Linda McKay- Panos, ‘British Columbia Supreme Court Releases Reference Decision on Polygamy – One Alberta 
Connection’ February 15, 2012 and BJ Wray and others, (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal ‘The Most Comprehensive Judicial Record Ever 
Produced: The Polygamy Reference’ 1877. 
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employed against polygamy across a wide variety of traditions over an extended period of time 
remain convincing today. As a result, he is unequivocally in favour of a polygamy ban, saying: 
 
… the most enduring argument in the Western tradition is that polygamy is too 
often the cause, consequence or corollary of harm, especially to the most vulnerable 
populations.104 
 
However, as Witte himself acknowledges, the legal approach to polygamy has not been 
consistent over time and is reasonable to question whether the case he makes against polygamy 
continues to be as strong in a postmodern, globalising world.105 In carrying out that 
investigation this part divides the broad collection of harms often associated with polygamy 
into four main categories: its impact on society, its impact on individuals (particularly women 
and children), it’s inconsistency with human rights and its inconsistency with feminist ideals. 
Here, the arguments against polygamy which are based on harm are divided up so that they 
may more clearly be understood, even if it is also accepted that each category will experience 
some overlap with the other.  
 
 
2.4.1 Harm in Western Society 
 
This work offers a further typology to assist in developing a clear understanding of the many 
factors often associated with societal harm. This includes, concern over morality, concern over 
inconsistency with liberal aims and values and concern over a general culture of violence, 
injustice and community harm which is encouraged by a permissive attitude to polygamy, each 
of which will now be examined.  
 
Beginning with the idea of morality, it is this which has perhaps most persistently dominated 
the discussion on harm and polygamy in the West, where academics and judges have suggested 
                                                           
104 Witte, (n 78) 457. 
105 Witte, (n 78) 2, 443. 
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that polygamy has a moral equivalence with slavery, incest and bestiality.106 In making his own 
broad, Western case against polygamy, Witte has aligned his critique with moral objection, at 
least in part. In so doing, he has focussed heavily on historic examples of the harm caused by 
polygamy, to men, women and children, over a long period of time, stretching from Greco-
Roman Laws outlawing polygamy through to the modern day American case against plural 
marriage, arguing that the association between polygamy and harm is long and enduring, such 
that monogamy surely must be preferred.107 Tipping his hat to the association between 
polygamy and immorality, Witte refers to the fact that, for a long time, polygamy has not 
unreasonably been considered something ‘bad’ in itself, rather like cannibalism. This 
suggestion echoes conservative notions of morality in expressing his view there can be no 
good arising from a practice which is inherently damaging. Such views have featured 
prominently in early objections to polygamy in case law, both in North America108 and in the 
United Kingdom109 where polygamy was variously found to be “injurious to public morals” 
and an “odious” practice, comments which conservative commentators continue to rely on 
today, locating their criticism of polygamy in the same morality objections made in these early 
cases. In the modern context in particular, the apparent association between immorality and 
polygamy has commonly been used as a rhetorical tool in the discourse on same sex marriage, 
to ballast conservative objections to the formalisation of same sex relationships.110 One of the 
                                                           
106 Sigman, (n 78) 101 refers to the comparison with its ‘twin’ slavery. She also refers to the judgment in Lawrence which overturns 
a ban on same-sex intimacy, and where the late Justice Scalia dissented, warning against the lifting of the ban because doing so would 
put the ban on polygamy at risk. 
107 Witte (n 78) 458 provides a range of reasons which support this argument, including a study by McDermott, Rose and Cowden 
Jonathan later published as ‘Polygyny and Violence Against Women’ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 1767. McDermott’s also provided 
evidence to this effect in the Reference case (paragraph 580). 
108 Reynolds v United States 98 US 145 (1878) 164. The Court in Reynolds backed its reasoning up by ascribing polygamy an African 
and Asiatic heritage, making clear it was thought to be odious and foreign to Western civilisation, in particular. The attempt by 
Mormons to introduce a non-Western practice into Western society was viewed negatively. Its concern with polygamy being, more 
generally, “injurious to public morals” was not supported with evidence and implied the potential harm to public morality did not 
require any further explanation.  
109 Hyde v Hyde (1865-69) LR 1 P&D, where polygamy was described as injurious to public morals.  
110 For more insight into the relationship between same sex and polygamous marriage and their respective appeals for recognition, 
see Calhoun (n 69), where she says challenges to same sex marriage are most effectively met by challenging assumptions about 
polygamy. Davis (n 9) also refers to this at 1957 where she notes the same sex marriage debate is often appropriated by polygamy’s 
proponents, who like to present polygamy as another civil rights battle and just another ‘alternative’ lifestyle, which should be 
tolerated (the ‘alternative lifestyle defence’), using the same language as gay rights activists, about ‘coming out’ and ‘closeted 
[polygamous] families’. (Although Davis herself distinguishes the argument for polygamy from the fight for same sex marriage saying 
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most striking examples of this is the 2006 decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v Texas where the Court was asked to overturn laws against sodomy, which it did but 
not without strongly condemning the immorality of plural marriage, in dissent. In this case, it 
was the familiar, conservative voice of (the now, late) Justice Scalia reminding us of the 
“massive disruption of the current social order” which would ensue if the laws against sodomy 
were overturned, linking directly that disruption to polygamous marriage among other 
objectionable practices.111 In fact, Justice Scalia warned against widespread social unrest 
precisely because in his view the laws against plural marriage (as well as incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity) would be sustainable in the 
future only if sodomy remained outlawed, maintaining the court’s power to ban certain 
practices based on their potential harm to society.112  
 
Concern over morality has been prominent, and the use of the ‘moral slippery slope’ argument 
against polygamy is still common today where same-sex marriage is discussed. Often more 
audible in the modern discussion on polygamy and harm in the West, however, is an argument 
which is diametrically opposed to that rooted in concern for conservative moral values: that 
is, the presentation of polygamy as a threat to liberal equality.113 Turning again to Witte’s 
analysis of the harmful nature of polygamy, while he cites morality as a concern in making his 
                                                           
they are fundamentality different, in particular because polygamy involves a unique multiplicity.) Similarly, the website 
propolygamy.com describes polygamy as the ‘next civil rights battle’ (accessed 11 March 2016). In David L Chambers ‘Polygamy and 
Same Sex Marriage’ 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 53 1997-1998, the author discusses the Defence of Marriage Act 1996 (allowing states not to 
recognise same sex marriages performed in other states) and analogises the arguments on federal intervention to prohibit polygamy 
a century ago and the federal intervention effectively allowing states to continue to prohibit same sex marriage.  
111 This was not the first time Justice Scalia has relied on the link between polygamy and another practice he considers odious in a 
dissenting judgment. In 1996 Justice Scalia dissented from the majority decision to invalidate a statute which would have prevented 
formal banning of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, saying “the court’s disposition today suggests that … polygamy 
must be permitted … unless of course, polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexuals; Romer v Evans 
517 US 620 (1996). 
112 Conservative politicians also picked up where Justice Scalia left off. Rick Santorum, a Republican Senator, is quoted as responding 
to the judgment by saying, “[i]f the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within your home, then you 
have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery.  You have the 
right to anything” in Sean Loughlin, ‘Santorum Under Fire for Comments on Homosexuality’ 
<www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/04/22/santorum.gays/> (April 22, 2003) (accessed 11 March 2016) (quoting interview by 
Associated Press with Senator Rick Santorum, April 21, 2003). 
113 For a detailed summary of harm in this context see Sigman (n 78) 168, where she discusses the harm to society and wives and lists 
the human rights and feminist aims it offends.  
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case against polygamy in the West, he also relies heavily on liberal political dogma. According 
to this reasoning, polygamy is harmful in the Western legal tradition because it is at odds with 
the principles of liberty and equality.114 In this regard, Witte suggests the laws against polygamy 
ought not to be seen as simple “prudential prophylactics against harm.” Rather, they are 
symbolic of something bigger, something with a deep, normative foundation and a broad, 
practical reach. Applying a liberal, equality analysis, monogamous marriage is seen as 
representative of a certain vision of the ‘good society’ and the ‘good life’, which is also why 
most Western and some other states encourage their citizens towards a dyadic model of 
marriage. By extension, where the state prohibits plural marriage, it is discouraging and 
warning against a form of marriage that is at odds with the fundamental values that Western 
society is said to hold dear. For this reason, according to Witte at least, the Western legal 
tradition ought simply to close the door on any suggestion it must recognise polygamous 
marriages. Because it cannot be reconciled with Western values, the West must simply say ‘no’ 
to polygamy, whatever the consequences.115  
 
Writing with similar strength of disapproval for polygamy Susan Moller Okin has also 
expressed liberal equality concerns in her essay on the tension between minority group rights 
and feminist aims, expressing the view that polygamy is illustrative of a gap between liberal 
aims and the practices of minority cultures in the West.116 Moller Okin suggests the West has 
departed from its more patriarchal past, and that other cultures must also shed practices that 
are at odds with liberal equality goals like non-discrimination. She is unforgiving in her thesis; 
where any minority culture risks extinction as a result of prohibitions on practices that, in her 
view, are discriminatory, so be it. The possibility of this outcome is, in fact, to be welcomed, 
                                                           
114 Bailey and others (n 69) at 4 cites research which says 64% of monogamous societies compared with 25% of polygamous societies 
have liberal democracies.  
115 Nicholas Bala and Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich, (n 71) 145 supports this suggestion saying, “[t]he historical record shows that 
monogamy, like private property, is indispensible to constitutional democracy … Those regions of the world where polygamy is still 
practised are precisely the areas where constitutional democracy has made the least progress.” Although he also agrees lack of legal 
recognition of relationships can marginalise women and children and perpetuate the conditions which have made their exploitation 
possible. 
116 Susan Moller Okin ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women in Cohen, Joshua, Nussbaum, Martha and Howard, Mathew (eds) Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Susan Moller Okin with Respondents (PUP, 1999) 15. 
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so important are liberal equality aims.117 Moller Okin’s views have widely been criticised for 
effectively creating their own self-supporting, circular theory, by arguing that any given 
practice must be grounded in liberal values and truths otherwise, according to the same 
universal truth, it becomes justifiable not to tolerate the practice concerned. In this way, Moller 
Okin’s concerns might easily be accused of perpetuating a modern form of colonialising 
paternalism, albeit that they are expressed behind a cloak of informed tolerance, a claim that 
will be explored in some detail in the chapters analysing modern human rights and feminist 
critiques of polygamy, later in this work. Whatever the criticism and however strong, though, 
Moller Okin’s message reflects the common and unambiguous support for liberal objections 
to polygamous marriage in the West. Where a minority group practice is deemed harmful, 
culture cannot trump women’s rights.118 In the case of polygamy, according to Moller Okin’s 
thesis, polygamy’s universal prohibition is required.  
 
The third concern in this typology of harm to society is a more general occupation with 
polygamy and its proclivity to cause harm to the community. This concern is anchored in 
liberal equality considerations, but tends to focus on the practical outcomes that threat to 
liberal values actually poses.119 Elevating the role of the family in the wellbeing of the 
community and state, Professor Maura Strassberg addresses community harm by engaging 
with Justice Scalia’s ‘slippery slope’ concerns, expressed in the Lawrence decision. Here, 
Strassberg considers whether Justice Scalia is right, and the extension of marriage to same sex 
                                                           
117 Susan Moller Okin (n 116) 24. Moller Okin does acknowledge that women should be involved and represented in any discussion 
on the group’s rights, but this is buried in her own analysis of what harm is and without any meaningful expression of her 
understanding of ‘patriarchal’ practices, like polygamy, from a Muslim woman’s point of view.  
118 Susan Moller Okin (n 116) 11. 
119 Strassberg has written extensively in the context of ethics and sexuality including the construction by conservative commentators 
of arguments against same sex marriage on the basis of the potential for the definition of marriage to extend to polygamy.  See Maura 
Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same Sex Marriage’ (n 7) 1501. In her analysis of the use of 
arguments against polygamy in this context, Strassberg has also written more generally about polygamy, saying “[P]olygyny not only 
fails to produce critical building blocks of liberal democracy, such as autonomous individuality and social existence, but promotes a 
despotic state populated by subjects rather than citizens.” Maura Strassberg ‘The Crime of Polygamy’ (n 66) 353. See Keith O’Brien, 
‘We cannot afford to indulge this madness: Cardinal Keith O’Brien, Britain’s most senior Catholic sets out his opposition to the 
Government’s plans to legalise gay marriage’ The Daily Telegraph (3 March 2012) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/9121424/We-cannot-afford-to-indulge-this-madness.html> accessed 13 April 2017, for a 
similarly articulated local objection. See also Jonathan Porter, ‘L’amour for Four: Polygyny, Polyamory and the State’s Compe lling 
Economic Interest in Normative Monogamy’ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 2093. 
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couples would likely undermine liberal arguments against polygamy and encourage it 
legitimately to be practised in Western societies.120 She concludes that any attempt to justify 
polygamy on the basis of the extension of the institution of marriage to same sex couples 
would be misguided.121 In her conclusion, same sex marriage is valuable and consistent with 
the aims of a modern liberal state and polygamous marriage simply is not. Prioritising the 
family as an essential part of the institutional structure of the liberal state and noting the 
importance of a free individual to the idea of a liberal democracy, Strassberg defines polygamy 
as something which will discourage individual thought and liberty and encourage the idea of a 
highly hierarchical community with a despotic model for statehood. Although her views are 
generally limited to the fundamentalist Mormon context, the main thrust of Strassberg’s work 
is in conveying the idea that, even at a time when the very idea of marriage is evolving and 
expanding, polygamy is inconsistent with the notion of a good society.122 Where the 
preservation of the liberal state is important to the notion of a good life, the preservation of 
monogamous families is apparently the key, while polygamy poses an unacceptable threat to 
that aim.123 
                                                           
120 Maura Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance (n 7), Jaime M Gher, ‘Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries 
Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement’ (2008)14 Wm & Mary J Women & L 559 also addresses directly the slippery slope 
‘accusation’ that permitting same-sex marriage will inevitably lead to the legalisation of polygamy, arguing for a more nuanced idea 
of marriage in its various forms, trying to walk a steady line between distancing same sex marriage arguments from polygamy s o as 
not to dilute the support it has worked so hard to gain, while at the same time, discouraging any attempt to malign polygamy as 
relentlessly barbaric and bad, encouraging respect for diversity in the context of any fight for marriage equality.  The article by Bala 
and Bromwich (n 71) also discussions the extension of the idea of ‘family’ in the Canadian context, including the Canadian Law 
Commission’s suggestion that a broader range of ‘close personal  adult relationships’ should legally be recognised, although the article 
concludes by reiterating strong arguments for not recognising polygamy.  
121 Maura Strassberg, ‘Distinctions of Form or Substance’ (n 7). Strassberg roots her analysis in Hegelian legal theory, and justifies 
doing so by reference to early American case law on polygamy (primarily, Reynolds v United States (n 108) which expresses concern 
that allowing plural marriage could undermine the liberal foundation of the United States and its constitutional prioritisation of 
democracy and freedom. 
122 Strassberg  discusses various psychological, sociological and political impacts of polygamy which were substantial and pressing, 
set out in the Reference decision, and justifying criminalisation in her view in ‘Scrutinizing Polygamy’ (n 122) at 1818. 
123 Strassberg also contrasts the practice of polygamy to that of the emerging practice of polyamory or polyfidelity, to further illustrate 
her point, highlighting distinctions between each practice on the basis of individual liberty and harm. Strassberg concludes that 
polyamory is not at odds with the liberal state, applying a Hegelian function analysis of marriage to come to the view that it does not 
pose a political threat, and nor does it evoke the same concern for various harms as the more damaging practice of polygamy (Maura 
Strassberg, ‘The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory’ (n 7) 433. Strassberg has argued elsewhere that the 
criminalisation of fundamentalist polygamy can be justified precisely because of the link she makes between plural marriage and its 
threat to the state, as well as its link to individual harm (Strassberg, ‘The Crime of Polygamy’ (n 66). 
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The idea of polygamy posing a direct risk to the community is discussed in detail in the work 
of Rose McDermott, where she gathers a multifaceted collection of specific, detrimental 
effects of polygamy on society.124 McDermott is unforgiving in her analysis of polygamy as a 
practice which can be linked to a wide range of very definite harms, including a decrease in 
civil rights and an increase in insecurity and weapons procurement, with potentially grave 
physical, political and economic consequences for those communities in which it is 
practised.125 McDermott also documents an apparent increase in morbidity, a decrease in 
education for women and girls, worse economic prospects (particularly for women) and the 
higher risk of all members of society being subjected to crime; a wide range of harms indeed. 
It is vital to note, however, McDermott acknowledges that her results do not consider variables 
like religious affiliation or political systems and their ability to mitigate the negative effects of 
polygamy on society. Despite that, she remains clear in her condemnation of plural marriage 
because of its potential for harm, expressing the view that the consistency and strength of her 
findings are highly suggestive of a culture of violence and injustice being encouraged by 
polygamous marriage.126 
 
Although via different paths, each of the views expressed above reaches the same conclusion 
about polygamy and harm to society, illustrating the predominant view of polygamy in the 
West as something which is manifestly objectionable where the aim is to prevent community 
harm and ensure liberal equality. While the strength of these arguments will be assessed in later 
chapters with regard to feminist and human rights objections, it is suffice to say that the 
description of the evil of polygamy, its risk to liberal goals and its propensity to cause harm to 
the foundation of Western society is representative of the conventional approach in Western 
democracies.127 While the reasoning and the justification for holding the view of polygamy as 
                                                           
124 McDermott, Rose and Cowden Jonathan ‘Polygyny and Violence Against Women’ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 1767, 1809. 
125 McDermott (n 124) 1809. 
126 McDermott (n 124) 1810.  
127 On the approach to Muslim personal status laws more broadly, as they relate to matters other than polygamy (for example, 
marriage and divorce, inheritance, and other family matters) see Pascale Fournier ‘The Reception of Muslim Family Laws in Western 
Liberal States’ <http://www.wluml.org/node/504> (December 2005) accessed 27 July 16 regarding Shari’a and its reception in Britain 
and other European states, where Fournier charts the extent which courts have rejected or recognised Muslim personal laws more 
broadly. 
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something which is harmful to and incompatible with the liberal state may vary, there is no 
doubt the West has a long history of unease about polygamy. While such objections on the 
basis of harm to society may arguably amount to the imposition of a ‘compulsive liberalism’, 
not unlike the legal moralism espoused by Devlin in his debate with HLA Hart on harm, the 
moralistic and liberal equality concerns about the impact of polygamy on society remain 
abiding and continue to run deep, having formed part of modern arguments which have 




2.4.2 Harm to Women 
 
While concerns about polygamy are often grounded in moral objections and concern for its 
lack of coherence with Western, liberal traditions, the inherent gender asymmetry associated 
with polygamy has also provided many of its detractors in the West with a direct link between 
the practice of polygamy and harm. This criticism is anchored in language which explicitly 
prioritises the gender imbalance of polygamous marriage—evident in the fact that only men 
may take additional spouses, and very often women’s right to choose polygamy over 
monogamy, or obtain a divorce is limited—and the associated concern that this difference 
automatically and immediately relegates women to a position which is inferior to men. The 
                                                           
128 Jonathan Turley, ‘The Loadstone Rock: The Role of Harm in the Criminalization of Plural Unions (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 1905. 
Turley was the lawyer acting for Kody Brown and his ‘Sister Wives’ in the American case brought by the Browns challenging the  state 
of Utah’s criminal prohibition on multi party cohabitation. In the article, Turley refers to compulsive liberalism as the ‘loadstone rock’ 
on which all cases must break, and the ultimate arbiter in determining how social values and individual freedoms balance out in 
polygamy, using the Hart/Devlin debate on harm to ballast his arguments, arguing that the legal moralism arguments used by Lord 
Devlin in constructing his argument on harm have returned in the form of an imposed and unreasonable ‘compulsive liberalism’.  Turley 
argues instead for a Millian approach to harm, which calls for more tangible harm to justify limits on individual choice, as he seeks to 
navigate a path through individual rights and more broad social, moral concerns. Rose McDermott and Jonathan Cowden discuss the 
harm of polygamy in Bennion, ‘The Effect of Polygyny on Women, Children and the State, where at 139 they confirm their view that 
“… [t]he promotion of monogamy and female emancipation is a formula for a safer world.” The Court in Bountiful was occupied and 
also largely swayed by conceptions of harm and polygamy in upholding its criminal prohibition in Canada.  
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worry expressed is that the harm caused by polygamy is suffered by women, never men, and 
it is severe, causing injury to women’s social, economic, physical and emotional wellbeing.129 
 
In seeking to understand the precise nature of the allegation of the gender-based harm in 
polygamous marriage, the recent discussion on polygamy in the Canadian context is helpful. 
In their analysis of women’s experiences of polygamy for the Canadian Department of Justice, 
Rebecca Cook and Lisa Kelly establish a useful categorisation of the harms one might 
reasonably associate with polygamy, in particular the gender-based harm thought more likely 
to arise out of a polygamous marriage.130 In a comprehensive review of polygamy and harm, 
Cook and Kelly list patriarchy, non-exclusivity, negative co-wife relationships, mental ill-
health, economic harm and a lack of citizenship rights as tangible harms which are more likely 
to be experienced by women in polygamous relationships.131 While Cook and Kelly 
acknowledge that not all polygamous relationships will manifest in the same way, they also 
reiterate that the harm of non-exclusivity is common to all plural marriages and it is this factor 
which causes many of the other harms to arise. As a result, they, and many others besides, see 
polygamy as an unjustifiable violation of women’s rights and recommend its elimination.132  
 
Picking up on Cook and Kelly’s suggestion, it is certainly the case that polygamy continues to 
be linked to harm precisely because any hardship is ordinarily suffered directly and 
disproportionately by women in plural marriages. Specifically with regard to non-exclusivity, 
the introduction of new wives can cause rivalry and competition for resources (both emotional 
and financial). The stress as a polygamous family multiplies and the lack of exclusivity 
polygamous wives experience as a result of that expansion is ordinarily more likely to have a 
negative effect on the wellbeing of the women involved.133 Although polygamy may have a 
positive impact on the day to day lives of some women, it is more often associated with the 
negative impact it can have on women’s economic, physical and emotional well being and the 
                                                           
129 Rebecca Cook and Lisa Kelly ‘Polygyny and Canada’s Obligations under International Human Rights Law’ (Report) (September, 
2006) Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice, Canada. Family, and  Ruth Gaffney-Rhys, ‘Polygamy: A Human Right 
or Human Rights Violation?’ (2011) Vol 2 Women in Society 2  
130 Cook and Kelly (n 129).  
131 Cook and Kelly (n 129). ‘Citizenship rights’ include the right to vote and other civil rights. 
132 For example, Witte (n 78), McDermott (n 107). 
133 Gaffney (n 129) 11. 
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generally accepted view in the West is that the detriment caused by polygamy will generally 
outweigh any benefits.  
 
Witte’s analysis of polygamy picks up this point. Alongside his comprehensive description of 
more general, societal harms, he expresses the clear view that polygamy ought not to be 
tolerated because it causes severe and sustained harm to individual women. In Witte’s thesis, 
polygamy is not just associated with general harm to society, it is also harmful to additional 
wives because: 
 
[polygamy]…routinises patriarchy, deprecates women, jeopardises consent, 
fractures fidelity, divides loyalty, dilutes devotion, fosters inequity, promotes rivalry, 
foments lust, condones adultery … and more.134 
 
Once again, Witte’s concerns are widely shared, particularly in the West. Turning again to 
Moller Okin, who refers to studies in which women explicitly deride plural marriage, calling it 
a barely tolerable institution, she also cites additional studies in which men confirm their use 
of plural marriage to suit their self-interest (in being cared for by many wives) and as a means 
of control (in threatening to take additional wives as punishment) presenting a picture of 
polygamy as irrefutably intertwined with patriarchy and harm to women.135 Moller Okin and 
Witte are far from being alone in their condemnation of polygamy on gender grounds. The 
difficulty in protecting women from male dominance and the physical, sexual, emotional and 
financial harm this has the potential to cause to women, for some, makes polygamy 
unforgivably bad.136 Because polygamy is widely thought of in the West as a form of marriage 
which serves the needs of husbands, rather than wives, it is inextricably linked with worse 




                                                           
134 Witte (n 78) 23. 
135 Susan Moller Okin (n 116) 15. 
136 McDermott (n 107). 
137 Nicholas Bala and Rebecca Jaremko Bromwich (n 71) 15 
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2.4.3 Harm and Human Rights 
 
The relationship between polygamy and harm ought to be particularly alarming for anyone 
interested in human rights according to at least one commentator, who has suggested it is time 
for human rights advocates to campaign directly for polygamy bans.138 It is certainly the case 
that international human rights guarantees are likely to be breached by polygamy, among them, 
the inherent gender imbalance in polygamous marriage, which seems automatically to violate 
the human right of women to equal status with men. In the context of marriage, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (‘UDHR’) states clearly that equality protections must be 
permitted to reach into the private sphere, and later human rights covenants also expressly 
protect equality in marriage and family life.139 It is also ordinarily the case that polygamous 
marriage does not envisage anyone of the same sex being able to marry, adding to its lack of 
equality credentials.140 Given that polygamy provides men with an entitlement not shared by 
women, and in light of the disproportionate harm for women which is associated with 
polygamous marriage, it seems unlikely that the practice of polygamy might be reconciled with 
the right to dignity, which is also protected in the Universal Declaration and other fundamental 
human rights conventions.141 In addition, the practice of polygamy breaches the right to 
                                                           
138 McDermott (n 107) 1812 and 1814. 
139 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) Article 16: (1) “Men and women 
of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family … [and] … are 
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Article 23(4) States must “… take appropriate 
steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage …”. Article 3 ICCPR, States  Parties have to “…undertake 
to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”. Similar 
wording at Article 2 of International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 19996), entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
140 Although it might reasonably be considered outside of the ordinary, it is worthwhile noting the exception found by Angela 
Campbell in her empirical research with women in Bountiful, (n 6) where discussions revealed the existence of same sex polygamy in 
a religious polygamous setting. Polyamorous relationships are also as likely to be same sex as they are heterosexual. 
141 UDHR Article 1; ICCPR Preamble and Article 10; ICESCR Preamble and Article 13; American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 
22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS, (American Convention) Article 11; African (Banjul) Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (African Charter), Article 3; Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (adopted 5 August 1990) (Cairo Declaration) Article 6. Fareda Banda, Women, Law and Human 
Rights: An African Perspective (Hart, 2005) 2 discusses the idea of polygamy and dignity, saying it violates the dignity of women, 
questions whether it is possible to reconcile where access to plural marriage is not the same for men and women, and given the harm 
polygamy may cause women in particular, it is arguable their right to dignity is injured by polygamous marriage. 
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privacy where co-wives are required to live together.142 The right to an adequate standard of 
living may also be breached by challenges associated with polygamous co-habitation.143 
Further, the age at which plural wives marry is arguably often lower for polygamous wives 
and, where children are married, additional international human rights guarantees are 
breached.144 Where polygamy engenders a society in which men exercise greater control over 
women in marriage a variety of rights guarantees requiring free and full consent to a marriage 
are also infringed.145 Other rights that are more likely to be engaged by polygamy are the right 
to education (particularly where young women enter into polygamous marriage),146 and the 
right to protection from sexual exploitation.147 Violence and harmful practices, including 
female genital mutilation (FGM), which some polygamous societies practice in part to reduce 
female desire, are also prohibited under international human rights guarantees.148 While 
violence against women, sexual slavery and FGM are not restricted to polygamous families or 
societies, they are more commonly associated with societies in which polygamy is practised, 
providing more support for the claim that polygamy is more likely to be harmful for women, 
and that it is likely to result in multiple breaches of women’s rights.149 Nestling comfortably 
alongside general, Western, liberal critiques of polygamy, the likelihood that polygamy will 
                                                           
142 Privacy and family life is protected under UDHR Art 12; ECHR, Article 8; ICCPR, Art 17; African Charter, Article 12. The issue of 
communal living has been highlighted by the group Women Living Under Muslim Laws (Warraich, Sonia and Balchin, Cassandra 
‘Recognizing the Unrecognized: Inter-Country Cases and Muslim Marriages & Divorces in Britain, Policy Research for Women Living 
Under Muslim Laws (WLUML Publications, January 2006))200 where they point out that national legislation will ordinarily have no 
provision for separate living space for wives, or if it does is often flouted or interpreted to mean only separate bedrooms. 
143 UDHR, Article 25; ICESCR, Article 11; among others, going directly to the discussion earlier in Islamic discourse on what it means 
to treat wives and families equally and fairly. 
144 CEDAW, Article 16(2) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 
1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (Child’s Rights Convention). 
145 UDHR Article 16(2); ICESCR, Article 10(1); ICCPR, 23(3); CEDAW Article 16(1)(b); UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, the 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (adopted 7 November 1962, entered into force 9 December 1964) 521 UNTS 
231, Article 1;  American Convention 1969, Article 17(3); African Charter, Article 6 . Ruth Gaffney has suggested that, because polygamy 
engenders a society in which men are more likely to control young women, polygamy contributes to forced marriage and contravenes 
these sections (Gaffney-Rhys, Ruth ‘Polygamy: A Human Right or Human Rights Violation?’ (2011) Vol 2 Women in Society 2, 5).  
146 Child’s Rights Convention, Article 28(1) and ICESCR Article 13.  
147 Child’s Rights Convention, Article 34. 
148 UDHR, Article 5; ICCPR, Article 7; ECHR, Article 3; American Convention, Article 5; Arab Charter, Article 8.   
149 McDermott (n 107). Some commentators go so far as to say that polygamy in some contexts is almost like a form of slavery 
(Gaffney n Gaffney (n 129) quoting Cook and Kelly (n 129). If she is correct, practices resembling slavery are expressly banned 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (adopted 30 
April 1956, entered into force 30 April 1957) 226 UNTS 3, adding further credibility to strict polygamy prohibition.  
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engage and breach specific international and regional human rights conventions which 
guarantee equal treatment for men and women seem to situate polygamy firmly on the negative 
side of the human rights ledger, such that polygamy has even been listed among the ‘harms’ 
that might prevent returning women to a home country in refugee claims against non-
refoulement.150 
 
Despite that, polygamous marriage is not explicitly prohibited in any international or regional 
human rights instrument, on equality or any other grounds, begging the question: why not? 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—operating in a region where polygamy 
is common—does come close. The Maputo Protocol, as it is known, is considered progressive 
and comprehensive, a view that is buoyed by the fact it is the only transnational human rights 
instrument that expresses a clear and unequivocal preference for monogamy. Article 6 of the 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa states that: 
 
…monogamy is encouraged, as the preferred form of marriage and the rights of 
women in marriage and family, including polygamous marital relationships, are 
promoted and protected.151  
 
While international human rights treaties are largely silent regarding polygamy, human rights 
bodies have been much more forthcoming in their disapproval, expressing the overwhelming 
view that it is best discouraged. In particular, the committee with responsibility for overseeing 
the women’s rights convention, the CEDAW Committee, has made very clear its concern 
about plural marriage and its role in violating the aims of the treaty, saying: 
 
                                                           
150 Fatoumata Cynthia Camara v Secretary of State for the Home Department  18 June 2013, Upper Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber Appeal Number AA/11020/2012. 
151 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (adopted 11 July 2003, entered 
into force 25 November 2005) reprinted in 1 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 40 (Maputo Protocol) of 54 nations in the African Union, 49 have signed 
it, 37 have ratified (at July 2016). 
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… [polygamy] contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men, and can have 
such serious emotional and financial consequences for her dependents that such 
marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited.152  
 
Other committees with oversight for United Nations treaties have also made clear their view 
that polygamy violates rights that ought to be protected by the treaties they oversee, including 
the Human Rights Committee, which has said: 
 
It should be noted that equality of treatment with regard to the right to marry 
implies that polygamy is incompatible with this principle. Polygamy violates the 
dignity of women. It is an inadmissible discrimination against women. 
Consequently, it should definitely be abolished wherever it continues to exist.153 
 
From the comments of CEDAW and the Human Rights Committee, among others, it is clear 
that significant international bodies with responsibility for monitoring and implementing 
human rights are in no doubt: polygamy is harmful and even if human rights instruments 
themselves do not expressly say so, polygamy breaches human rights standards and ought 
universally to be abolished.154  The human rights attitude to polygamy is succinctly summed 
                                                           
152 UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 21’ on Equality in 
Marriage and Family Relations, adopted at the Thirteenth Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (1994) UN Doc A/34/180 “… Committee notes with concern that some States parties, whose constitutions guarantee equal 
rights, permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal or customary law. This violates the constitutional rights of women, 
and breaches the provisions of article 5(a) of the Convention.” In the CEDAW press release, it said even if the tradition of polygamy is 
firmly rooted, and where a tradition perpetuates discrimination, it must still be addressed directly.”  
153 UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Recommendation 28’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 10 (2000). 
154 See also, UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General  Recommendation 24’ on 
Article 12: Women and Health), adopted at the Twentieth Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against  
Women (1999) UN Doc A/54/38/Rev 1, chap I which mentions polygamy specifically as a harmful practice. In addition to comments 
and recommendations, committees with supervisory responsibility for CEDAW, ICCPR, ICESCR, and the CRC have all called for states 
to abolish and prevent the practice of polygamy , in a variety of concluding observations on countries where polygamy is practised 
(Cook and Kelly (n 129) at 5, f/n 22, 23, 24, 25 where they list the concluding reports and in particular, note UN Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ‘Concluding Comments on the Initial Report on Namibia’ at the Seventeenth 
Session, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1997) UN Doc CEDAW/C/NAM 1. See also UN 
Press Release 2004 ‘Customs, traditions remain obstacles to women’s rights in Equatorial Guinea say anti-discrimination committee 
experts’ (8 July 20014) WOM/1452 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/wom1452.doc.htm> accessed 18 April 2017, discussing a 
country report and describing any law to prohibit polygamy as likely to be ‘stillborn’ because polygamy sits entirely outside the civil 
 68 
up in the final quote from the report referred to earlier, by Cook and Kelly on polygamy and 
human rights:  
 
Under international human rights law, there is a growing consensus that polygyny 
violates women’s right to be free from all forms of discrimination. Where polygyny 
is permitted through religious or customary legal norms, it often relies on obedience, 
modesty and chastity codes that preclude women from operating as full citizens… 
the physical, mental, sexual and reproductive, economic and citizenship harms 
associated with the practice violate many of the fundamental human rights 
recognised in international law… State practice indicates that a complete legal 
prohibition of polygyny is the norm in most domestic systems…these restrictions 
reflect not only the socio economic problems associated with polygyny, but also a 
growing recognition of women’s right to equality.155 
 
 
2.4.4 Harm and Traditional Feminist Discourse 
 
Rather like the guarantees set out in international human rights treaties, traditional feminist 
objections to polygamy have much in common with Western liberal values which privilege 
basic equality, as well as those which reject men’s dominance. Because men may have 
additional wives while women are almost never permitted the same privilege, it is easy to locate 
polygamy as an inherently unequal and objectionable practice in the traditional equality 
feminist lexicon. Where women do not have the same access to plural partners, they are at a 
disadvantage purely because of their sex, meaning polygamy is unquestionably at odds with 
traditional equality goals.  
 
It is not just liberal feminist aims that are at odds with polygamous marriage, however. Because 
men are the central ‘hub’ in polygamous families they are likely to have greater rights and 
expectations within any given marriage and exert greater control over their spouses, or the 
                                                           
legal system , although (even if unintentionally) this claim perhaps provides additional evidence for tackling the objectionable practices 
often associated with polygamy rather than the polygamous marriage itself. 
155 (Cook and Kelly (n 129) 2. 
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‘spokes’ on the polygamous marriage wheel.156 In that regard, polygamy also offends feminist 
concern about male dominance. Radical feminist objections to male dominance are 
undoubtedly engaged by the possibility of men using the addition of extra wives as a means to 
control or punish women they are already married to, as well as the negative sex stereotyping 
of women as the weaker spouse in polygamous marriage. Concern over the potential for male 
dominance in polygamy, along with other, indirect, factors associated with plural marriage 
such as the lack of access for women to divorce, the broad age gap between husbands and 
their often younger wives (particularly for subsequent wives, married later in a man’s life) and 
the reduced control women more often have in polygamous societies to choose who they 
marry and when—all reinforce the view of polygamous marriage as patriarchal and 
domineering, making it objectionable in light of concern over the subjugation of women.157  
 
Muslim feminist scholars have also sought to dismiss the practice of polygamy as ‘of its time’ 
and to interpret those parts of the Qur’an that discuss it as intended simply to affirm its 
practice and recommend its eventual decline.158 Amina Wadud, a respected scholar of both 
feminism and Islam, has argued strongly against the influence of patriarchy in Islamic 
practice.159 Specifically with regard to polygamy, Wadud is highly critical of mainstream 
                                                           
156 Greg Strauss ‘Is Polygamy Inherently Unequal?’ (2012) 122 (3) Ethics 516, where he describes a ‘hub and spoke’ model of marriage 
which, even where the central spouse is virtuous, each peripheral spouse as fewer rights and more obligation than the central spouse. 
He suggests a revised polyfidelity structure to replace polygamy, removing the inequalities, whereby each spouse is entitled to marry 
others. Even if difficult in practice, Strauss says this is one method for a more egalitarian approach. Susan Moller Okin  discusses the 
propensity for practices like polygamy to be concerned with control over women, emphasising the inherent potential for power 
imbalances and patriarchy in ‘Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions’ (1998) 108(4) Ethics 661-684.  
157 Lama Abu-Odeh,  ‘Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt’ (2004) 37 V and J Transnat'l L 1043, 1145 where she states 
the feminist position is that polygamy should be prohibited. Her article details a range of modern, secular and feminist objections to 
polygamy and other Islamic family practices, with a comparative analysis of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. For an alternative view on 
dominance and subjugation in marriage and whether that is more or less of a problem in polygamy or monogamy, see Adrienne Davis 
(n 9) 1972, discussing the fact that monogamous marriage can result in women doing everything on their own at home while also 
trying to pursue careers so they are exhausted, or having to battle with their husbands to share the load and be exhausted and battle 
weary and either way, their needs are subjugated in dyadic marriage too. 
158 Asma Lamrabet, Women and the Qur’an; An Emancipatory Reading (Square View, 2016).  
159 Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman; Reading the Scared Text from a Woman’s Perspective (OUP, New York, 1999). Wadud’s 
ground-breaking re-evaluation of Islam and the lives of Muslim women under Islamic law is not so different from that of Chinkin and 
Charlesworth, in laying the blame for gender inequality at the door of men’s domination of the content, interpretation and 
jurisprudence around Islamic and international law, respectively – in each setting, men were included, women were not and in each 
case, this has had great bearing on the way laws are framed. And yet in the mainstream, while the work of Chinkin and Charlesworth 
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Muslim interpretations of the Qur’an that suggest that the sacred text permits polygamous 
marriage.160  As earlier accounts of polygamy in Islam have confirmed, she is not alone. In her 
book on women and gender in Islam, Leila Ahmed quotes Malak Hifni Nasif, writing in the 
early part of the twentieth century on polygamy, where she describes the word ‘co-wife’ as 
‘women’s mortal enemy’, saying of polygamous marriage:  
 
… how many hearts has it broken, how many minds has it confused and homes 
destroyed, how much evil brought and how many innocents sacrificed and prisoners 
taken for whom it was the origin of personal calamity … [Polygamy] is a terrible 
word laden with savagery and selfishness … Bear in mind that as you amuse 
yourself with your new bride, you cause another’s despair to flow in tears …161 
 
It is worth noting that, for some wives, polygamy is not viewed in this way. In debunking 
feminist criticisms of polygamy, Elizabeth Joseph, an advocate for both women’s rights and 
polygamy, herself a polygamously married wife (until the death of her husband), as well as a 
lawyer, journalist and academic, has described polygamy as the ‘ultimate feminist lifestyle’ 
citing the opportunities it has provided to her as a career woman and a mother. She has 
presented a view of polygamy as offering “an independent woman a real chance to have it all” 
based on her own experience of it as both empowering and liberating, enabling her with 
enough family support to pursue her career and manage her family obligations more 
comfortably.162 And it is not just Mormon polygamous wives who report positively on the 
                                                           
is celebrated as being innovative, insightful and forward looking (a position this work supports), Wadud and others like her seem 
unfairly to be met with a more suspicious and less generous response, a response which is more likely be used to illustrate all that is 
wrong with Islam, rather than to showcase Wadud as a progressive voice seeking positive changes for women, as Chinkin and 
Charlesworth are viewed. So often, when commentary like Wadud’s reaches the mainstream, the focus is on Muslim men who may 
oppose her, so that the voice of another Muslim woman—one who is advocating for change basing her arguments on the same Islamic 
principles traditional Muslims say make that change impossible—is effectively silenced once more. 
160 Amina Wadud (n 159) 85. 
161 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven, 1992). 
162 ‘Polygamist wife contends polygamy is the ultimate feminist lifestyle’ Las Vegas Sun 
<https://lasvegassun.com/news/1997/may/05/polygamist-wife-contends-polygamy-is-the-ultimate-/>(5 May 1997) accessed 21 
April 2017 and John Tierney, ‘Who’s Afraid of Polygamy?’ New York Times (11 March 2006) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EEDA1331F932A25750C0A9609C8B63> where he discusses Joseph’s views 
on polygamous marriage as being emancipatory and empowering. See also Bennion ‘Progressive Polygamy in Western United States’ 
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practice of polygamy for them; Muslim women are capable of being happy plural wives too.163 
Still, when it comes to equality, dominance and polygamy, the views expressed by Joseph and 
others like her are not the norm. While the idea of a feminist friendly form of polygamy is 
increasingly being considered possible (and will be discussed in detail later in this work), 
polygamy’s denouncers continue to speak with the loudest voices, particularly in the West.164 
In traditional feminist discourse polygamy is ordinarily viewed as a family model in which 
men’s power pervades, making it objectionable from a range of feminist perspectives.  
 
 
2.5 Harm and the Regulation of Polygamy 
 
The disquiet about polygamy has acted as the prompt for a raft of legislative interventions by 
states to limit its practice, both for Muslims and more generally.165 This section charts the 
response to polygamy across an assortment of jurisdictions in an effort to show the diverse 
ways in which the harm so often associated with polygamy is managed and to provide a 
comparative basis for the examination of the treatment of polygamy in the United Kingdom, 
in the following chapter. In reviewing polygamy regulation, this work adopts in part the 
typology used by Angela Campbell in her examination of the global treatment of polygamy in 
                                                           
in Den Otter Beyond Same Sex Marriage (Lexington, 2016) where she challenges the popular view of polygamy as subordinating 
women, highlighting the experience of a series of families who practice progressive forms of polygamy which reflect feminist values. 
163 Shagufta Yaqub, ‘Private Wives’ Guardian (12 August 2005) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/aug/12/gender.uk> 
accessed 21 April 2017, on women’s positive experiences of Islamic polygamy. 
164 For more information on the way polygamy might comply with feminist aims see, Alexandre, ‘Big Love’ (n 87) and ‘So Long a 
Letter’ (n 99). Also Calhoun (n 69) where she posits that polygamy may not always be incompatible with liberal and egalitarian aims. 
165 Aside from the approbation in human rights documents, the Hague Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of Marriages 
1978 (adopted 14 March 1978, entered into force 1 May 1991) 16 ILM 18 Article 11 also states that a contracting state can refuse to 
recognise a marriage if ‘ … at the time of the marriage under the law of that state … one of the spouses was already married.’ The aim 
of this Convention is to ensure the recognition of valid marriages between countries, rather than to provide for human rights 
guarantees relating to marriages and polygamy is not prohibited for states parties. But states can refuse to recognise plural marriages, 
where plural marriages are not permitted by them according to this document. Only three states have ratified this Convention 
(Australia, Luxembourg, Netherlands), however, and it has little practical effect, even if it reflects the conflicts of laws approach which 
is adopted by most states in practice.  
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which state responses are classified as ‘permissive’, ‘prohibitive’, or ‘combined’ in their 
approach to regulation.166  
 
 
2.5.1 Regulation in Permissive States 
 
Those jurisdictions that express a more tolerant attitude to polygamy are located in the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia, where deference to Islamic personal law, local custom, or both, is 
ordinarily the basis for a permissive approach.167 State intervention to prevent harm is still the 
norm even in permissive societies, where separate systems of personal law tend to co-exist 
alongside other laws that govern family matters.168  Official responses to polygamy in 
permissive states are not uniform, however, and different jurisdictions implement their own 
interpretation of the fairness requirement in Sura 4:3. Formal efforts to ensure fair treatment 
may manifest in the requirement for formal permission to enter into an additional marriage, 
                                                           
166 Angela Campbell, ‘How Have Approaches to Polygamy Responded to Women’s Experiences and Rights? An Internat ional, 
Comparative Analysis' in Angela Campbell and others ‘Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications for Women and Children: A 
collection of Policy Research Reports. Final Report, Status of Women Canada (November, 2005). 
167 Although polygamy is generally less common than monogamy, it is said to be permitted in 85% of societies around the globe 
Katherine Charsley and Anika A Liversage, ‘Transforming Polygamy: Migration, Transnationalism and Multiple Marriages Among 
Muslim Minorities’ (2013) Vol 13(1) Global Networks 60. Although permitted by law, the frequency of polygamous marriages varies 
widely in these areas: while almost 20 per cent of Saudi Arabian marriages are polygamous, the practice is rare in Indonesia, the most 
populous Muslim country. According to Charsley, the highest occurrence is found in Sub-Saharan Africa (citing Coulibaly et al. 1996, in 
Sargent and Cordell 2003: 1962). Although, particularly in the African region, there are different historic justifications for allowing 
polygamy, which include Cameroonian Christian polygamists. Ruth Gaffney also discusses this in her article ‘The Legal Response to 
Polygamous Marriages in England and Wales’ (2011) 4 International Family Law 319 where she confirms that, in several African 
jurisdictions including Mozambique, Kenya, Botswana and Ghana polygamy is a traditional practice governed by customary law, 
Nigerian law permits polygamous marriage according to both customary and Islamic law and that polygamy is also permitted in some 
African and Asian jurisdictions under civil laws which are usually adopted to formalise the customary law position (Zambia) or Islamic 
law (Iran, Pakistan). Another useful comparative account is contained in a report prepared by the Utrecht Centre for European 
Research into Family Law, ‘The Legal Status of Polygamous Marriages: A Comparative Law Perspective’ (2009), available at 
<https://www.wodc.nl/images/1815_volledige_tekst_tcm44-247785.pdf> (accessed 21 April 2017); available in Dutch only, no English 
language version available and Zeitzen (n 73) 14. 
168 Family and personal matters are, for many Muslims, governed by the Qur’an and Shari’a over ordinary civil law. This is in part 
because the Qur’an devotes much attention to marriage, divorce, inheritance and other personal matters. The extent to which Muslim 
personal law applies for Muslims around the world varies. Its application may be governed in some instances by an over-arching civil 
code, such as in India, where the formal application of Muslim personal law is governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act 1937, along with other legislation dealing with specific issues such as marriage. For more information on Muslim 
personal law see Pearl and Menski (n 98) and Andrew Rippin (ed) The Islamic World (Routledge, 2008).  
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and that permission may be refused where evidence can be produced to show that a husband 
will not be able to treat his wives equally.169  In some states it is possible for wives to insert 
additional clauses into marriage contracts prior to a marriage that remove the right of their 
husband to take an additional wife, thereby protecting women from being forced into 
polygamous families. Where a contractual prohibition is ignored, this may be considered a 
valid ground for a wife to obtain a divorce.170 In other permissive states, polygamy is permitted 
with very few restrictions, except those that are set out in the Qur’an.171 
                                                           
169 In Pakistan, Morocco, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Libya, Syria and Somalia for example, formal judicial permission must be obtained 
before a polygamous marriage can be entered into. In Pakistan, The Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961 governs personal laws for 
Muslims, allowing polygamy provided the consent of all wives is gained in advance and the husband is able to show he can adequately 
and fairly take care of all wives. In Iran, The Family Protection Act 1967 provides legal protection for women in plural marriages, 
although here, it is the husband’s finances and his capacity to treat all of his wives equally which are assessed by a court before any 
permission is granted and a polygamous marriage can go ahead. The law in Iran also prescribes punishment for any man who contracts 
a polygamous marriage without adhering to the strict legal prerequisites, where the husband is liable to imprisonment for up to two 
years. In Iraq, The Iraqi Law of Personal Status 1959, which says a polygamous marriage will not be permitted unless prior authorisation 
from a judge is obtained, that authorisation being based on an assessment of the husband’s position and a decision that he is financially 
capable of supporting two wives and that there is not risk of unequal treatment. In Somalia, The Somali Family Law of 1975 provides 
the permission of a court must first be obtained before a second marriage can be contracted. The utility of this law is limited by the 
fact a wide range of factors may be considered good reasons for a husband to take an additional wife, including an earlier wife’s 
sterility and illness, as well as ‘social necessity’. The Marriage Law (1974) requires that strict conditions must be complied with before 
a second marriage can be entered into in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Islamic state, and wives must first give their permission. 
The Syrian Law of Personal Status provides that a husband must be in a position to support additional wives to enter into a polygamous 
marriage - 1953 (Decree No. 59 of 1953), although at the time of writing there are obvious difficulties with enforcement. There are 
also legal restrictions on polygamy in Yemen (Family Law No 1 (1974), which upholds monogamy as the preferred form of marriage, 
although polygamy may be permitted by a court where a wife is deemed not to be able to provide children or is sick)  and Singapore 
(Muslim Marriage Act 1966 and the Administration of Muslim Law Act (1966). More information about polygamy in Pakistan in the 
Report of the Pakistani Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, Gazette of Pakistan, “Extraordinary”, June 20, 1956, 1215-1218. 
Bangladesh has taken some of the provisions of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance from Pakistan and has enacted the Muslim 
Marriages, Divorces (Registration) Act (1974) which allows polygamy provided formal permission has previously been obtained, 
although the climate becoming ever more hostile locally towards polygamy, with stronger legal controls including the introduction of 
taxes for any man wishing to enter into a polygamous marriage (Peter Foster, ‘Bangladeshi men face tax on polygamy’ The Telegraph 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/bangladesh/1520485/Bangladeshi-men-face-tax-on-polygamy.html> (6 June 
2006). For an overview see Angela Campbell (n 166) 33. 
170 For example, divorce is permitted for women in polygamous marriages in Morocco, either because equal treatment is not possible, 
or because any second marriage is not permitted under a marriage contract. Similar restrictions are in place in Algeria and Egypt, 
where men must have a clear and genuine need to enter into a second marriage and must treat each wife equally, and where women 
are able to get a divorce because they object to a second marriage. 
171 Angela Campbell (n 166) 33. In Saudi Arabia, for example, where state regulation is not generally provided where a wife chooses 
to leave a polygamous marriage, she will lose all financial benefits, including maintenance and her right to live in a particular home, 
unless it is registered in her name. 
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Despite regulation in jurisdictions where polygamy is permitted and its potential to provide 
some protection from harm, there are often difficulties in enforcing protective laws in practice. 
In some cases, this may be because women come under pressure, be it familial or practical, 
not to exercise their rights under the marriage contract, or a court may simply give a husband’s 
evidence more weight, or take it as unchallenged whether there is a dispute over a polygamous 
marriage.172 Any apparent protection offered by a legislative obligation on husbands or a 
marriage contract may simply not be effective in reality. By way of example, in Pakistan, while 
legislative protections exist, the law that are designed to protect women in polygamous 
marriages have been described as a ‘dead letter’ because the authorities make little effort to 
enforce them.173 Further, in states like Somalia, Syria and Libya, where effective and 
functioning governmental, legal and administrative authorities do not always exist, with the 
best will in the world, the laws designed to protect women in polygamous marriage are virtually 
impossible to enforce. A lack of education or knowledge on the part of women may also make 
protection utterly useless in practice, despite the existence of formal legal protections. 
 
 
2.5.2 Regulation in Combined States 
 
In ‘combined’ states polygamy is permitted, but only for certain members of the community 
or in particular cases.174 In India for example, polygamy is banned, although only among 
                                                           
172 Pearl and Menski (n 98) 244,  
173 Pearl and Menski (n 98) 256, 257. For a discussion on regulation in permissive states which suggests that such regulation signals 
the beginning of the end for polygamy in the Islamic world see Ameneh Maghzi and Mark Gruchy ‘The Dialectic of Islam and Polygamy’ 
in Ronald C Den Otter ‘Beyond Same Sex Marriage: Perspectives on Marital Possibilities (Lexington, 2016). 
174 The term ‘combined’ is adopted directly from the research of Angela Campbell (n 166) 28, to categorise those states that have 
dual systems of marriage management so that polygamy is permitted in some situations for some people, and prohibited in others. 
This approach might also be referred to as ‘tolerance’ but that term is not used in part because it has a range of more broad 
connotations in academic literature, for example in denoting behaviour which is designed to make the state look virtuous, or as though 
it is protecting behaviour which is valued (for example, like free speech, or women’s rights), or in a more subversive way as  ‘tactic of 
subjection’ where tolerance is actually used to keep the ‘other’ contained. It is that final idea of tolerance which might most closely 
be associated with states which opt for a combined approach to polygamy in that they do not seek to do so in an effort to align 
themselves with virtue, rather, they permit polygamy in grudging acceptance of their Muslim population, and largely because it 
provides the opportunity to contain the application of personal law according to the Qur’an. Either way, the idea of ‘tolerance’ is 
complex and loaded, and so it is not generally used here to describe states whose default is to be prohibitive but who allow polygamy 
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Hindus. It is tolerated for Muslims, if not encouraged.175 In some cases, Indian judges have 
indicated real concern about the on-going practice of polygamy, even referring to it as an 
“unremitting wrong” to the first wife in any polygamous marriage.176 However, despite 
polygamy being banned for Hindus and there being some unease about the operation of a dual 
system of personal law giving Muslim men more freedom than others, the Indian Government 
has not legislated specifically to provide additional protection for Muslim wives in the way 
other states with large numbers of Muslim inhabitants have done.177 Some African states have 
also adopted laws that plot a combined path between customary and civil laws, attempting to 
balance the two. Prospective spouses in such jurisdictions are often free to choose whether 
they wish to marry under the civil law or according to customary laws that allow polygamy. 
The South African Law Reform Commission has also recommended the right to marry 
polygamously be extended to Muslims marrying under Islamic Law. Should this 
recommendation be taken up, South Africa will operate a combined approach to the practice 
of polygamous marriage which takes into account civil, customary and religious lives of 
citizens, an approach already adopted by other African states.178  
                                                           
for Muslims. For more information on the idea of tolerance see Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion; Tolerance in the Age of Identity 
and Empire (PUP, 2006) 25, 105 and Lorenzo Zucca ‘Tolerance or Toleration? How to Deal with Religious Conflicts in Europe (August 
12, 2010) in A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape (OUP, forthcoming) SSRN: 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592425> (accessed 22 April 2017). 
175 The Hindu Marriage Act (1955) bans polygamy for Hindus. The leading Indian case on Muslim polygamy is Itwari v Asghari AIR 
1960 A1 684, polygamy is to be “… tolerated but not encouraged.” See also Cyra Choudhury, ‘Between Tradition and Progress: A 
Comparative Perspective on Polygamy in the United States and India’ (2012) 83 University of Colorado Law Review 963  for a brief 
history of the response to polygamy in India, where she says the banning was piecemeal to being with and the case State of Bombay 
v Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84, 18 (India) challenged The Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act 1946, the 
legislation that preceded the federal legislation post-independence. In this case, the court reached a similar conclusion to that in 
Reynolds, upholding criminalisation of plural marriage for Hindus. 
176 For examples of the strength of opinion in Indian judicial comment, see also Ayat-un-Nissa v Karam Ali, ILR [1908] 36 Cal 23, 
referring to polygamy as a continuing wrong to the first wife; Shahulameedu v Subaida Beevi, 1970 KLT 4, where the judge expressed 
the view that it was unlikely plural marriage was supported in Muslim law and “...those who quote the scared Koran or cite the holy 
Prophet as sanctioning for a male the rather unholy practice of a conjugal quadrangle are sinning against their religion itself”.  
177 Pearl and Menski (n 98) 244; general acts of parliament are used together with the Indian Constitution, in line with the wording 
and interpretation of the Qur’an, to regulate polygamy. The political climate and the sometimes violent tension between Hindus and 
Muslims in India may explain the reluctance on the part of the Indian government to legislate to restrict or ban polygamy for Muslims, 
despite obvious concern. 
178 Angela Campbell (n 166) 27 which mentions the extension of rights to women married under customary law, the basis for which 
is they will be at risk of economic instability and hardship. Commentators have said this is a more appropriate response to customary 




2.5.3 Regulation in Prohibitive States 
 
Prohibitive states are those that have rejected the idea of regulation in favour of an outright 
ban. Using civil law, prohibitive states make polygamous marriages invalid, ensuring they do 
not benefit from legal entitlements. Using criminal law, where states object strongly to 
polygamy they may also punish plural marriage by providing criminal sanctions for 
polygamous cohabitation.179 This group includes states where Islam is the prevailing religion. 
In Tunisia and Turkey, for example, legislators have introduced an outright ban based largely 
on concerns over gender equality and fairness, and the challenges associated with the effective 
regulation of polygamous marriages. Polygamy is most often proscribed, however, in states 
where Islam does not dominate, including across North America, the United Kingdom, the 
European Union, Australia, New Zealand and in some parts of Asia, the Pacific, and Central 
and South America.180 Unlike most jurisdictions where Islam is a major religious influence, 
these states insist on monogamy for all citizens, be they Muslim or not. Where a spouse wishes 
to marry again, they will generally insist on a legal separation between a husband and wife 
before any other relationship is formally, and sometimes informally (or religiously), entered 
into. 
 
Despite the much less accommodating approach to polygamy in prohibitive states, it is worth 
noting that de facto polygamy continues to occur in many of these jurisdictions, in a number of 
                                                           
179 Fournier’s discussion (n 127) provides a useful overview. 
180 In New Zealand marriage is defined in s 2 Family Proceedings Act and, like the position in the United Kingdom, that includes valid, 
foreign polygamous marriages for non-domiciles. Bigamy is, however, proscribed by s 205 Crimes Act 1961. In Australia, marriage is 
governed by the Marriage Act 1961. Bigamy is an offence in all States and Territories in Australia (s 94 Marriage Act 1961). Calls for 
recognition of domestic polygamy for customary reasons have been rejected in Australia and New Zealand, see Australian Law Reform 
Commission ‘Multiculturalism and the Law’ (Report No 57) (1992) 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/alrc57.pdf> accessed 22 April 2917 and Australian Law Reform 
Commission (Report No 31) ‘The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (1986) 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/ALRC31.pdf> accessed 22 April 2017, Ann Black ‘In the Shadow of our 
Legal System: Shari’a Courts in Australia in Ahdar, Rex (ed) Shari’a Law in the West (OUP, 2010), and Rangi Kerehoma v Pub Tr [1918] 
NZLR 903 (SC) available at <http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZGazLawRp/1918/145.html?query=rangi%20kerehoma> 
accessed 22 April 2017, and Nan Seurffert ‘Shaping the Modern Nation: Colonial Marriage Law, Polygamy and Concubinage in Aotearoa 
New Zealand (2003) 7 Law Text and Culture 186, 207-12. 
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different forms. Most notably in the North American region, Mormon fundamentalist 
polygamous families have long existed, persistently ignoring state and federal prohibitions on 
plural marriage since The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints was founded by Joseph 
Smith in North America in 1830.181 For Mormons, marriage is central both to religious faith 
and social interaction because it is viewed as being essential to resurrection after death and 
becoming closer to God. The ‘Doctrine and Covenants of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints’ makes it clear that plural marriage is not available to women, and is—as it 
is in Islam—the limited privilege of men.182 Mormon polygamy was criminalised under the 
Morrill Act in 1862, which prohibited plural marriage in all territories of the United States.183  
This legal ban was not particularly successful in eliminating polygamy, however, and Mormons 
continued to enter into polygamous marriages.  
 
In North America, the recent case of Brown v Buhman has challenged Utah’s state ban on 
religious polygamy.184 The Browns became famous following their reality television show 
‘Sister Wives’ and were prosecuted by state authorities as a result. The lower Court struck 
down the criminal prohibition on polygamy as unconstitutional. This decision was appealed 
by the state of Utah, and that appeal was dismissed for technical reasons relating to standing.185 
                                                           
181 Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of the Latter Day Saints (Doctrine and Covenants), Section 132, Verses 61-63; “… [if] after 
she is espoused, [she] shall be with another man, she has committed adultery, and shall be destroyed …” However, the polygamy  
practised by Mormons differs in a range of ways from that practised according to the precepts of Islam. In Mormon polygamy, there 
is no limit on the number of wives a husband may take and there is no underlying set of guiding principles for participants of Mormon 
plural marriage to follow. Further, according to the Doctrine and Covenants any man who does not abide by the covenant to enter 
into plural marriage is damned and may not be permitted to enjoy the glory of God in the afterlife, lending polygamy an almost 
compulsory character for fundamentalist Mormons; a sentiment which is completely absent from Islamic polygamous doctrine. In 
Islam a maximum of four wives is permitted and the Qur’an also contains guidance as to the equal treatment of wives. For a  helpful 
overview of Mormon polygamy and its regulation in the United States, see Sigman (n 78).  
182 Doctrine and Covenants, Section 132, Verse 4. 
183 This was according to c. 126 of the elaborately named ‘Act to Punish and Prevent the Practice of Polygamy in the Territories of 
the United States and Other Places, and Disapproving and Annulling Certain Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah 
1862’ also known as the ‘Morrill Act’. The Act stated that “… every person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any other 
person, whether married or single, in a Territory of the United States, or other place over which the United States have exclusive 
jurisdiction, shall ... be adjudged guilty of bigamy, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred 
dollars, and by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.”  
184 Brown v Buhman (10th Circuit) (n 9). 
185 Brown v Buhman (10th Circuit) (n 9).In effect,  because the Browns were no longer being prosecuted by the State for polygamy, 
they had no standing to bring the case against the State.  
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Although the state authorities withdrew the prosecution, the Browns sought leave to appeal 
to the Supreme Court, on the basis that the continued possibility of prosecution breached 
their right to religious freedom, privacy and free speech. That request was denied earlier this 
year, arguably leaving the future direction of the American approach to polygamous 
cohabitation somewhat unsettled.186 In any event, the initial decision in the Brown case 
illustrates a judicial willingness for sharp formal divergence from the reasoning of earlier, much 
more prohibitive cases on polygamy in the United States, like that in Reynolds. As the Brown 
case played out it became apparent that, in the absence of any clear harm or abuse, the Court 
was willing either to condone or ignore religious polygamy on the basis that not doing so 
would cause much greater harm to the parties involved. In this regard, Brown reflects a greater 
willingness to engage with the reality of polygamous marriage instead of simply casting 
polygamy as an irredeemably harmful practice, as in Reynolds.187 As Ron Otter has written in 
defence of plural marriage, simple references to harm, whether to women, society or in 
offending rights, are increasingly being called into question in prohibitive states, so that where 
states wish to maintain criminal prohibitions on polygamy: 
 
[I]n articulating their normative constitutional view, they will have to do more than 
consult a dictionary, refer to religious understandings, conduct survey research, 
embrace “tradition”, investigate how most people happen to use the “m” word, put 
forth empirically unfounded claims, or generalise from outliers. 
 
When it comes to polygamy, the very foundation of constitutional rights and their relationship 
with harm are increasingly being put to the test in prohibitive states as those who seek the 
freedom to marry unconventionally are resisting legislative requirements to do otherwise.188  
                                                           
186 Brown v. Buhman (No 16-333) 580 US  (1.23.2017).  
In practice the state authorities tend not to prosecute unless there is abuse, breach of another law like child marriage, etc.  
187 Reynolds (n 108).  
188 Casey Faucon, ‘Polygamy After Windsor: What’s Religion Got to do with It?’ (2015) 9 Harvard Law & Policy Review 471 says the 
legal tide is beginning to shift in favour of polygamists in America. The focus in Brown signifies a sharp turn away from the reasoning 
in Reynolds, even if this doesn’t represent a change to the legal definition of civil marriage, which still involves only two people. 
Strassberg has argued strongly against this position, stating the state ought to have relied on the reasoning in the Bountiful case, 
instead of the Reynolds reasoning, in arguing to maintain the criminalisation of polygamy. The Bountiful reasoning was “compelling” 
according to Strassberg and had the state offered it to the court in Brown, she suggests the outcome would have been different. See 
also Ron C Den Otter, ‘Three May not be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage’ (2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 
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Over the border, the ‘Bountiful’ Mormon polygamous community in Canada has also attracted 
the attention of the state and the legal community as a result of the provincial government 
raising the question of the reasonableness of the enforcement of anti-polygamy laws. The 
Bountiful case, in which the constitutional legality of the ban on polygamy in Canada was 
questioned, also raised issues reminiscent of the Reynolds decision over a hundred years earlier, 
with the provincial authorities asking the British Columbia Supreme Court to consider whether 
the criminal law prohibiting polygamy in Canada is consistent with the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.189 The underlying reason for the referral of this question to the Court 
was to establish whether or not the provincial authorities might prosecute polygamists 
according to the Canadian Criminal Code which bans polygamy, without violating the right to 
religious freedom and free association, which is expressly protected according to the Canadian 
Charter, itself supreme law.190 Unlike the District Court in Brown, the provincial Court in 
Bountiful concluded, “… there is no such thing as good polygamy” and came to the decision 
that an assessment of this type must again essentially be concerned with harm.191 The Court 
in Bountiful framed its objections to polygamy in the context of an increased risk of harm to 
individuals—specifically, women—in polygamous marriages and the criminal prohibition on 
plural marriage was upheld on that basis.192 Despite the outcome the Bountiful case has 
provided a prompt for prolific academic, legal and policy discussion on polygamy and it is 
                                                           
1747 where he says similar things, but this time in favour of recognising polygamy, referring to United States v Windsor 570 US _ 
(2013) where strong references to dignity are likely to mean judges may be more reluctant to “… restrict marriage to a man and a 
woman if such a restriction is predicated upon demeaning sexual minorities.”  He goes on “[A]t stake is nothing less than discerning 
the meaning of the United States Constitution when those who have different ideas about marital relationships want the freedom to 
live unconventionally” (at 1981) 
189 Reynolds (n 108).  
190 Reference (n 5), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
191 Reference (n 5) paragraph 1343. 
192 Reference (n 5) paragraph 1343.Prior to Brown, courts at all levels in the USA had consistently upheld the constitutional validity 
of prohibitions on plural marriage in the face of challenges on the grounds of free exercise, due process or equal protection, according 
to the evidence of Professor Hamilton, cited in the Bountiful decision, paragraph 334. The only similar case in the United Kingdom is 
that of Bibi v United Kingdom, Application No. 19628/92, a claim to the European Court of Human Rights against immigration 
restrictions on polygamous families, primarily focused on the right to a family life under Article 8 ECHR.  
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clear there remains strong support for rethinking polygamy, harm and its regulation, with many 
scholars calling for polygamy either to be recognised or de-criminalised.193 
 
While Mormons continue to be the most prominent polygamists in North America, other 
communities also practice polygamy in this region. In particular, it is becoming more evident 
among first and subsequent generation Muslim migrant families. Although still less visible than 
Mormon fundamentalist polygamy in North America, evidence exists to show that Muslims 
and other migrants have settled in the United States, where they practice polygamy illegally.194 
In spite of it being universally prohibited, polygamy among Muslim communities is also now 
more prominent across Western Europe, and this is likely to be largely as a result of increasing 
numbers of Muslim migrants to the region. While it is not possible to obtain reliable statistics 
for the rates of Islamic polygamy in Europe, globalisation, post-war migration from former 
colonies and recent conflict have all resulted in an increase in the movement of people and a 
rise in migrants to European countries.195 Early migrants brought their polygamous families 
with them prior to immigration bans, and more recently there is evidence that male workers 
who have come as economic migrants have met their emotional needs following separation 
from their families at home by taking new wives and establishing families in their new home 
                                                           
193 There are many scholars discussing polygamy in the Canadian context, but the primary ones among them calling for a polygamy 
‘re-think’ are Angela Campbell ‘’Wives’ Tales: Reflecting on Research in Bountiful’ in Provost, René and Sheppard, Colleen (eds) 
Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer, New York 2013); Sister Wives, Surrogates and Sex Workers: Outlaws by 
Choice? (Ashgate, Farnham 2013); ‘Bountiful’s Plural Marriages’ (n 6) 43, where Campbell encourages the privileging of the 
experiences of women in polygamous marriage in discussing whether the state ought to reconsider its approach to the criminalisation 
of polygamy in particular. Martha Bailey and Amy Kaufman have also examined the treatment of various forms of polygamy, resisting 
calls for its legalisation in the domestic sphere, but questioning it criminalisation, and also suggesting wider acceptance of foreign 
polygamous marriages in Polygamy in the Monogamous World (n 2) and ‘Should Civil Marriage Be Opened Up To Multiple Parties?’ (n 
8) 1747. Other collections illustrate the increasing Canadian and wider North American interest in polygamy, including, Janet Bennion 
and Lisa Fishbayn Joffe (eds) The Polygamy Question (n 7) and Gillian Calder and Lori G Beaman Polygamy’s Rights and Wrongs (n 6).  
194 For example, the Hmong people From Laos, who helped the Americans in the Vietnam War and settled in the United States 
afterwards. Zeitzen (n 73) 166. For more information see Kecia Ali, (n 100) 620. 
195 K Charsley and A Liversage (n 167) 4. Zeitzen (n 73) 5, where the authors confirm it is not possible to get reliable statistics on rates 
of polygamy for Muslim populations in Europe. See also Ziauddin Sardar in Syed Z Abedin and Ziauddin Sardar (eds) Muslim Minorities 
in the West (Grey Seal, 1995) 1, where Sardar estimates there are 15 million Muslims in Europe. Different countries have Muslims 
predominantly from different places; for Germany often its Turkey, for France the Maghreb, Muslims living in England are historically 
South Asian, although increasingly they come from sub Saharan Africa and Middle East conflict zones. This is largely in contrast with 
North America where selective immigration policies have targeted middle class and professional Muslim groups.  
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country.196 Research has shown that this sort of transnational polygamy is often practised by 
young men who wish to fulfil dual marital aspirations for a range of reasons.197 This may be 
either because divorce is viewed negatively by their religious and cultural communities at 
home, or because they are trying simply to maintain companionship where they are working, 
while at the same time, preserve the families they have left behind. These polygamous 
relationships involve multiple marriages, only one of which is registered and recognised in the 
receiving state. The parallel existence of religious and civil marriages (and in some cases, 
divorces) or transnational marriages that are recognised in separate civil contexts creates the 
opportunity for polygamy to exist in prohibitive states in Europe, without engaging the legal 
system which prohibits it. In this example, migration clearly creates the conditions, the 
opportunity and in some cases, the motivation for polygamy so that:  
 
[C]o-existing legal systems within and between countries, norms surrounding 
marriage and divorce, tensions of competing marital aspirations, and the distance 
created by migration, all combine to create situations where men (and, to a much 
lesser extent, also women) are, in one form or another, married to more than one 
person at the same time.198 
 
Whatever the prompt, the increased incidence and visibility of polygamy in many parts of 
Europe even though plural marriage is not permitted, has illustrated that “no culture is 
immune from outside influences or indeed from increasingly self confident internal forces for 
change” however prohibitive it may formally be.199 In spite of strict legal prohibitions on plural 
marriage, economic migrants and refugees have commonly brought polygamy with them to 
Europe through whatever means possible.200  
 
 
                                                           
196 K Charsley and A Liversage (n 167)  
197 K Charsley and A Liversage (n 167) 10. Charsley also talks about marriage being used as a way of circumnavigating immigration 
restrictions in Denmark; the so called ‘Turkish Trick’ –where a male migrant later divorces his Danish wife and returns to Turkey to 
bring his Turkish wife to Denmark with him, although this has been made more difficult in practice with changes to Danish law. 
198 K Charsley and A Liversage (n 167) 17, 20. 
199 Zeitzen (n 73) 165.  
200 K Charsley and A Liversage (n 167) 5. 
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2.6 Rethinking Polygamy and Harm 
 
2.6.1 The Benefit in Rethinking Harm 
 
As this chapter has sought to outline, the association between polygamy and harm is long and 
it remains strong today, cross a range of jurisdictions. Certainly in the West, the overriding 
view of polygamy is that it is inconsistent with human rights and feminist aims, as well as 
harmful to women and society, requiring strong regulation in the form of outright prohibition. 
However, while polygamy has a strong association with harm, that link is not always 
unconditionally accepted. Despite the apparently overwhelming evidence of the harm caused 
by polygamy, calls for more thoughtful legal treatment have been made. The discussion on 
polygamy and harm has been particularly active in the North American context, where 
questions about polygamy’s inherent harmfulness have been situated in a more progressive 
dialogue which does not rely on categorising the uncivilised ‘them’ from the civilised ‘us’; a 
discourse which ignores the “messy, lived experiences of family and community life [which 
defy] the categorisation of polygamy as either harmful or unproblematic.”201 
 
As part of a collection of reports produced to reflect on the legal and social implications of 
polygamy around the same time as Cook and Kelly’s research, Professor Angela Campbell 
offers a more considered view of the link between polygamy and harm.202 Her report, focusing 
more broadly on polygamy in an international setting and intended to assess whether responses 
to polygamy adequately address the “needs, interests and realities…” of women living within 
plural marriage, concludes that:  
 
…[g]iven the diversity within the global community of women in polygamous 
marriages, it is extremely difficult to draw a single, unqualified conclusion as to 
                                                           
201 Lori Beaman addresses this question directly in ‘Is Polygamy Inherently Harmful?’ in Calder and Beaman (n 6) 2. For additional 
commentary in this context see also Sigman (n 78).  
202 Angela Campbell (n 166) with the objective of enhancing public debate on gender equality and bringing that debate to bear on 
policy development, and asks for the issues to be viewed more closely and outside of the usual rhetoric, with a focus on women’s 
actual experiences of both polygamy and its regulation. 
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how women experience polygamy. While some women might suffer socially, 
economically and health-wise as a result of polygamous life, others might benefit.203 
 
Applying the contents of that report to the issue of the Canadian government’s response to 
polygamy, Professor Campbell recommends a more nuanced response to the multifaceted 
experiences of women who are in plural marriages.204 She provides support for that suggestion 
in her criticism of the usual normative focus on gender equality concerns and religious rights, 
repeatedly recommending a more rigorous examination is needed of “polygamy’s actual 
implications for plural wives, and … awareness of the lived experiences of [women in 
polygamous communities].” While the report does not comment on polygamy and harm per 
se, Campbell does draw a link in her research to the act of criminalising polygamy and the 
hardship this causes, most often to the women it is intended to protect. Campbell’s interviews 
with members of the Bountiful community reveal, whether or not criminal prohibitions are 
strictly enforced, women feel stigmatised by the moral expression of criminal sanction, and 
experience hostility and intolerance as a result.205 Whether or not criminal sanctions are 
implemented, Campbell’s research suggests it is wise for any debate regarding polygamy not 
simply to assume it is a practice that is always hostile to women and children within the 
ordinary critical framework.206 Rather than simply accepting the “situated knowledge of the 
golden few” who, she says, we assume stand on a morally prominent high ground with all the 
                                                           
203 Campbell (n 166) 10.  
204 Campbell (n 166) 10. 
205 Campbell ‘Bountiful’s Plural Marriages’ (n 6) where she invites the reader to view the community of Bountiful in a way which is 
not automatically associated with coercion. While her paper is not intended to comment on harm per se, she does discuss the concern 
over harm with polygamy in some detail and her article presents the Bountiful community in a less patriarchal and unequal light, 
offering insight into the impact doing so might have on formal, juridical approaches to polygamy as a result.  
206 The reasons for the hostile assumptions regarding polygamy are explored in Elizabeth Emens (n 9) where the author investigates 
why, when marriage involving different sexes is being discussed so willingly, is marriage involving different numbers of people still so 
widely assumed to be undesirable, particularly when people practice so many alternatives to monogamy in the form of either adultery 
or serial polygamy (divorce and re-marriage). Emens focuses on polyamory, or less formal multi-partnered relationships in her study, 
asking whether objections to it are because it is associated with the more patriarchal, historic notions of polygamy, and what 
consequences the current approach has in terms of marriage, divorce, custody, property sharing, etc. Emens cites norms and law 
which urge people (in the West at least) strongly towards monogamy, and which pressure anyone with non-monogamous aspirations 
to keep them to themselves, irrespective of the fact they may be beneficial and not harmful to the people involved. To this end, 
similarly to the recommendations put forward by Adrienne Davis (n 9) Emens recommends laws prohibiting things like polygamy or 
adultery become default rules which parties can contract out of, if they so wish. See also Faucon ‘Marriage Outlaws’ (n 87) on effective 
regulation of religious polygamous  marriages in the West. 
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authority that entails, it is important that the realities of women’s lives are discussed. Campbell 
is eager to ensure that the true source of any hardship women experience is exposed, faced 
and responded to appropriately—a suggestion which is built on later in this work not only in 
the context of domestic legal responses to polygamy but also with regard to its treatment in 
human rights and feminist theory.207 Rather than assuming polygamy is universally harmful, 
without any additional consideration of women’s context or experience, Campbell suggests 
government policy would be more effective if targeted specifically at factors which are 
detrimental to women (such as abuse, poverty, coercion, ill health, etc.), and not so rooted in 
universal objection.208  
 
Focusing on the fundamentalist Mormon community in North America, Emily Duncan has 
also reasoned that public reaction to raids on Mormon compounds as well as anti-polygamous 
legislation have served only to drive polygamy underground and cause more harm, because 
the authorities are less capable of investigating actual harms that occur, including forced 
marriage, underage marriage, incest, rape or other violence or welfare fraud.209 In asking the 
reader to re-consider the prohibition of polygamy on the basis of harm, Duncan draws an 
interesting comparison between alcohol prohibition and plural marriage. She cites the 
prohibitive approach of teetotal President, John D. Rockefeller, who supported the repeal of 
the ban on alcohol because he believed it led to an increased disregard for the law, which 
ultimately drove the consumption of alcohol underground and exacerbated its negative 
effects.210 According to this reasoning, more effective regulation is needed; regulation which 
reflects the practical realities of polygamy, rather than a public policy which adopts an assumed 
morality and is not effective at all at preventing harm in practice. Duncan is of the view that 
legalising polygamy will bring polygamous communities into the open and promote 
collaboration between polygamist families and the state, which will reduce abuse and enable 
the authorities to prosecute crimes more easily. To this end, she recommends the state focus 
                                                           
207 Angela Campbell ‘Bountiful’s Voices’ (n 6) 60 where she quotes Matsuda ‘Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness 
Problem’ (1989-90) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1763, at 1764.  
208 Campbell (n 166) 11. 
209 Emily J Duncan (n 73) 332 “Thus, if there is to be a rational policy in this area, it should consider the legalization of polygamy, 
thereby allowing greater regulation of the practice, compelling polygynous communities to emerge from the shadows, and openly 
assisting the women and children who live in them.” 
210 Duncan (n 73) 315.  
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on the real crimes, not the apparent crime of culture. In her view, unless such changes occur, 
polygamists will be left to practice polygamy in whatever way the most dominant among them 
wants.211  Increasing numbers of authors are supporting the more thoughtful approach to 
polygamy suggested by Campbell and Duncan, lamenting: 
 
… the disconnect between the empirical reality of polygamous practice, on the one 
hand, and legal policy and law enforcement, on the other, has emphasized imagined 
harms at the expense of existing harms-or even state-created new ones.212 
 
In this regard, the social surroundings for the practice of polygamy are elevated in 
considerations about harm. Whether there is gender equality, or not, depends more on formal 
responses to polygamy which avoid ‘smuggling in’ assumptions that render it helplessly 
harmful.213 Once the possibility for redemption is accepted, the recommendation which most 
often flows as a result is that polygamy at least be decriminalised, allowing the state to focus 
on more useful, direct measures to prevent the commission of crimes often associated with its 
practice.214 The morality arguments so heavily relied on in early case law and still cited today 
by conservative judges regarding the threat that polygamy poses to community well being are 
being relied on less and less. Further, so far as equality and rights arguments are concerned, 
more and more, women’s rights are viewed as better served by recognising polygamy, than 
                                                           
211 Duncan (n 73) 334.  
212 Sigman (n 78). 
213 Cheshire Calhoun, ‘Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage’ (2005) 42 San  Diego Law Review 1023, 1039, where she says whether 
or not polygamy is unequal for women depends very much on the form of ‘social practice’ that polygamy takes. “The customary social 
practices associated with polygamy help determine the degree of gender equality, mutuality, and individual autonomy versus 
unilateral dominance and gender inequality that is likely to occur…” Calhoun refers to Nancy Rosenblum who suggests something 
along the lines of Adrienne Davis in terms of regulation where she says, “There is no reason why egalitarian norms of property 
distribution, parenting and the division of domestic and market labour recommended by democratic theorists could not be adjus ted 
for plural marriage.” Calhoun  also says the legal form of polygamy matters to equality outcomes, and in this regard she says it would 
have to be recognised as valid for same sex polygamous unions for example. Calhoun’s concern is with objections to polygamy being 
based on assumptions which ‘smuggle in’ a whole host of other assumptions about the background social conditions for women which 
render polygamy unequal. 
214 A wide range of views on the effective regulation of polygamy is provided in Bennion and Fishbayn Joffe (eds) (n 7) including an 
additional discussion on the relative downsides and benefits of polygamy for women in Debra Majeed, ‘Ethics of Sisterhood; African 
American Muslim Women and Polygyny’ at 85. An economic account of the effect on women is provided at Shoshana Grossbard ‘An 
Economist’s Perspective on Polygyny’ at 103.  
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not.215 So much is the tide beginning to turn with regard to polygamy and traditional 
approaches to the management of perceived harms in the West, one commentator has called 
the notion that monogamy is somehow superior both sociologically false and smug, paving 
the way for voices of those who offer alternative methods of polygamy regulation to be 
audible.216 Among them, commentators like Adrienne Davis not only suggest innovative and 
effective methods for regulating polygamy, in a direct response to the ordinary discourse on 
harm, they contend that to not do so is bad for liberal democratic societies and values.217  
 
It is undoubtedly the case that women’s experience of polygamy is varied—whether women 
have a positive experience is very often more dependent on the socio cultural context of a 
plural marriage and the family relationships within her particular family unit, than the plural 
nature of the marriage itself, and whatever the depth and breadth of formal disapproval, for 
some women, polygamy is a positive experience.218 In societies where being unmarried is 
                                                           
215 Sarah Song in ‘Polygamy Today A Case For Qualified Recognition’ in Bennion and Fishbayn Joffe (eds) (n 7) 199.  
216 Stephanie Forbes, ‘Why Have Just One? : An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws Under the Establishment Clause’ (2003) 39 
Houston Law Review 1517. 
217 Davis (n 9), 1585.  
218 In particular the report by Angela Campbell (n 166) where she concludes that women’s experiences of polygamy vary widely and 
according to context. Angela Campbell continues her analysis in ‘Bountiful’s Plural Marriages’ (n 6) 343, where she explores marriage 
more generally in the Bountiful community, dispelling a range of myths about communities that practice polygamy and showing a  
wide range of polygamous (and other) marriage experiences, including same sex polygamy, taking place in a community which is 
largely presented to the outside world as one where patriarchy and coercion dominate marriage practices, even if her paper does not 
seek to reach a firm normative conclusion about polygamy. Emily Duncan (n 88), also picks up on the idea that polygamy is not all bad, 
quoting one FBI agent familiar with polygynous sects saying, "At least 99% of all polygamists are peaceful, law abiding people, no 
threat to anybody. It's unfortunate that they're stigmatized by a band of renegades” (quoting Bella Stumbo “No Tidy Stereotype; 
Polygamists:  Tale of Two Families, LA Times, May 13, 1988 Part 1 at 1). Sigman (n 78) 143 describes the conventional suggestion that 
polygamy is always harmful as ‘over simplistic’ saying, “… Polygamy can certainly be oppressive and patriarchal—a system that cabins 
women into prototypical gender stereotypes while denying them fundamental rights. Yet polygamy, in other contexts, can be 
communitarian and inclusive, allowing women greater participation in the economics and social structure of the family unit.” Her 
suggestion is supported by Elizabeth Joseph, herself a well known polygamous wife and professional career woman, who has desc ribed 
polygamy as “ am empowering lifestyle which provides her with “ … the environment and opportunity to maximize by female potential 
without all the trade-offs and compromises that attend monogamy” (Las Vegas Sun (n 162). See also Bennion (n 162). Finally, Sonja 
van Wichelen ‘Polygamy Talk and the Politics of Feminism: Contestations over Masculinity in a New Muslim Indonesia’ (2009) 11(1) 
Journal of International Women’s Studies: Gender and Islam in Asia, 178 canvasses the range of views on women who practise 
polygamy in Indonesia, with some women who see it as their pious duty, some who prefer it to men committing adultery or prostitutes, 
and others who are highly educated and career driven who, even now, will choose polygamy over monogamy because of the freedom 
it gives them, like Joseph in the North American setting. 
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shameful, or where an unmarried daughter is an unmanageable economic burden, polygamy 
may offer a solution which is capable of improving women’s lives by offering stability for them 
and their families.219 And it is not just poorer families who have the potential to benefit from 
a polygamous marriage. Educated women who have no wish to be materially dependent on 
their husbands but who wish to be married and have a family may choose to be in a 
polygamous marriage because it suits them by providing an arrangement which allows them 
the time to be successful in their career and be involved in a family life.220 Far from being 
compromised, these women are empowered by their polygamous marriage, because it allows 
them more freedom and independence than they might ordinarily experience in a 
monogamous relationship. In addition, other women will feel supported by the emotional and 
practical support a positive co-wife experience may offer.221 Alternative theories of harm are 
emerging—theories which denounce typical morality, liberal equality, human rights and 
feminist objections, and which increasingly demand that Western and prohibitive states 
reconsider their selective disapproval for plural forms of marriage.  
 
 
2.6.2 The Impact of Not Rethinking Harm 
 
The suggestions made by Campbell, Duncan and others like them are given practical resonance 
in the context of the French ban on polygamous marriage, which was ruthlessly imposed and 
implemented. French authorities had initially been accommodating of large numbers of 
migrants and refugees who had arrived from former colonial outposts and settled over a long 
period of time, so much so that as many as 140,000 polygamous families were thought to exist 
in France in the years preceding the introduction of a ban.222 In 1993 the permissive French 
approach towards polygamy among migrant communities was peremptorily withdrawn when 
                                                           
219 Gaffney-Rhys, Ruth, ‘Polygamy and the Rights of Women’ (2011) Vol 1 Women in Society 2, 8 
220 Las Vegas Sun (n 162) and van Wichelen (n 218) and Gaffney (n 219), 7 where she mentions Mary Potter and Elizabeth Joseph, 
who make this argument. 
221 This is especially true of the Masai, Kung and Mende peoples of Africa, where co-wives consistently report positive feedback of 
their polygamous marriage experience, Gaffney (n 219) 7. 
222 Zeitzen (n 73) 166.  
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the ‘Loi Pasqua’ was introduced.223 The law, so named after the French government minister 
who was responsible for introducing it, banned polygamy outright and prevented husbands 
from living with more than one wife, with the intention of eradicating the harmful practice of 
polygamy among migrants living in France. It also outlawed family reunification for 
polygamous families, preventing co-wives from joining husbands.224 While outright bans on 
polygamy in North America have largely been ignored by authorities in the absence of 
evidence of other, tangible harm, in France the Loi Pasqua was enforced to its fullest extent 
with devastating consequences for those who were affected. Men in polygamous families were 
required to divorce additional wives and plural wives were required to leave their family 
households. The law also applied not only in the future for anyone coming to France, but 
retroactively as well, so that anyone already living in France was affected. The penalty for any 
failure to comply with the Loi Pasqua was the loss of the right to stay and to work, with the 
ultimate penalty for non-compliance being deportation. This caused families who had 
previously been living legally in France to split up or lose their work and residence permits. 
The Loi Pasqua and its unforgiving enforcement caused much harm to Muslim migrant 
families, and particularly to women and children.225 The brutal implementation of the law 
caused hardship and distress to wives who were forced to be without their husbands and very 
often also without any financial support whatsoever. This resulted in many women who were 
made to divorce their husbands being left with nowhere to live and no support, while 
additional wives expecting to join their families were also denied that opportunity. As a result, 
                                                           
223 ‘Loi Pasqua’ (1993) Ordonnance n° 45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945 bis, 30, as inserted/amended by Loi 93-1027 du 24 août 1993, 
Arts 9, 23. Loi Pasqua provides: “Art 9 There is inserted, in the aforementioned ordonnance n° 45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945 
précitée, an article 15 bis in the following terms:  "Notwithstanding arts 14 and 15 [of ordonnance 45-2658], a carte résdident may 
not be issued to a foreign immigrant in a polygamous state nor to the relatives of such immigrant.  Any carte résdident issued in 
contravention of these provisions is withdrawn. Art 23 There is inserted into  a Chapter VI in the following terms: Of family 
reunification; Art 30   Should a polygamous foreigner reside in French territory with a first spouse, the benefit of family reunification 
may not be granted to any other spouse.  Save that [i.e. unless] such other spouse is deceased or deprived of parental rights, nor shall 
his or her children benefit from family reunification. The [right to remain] obtained by another spouse shall be refused or withdrawn 
as the case may be.  The [right to remain] of a polygamous foreign immigrant who has caused to accompany him more than one 
spouse, or children other than those of the first spouse or those of another spouse who is deceased or deprived of his or her parental 
rights, is withdrawn.” 
224 Loi Pasqua  
225 Angela Campbell Status of Women Report (n 166) 18. See Charsley and Liversage (n 167) 19 referring to the French policy and the 
hardship caused, they cite Zeitzen (n 73) 165.  
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the ban on polygamy in France caused a greater level of harm to polygamously married wives 
and their children than any harm which might have been caused by polygamous marriage.  
 
The French example is important because it illustrates starkly an occasion when the putative 
aim of prohibitive states in banning polygamy bears little correlation to its effect in practice.226 
Here, the comments of those in favour of a more productive and fair engagement with 
polygamy have meaning. However, despite the outcome in France and the suggestions of those 
who endorse a more permissive approach to the practice of plural marriage for the sake of 
preventing harm, it is the views expressed in the report by Cook and Kelly which continue to 
reflect the dominant view of polygamy in prohibitive jurisdictions.227 In Western states it is 
easy to find support for the more conventional view of polygamy as so harmful as to 
necessitate its universal prohibition. The Bountiful case illustrates this prevailing view in action. 
Here, as so often, harm was the central concern, and the Court elevated that association 
between the practice of polygamy and harm above the hardship often suffered by a universal 
ban in practice.228 Whatever the reality, the core objections that are often used to promote this 
approach—including the fact that polygamy represents and promotes a patriarchal family 
form, it is harmful to women and threatens host society values—are seemingly automatically 
adopted. One Canadian commentator, Lori Beaman, has described her alarm at this process, 
saying: 
 
                                                           
226 In addition, measures like the Loi Pasqua usually fail completely to eradicate polygamy. For the practice of polygamy in France see 
‘Many Wives Tales’ http://www.economist.com/node/16068972/, The Economist  illustrating the ‘problem’ of polygamy continues 
since the Loi Pasqua was passed over 20 years earlier, estimating there are 200,000 people still living in 16,000-20,000 plural marriages 
across the country. 
227 For additional material recommending the prohibition of polygamy see Witte (n 78), Strassberg (n 66) Bala and Bromwich (n 71) 
where the authors argue there are good reasons for not giving legal sanction to polygamous relationships. In the collection of reports 
for the Status of Women, Canada (Campbell and others n 166), in a report called ‘Separate and Unequal: The Women and Children of 
Polygamy’, while accepting plural marriage is complex and women have a range of experiences, the Alberta Civil Liberties Research 
Centre expresses the clear view that polygamy is likely to infringe on public and personal safety and cause sufficient harm to allow 
anti-polygamy legislation to be enforced.  
228 Reference (n 75). The expert evidence of Angela Campbell, summarising her research highlighting the varied experiences of both 
polygamy and its regulation can be found at <http://www.vancouversun.com/pdf/polygamy/angelacampbell.pdf>.  
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…[the] discourse of harm has stifled well-informed debate about polygamy … 
Harm has become an impenetrable cloak around polygamy that is supported by 
public discourse, including [in] the media and [by] the state.229 
 
In seeking to lift the ‘impenetrable cloak’, Beaman encourages those who object to polygamy 
to take a closer look at the lived experiences of polygamous marriage and family life. In doing 
so, she laments the common, binary presentation of polygamy and those who practice it as 
‘the other’, to be feared and excluded, with all of the implications that raises for the regulation 
of family life, particularly as our concept of the family and the make up of our society evolve. 
Beaman is not alone in her lamentation, either. Where absolute objections to polygamy are 
introduced in immigration settings, others have noted that, like unconditional prohibition of 
polygamy or other religious practices in the domestic sphere, unthinking, universal bans on 
polygamy are much more likely to cause more harm, than good.230 The truth is, strict bans on 
polygamy have not eradicated its practice in prohibitive states. Instead, they have effectively 
denied polygamous wives of rights and protections, leaving them exposed and vulnerable to 
abuse in both domestic and immigration settings. It is the suggestion of this work that these 
unintended consequences of polygamy regulation provide a sound basis for questioning the 
logic of relying on common assumptions about harm to justify the prohibition of polygamy.231 
 
 
2.6.3 Rethinking Harm in Practice 
 
In the face of strong criticism of polygamy in prohibitive states, the range of official responses 
to polygamy around the globe surely provides tangible scope for a legitimately wide breadth 
of measures to respond to concern over harm. Specifically, regarding Muslim polygamy, the 
different forms of regulation outlined here illustrate that Islam is neither uniform nor static, 
corresponding with the view that it is possible to interpret the Qur’an with a degree of fluidity 
and adaptability.232 As outlined earlier, progressive Muslim scholars express the view that the 
                                                           
229 Calder and Beaman (n 7). 
230 Bailey and Kauffman in Campbell and others (n 69) 16. 
231 Calhoun (n 213) 1039. 
232 Kecia Ali (n 100) 627.  
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manifestation of Shari’a can evolve; Islamic law was not intended to be static and the terms of 
the laws that govern the lives of Muslims can change over time.233 Muslim practices can adapt 
and suit the needs of modern society. If those states that take a hard line were to heed the calls 
of more progressive academics, this flexibility in Islam would allow scope to tailor laws truly 
to be effective in preventing harm. In acknowledging this flexibility, politically, it is likely 
always to be more difficult for Western states than for predominantly Muslim states to 
introduce any sort of reform regarding Islamic marriage. Nonetheless, the variation in the 
treatment of polygamy across permissive and combined states does provide a starting point 
for prohibitive states to bring polygamy within the realm of acceptability, even if that seems 
intolerable at first.  
 
The work of Adrienne Davis is helpful in this regard in showing the potential to create space 
for an alternative discourse on the regulation of polygamy in the West.234 The method she 
devises rejects the normative structure used by commentators like Cook and Kelly, as she 
distances her analysis of polygamy and harm from the more conventional approaches which 
focus on human rights like gender equality and religious freedom. Rather, Davis sets her sights 
on the problem of polygamy as one of bargaining and co-operation in a multiple party 
relationship, albeit in a private, rather than a corporate, setting. Davis offers a mode of 
regulation that recognises that polygamy has the capacity to be harmful but which focuses on 
regulating the harms themselves, rather than on the type of marriage. She suggests a paradigm 
for the regulation of polygamy that addresses harm more productively. In articulating a 
                                                           
233 KK Arora, ‘Polygamy: A negation of Qur’an’ in Saraf DN (ed) Social Policy, Law and Protection of Weaker Sections of Society (Eastern 
Book Co., Lucknow 1986) 368-375. Also, Michele Alexandre, (n 87) where the author provides a detailed introduction to ‘Ijtihad’ or 
the recommendation from the Prophet Mohammed that judgment be used in interpreting the Qur’an. The author suggests “Ijtihad is 
one of the many proofs that the basis for Islamic jurisprudence is one of fairness and justice rather than repression and injustice …[and] 
… also indicates that it is possible for Islamic reforms to remain consistent with the spirit of Islam while champ ioning a fair application 
of the law.” She explains many Muslims have remained closed to the possibility of Ijtihad since the 10th century when fears over the 
demise of Islam promoted a more rigid application of Shari’a. encouraging the promotion of a strict interpretation of the Qur’an and 
a rigid approach to day to day life. As Alexandre says “Islam, a once evolving jurisprudence, has been stifled because of the  reluctance 
to use Ijtihad.” “The Qur’an and Sunnah contain a paradigm of equality that is counter to the notions that have been implemented by 
Islamic traditionalists. 
234 Davis, (n 9) acknowledges her work will appall some and amuse others, but her suggestions are serious and helpful and she is 
skilful in drawing parallels between economic and intimate relationships to apply a similar private law solution to their management. 
See also Faucon (n 69) and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International 
Law (Syracuse University Press 1990).  
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method for the effective recognition and regulation of polygamy in a way which is consistent 
with Western, social norms, Davis provides a framework for ensuring fairness where there are 
multiple partners in a relationship. She bases this on the laws of commercial partnerships, 
proposing rules that might accommodate marriages with many wives and reduce the 
vulnerability risked by being a co-wife. Rather than looking to family law or human rights law 
to resolve harms arising out of polygamy, however, she turns to commercial partnership law, 
where she draws analogies and sees solutions to some of the problems of polygamy, were it 
to be practised openly in the West. In so doing, Davis acknowledges that no method of 
regulation is going to be fool proof. However, as she points out, the same can be said for any 
relationship and its management, including monogamous marriage for that matter.235  
 
What Davis’ work does—along with similar suggestions by other commentators—is give 
tangible and functional voice to the notion of regulating polygamy in states that currently 
abhor it, challenging traditional objections based on harm. Her practical suggestions for 
governance are anchored in Western models of regulation, providing the possibility of a 
familiar and tolerable framework to control and manage polygamy, even in the prohibitive 
West. Where harm may arise out of polygamy, it becomes theoretically possible for a state to 
introduce regulation to manage injury and balance competing harms adequately. The potential 
benefit is clear when the detrimental effects from simply banning polygamy and ignoring its 
on-going practice are considered. Very often, as Campbell and others have pointed out, this is 
done at women’s peril. Whatever the well-meaning aims of universal bans, they are 
undoubtedly capable of causing more harm, than good, as the French example so glaringly 
illustrates.  
 
Women in polygamous marriages in the immigration sphere are especially vulnerable to harm 
and also much more likely to be ignored by both states and human rights bodies which have 
                                                           
235 Choudhury (n 175) confirms her view that there’s no real explanation of why monogamy is modern – except perhaps an 
assumption because of its dyadic form – but she says this “conflates form with substance”, recalling the inequality in monogamous 
marriage up until very recently, with women being under the complete control of husbands under the doctrine of coverture, etc. Once 
married, women had little independence and came under the authority of their husbands. The preoccupation with abuse in 
polygamous marriages she says conveniently ignores the fact that abuse occurs and women are vulnerable in the private sphere, 
whatever the form of family. 
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little interest in immigration provisions preventing family reunion for polygamous families.236 
As one prominent immigration practitioner has pointed out, it is vital to question the efficacy 
of any measure to restrict polygamy in immigration, as well as assess the extent to which that 
measure intrudes on the lives and rights of those affected.237  That interference must be 
assessed by asking how crucial are the rights that are breached, and how severe is the day-to-
day impact on those women affected? As this work will attempt to show, in the context of 
migration claims for refugee families, the unintended consequences of banning polygamy are 
severe. The unconditional rejection of polygamy in immigration amounts to an unforgivable 
official abdication of concern for injury caused to displaced polygamous women. Further, as 
this chapter has aimed to show, oblique references to ‘harm’, whether to women or society at 
large, or by referencing human rights standards or feminist discourse, may no longer be 





Plural marriages have been possible for many centuries. Although they may historically have 
been practised by a diverse collection of faiths and cultures, the most common type of 
polygamy nowadays is that which is practised by Muslims and sanctioned by the Qur’an. In 
that connection, while an association between polygamy and harm is likely to have been made 
in the first instance because of the disjuncture between Christian and other religious or cultural 
practices, objections to polygamy on the basis of perceived harm are now most often 
associated with concern over the threat to liberal values, particularly gender equality. The strict 
regulation of polygamy is often justified on the basis of a direct link between plural marriage 
and the injury it causes to co-wives. Although commentators who question this view are 
increasing, the orthodox absolutist approach to polygamy—certainly in the West—is that it is 
universally bad for women, and as a result, must be abolished. Indeed, this view of polygamy 
is common to a divergent collection of critics, be they conservatives whose views are grounded 
                                                           
236 Helena Wray Regulating Marriage Migration (Routledge, London 2011) supports this suggestion, saying the treatment of marriage 
is especially important in immigration, a context where “… other competing interests can easily be downplayed.” 15, 16. 
237 Wray (236) 15, 16 has a very useful discussion on how to deal with regulating marriage migration where a harm is perceived, she 
says this type of analysis can never take place in a cultural vacuum, and can’t be avoided.  
 94 
in moral objections to the practice of polygamy, or supporters of liberal values who fear its 
practice threatens the very fabric of Western society. Those who promote transnational human 
rights standards have also widely condemned polygamy because it is considered inherently 
unequal and likely to breach women’s rights. Traditional, equality feminists share similar views, 
based on concerns over both dominance and gender inequality.  
 
The widespread legal regulation of polygamy, even in states with a more permissive and 
accepting approach to its practice, is perhaps illustrative of this strong link with harm. 
Alternatively, such regulation might also be used to argue that polygamy, like any other 
intimate relationship, has the capacity to be manipulated and to be harmful, and just like other 
marriage practices, it may also be regulated to reduce the potential for harm to be caused. The 
fact that Muslim polygamy is commonly regulated in some, even permissive, states illustrates 
its potential for adaptation—that there isn’t simply one way to be in an Islamic polygamous 
marriage—and that it is possible for polygamous marriages to take account of modern rights-
based and feminist concerns. Moreover, as Adrienne Davis tells us, the possibility of a 
regulatory framework already exists in the corporate legal vernacular, already accepted in the 
West.  And as unconditional and strict prohibition in France has so tragically shown, 
conventional objections to polygamy which lead to its exclusion may result in outcomes which 
reveal much about the impact of such strict prohibition on women, and the real motivation 
for laws prohibiting plural marriage. As the experiences of Muslim co-wives following the 
introduction of the Loi Pasqua so damningly show, women are not always protected by a 
complete ban on polygamy. In fact, such bans themselves have the potential to cause great 
hardship.  
 
Despite that, the feminist and human rights orthodoxy is that the inherently unequal nature 
of polygamy cannot be consistent with superior liberal values. While polygamy is not expressly 
prohibited in any human rights charter, the international human rights community has 
confirmed without equivocation its view that polygamy breaches a wide range of human rights 
instruments, calling for its abolition. Polygamy also offends conventional liberal and 
dominance feminist aims. On the face of it, the practice of polygamy is simply incompatible 
with equality and therefore objectionable in the West. However, it is also clear from more 
recent legal and academic commentary that universal polygamy bans are increasingly being 
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called into question and that a more detailed evaluation of harm is being called on to replace 
the usual conservative, liberal, human rights or feminist basis for determining laws and policy 
on plural marriage.  
 
It is to the consideration of harm and polygamy in the domestic British setting that this work 
now turns, and to an examination of inconsistencies in the legal treatment of polygamy with 
particular focus on displaced polygamous families seeking reunion, for whom any formal 




Chapter 3  
The Contradiction: 
Polygamy in the United Kingdom 
 
 
3.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
 
This chapter is about the treatment of polygamy in the United Kingdom. The first part 
examines the domestic legal approach to polygamy, where harm is more often balanced, and 
the approach to polygamy in immigration, where relative harms are not considered and 
polygamous marriages do not provide any entitlement to immigration rights. Questions of 
harm are considered specifically in the British context as inconsistencies in the state’s formal 
response to polygamy are exposed. As this chapter aims to show, the state’s approach to 
polygamy has never been—and continues not to be—uniform. The second part of this chapter 
explains why these different approaches to polygamy matter. This chapter reflects on whether 
the unqualified rejection of polygamous spouses is acceptable in the refugee context, in 
particular, when banning polygamy is likely to have harsh outcomes for wives denied entry. 
The chapter concludes by suggesting that immigration laws which ban additional wives be 
reconsidered, to take account of women’s experiences of harm.  
 
 
3.2 The Validity of Polygamous Marriage 
 
3.2.1 Domestic Polygamous Marriage 
 
The United Kingdom is considerably more relaxed about purely religious polygamy and 
informal multiple-party co-habitation than other prohibitive jurisdictions, such as Canada and 
the United States of America, where even informal plural relationships constitute a criminal 
act. Despite that, neither men nor women are permitted formally to marry more than one 
person in Britain.238 In addition to this civil prohibition on non-dyadic marriages, legislative 
                                                           
238 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s 11(b). In addition, parties who knowingly give false information regarding their status to procure 
a marriage commit an offence, see Perjury Act 1911 s 3. See R v Bham [1966] 1 QB 159 (an attempted polygamous marriage which 
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measures have long existed in the United Kingdom that seek to punish individuals who enter 
into a formal, additional marriage when they are already validly married. Although the penalty 
is no longer death, anyone convicted of the criminal offence of bigamy now is subject to a 
sentence on conviction of seven years imprisonment.239 
 
Despite the long legal disapproval for non-monogamous marriage, polygamy is undoubtedly 
practised in the United Kingdom, and increasingly so.240  Moreover, where polygamy occurs, 
it is not just practised by older, first generation Muslim migrants who arrived on earlier waves 
of economic migration in the boom post-war years. Younger Muslims, many of whom have 
been born and raised in the United Kingdom, are also entering into plural marriages.241 
                                                           
becomes void and Hyde v Hyde (n 109) 130, 132 where the idea of marriage as a voluntary union between two people to the exclusion 
of all others, is firmly stated and reinforced. 
239 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  
240 As already discussed, domestic polygamy is very hard to detect because it is carried on without state engagement. Formal statistics 
are not available on the number of polygamous marriages in the United Kingdom, as confirmed in Catherine Fairburn, House of 
Commons Library, Briefing Paper ‘Polygamy’ No 05051 (6 January 2016) where the Director General for the Office for National Statistics 
confirms such information is not readily available. The marriage register is used to gather statistical information on marriages and 
polygamous marriages are not registered in this way (either because they are foreign marriages or they are only religious marriages). 
Neither is the information available from any other survey data. Various news publications have speculated on the numbers however, 
and it has been suggested that as many as 20,000 unregistered polygamous families and up to a 1,000 foreign, valid polygamous 
marriages currently exist in the United Kingdom today.  For reports estimating the numbers of polygamous families in the United 
Kingdom see variously Rachel Stewart and John Witte (n 88); ‘What’s Wrong with Polygamy?’ BBC Radio Asian Network Reports (26 
September 2011) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0153rzs> accessed 10 February 2015, discussing the numbers of polygamous 
marriages increasing, which refers to the Islamic Shari’a Council in Britain (an organisation which provides advice on Islamic principles 
and law, it describes itself as being comprised of members from all of the major schools of Islamic legal thought, and widely accepted 
by Muslims living in Britain as an authoritative body with regard to Islamic law) having received 700 applications in 2010 citing 
polygamy as one of the main reasons for wanting a divorce; Rosie Kinchen, ‘Muslim high flyers share a husband: A shortage of eligible 
men is driving thousands of women to become co-wives’ says Rosie Kinchen’ The Sunday Times (11 March 2012) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/muslim-high-flyers-share-a-husband-rd26bsc7l3z> accessed 13 April 2017. See also Pearl & 
Menski (n 98) who refer to the fact that, even in Britain today, Muslims claim the right to polygamous marriages. See also Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws (Report, n 142) 24, which refers to existence of polygamy in the UK and cites the example of a man who 
brought a second wife back to the UK where he lived between two homes and maintained relations with both women.  
241 Jonathan Djanogly, then Junior Minister at the Ministry of Justice, HC Deb 12 October 2011 c402W “…[there is] anecdotal evidence 
of people entering into polygamous marriage in the UK through religious ceremonies that are not registered by the state and are not 
recognised under UK law. Due to the fact that these marriages are not legally recognised there is no indication of how many such 
polygamous relationships exist. Any parties to such relationships do not share the same rights as a legally married couple, s uch as 
access to financial remedies available on divorce or inheritance rights on the death of one of the spouses, and are treated as 
cohabitants. The Government have carried out some work with the Muslim community to encourage mosques to undertake the civil 
aspects of marriage.”  
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Because concurrent, civil marriages are prohibited in Britain, Muslim men who marry here 
polygamously do so in private, without attracting the attention of the state. This is achieved 
by entering into a second marriage which is solely religious, called a ‘Nikah’, and which is not 
formally registered with state authorities.242 Nikah are not civil marriages recognisable in the 
ordinary way and additional nikah may be entered into according only to religious convention, 
without any state involvement. The parties are treated for domestic purposes as cohabitants, 
without spousal entitlements in civil law.243 As a result of their legal anonymity, religious plural 
marriages are difficult to assess in terms of their number, although available estimates suggest 
these marriages are rising, not declining.  
 
It is perhaps curious that young Muslims in the United Kingdom are today opting to enter 
into polygamous marriages. The reasons for this trend are varied and are likely to include a 
desire on the part of those involved to appease family members by agreeing to an arranged 
marriage, while at the same time, satisfying a desire to find a ‘love match’.244 A desire to avoid 
the shame associated with divorce may also be a prompt for these marriages in the United 
Kingdom. Because marital break-ups are generally viewed negatively among Muslim societies, 
opting for polygamy may be seen as a more attractive alternative to divorce for all 
concerned.245 Polygamy may also be sought in modern Britain as a solution to infertility 
(whether or not the absence of children is due to the infertility of the woman involved).246 
While this research is not concerned primarily with polygamy in the domestic sphere, and 
whatever the reasons for the beginnings of a rise in polygamous marriage in the United 
Kingdom (among other European and North American nations), the continued formation of 
polygamous marriages in the United Kingdom lends weight to the view that those who practice 
                                                           
242 Zeitzen (n 73) 5, a nikah ceremony is not legally valid and Zeitzen explains that often second marriages are religious or customary, 
so that they may not be included as ‘marriages’ for the state’s purposes.  
243 Collins et al (eds) Dicey Morris and Collins on the Conflicts of Laws (14th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 254, Rule 31, “a marriage 
celebrated in England in accordance with polygamous forms and without any civil ceremony as required by English Law is invalid, 
whatever the domicile of the parties.” In the USA and Canada informal co-habitation is a crime, that approach having arisen in response 
to domestic, Mormon polygamy. The same bans also exist in Germany and France but the United Kingdom legal system is largely 
unconcerned with informal cohabitation and laws regulating relationships are pre-occupied with governing traditional formal 
marriage, same sex marriage, and regulating bigamy.  
244 Charsley (n 166) 10. 
245 Charsley (n 166) 10. 
246 Charsley (n 166) 10. 
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polygamy have little willingness to abandon their religious laws and customs. This is true 
whatever the formal approach to plural marriage in the United Kingdom, be it prohibitive or 
permissive, a fact which Western governments may increasingly be forced to acknowledge and 
engage with, as young, modern Muslims with dual aspirations increasingly consider the 
benefits of polygamy.247 
 
 
3.2.2 Foreign Polygamous Marriage 
 
Where a marriage takes place outside of England, establishing the English legal system’s 
approach to validity is more complex. Because separate legal systems are engaged, the legal 
validity of a marriage is governed not only by domestic law in the United Kingdom, but also 
by the law in other jurisdictions and rules relating to conflicts of laws regarding the dominance 
of one law over another. The starting point to determine the validity of a marriage with an 
international element is the ‘lex loci celebrationis’ rule: that is, the validity of the marriage is 
determined according to the law of the country in which the marriage is celebrated. Provided 
a marriage with an international element is conducted in accordance with the law where the 
marriage takes place, it will attract formal validity and may be recognised in other jurisdictions 
as a legitimate marriage.   
 
The application of lex loci celebrationis applied up to the middle of the nineteenth century. From 
the mid-1800s onwards the British response changed, however, and a new and much less 
welcoming judicial approach was taken to foreign polygamy. In Hyde v Hyde, a British citizen 
who had entered into a Mormon marriage and subsequently renounced his faith petitioned the 
                                                           
247 Sona, Federica ‘Polygamy in Britain’ Osservatorio delle Liberta ed Istituzioni Religiose, (Newsletter) n 33/2005  July 2005 
<http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/104/documents/Sona_Polygamy_in_Britain.pdf> accessed 11 April 2017, 2 in which she says the 
abolitionist policies and assimilationist aims of the British government have not prevented polygamy being practised here. In her view 
“….ethnic minorities have no intention of abandoning their religious laws and customs”. Ahsan (n 96) 30, also talks about the pressure 
on Muslims in the West and says that despite it they have “… by and large been able to hold fast to their values and traditions.” 
Charsley and Liversage (n 166) 10 say their research in Britain and Denmark reveals that transnational polygamy is also on the increase, 
and not only among migrants but also for younger Muslims which they also put down to effort to appease the family with a suitable 
marriage and at the same time find a love match. They describe such marriages as ‘dual aspirational’ and say it is not particular to 
traditional, old minorities and is present as part of the modern Western Muslim community.  
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court in England for divorce.248 He had returned to live in England without his wife and she 
had later re-married, giving rise to the claim of adultery, so that a divorce ought to have been 
available.  However, the judge in Hyde expressed concern because the union was ‘potentially 
polygamous’ having been carried out according to Mormon marriage rites, which at the time 
permitted plural marriage. Because the marriage was potentially polygamous it was treated as 
actually polygamous by the judge, and was not recognised as valid, and for that reason no 
divorce could be granted. In this case, although the marriage was valid elsewhere, because it 
was also potentially polygamous as a Mormon union, the English judge expressed the view:  
 
… if the compact of a polygamous union does not carry with it those duties which 
it is the office of the marriage law in this country to assert and enforce, such unions 
are not within the reach of that law.249 
 
The ruling in Hyde was the first to place limits on the availability of relief for otherwise perfectly 
valid polygamous marriages in the United Kingdom. This blanket rejection of plural (and 
potentially plural) marriages persisted as the stated legal position in Britain for many years, 
until the publication of a report on polygamy by the Law Commission in 1972, which objected 
to the complete denunciation of matrimonial relief for individuals in polygamous marriage 
because doing so causes unnecessary harm.250 Notwithstanding the state’s public policy 
concern not to encourage polygamy, the Law Commission expressed a strong preference for 
a change in approach because of the harm caused in rejecting valid foreign marriages 
outright.251  At the same time, the Commission did re-state the importance of assimilation for 
                                                           
248 Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P&D 130. For a discussion on Lord Penzance’s description of marriage, and whether modern judges ought 
to be constrained by it, see Rebecca Probert ‘Hyde v Hyde: defining or defending marriage?’ (2007) 3 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
322. 
249 Hyde v Hyde (n 109) 137. 
250 Law Commission, ‘Family Law Report on Polygamous Marriages’ (Law Com No 42, 1971) 35. In one case affected by the rule 
established in Hyde, a child was denied the right to succeed to her father’s property because his marriage with her mother was carried 
out according to the customs of the Barlong people, which permitted polygamy, even though the marriage was only ever 
monogamous. 
251 Law Commission (n 250) 11 “Something is gravely wrong when learned and humane judges are compelled by ancient authority to 
come to a conclusion which manifestly shocks their sense of justice.” At 13, paragraph 35(a) the Commission also says “Family 
relationships validly created under a foreign system of law should be recognised here, unless there are compelling reasons of English 
Public Policy to the contrary.” 
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newcomers who practiced polygamy and the balancing act the state was required to carry out, 
saying  
 
… it is rightly argued that immigrants to England are not in a privileged position 
and are expected to conform to English standards of behaviour. However, it seems 
to us that parties to polygamous marriages are more likely to conform to English 
standards if English law imposes on them, so far as is practicable, the same family 
rights and obligations as are imposed on other married people. The denial of all 
relief cannot achieve any change in the standards of behaviour of people who have 
made their home in England. On the contrary, denial of relief not only permits 
parties to escape from their obligations, lawfully entered into under another legal 
system, but tends to perpetuate the polygamous situation because the marriage 
cannot be ended.252 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Foreign Polygamy by Domiciles 
 
The government responded to the Law Commission’s concerns by enacting the Matrimonial 
Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972, later replaced by s 11(d) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, the effect of which was to allow anyone coming to the United Kingdom to 
adhere to their personal and religious laws with regard to marriage, provided any polygamous 
marriages took place outside the United Kingdom and neither party was domiciled here. The 
passing of the Acts confirmed a softening in the state’s position on polygamy in response to 
the Law Commission’s concerns. In practice, while neither Act allowed for the celebration of 
polygamy in the United Kingdom, or permitted anyone domiciled in the United Kingdom to 
enter into a valid polygamous marriage, the new legislation meant that a party to a polygamous 
marriage could now claim marital rights and enforce obligations in English courts. This 
                                                           
252 Law Commission (n 250) 14, paragraph 38.  
 102 
allowed the state formally to acknowledge that not recognising polygamy in some 
circumstances would cause unreasonable harm.253   
 
However, while the statutory response to the hardship caused by Hyde was undoubtedly 
progressive, it added its own complexity to the response to polygamy with a foreign element 
because it continued to restrict migrants who were English domiciles from entering into valid 
polygamous marriages. According to the new legislation, any polygamous marriage entered 
into—even outside the United Kingdom—when either party at the time of the marriage was 
domiciled here would still be considered void.254 The new focus on the question of domicile 
made the determination of validity for a plural marriage more complicated because the exact 
nature of domicile can be difficult to determine. It is not simply a case of where one resides 
which is determinative. Further, the reach of the legislation meant that potentially polygamous 
marriages entered into by domiciles, not only actually polygamous marriages, were still subject 
to restrictions. The impact was to make void all marriages carried out according to marriage 
rites permitting plural marriage where a British domicile was involved, a position which was 
arguably not only unjust, but meaningless in restricting the harm thought to arise from a plural 
marriage. Although the United Kingdom’s approach to polygamy was more open to a degree, 
the response to polygamy continued to cause hardship for many people living here who had 
been married according to a system which permitted polygamy, whether they were in actually 
polygamous marriages or not.255  
 
The harm caused by the formal treatment of polygamy was considered in the early 1980’s in 
the case of Hussain v Hussain.256 The Hussains’ marriage had been conducted in Pakistan 
                                                           
253 s 11(d) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, where the proper law to apply is the foreign law, a polygamous marriage should be 
considered valid, which is confirmed in Nigel Lowe and Gillian Douglas Bromley’s Family Law (OUP, 2007) 75, where they state the 
overriding principle that a foreign rule of law must be applied instead of the English rule when the conflict of laws so requires. 
254 The Matrimonial Causes Act was not retrospective, however, and applied only to those marriages contracted after 31 July 1971. 
Note, s 11(d) is not a conflicts rule, but a rule of English domestic law and it applies if, according to the application of conflicts rules, 
English law applies. 
255 Sonia Harris-Short and Joanna Miles, Family Law Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, Oxford 2007) 128, discusses unsatisfactory 
judicial attempts to mitigate the harm from this rule. The Law Commission recommended law reform,  including to make a potentially 
polygamous marriage contracted by someone domiciled in England and Wales valid Law Commission, ‘Private International Law: 
Polygamous Marriages; Capacity to Contract a Polygamous Marriage and Related Issues’ (Law Com No 146, 1985). 
256 Hussain v Hussain (1983) Fam 26, [1982] 3 All ER 369. 
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according to Islamic rites, with the husband domiciled at the time of the marriage in England 
and the wife in Pakistan. The parties lived in England following their marriage and later 
separated. Mr Hussain attempted to use the Matrimonial Causes Act to argue their marriage 
should be considered void in an attempt to deny his wife any relief arising out of their parting. 
To that end, he argued the marriage was ‘potentially polygamous’ under s 11(d) as he had been 
domiciled in England at the time of the wedding and it had been celebrated only according to 
Muslim rites, which allows polygamy by the husband. In responding to Mr Hussain, however, 
the Court deviated from the reasoning in Hyde and held that the Hussains’ marriage could 
never be polygamous, even though it was a Muslim union. In an innovation designed to hold 
Mr Hussain to account and avoid causing harm to his wife, the Court held that a marriage 
might only potentially be polygamous where the parties have capacity to marry a second 
spouse. As capacity is dependent on domicile and in this case the husband was an English 
domiciliary, he was subject to the express prohibition on plural marriage in s 11(b) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act and had no capacity to marry polygamously in any event. As a result, 
the Hussains’ marriage could only be monogamous and was therefore valid, with the effect 
that relief was available to the parties. 
 
While the court’s decision in Hussain did not return the English legal approach to the pre Hyde 
days of basing legal validity simply on lex loci celebrationis, it did go some way to construe the 
Matrimonial Causes Act so as to be more forgiving of marriages celebrated according to 
systems permitting polygamy to make legal assistance available for potentially polygamous 
marriages in the United Kingdom. To avoid hardship the Court chose not to apply the strict 
approach to polygamy and called for a simple reading of ‘domicile’. In doing so, while the 
Court did not go so far as to say that all potentially polygamous marriages entered into by 
English domiciles must be valid, it did convert a potentially polygamous marriage into an 
essentially monogamous one to allow for relief. Admittedly, in a novel and limited way, the 
Court in Hussain went some way in acknowledging the validity of a marriage that was 
conducted according to personal laws which permit polygamy so as to avoid causing harm to 
the wife involved. In that regard, the judgment in Hussain is useful in providing evidence of 
judicial concern in the United Kingdom over the hardship which had arisen out of earlier, 
more restrictive approaches to polygamy. Although the creative recognition of polygamy in 
Hussain can’t reasonably be viewed as expressing more general support for polygamy per se, it 
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does illustrate the possibility of formal tolerance towards a potentially polygamous marriage 
to avoid harm. 
 
Some ten years after the Hussain case, and following a further report by the Law Commission 
on the capacity to contract a polygamous marriage and associated issues, the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 further reformed and clarified the 
law.257 In a move that acknowledged on-going concern, the government abolished the concept 
of a potentially polygamous marriage where either party to a marriage was domiciled in 
England or Wales. In practice, following the introduction of this Act, anyone domiciled in the 
United Kingdom could be validly married in a jurisdiction that permitted polygamy as long as 
the marriage was not actually polygamous.  
 
However, capacity to enter into an actually polygamous marriage abroad continues in part to 
be determined by domicile. Where either of the parties’ domicile is considered to be the United 
Kingdom (with the question of domicile in turn dictated either by the place in which the parties 
are living at the time of the marriage, or the place they intend to establish their marital home) 
even where they travel to a jurisdiction which does allow plural marriage, they will still lack the 
capacity for an actually polygamous marriage to be valid.258 In this case, while the marriage 
                                                           
257 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 s 5(1); where either party at the time of the marriage is domiciled 
in England or Wales the marriage is not polygamous where, at its inception, neither party has any spouse additional to the other. 
Accordingly, a marriage which is not polygamous, must be monogamous and under s 5(1) such marriages are not void. Law 
Commission, (Report) (n 255) 9, 11, where the Law Commission outlined defects in the approach to polygamy, referring specifically to 
Hussain in doing so, offering proposals for reform, including specifically that a man or woman domiciled in England and Wales or 
Scotland ought to have “… the capacity to enter into a marriage outside the United Kingdom which, though celebrated in a form 
appropriate to polygamous marriages is not actually polygamous.” 
258 Clarkson, CMV & Hill, J The Conflict of Laws (2nd edn OUP, 2002) 342; where England is the intended place for the matrimonial 
home, a polygamous marriage will be void even if both parties are living in an Islamic country when they marry. Judicial views on 
domicile are expressed most notably in Ross v Ross 1930 SC (HL) 1, per Lord Buckmaster; a domicile of choice is acquired by the person 
deciding that his permanent home for all purposes is to be the new one. Where someone intends their home to be the new one for 
certain purposes only, new domicile is not acquired. It is important to look at evidence in determining domicile, including relevant 
conduct, statements of the person in question, etc. as a whole. Lawrence v Lawrence [1985] 2 All ER 73, the court may look at intended 
family home rather than ante-nuptial domicile to determine capacity to marry. More recent case law in the immigration setting 
includes Hokan Khan Omerzy v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, 16 August 2013, Upper Tribunal (Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number : IA/07455/2011, involving an Afghan husband and a Slovak wife and where, because of her 
domicile, the marriage (an additional one for the husband) could not be valid and he obtained no entitlement to residence card 
through EU qualified ‘wife’. In Abdin v Entry Clearance Officer [2012] UKUT 00309]. Also, SM v Secretary of State for the Home 
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may formally be valid according to the lex loci celebrationis, because of restrictions on polygamy 
in the parties’ domicile and applying the rules of essential validity, any actually polygamous 
marriage entered into by an English domicile will be considered invalid because English 
domiciles do not have the capacity to enter into a non-monogamous union.259  
 
 
3.2.2.2 Foreign Polygamy by Non-Domiciles 
 
This leaves the question of how plural marriage is viewed where the participants are neither 
marrying in the United Kingdom, nor domiciled here. While it is government policy to prevent 
the domestic formation of polygamous households, despite strong objections to plural 
marriage with a domestic component, entirely foreign polygamous marriages are considered 
valid in the United Kingdom.260 Provided neither party is domiciled here and the plural 
marriage in question meets the requirements for legal validity in the country of solemnisation, 
a polygamous marriage entered into externally will be recognised.261 In October 2011 a written 
answer to a parliamentary question by the Ministry of Justice representative articulated the 
state’s position:  
 
                                                           
Department [2008] UKAIT 00092 (paragraph 10) regarding an actually polygamous marriage and choice of domicile, the Court has said 
“It is well known that both in English law and Scots law and, indeed we understand it, the law of much of the rest of the world, it is for 
a person who seeks to establish that a domicile of origin has been lost and replaced by a domicile of choice to show that.”  
259 Fairburn (n 240).  
260 Fairburn (n 240). See also Dicey (n 243) 36 “A marriage which is polygamous … and not invalid … will be recognised in England as 
a valid marriage unless there is some strong reason to the contrary.” Law Commission (Report) (n 250) says this principle is confirmed 
in Shahmaz v Rizwan [1965] 1 QB 390, 397 and Alhaji Mohamed v Knott [1969] QB 1, 13-14 (DC). Bailey and others ‘Expanding 
Recognition of Foreign Marriages (n 69) 7 “Common law countries have long adopted the principle that a polygamous marriage is valid 
by the law of the place of celebration and by each party’s personal law and will be recognised for many purposes even if the marriage 
is actually polygamous, “[C]ommon law countries have long adopted the principle that a polygamous marriage is valid by the law of 
the place of celebration and by each party’s personal law and will be recognised for many purposes even if the marriage is actually 
polygamous.” 
261 Fairburn (n 240) refers to a written answer of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, a junior minister at the Ministry of Justice in April 2008 
“[P]rovided the parties follow the necessary requirements under the law of the country in question, the marriage would be recognised 
in England and Wales. The law is drafted thus because the Government have no desire forcibly to sever relationships that have been 
lawfully contracted in other jurisdictions.” 
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Polygamous marriages cannot be legally formed in the United Kingdom. Nor is it 
possible for anyone domiciled in the United Kingdom to enter into a polygamous 
marriage abroad. Where a polygamous marriage is contracted outside the United 
Kingdom between parties, neither of whom is domiciled in the United Kingdom, it 
will be recognised.262 
 
Although legal recognition is limited in that it relates only to valid, foreign polygamous 
marriages, in practice, unless there is a very strong public policy reason to do otherwise, such 
marriages benefit from broad legal acceptance and justifications for not recognising them are 
rarely accepted.263  The basis for this approach to plural marriage stems from convention 
relating to conflicts of law and a lack of willingness on the United Kingdom government’s part 
forcibly to sever relationships that have been lawfully contracted in jurisdictions where plural 
marriage is permitted.264 In that connection, entirely externally formed polygamous marriages 
are not only considered valid, but may also provide the basis for domestic legal entitlement, 
including rights to social security, matrimonial relief and inheritance.265  
                                                           
262 Fairburn (n 240) citing a written answer by Jonathan Djanogly, then Junior Minister at the Ministry of Justice in October 2011 (HC 
Deb 12 October 2011 c402W). 
263 Dicey (n 243) 850, Rule 73 836: “…today polygamous marriages are recognised for most purposes.”, claiming there is sufficient 
authority to warrant generalisation in Rule 73. See Alhaji Mohamed v Knott [1969] QB 1, 13-14 (DC) “A polygamous marriage will be 
recognised in England as a valid marriage unless there is some strong reason to the contrary.” 
264 Fairburn (n 240). 
265 The position regarding entirely foreign polygamous marriage is summed up in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Conflict of Laws 
(Volume 19) 2011 paragraph 522: “Marriages Conducted Abroad, Recognition of Polygamous Marriages: “A polygamous marriage 
which is valid under the lex loci celebrationis as regards form and under the law of each party’s ante nuptial domicile as regards 
capacity will be recognised in England as a valid marriage unless there is some strong reason to the contrary. During its subsistence 
the marriage will be held to constitute a bar to subsequent marriage in England or, probably, to a subsequent monogamous marriage 
elsewhere, and effect will be given to the legal consequences flowing from the marriage, such as the legitimacy of the children and 
rights of succession to property. The fact a marriage was celebrated under a law permitting polygamy does not preclude the English 
court from granting matrimonial relief or making a declaration concerning the validity of marriage.” Regarding ‘strong reasons to the 
contrary…’ at footnote 4 to that passage, Halsbury’s concludes: “There are now very few exceptions to the recognition for all purposes 
of a valid polygamous marriage; and a potentially polygamous marriage (i.e. a marriage in polygamous form but actually monogamous) 
is treated similarly.” Witte (n 78) 9 considers the recognition of polygamy for domestic law purposes generally. In his article, ‘Why Two 
in One Flesh’ (n 82)  he states it is usually the first wife and children who almost always get priority in marital property and inheritance 







Table: Timeline of Marriage Regulation in the United Kingdom 
 
 
Date Law/Case Validity/Recognition 
 
1861 Offences Against the 
Person Act 
Bigamy is a crime, updated earlier law from 1604, 
which itself updated much earlier laws from as early 
as the time of Cnut to outlaw bigamy.  
 
This law does not affect valid foreign polygamous 
marriages, which are considered valid. 
1866 Hyde v Hyde A Mormon marriage that at the time was legal in the 
USA. Where a marriage is polygamous or potentially 
polygamous, even if it is valid elsewhere, it is no 
longer considered valid in the United Kingdom. No 
divorce could be granted. 
 
1949 Marriage Act The Act that largely governs and regulates marriage 
in the United Kingdom.  
1971 Law Commission 
Family Law Report 
on Polygamous 




Recommends the current treatment of polygamous 
and potentially polygamous marriages following Hyde 
is unfair and harmful. Recommends the recognition 





Marriages) Act 1972, 
later replaced by 
11(d) of the 
Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 
Polygamous and potentially polygamous marriages 
may be valid, as long as neither party is domiciled in 
the United Kingdom at the time of the marriage. If 
either party is domiciled in the United Kingdom, the 
marriage may not be considered valid, including 
where it is only potentially polygamous and not 
actually polygamous. 
 
1983 Hussain v Hussain  A potentially polygamous marriage with one party 
domiciled in the United Kingdom is converted into 
actually monogamous marriages, so that relief may 
be granted, effectively abandoning the ‘potentially 
polygamous’ barrier to validity. Following Hussain, it 
is possible that only actually polygamous marriages 
with an English domicile involved will be considered 
invalid to avoid hardship (in this case, for the wife). 
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1988 Immigration Act and 
Immigration Rules  
 
Introduced an express ban on settlement for 
polygamous wives, only one wife may be granted the 
right of abode. No exception is made in any law for 
refugee families.  
1995 Private International 
Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995  
Legislates for the outcome in Hussain, so that anyone 
domiciled in the United Kingdom can be married in 
a jurisdiction that permits polygamy and where the 
marriage is not actually polygamous it will be 
considered valid. The legal position for actually 
polygamous marriages where neither party is 
domiciled in the United Kingdom has not changed, 
and they remain valid. 
2004 Civil Partnerships 
Act  
Allowing same sex couples to enter into marriage-
like relationships, called civil partnerships. 
2013 Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act  
Legalised same sex marriage in England and Wales.  
 
 
3.3 The Recognition of Polygamous Marriage 
 
It is important to distinguish between the validity of marriage, as discussed in the previous 
section, and the recognition of a plural marriage for a specific entitlement. While entirely 
foreign polygamous marriages are universally considered valid in the United Kingdom, not all 
of the ordinary legal rights and obligations that flow from marriage will be extended to them. 
Even if valid polygamous marriages themselves may not violate public policy, in certain 
circumstances, their recognition in providing an entitlement to certain rights might well do. 
Accordingly, an entirely valid polygamous marriage may be recognised for some things, and 
not for others.  
 
 
3.3.1 Domestic Rights for Polygamous Spouses 
 
The notion of public policy and the consideration of harm each have some bearing on 
decisions regarding polygamous marriage in a range of domestic legal contexts. Although the 
domestic discourse on polygamy is often dominated by a disapproving tone in the United 
Kingdom, valid polygamous marriages are considered an appropriate basis for a reasonably 
wide range of legal rights and entitlements, even though not all the rights which might 
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ordinarily flow from marital status will be offered to polygamous couples. Regarding 
matrimonial relief, the courts and the Law Commission have referred expressly to the 
particularly disturbing hardship which is caused by closing the doors of matrimonial courts to 
the parties in a polygamous marriage, as well as the risk of associated social problems. 
Accordingly, a domestic legal entitlement to matrimonial relief is provided for the participants 
in an actually polygamous marriage.266 As a result, in the United Kingdom, a polygamously 
married wife or husband may petition for separation, annulment or divorce in the English 
courts, as well as claim financial assistance following a marriage breakdown.  
 
Multiple polygamous wives have also formally been acknowledged in connection with 
inheritance purposes and intestate succession as ‘surviving spouses’ in Britain.267 Here, the 
courts have said it is meaningless to consider public policy objections to polygamy where wives 
who are married in accordance with the law of their domicile regard themselves, entirely fairly, 
as wives.268 As a result, the categorisation of additional wives as spouses for succession 
purposes does not conflict with the state’s public policy desire not to encourage the formation 
of polygamous households.269 Any of the surviving wives of a valid polygamous marriage may 
                                                           
266 S 47 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Dicey (n 243) Rule 82 Matrimonial Causes and Family Law, say, the Rule applies notwithstanding 
the fact that either party to the marriage is, or has during the subsistence of the marriage, been married to more than one person. 
Dicey refers to the restriction in Hyde v Hyde and the recognition of polygamous marriage for matrimonial relief, hardship, distress 
especially after the influx of Commonwealth immigrants in 50s and 60s, and the fact that English judges did their best to limit the 
severity of the ruling, generally by converting a polygamous marriage to a monogamous one where they could to offer matrimonial 
relief.  
267 Official Solicitor to the Senior Courts v Yemoh and Others [2011] 2 FLR 371 (Yemoh) where polygamous wives were considered 
‘surviving spouses’ under s 46 Administration of Estates Act, 1925, extending the reasoning in Coleman and Shang [1961] AC 481  to 
the domestic setting. In practice, the court did restrict the application of the Act so that the wives should be considered one spous e 
and share the statutory legacy equally. Re Sehota (Deceased) [1978] 1 WLR 1506. Court considering whether a polygamous wife is a 
‘wife of the deceased’ for s 1 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 and said, yes.  
268 Of Yemoh Ruth Gaffney-Rhys, ‘The Legal Response to Polygamous Marriages in England and Wales’ (n 167) 319, says “Given that 
a spouse can now petition for divorce, annulment or judicial separation, an apply for matrimonial relief on separation, and f inancial 
provision on death and is recognised for the purpose of obtaining a grant of letters of administration it would have been illogical to 
deny polygamous spouses rights under the Administration of Estates Act 1925 as their marriages were lawful in the place of celebration 
and according to the law of domicile.” 
269 Yemoh (n 267) settled the matter in the UK, with the Court saying explicitly that the public policy reasons which used to be used 
to justify not recognising valid foreign polygamy re: matrimonial relief “would not appear … to be of meaningful relevance to the 
question of succession under the Administration of Estates Act 1925.” The Court did point out the situation would be different if the 
polygamous marriage had taken place in England or if anyone was domiciled here. English public policy would oppose recognising that 
sort of polygamous marriage. Gaffney (n 167) says Yemoh did not raise any major public policy issues: it doesn’t encourage polygamy, 
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succeed to a husband’s property on his death intestate whether he married one wife or several, 
and whether he died domiciled in a country where the law permits polygamy or in the United 
Kingdom, because to do otherwise would be unduly unfair to the wives concerned.270 The 
Law Commission has also highlighted the plight of women in polygamous marriage in the 
context of social security entitlements, because: 
 
…[to] deny social security benefits [for polygamous marriages] may involve 
hardship and injustice ….271 
 
As a result, notwithstanding the state’s public policy concern to discourage polygamy, valid 
polygamous marriages do in some cases provide the basis for a domestic entitlement to social 
security benefits, where undue hardship might otherwise be caused to the parties involved.272 
                                                           
particularly as the court shared the statutory legacy (the tax free part of the deceased’s estate) between all of the wives,  rather than 
creating 8 shares. For another example of the early legal recognition of polygamy Amin Din v National Assistance Board [1967] 2 QB 
213 where the wife, after being abandoned, applied for national assistance. She was a second wife, although the first wife had 
previously died. Her application for national assistance was successful. The Board pursued the husband under s 43 National Assistance 
Act 1948 which entitled the state to recover the costs of assistance from anyone liable for maintenance. The argument was the 
husband was liable for the costs of assistance under s 42(a) which said: a man shall be liable to maintain his wife and children. The 
court agreed ‘wife’ in this act should include a polygamously married wife. The husband was ordered to pay maintenance. 
270 Dicey (n 243) 852. See Baindail v Baindail [1946] p 122, 127-8 (CA); Coleman v Shang [1961] AC 481 (PC); Yew v Att-Gen for British 
Columbia [1924] 1 DLR 1166 (BCCA); Re Bir’s Estate, 83 Cal App 2d 258, 188 P 2d 499 (1948). Compare with Re Sehota [1978] 1 WLR 
1506. Polygamous spouses qualify: Coleman v Shang [1961] AC 481, [1961] 2 All ER 406, Cheang Thye Phin v Tan Ah Loy [1920] AC 369, 
Chii Eng Choon v Neo Chan Neo (Six Widows’ Case) (1908) 12 Straits Settlements LR 120.  
271 Law Commission (n 250).  
272 For a summary of the position on social security see Fairburn (n 240) in particular part 3. Social Security Benefits at 7, quoting a 
written answer to a parliamentary question by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Chris Grayling, to what extent polygamous 
families are recognised in the benefits system, which also confirms the government has decided no longer to recognise polygamous 
marriages-measures in the Welfare Reform Bill will recognise this policy change regarding social security benefits, and when the 
universal credit regime comes in to force (at the time of writing this is anticipated in 2021) polygamous marriages will no longer be 
recognised for social security purposes. This may have the unintended consequence of meaning polygamous famil ies have a greater 
entitlement; rather than applying as a collective they will apply as individual claimants and their entitlement may grow as a result. 
Grayling also confirms in the same answer that the government does not collect data on the number of polygamous households, o r 
the cost of benefits for them. This is also confirmed by Department for Work and Pensions Minister, James Plaskitt, in February 2008, 
who said “… we do not collect data on the number of people in a valid polygamous marriage claiming a social security benefit. 
Information could be provided only at a disproportionate cost.”  See also Esther McVey, Minister of State for Employment, “[T]he 
Government has decided that universal credit, which replaces means-tested benefits and tax credits for working-age people, will not 
recognise polygamous marriages. Instead, the husband and wife who are party to the earliest marriage that still subsists can make a 
joint claim for universal credit in the same way as any other couple. Any other adults living in the household would each have to claim 
 111 
Contributory benefits (i.e. those which require national insurance contributions in order to 
qualify, such as a state pension, bereavement benefit or employment allowance) are not 
available in respect of all spouses, however.273 As mentioned previously, the law also treats 
bigamy and polygamy differently, so that individuals in foreign polygamous marriages are 
excluded from prosecution under criminal provisions dealing with plural marriage in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
It is accepted that the recognition of entirely foreign polygamous marriage in the domestic 
legal context results, at least in part, from the balancing of domestic and foreign interests, in 
keeping with private international law aims and principles. The domestic recognition of 
polygamy is not simply to affirm international legal doctrine, however. Rather, as the 
comments of the courts and the Law Commission show, the hardship that might otherwise 
result from the non-recognition of polygamous marriages also dictates the British legal 
approach, so that there has been a trend of increasing legal acceptance since Hyde. While this 
recognition is not universal—polygamy is still recognised domestically for some purposes and 
not for others—neither is the objection to polygamy in the domestic legal sphere absolute. 
Despite concerns about polygamy and harm, a comprehensively hostile approach is not taken 
and a balancing act is carried out. Importantly, very often this is to avoid what might be viewed 
as a greater harm being caused by not recognising a valid plural marriage. Neither does the 
recognition of entirely foreign polygamy to avoid causing harm offend more general public 
policy aims, because it does not encourage British citizens in any way to engage in polygamy 
and does not interfere with the state’s objection to the formation of domestic polygamous 
households. In no way does the recognition of entirely foreign, valid polygamous marriages 
alter the clear restriction on entering into a plural marriage in the United Kingdom, and any 
person domiciled here continues to be restricted from contracting a valid polygamous marriage 
elsewhere. As a result, valid polygamous marriages are capable of acting as the sole basis on 
which rights are granted with the advantage of allowing vulnerable individuals who require 
                                                           
as a single person on the basis of their own circumstances. This process already happens where a polygamous marriage is not 
recognised in UK law”, HC Deb 16 January 2014 c640W. 
273 Any income-related benefits (for example, income or housing benefit) may be paid at a lower rate, or restricted to families living 
in the same household, so that the formation of polygamous households is not promoted. 
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and deserve the protection of the law to benefit, while still ensuring wider public policy 
considerations are not ignored.  
 
 
3.3.2 Immigration Rights for Polygamous Spouses 
 
3.3.2.1 The Early Approach in Immigration 
 
With the end of World War II, the United Kingdom experienced a sharp increase in migrants 
from former colonial territories. In particular, significant numbers of Muslims came to 
England from Commonwealth countries, including large numbers from Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and India. These migrants came often with the purpose of providing labour for post-war 
rebuilding. Many who came in this initial wave of migration had relatively free access to work 
in the United Kingdom as a result of the ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth’ 
immigration scheme.274 Because they enjoyed reasonably free movement under the scheme, 
often these early migrants did not intend to stay permanently in the United Kingdom. Their 
tendency was to ‘commute’ between locations, staying in Britain for long periods of work 
before returning home, dividing their time between their work obligations and their personal 
obligations in their home country. This meant that, initially, their families did not travel with 
them.  
 
The different lifestyles of those who came in this post-war wave of migration prompted much 
public comment, perhaps also because they were coming in much larger numbers than ever 
before, and the new migrants gained much attention. Developing concerns over the protection 
of domestic economic interests and a growing, xenophobic fear of the impact that migrants 
might have on English society are perhaps indicated nowhere more clearly than in the speech 
delivered by Enoch Powell in April 1969, in which he criticised broad Commonwealth 
                                                           
274 CUKC. For additional information on domestic immigration law regarding migration and international family migration , see Gina 
Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law (4th edn OUP, 2010), Dallal Stevens, UK Asylum Law and Policy; Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives (Sweet & Maxwell London, 20014), John Murphy, International Dimensions in Family Law (MUP, 
Manchester 2005), Helena Wray, Regulating Marriage Migration into the UK (n 236).  
 113 
migration and resorted to a racist foundation to call for its halt.275 Although Powell’s speech 
was widely condemned for being extreme, it was undoubtedly symptomatic of a more general 
fear of migration and difference. In the period immediately after, and throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, it was the same fear that drove the British government openly to pursue policies 
of cultural assimilation in an attempt to assuage concerns about migrants, multiculturalism and 
social cohesion. This began with changes to the CUKC scheme, which had allowed so many 
migrants to come to the United Kingdom, and was followed later by the introduction of more 
targeted immigration restrictions directly affecting plural families.  
 
Under the government’s new policies, initial changes meant those who came here for work 
were unable to move so freely between borders as before and it became necessary for them to 
settle more permanently in Britain to continue working without being separated from their 
families. In order for migrant workers to combine their working lives with their family lives, 
migrant women and children very quickly became the majority of applicants for entry, 
sponsored by their husbands and fathers, in line with family reunification policies of the time. 
Numerous among these new categories of migrants were the many Muslim families who came 
from the Indian sub-continent. They became increasingly visible with the construction of 
mosques, the establishment of new religious centres, the availability of halal food and the 
introduction of religious education—all new additions to the British cultural landscape.276 
Valid, foreign polygamous marriages were not a barrier to immigration at this time, and as a 
result, it was also among this wave of Muslim migrant families that polygamy first became 
more commonly practised in Britain. 
 
The visibly changing nature of British society prompted further fears about the impact new 
entrants might have on social order, and at a time of high racial tension, rising anxiety over 
the influx of migrants with different religious and cultural practices resulted in significant 
additional immigration restrictions. At this time, the United Kingdom government began 
openly to express its preference for adopting policies of limiting immigration as well as 
                                                           
275 Enoch Powell delivered the speech on 20 April 1969 at a Conservative Association Meeting. The full text of the speech has been 
reproduced by The Telegraph here: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html> 
accessed 22 April 2017.  
276 Ahsan (n 96)  21. 
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encouraging cultural assimilation, and took action specifically to limit family reunification for 
that purpose.277 The state’s goal at this time appeared to be encouraging conformity with what 
was considered a ‘traditional’ British way of life and to that end immigration controls were 
tightened with the enactment of the 1970 Immigration Act.278 Restrictive rules for the entry 
of spouses were introduced, signalling what was to be the beginning of an on-going decline in 
support for large-scale family migration in the United Kingdom. 
 
While none of the immigration restrictions at this time introduced an express prohibition on 
the entry of polygamous wives, the fact of increased restrictions together with cases like Zahra 
and Another v Visa Officer, Islamabad in the late 1970s provide evidence of the state’s general 
antipathy towards the idea of certain categories of migrant. In general, those who were less 
likely to conform or assimilate were made less welcome to settle in the United Kingdom.279 In 
Zahra, the applicant made a claim to the visa officer at the British Embassy in Pakistan to join 
her husband and settle in the United Kingdom as his second wife, together with their son. The 
couple had been married in October 1974 in Pakistan. The entry clearance officer applied s 
11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act and determined that her husband had been domiciled in 
England at the time of their marriage and, although the polygamous union was valid under 
Pakistani law, according to English law her husband had no capacity to contract an actually 
polygamous marriage.280 At the time, the Immigration Rules also stated that a ‘woman who has 
been living in permanent association with a man … may be admitted as if she were his wife, 
due account being taken of any local custom or tradition tending to establish the permanence 
of the association.’ This more favourable provision was dismissed out of hand, the 
Immigration Appeals Tribunal ruling that it was intended only to deal with monogamous 
                                                           
277 Sona (n 247) 3 refers to the fact that the changes in the 1970s were designed to encourage conformity with British standards of 
behaviour, and relies on statements in Law Commission reports on matrimonial disputes in courts to support this view on the b asis 
for change. Sona says the changes were to force migrants into British patterns of behaviour. 
278  Immigration Act 1971 and the introduction of the Immigration Rules.  
279 Zahra and Another v Visa Officer, Islamabad [1979-80] Imm AR 48, goes some way to raise questions about the real purpose of 
immigration restrictions being to restrict the ‘other’, which is discussed in Wray (n 236) 83 “The reference to an oriental pasha places 
the polygamous marriage in the realm of the exotic, obviating the need to take the claim for entry seriously. The strong impression is 
that the Tribunal did not wish this application to succeed and the unfavourable decision on domicile was part of that.”  
280 At no point did anyone considering the case apply s 14(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a saving provision which allowed 
for consideration of the legal validity of a marriage in the ‘home’ jurisdiction. 
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marriages and remarking that allowing a husband to come with his ‘harem’ would be absurd.281 
The marriage in Zahra was declared void and, accordingly, the entry clearance officer’s decision 
to refuse entry to the second wife in a polygamous family was upheld on appeal.  
 
Even though the legislative trend was for tighter restriction, it is worth noting that the available 
law was not always interpreted by the courts to the disadvantage of polygamous families. The 
eligibility of a spouse now depended on whether or not their partner was domiciled in the 
United Kingdom at the time of the marriage and determining domicile was often not 
straightforward. In the cases following Zahra some courts showed willingness to use this 
uncertainty for the benefit of those in polygamous marriages, with the effect that polygamous 
spouses were able to join their partners.282 Judicial empathy for the suffering of affected 
families meant that, whatever the formal restrictions on polygamously married couples, they 
were not always interpreted to the family’s disadvantage. As a result, until the introduction of 
legislation expressly restricting polygamy in immigration, refusals for wives tended to be 




                                                           
281 Prakash Shah (n 11) 9, expresses the view that the language used by the Court and its method of reasoning to avoid making use 
of s 14 Matrimonial Causes Act illustrate an intention to ensure an ‘assimilationist’ approach to polygamous marriage. The measures 
introduced, while not necessarily directed at Muslims, were closely associated with controlling the immigration of Muslims, reflecting 
a rise in political agitation against Muslims in Britain at the time. In this regard, in his legal pluralist critique of anti-polygamy legislation, 
Shah describes the new laws as part of a redrawing of ‘culturally articulated battle lines’.  
282 Shah (n 11) referring to Rokeya and Rably Begum v Entry Clearance Officer, Dacca [1983] Imm AR 163 where the Court underlined 
the burden of proof on those alleging that the domicile of origin had changed was a heavy one, particularly where a family is split 
between England and another jurisdiction. While the Court did not ignore the basic requirement for the domicile test, they did find a 
way to hold that the marriage was valid by finding enough evidence to conclude the domicile of origin had not changed. In this case a 
husband married his first wife in Bangladesh in 1969, was domiciled in the United Kingdom in 1972 and married his second wife  in 
1975. The immigration officer decided that because the husband had been domiciled in England at time of his second marriage, the 
marriage was void under the Matrimonial Causes Act and therefore, the additional wife was not entitled to claim the right of abode. 
However, the Immigration Appeals Tribunal ‘sympathetically’ found a way around the matter of domicile to hold that the marriage 
was valid, by saying that the change in the husband’s place of domicile had not been established convincingly.  See also Entry Clearance 
Office, Dhaka v Ranu Begum and Others [1986] Imm AR 461 where a re-acquiring of Pakistani domicile was found so that a second 
marriage was valid. Again, the Court appeared to be relieved to have narrowly escaped the burden of ratifying the idea that an English 
domiciliary might have a valid polygamous marriage (albeit only for marriages celebrated prior to the August 1972 deadline.) Shah 
says the judgments seems to favour upholding a marriage if it is possible to do so. 
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3.3.2.2 The Current Approach in Immigration 
 
Racial tensions associated with migration continued and in the 1980s the government’s 
response to immigration hardened further.283 The enactment of the new Immigration Act and 
Immigration Rules 1988 targeted polygamous families directly, introducing the first express 
ban on permanent settlement in the United Kingdom for polygamous wives.  284 While the 
introduction of the new Immigration Act and Rules did not affect the validity or otherwise of 
a polygamous marriage (which was still determined according to conflicts rules and questions 
of domicile) it severely limited the immigration rights of actually polygamous wives by 
expressly permitting a husband to sponsor only one of his wives for a spousal visa. The 
unequivocal ban on entry for additional wives made reference to questions of domicile, or the 
validity of a marriage for immigration entitlement, irrelevant. In essence, from 1988, where 
one wife in a polygamous relationship had already acquired the right to live in the United 
Kingdom through her husband, an additional wife could no longer exercise any right she might 
otherwise have had to settle here with her husband and family.285  
 
Following the introduction of the new restrictions, immigration cases increasingly featured 
polygamous families seeking to find a way around them. However, this time, English judges 
followed the new statutory regime rigidly and harm suffered by polygamous wives was entirely 
                                                           
283 Evidence of tension around this time is reflected in events, like the Muslim Charter of Demands during the 1987 election and in 
vociferous mainstream objections to it. It is also around this time that the Rushdie affair explodes in Britain, in September 1988, raising 
further doubts for some about possibility and progress of multiculturalism.  
284 Immigration Act 1988 and paragraphs 278-280 of the Immigration Rules (HC 395 of 1993-4 as amended) s 2 of the Immigration 
Act 1988 is the primary section restricting polygamous wives from settling in the United Kingdom. See also Immigration Rule 278. The 
Rules and the Act are supplemented for Home Office staff with the Immigration Directorate Instructions, Chapter 8, Annex C, Spouses, 
(July 2012) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chapter-8-section-1spouses, which states, where a man with polygamous 
wives wishes to settle in the United Kingdom, only one wife may come, and she will only be eligible for settlement where no other 
wife has already been admitted to the United Kingdom. In this regard, it is the order that wives come to the United Kingdom which is 
relevant, not the order in which they were married. See also Home Office, Polygamous and Potentially Polygamous Marriages, 
Immigration Directorates’ Instructions, Chapter 8 Section FM 1.4 Partners (July 2012).  
285 Although, as explained earlier, this had no prohibitive effect on a polygamous wife seeking permission to enter and remain in the 
United Kingdom using a basis other than her status as a spouse, for example as student or a general visitor, provided such alternative 
route was available. Sona (n 247) 15 describes this legislation as marking a “…new departure in the attempt within British law to 
control polygamy through immigration restrictions.” Sona argues that immigration is used to control polygamy, and polygamy is 
stigmatised to reduce immigrants. Additional wives can visit temporarily according to s 2(7) Immigration Act.  
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excluded from consideration.  This fact is well illustrated by a case involving a second wife in 
Bangladesh who had effectively been abandoned by her husband (living in England) and who 
no longer enjoyed the support of her family in Bangladesh either. The applicant was virtually 
destitute and sought to challenge the legality of the Immigration Rules prohibiting her entry 
on the basis they were ultra vires.286 In response, her husband relied on the legal exclusion of 
additional wives. At the High Court and later the Court of Appeal, the restriction on her entry 
was upheld, although some sympathy was expressed for her circumstances.  
 
In some cases, the question of domicile and the legislative impediments to immigration were 
considered together, although with no positive effect on the outcome for applicants either. In 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Zeenat Bibi the second wife had arrived as 
visitor to the United Kingdom in 1991.287 Her husband had been in here since 1967, was 
registered as a British citizen in 1974 and married the appellant in 1989. While the case was 
being heard the couple had two children, both born in the United Kingdom. The wife was 
declared an illegal entrant and her application to remain in the United Kingdom was refused. 
The Secretary of State had declared the marriage polygamous and invalid. The lower court 
judge said that the marriage was invalid because of the husband’s domicile at the time the 
couple were married. The higher court expressed the view the marriage was valid but the 
Immigration Rules prevented an application as a spouse in the circumstances. Neither court 
said the wife’s removal was unreasonable, even though the two children were British citizens 
and they had the right of abode themselves. Commentators have described this example of 
the implementation of the 1988 Act and Rules as a: 
 
… particularly disappointing case, with the judges blindly following the statutory 
rules without regard to the human factors involved…288 
                                                           
286 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Hasna Begum [1995] Imm AR 249. The applicant argued that the Immigration Rules 
cannot exercise a power which is wider than the provisions of the Act to which it relates, among other things, in an effort to overturn 
the entry clearance officer’s decision and obtain entry to the United Kingdom. The Court viewed the suggestion that the Rules were 
ultra vires as  ‘misconceived’ and for that, and other reasons, dismissed the application. 
287 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Zeenat Bibi [1994] Imm Ar 326 QBD, R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Ex p. Zeenat Bibi  [1994] Imm. A.R. 550  (CA). 
 
288 Shah (n 11) 394. 
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Similarly, in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Laily Begum a widow from 
Bangladesh asked the Court to reconsider her removal from the United Kingdom.289 She was 
a second wife and had four children to her husband before he died. Her children were based 
in the United Kingdom and some were also said to suffer from severe emotional problems. 
Despite this, the Court again considered it acceptable for the wife to be removed as she had 
no spousal entitlement to the right of abode. As this case and others like it illustrate, the result 
of the hardened immigration restrictions from 1988 onwards was to offer no flexibility 
whatsoever for the Courts to do anything but force migrants—and women in particular—to 
be without their families and to make them vulnerable to multifaceted hardship as a result.290  
 
The blanket refusal to recognise polygamous marriages is notable for its impact, but also for 
the stark contrast between the treatment of polygamy in immigration matters, and the 
approach to it in the domestic sphere, where a more nuanced balancing of relative harms is 
still carried out. Here, there is some flexibility in the state’s treatment of polygamy 
notwithstanding the public policy concern not to encourage plural families. Where that much 
more flexible domestic attitude towards foreign polygamy is also considered alongside the 
presumption from a conflicts of law perspective that valid foreign polygamous marriages 
ought to be recognised, the absolute prohibition of polygamy in immigration begins to seem 
curious. It begs the question, what precisely is the reason for the state’s objection to polygamy 
in this context; an objection to polygamy based on concern about harm to women and society, 
or something else? 
 
The comments of those involved in legal reform at the time of increased immigration 
restrictions provide some assistance in answering this question. The speech referred to earlier 
by Enoch Powell heralded a time of increased occupation by both the state and citizens with 
                                                           
289 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Laily Begum [1996] Imm AR 582.  
290 Cases involving polygamy continue to come before the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal in the United Kingdom, including a recent 
case where evidence of a civil divorce did not count as evidence of dissolution of an Islamic marriage  and the Muslim marriage was 
considered valid. In this case, the maintenance of the polygamous marriage meant the sponsor’s wife was eligible to join him in the 
United Kingdom (Entry Clearance Officer, Amman v Da and Others, Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal No 
Oa/12459/2014 (Unreported) (4 May 2016). 
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migration and difference. While the government attempted to attribute the on-going 
retrenchment of immigration rights in that period to the desire to promote harmonious 
community relations, rather than seeing restrictions as community-minded, the evolution of 
immigration law at this time has been described rather simply as “fundamentally racist.”291  
The motivation for more restrictions in immigration seems in part to have been the reduction 
of in numbers of demonstrably different newcomers. As a condition for social harmony, the 
aim of the state at this time was for fewer black and Muslim migrants to be allowed in.  
 
This view of the policy driving immigration at the time is supported by the recent publication 
of private papers discussing changes to immigration legislation. In papers released by the 
National Archives in 2016, Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister, expressed her strong 
preference in 1986 for a clamp down specifically on Asian men bringing second wives into the 
United Kingdom, claiming to do otherwise would be to discriminate in favour of the “coloured 
Commonwealth.”292 Comments by Mrs Thatcher and in communication with her ministers 
illustrate the public pressure being felt by the government, which led to legislative limitations 
on polygamy along with other restrictive measures. The papers are also illustrative of the 
contrasting approach taken in respect of the “old Commonwealth” and the decision not to 
limit working holiday makers, most of whom were from those countries with largely Christian 
and white populations, such as Australia and New Zealand. In this regard, the papers provide 
valuable insight into the minds of those in government at the time of the introduction of a 
universal ban on polygamy in immigration, providing evidence in support of the suggestion 
the ban on additional wives was less to do with preventing harm to women or society, and 
much more about restricting difference, exerting cultural superiority and expressing a tangible 
                                                           
291 Chris Platt ‘The Immigration Act 1988: A discussion of its effects and implications’, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, 
University of Warwick, (Policy Paper) (May 1991) 2. Writing in 1991, Platt says the government characterised the bill as being designed 
to promote ‘harmonious community relations’. His argument is the 1988 Act is racist in truth and, while he can’t have known what 
has recently been released by the archives regarding the policy makers at the time and their thoughts, they would indicate there is 
some merit in his concerns.  
292 Ben Farmer “Margaret Thatcher demanded halt to Asian men bringing second wives to Britain, newly released files reveal” The 
Daily Telegraph (21 July 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/21/margaret-thatcher-demanded-halt-to-asian-men-
bringing-second-wiv/> accessed, 7 September 2016, National Archives references: 1986 CAB 129/220 and CAB 129/221. 
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desire under some public pressure to exclude the ‘other’.293 Given the likelihood that prejudice 
and fear provided the fundamental basis for more severe restrictions in immigration law 
regarding polygamous families, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 1988 Act has been described 
as:  
 
… blatantly racist … the primary purpose of which is to prevent the entry of black 
people, in a structured and deliberate manner.294  
 
 
3.4 Polygamous Refugee Families 
 
3.4.1 Refugees and Family Reunification 
 
                                                           
293 Bhabha and Shutter, Women’s Movement: Women Under Immigration, Nationality and Refugee Law (Trentham Books Limited, 
1994) 126 suggest that, under the guise of eliminating sex discrimination, the government used the 1988 Immigration Act to remove 
the ability for polygamous wives to come in with their husbands. Even though the numbers of polygamous households were 
insignificant at the time (according to the authors) the possibility of polygamous households in the UK, they say, aroused racist and 
anti Muslim feeling which were the real reasons for the changes. “The unfortunate truth that must be accepted following the passage 
of an Act that is so blatantly racist and the nature and tone of the parliamentary debates relating to that passage is that it is the far 
right … operating within the Conservative Party, have … constructed its arguments in favour of an immigration control system, the 
primary purpose of which is to prevent the entry of black people, in a structured and deliberate manner.” Claire A Smearman in 
“Second Wives Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in US Immigration Law” (2009) 27 Berkley J Int’l Law 382 discusses similar 
approaches to immigration policy in the United States to exclude “… the immoral Chinese, with their tradition of multiple wives and 
concubines …”  which would threaten the American way of life and family. Polygamously married immigrants were excluded from 
1891 in the US, when Congress enacted first federal immigration statute: Law of March 3, 1891 (Immigration Act of 1891) ch 551, § 1, 
26 Stat 1084. At 404 Smearman refers to the fact that in immigration law, a valid foreign marriage will not be valid for immigration 
purposes if it “violates the public policy of the United States.” In Canada, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 
SOR/2002-227 (Can.) prevents migration by polygamous families. Note, the United Kingdom operates a relatively generous family 
reunion policy in respect of dependent children of spouses in valid, polygamous marriages, who are eligible for family reunification 
(Abadul Islam and Monira Begum v Entry Clearance Office, 2 July 2014 Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber, Appeal 
Number: OA/22240/2012 and OA/22247/2012), is the most recent immigration appeal case confirming that valid foreign polygamous 
marriage will be recognised where a child seeks to enter and remain in the United Kingdom.  
294 Chris Platt (n 291) quotes T Renton, Lords Committee Stage 21 March 1988 col 49 “If people want to have the advantage of coming 
to live in our civilised society, I believe they should accept our standards.” Platt takes from this the real aim of clause 2 is to prevent 
families from the Indian sub-continent from coming and he says this is deliberate policy, not just an unfortunate side effect. For a 
reconstructed historical account of refugees and claims to asylum in the United Kingdom see Prakash Shah: Refugees, Race, and the 
Legal Concept of Asylum in Britain (Cavendish, 2000). 
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The tradition of offering asylum to those who do not enjoy safety in their community of origin 
has a long history. In the modern setting, the provision of refuge is inextricably linked with 
international human rights standards, which reflect states’ formal recognition of the wider 
good in protecting those seeking asylum. The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Refugee 
Convention, the document primarily responsible for setting out states’ obligations to refugees, 
and acknowledging the right to asylum by placing formal and binding obligations on states 
who have signed up to it.295 Accordingly, Britain has an obligation in international law to 
provide asylum to anyone meeting the definition of a refugee. According to the Refugee 
Convention, a ‘refugee’ is someone unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.296 The Refugee Convention offers 
the possibility of safety for anyone fleeing persecution and in need of international protection 
because they no longer enjoy the protection of the state in their country of origin. It provides 
safeguards to anyone granted refugee status, including the right not to be returned (or the right 
of non-refoulement) so that no state may expel anyone who meets the refugee definition. 
Minimum standards of treatment for refugees are also outlined in the Refugee Convention, 
which require that refugees must be treated with dignity and respect. The fundamental right 
to seek asylum from persecution is also grounded in other manifestations of human rights 
guarantees, appearing in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for 
example.297 It is also strengthened by reference to other fundamental human rights principles, 
                                                           
295 Refugee Convention (n 1), which was initially backward looking, aimed at offering protection for European refugees following 
World War Two. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967, 
606 UNTS 267) expanded the Convention, removing the temporal and geographic limitations, ensuring it was a forward looking 
instrument. Further guidance can be found on the meaning of the Refugee Convention in UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees UN Doc 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV 3 (2011). The UNHCR (the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the refugee agency at the 
United Nations) has responsibility for safeguarding refugees. In Europe, see also the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 
on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection (known as the ‘Qualification Directive’ as it sets out the definitions of those who qualify for 
protection. UK law brings the Qualification Directive into domestic law via the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection 
(Qualification) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/2525) and modifications to the Immigration Rules (see Part 11).  The Refugee Convention 
does not apply to all who satisfy the definition of a Refugee under Article 1, including anyone who has committed war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, serious non-political crimes, or anyone guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
296 Refugee Convention (n 1)  Article 1A . 
297 UDHR (139) Article 14  “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”  
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such as non-discrimination. Accordingly, the right to protection for refugees ought to be 
honoured without discrimination as to race, religion, age, disability, sex or any other prohibited 
ground.298  
 
Family associations are vital in ensuring effective settlement and integration for anyone 
migrating to a new country, including and perhaps more particularly, for refugees. It is 
generally recognised the family is entitled to “ … respect, protection, assistance and 
support.”299 Central to this is the formal process of family reunion, the significance of which 
has described by representatives of the Home Office as: 
 
… a fundamental principle-not a privilege but a right-that it would not be proper 
to take away: [that is] that of a mother and her children to join the father who is 
already settled in this country.300 
 
While applications for refugee status are protected by international human rights guarantees, 
no express right to family reunification exists in either the Refugee Convention or in any other 
human rights instrument.301 Although the Final Act of the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the States of Refugees and Stateless Persons unanimously endorsed the principle of family 
unity as an essential refugee right, requiring states to take positive steps towards the 
preservation of family unity and the UNHCR has promoted the idea of family unity since the 
Refugee Convention was introduced, no clear  ‘right’ to family reunion exists in international 
law.302  
                                                           
298 UDHR (139) Article 2. 
299 European Council on Refugees and Exiles ‘Position on Refugee Family Reunification’ (Report) (July 2000) , 5. The recognition of 
families is discussed by Helene Lambert in ‘Family unity in migration law: the evolution of a more unified approach in Europe’ in Chetail 
and Bauloz (eds) Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar, 2014) 194, where she quotes Kate Kastram, 
‘Family Unity: The New Geography of Family Life’ (Migration Policy Institute, 1 May 2003).  
300 HC Deb 24 July 1968, vol 769 col 852. 
301 One possible exception to that rule may exist in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted  20 November 1989, entered 
into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, Articles 9 and 10 work together to ensure that children are not generally separated from 
their parents. Article 10 deals specifically with applications for family reunion by children, requiring that states deal with applications 
in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. Whether that equates to a right to family reunification is moot, particularly as some 
states will still refuse to allow the children of additional polygamous spouses residency rights. 
302 Refugee Convention (n 1), Final Act s IV Recommendation B. 
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Accordingly, once settled, the process of reuniting a refugee sponsor with family members is 
largely governed by domestic immigration law, meaning that requirements for family reunion 
differ in individual states.303  The United Kingdom does offer the possibility of family reunion, 
recognising the fragmentation that occurs for all migrants, but in particular for refugee families 
who may be forced to leave their country of origin quickly. This, and the importance of family 
to the process of refugee re-settlement, are reflected in British domestic law and policy, which 
allows refugees and their immediate families to reunite and settle together. To that end, family 
reunion provisions permit anyone granted refugee status to apply to have their immediate 
family in the form of spouses and children join them.304 In addition, the particular challenges 
faced by refugee families are acknowledged, and refugees are treated more favourably than 
general migrants who wish to reunite their families, with no prerequisite obligation for 
financial maintenance or accommodation, and no cost is incurred by any refugee wanting to 
make an application.305 The special hardship faced by polygamous refugee families is not, 
however, reflected in family reunion laws. Regardless of the validity of their marriage, 
additional wives in polygamous families are without exception excluded from being reunited 
with their families according to immigration law. Immigration Rules and policy guidance for 
caseworkers assessing refugee family reunification makes it clear that only one wife in a 
                                                           
303 The substantive ‘right’ to family unity will be discussed in detail in the following chapter on human rights. For now, it is suffice to 
say that no formal, express right to family reunion exists and states have a large amount of autonomy about how they manage the 
family reunification process.  
304 Provided with regard to spouses that any solemnisation of the relationship took place before the refugee sponsor fled the country 
of origin; Immigration Rules Part 11 Immigration Rules, 352A – spouses (352D children) – family reunion Rules. See also policy in the 
Asylum Instruction provided by the UK Border Agency to provide guidance for Case Owners working in assessing asylum claims, see: 
Home Office ‘Family Reunion: for refugees and those with humanitarian protection’ (Version 2.0) (29 July 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257465/familyreunion.pdf>  (accessed 15 
December, 2015) and Home Office ‘Family Reunification of Third Country Nationals in the European Union’ (March 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/28a_uk_family_reunification_final_en.pdf> accessed 22 April 2017. As the 
guidance specifies, also included are unmarried or same sex partners (evidence is needed of two or more years together before fleeing) 
and children under 18, step children where the biological parent is dead, or anyone else conceived by the sponsor before fleeing. 
Other extended family or non pre-existing family can apply to come the United Kingdom under other provisions of the Immigration 
Rules or under Article 8 ECHR (the Right to a Family Life) but they do not qualify for family reunion and applications are more complex 
and difficult. 
305 Home Office Guidance (n 304).  
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polygamous family may take advantage of reunion provisions.306 No evaluation of harm is 
carried out in assessing reunification entitlements, no exception is made for the refugee status 
of the sponsor and no consideration is given to the plight of the family concerned.  
 
 
3.4.2 The Impact on Polygamous Wives 
 
Many women placed in refugee situations show remarkable strength and resourcefulness in 
coping with their daily realities as they take care of themselves and their families. Women, 
alone or not, have an incredible capacity to make the best of their situation where possible and 
very often it is women in refugee communities who drive improvements and effect change for 
the benefit of themselves and their families.307 Whatever the strength and resilience of 
displaced women, however, as already outlined, it remains the case that the experiences of 
refugee women are also disproportionately challenging. Their journey has been described as 
one of grinding hardship, filled with misery, anxiety and isolation.308 For these women, it is a 
journey where: 
 
They have run out of money, face daily threats to their safety, and are being treated 
as outcasts for no other crime than losing their men … It’s shameful. They are 
being humiliated for losing everything.309 
 
                                                           
306 Immigration Rules 278-280 and Home Office: Family Reunion: for refugees (n 304), 19 polygamous marriages. The document also 
provides guidance for officers where exceptional circumstances or compassionate factors exist and granting of leave is appropriate 
outside of the Immigration Rules. Additional polygamous wives are not mentioned in this part of the guidance, where unjustifiably 
harsh consequences may give rise to a right to enter and remain. 
307 Amnesty International (n 18), Townsend (n 19), International Rescue Committee and Human Rights Watch (n 20), UNHCR 
Executive Committee, Beswick, Johnsson and UNSC Res 1325 (British Red Cross) (n 21), each of which details the specific hardship 
suffered by women in refugee settings. 
308 Maya El Helou ‘Refugee Camps in Lebanon: Syrian Women Bodies as a Site of Structural Violence’ (Report) (18 December 2014) < 
http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=673&lang=en> accessed 10 March 2015.  
309 Antonio Guterres, UNHCR Chief  in Harriet Sherwood, ‘Syria’s female refugees facing poverty, harassment and isolation’ Guardian 
(London, 8 July 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/08/women-head-quarter-syrian-refugee-families accessed 12 
March 2015. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
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In the British context, the absolute exclusion by immigration laws of women in polygamous 
marriages sits in stark contrast with the approach to polygamy in the domestic legal sphere. In 
that regard, when one considers the impact on refugee women, the disjuncture in the domestic 
treatment of polygamy and its treatment in immigration becomes deserving of attention. At 
first glance, the state’s complete ban on polygamy appears entirely reasonable. How can it be 
improper for the government of the United Kingdom to exclude cultural or religious practices 
which it deems breach the minimum standard of the state’s own core values? That position is 
undermined, however, by the timing and purpose of the introduction of legislative restrictions 
on polygamy. The relevance of fear, and most particularly a fear of those who are 
demonstrably different, is reflected in both the public and private statements of politicians 
around the time of increasing immigration control. In the United Kingdom, the absolute 
prohibition on polygamy in immigration has much to do with excluding difference, perhaps 
explaining why the state doesn’t carry out any balancing of relative harms in the immigration 
context. Given the doubts over the state’s motives for the absolute prohibition on polygamy 
in immigration, this work suggests that the on-going basis for that policy, especially in the 
refugee context, must be explained and justified, to prove the state is not hiding behind the 
‘impenetrable cloak of harm’ to exclude those who are simply different, to the great expense 





This chapter has charted the practice of polygamy in the United Kingdom and its treatment 
under English law. While the state may prohibit and punish civil, bigamous marriages and 
largely ignore religious plural marriages entered into domestically, the United Kingdom has a 
long tradition of acknowledging plural marriages that are validly formed elsewhere. While the 
recognition of entirely foreign polygamous marriage undoubtedly arises in part because of 
international law obligations, it is also linked with concern for the greater harm that might be 
caused by not recognising polygamous marriages. The state’s concern for harm is illustrated in 
                                                           
310 Shah (n 11) expresses his concern about this possibility, arguing that polygamy restrictions in immigration reflect “… culture wars, 
while not achieving the aim of eliminating polygamy as ethnic minorities continue to navigate among various legal levels to circumvent 
official laws … being waged potentially at the expense of women and against the best interests of their children.” 
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case law and legal commentary on the legal response to polygamy, in which the importance of 
preventing unnecessary harm, most often to wives, is expressly referred to.  
 
Despite the United Kingdom’s own willingness to acknowledge polygamy for domestic 
purposes, as well as the comments of the state’s own representatives regarding the importance 
of family reunion and its status as a ‘right’ not a privilege, the same readiness does not feature 
when it comes to polygamy in immigration. Where plural marriage and the laws governing 
settlement in the United Kingdom collide, non-monogamous families are universally and 
without exception denied the opportunity to settle together in the United Kingdom as family 
units. This disjuncture in the treatment of polygamy in the domestic and immigration settings 
is arguably not only inconsistent, but also particularly disturbing when it is considered in the 
context of refugee families. The blanket ban on polygamy has the potential to cause hardship 
to those who are already likely to be suffering a great deal. Any hardship caused by the 
polygamy ban is also more likely to be suffered disproportionately by displaced women 
because additional wives who are forced to remain in unstable environments face an even 
great risk of a range of harms, some of which are specific to their gender.  
 
Even where one allows for the public policy driving the prohibition of polygamy to take 
precedence, the disjuncture in the formal treatment of polygamy in the domestic and 
immigration spheres remains difficult to reconcile. The inconsistent treatment of polygamy, 
as well as the disproportionate impact of its universal prohibition on women, provides a 
prompt for the reconsideration of the legal response to polygamy in the United Kingdom. 
That reconsideration begins in the following chapter, with an examination of the assistance 





Chapter 4  
The Problem: 
The Promise and The Failure of Human Rights 
 
 
4.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
 
This chapter considers the treatment of polygamy by human rights. International human rights 
guarantees make the actions of sovereign states reviewable according to supra-national 
standards. This chapter interrogates the promise of rights, their efficacy in practice and 
whether they provide effective, universal protection. While rights are commonly presumed to 
be “… impeccable with everything else being adjusted to maintain that assumption”, here, the 
paradox of polygamy is used to reveal discomfort with that idea because rights fail to treat 
displaced polygamous wives—whether unintended or not—as anything other than the 
quintessential and relentlessly undeserving ‘other’.311 
 
This chapter begins by outlining the promise of modern human rights standards. The first part 
outlines the modern system of international, regional and domestic human rights protection. 
The efficacy of that system is then questioned, as the rights guarantees that are offered to two 
distinctly relevant groups, refugees and women, are assessed for their effect. The notion of 
‘women’s rights’ and whether or not there is any tangible and enforceable right to family unity 
that might be claimed by refugee families are discussed, and more direct rights are tested such 
as the right to equality, the right to marry and the right to a family life. This critical review of 
rights attempts to develop a deeper understanding of human rights responses to certain 
categories of people. Pluralist, postcolonial and feminist critiques are explored, as the idea of 
universal rights is examined more closely. Each of the critical threads is brought together to 
assess the relevance of human rights failures in practice.  
 
                                                           
311 Mashood Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (OUP, 2003) 15, who refers to the common presumption that 
rights and the current interpretation of them are “… impeccable with everything else being adjusted to maintain that assumption, 4, 
quoting Watson, JS Theory & Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights (1999).  
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This analysis is intended to lay a foundation for the final substantive chapter in this work, 
which seeks to reshape the discussion on polygamy regulation, by applying a refreshed feminist 
approach to its treatment in law and human rights.  
 
 
4.2 The Promise of Rights 
 
4.2.1 International Human Rights 
 
Until the early twentieth century, the pre-occupation of formal international legal rules had 
been with regulating the behaviour of states in relation to each other.312 International law was 
regarded as something that governed conduct between nations, not individuals and states. 
Following the brutality of the Holocaust and in an effort to avoid anything like that happening 
again, international law began—on a wide-reaching scale and with state accession—to regulate 
states’ treatment of individuals. In the seventy years since then, a system of rights has evolved 
which scrutinises and regulates states according to international, regional and domestic human 
rights regimes. This modern coming together to maintain peace and security and to promote 
and encourage respect for human rights is embodied in the United Nations, whose founding 
charter witnesses an agreement by states to co-operate in achieving universal respect for 
human rights.313 The commitment in the Charter of the United Nations to promote human 
rights led to the new inter-governmental organisation’s first codification of rights standards in 
the Universal Declaration, a non-binding statement on the scope and importance of rights.314  
Since the UDHR, international human rights standards have grown exponentially and have 
been implemented with a reasonable degree of consensus by states. An International Bill of 
Rights in the form of two covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
                                                           
312 Antonio Cassese, International Law (OUP,  2nd edition, 2005) provides a useful exposition on international law rules and practice. 
313 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 1, 55 and 56. James 
Hathaway The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (CUP, 2014) 43, says the commitment is context specific; states are only 
required by the charter to honour human rights only where a failure to do so might risk stability and well-being among nations. Using 
this interpretation, the Charter does not commit states to an all-encompassing human rights obligation, rather, they are duty bound 
to respect rights only where non-compliance with rights would have a negative impact on security and inter-state relations.  
314 UDHR (n 139). 
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(ICCPR)315 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESC),316 were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966 and came into 
force ten years later. As a result, rights were no longer a question simply for domestic 
preference or practice and states became answerable to the international community for their 
behaviour in the domestic sphere.  
 
This early promise of rights led to the implementation of many additional international human 
rights guarantees, each one aimed at providing specific types of protection. To date, the United 
Nations has drafted and continues to enforce more than eighty human rights treaties, securing 
its prominence as the primary source of codified, international human rights law. The rights 
of refugees, women, minorities, children, people with disabilities and protections against 
discrimination, religious persecution, torture, genocide, and slavery are provided in treaties and 
declarations adopted by states members at the United Nations.  Most relevant to this work are 
the Refugee Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which respectively shield non-citizens who no 
longer benefit from the protection of their own state, and target the needs of women.317  
 
The developing network of human rights standards is monitored by the United Nations with 
seven of the most fundamental international human rights treaties overseen by committees.318 
Some have the power to hear specific complaints and others the power to review member 
states’ behaviour with respect to their treaty obligations, making general comments and 
recommendations for improvements. Although this system of international human rights law 
                                                           
315 ICCPR  (n 139).  
316 ICESCR  (n 139). 
317 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 
entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
318 Human Rights Committee (HRC) overseeing the ICCPR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) overseeing the 
ICESCR; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) overseeing the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Committee Against Torture (CAT) overseeing the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
overseeing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) overseeing the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Only the HRC, CERD, CAT, CEDAW and the CRC may receive 
communications complaining about violations. In these cases, the committees will hear the complaint, and apply the treaty provisions, 
and may issue recommendations to remedy treaty violations.  
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does not always work directly to bring influence to bear, it is used as a ‘backstop’ when 
domestic rights or other legislation fails to uphold rights standards.319 When national laws and 
protections fall short, international human rights provide a basis for applying pressure on 
governments to uphold their obligations.  
 
 
4.2.2 Regional Human Rights 
 
In addition to the international regime of human rights guarantees, there are regional systems 
that also establish rights obligations. Most regions have a human rights treaty, including 
Europe, the Americas,320 Africa,321 and Arab states.322 Although regional systems are based to 
an extent on the international example, each region has developed its own, unique system for 
outlining and enforcing human rights and no two regions operate in exactly the same way, or 
privilege the same things.323 Notwithstanding the United Kingdom’s decision to depart from 
Europe following a referendum in June 2016, the arrangement with most relevance to this 
work at the time of writing continues to be the European regional system of human rights 
                                                           
319 Kenneth Roth ‘What are Human Rights For?’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds) International Human 
Rights Law (OUP 2010), 8. 
320 The Organisation of American States, whose Charter came into force in December 1951, around the same time as the European 
Union, and which brings together all 35 independent states of the American region, with a four-pronged approach to its essential 
purposes, one of which is the promotion of human rights. Human rights are governed according to the American Convention on Human 
Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS and overseen by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
321 The African Union is the regional inter-governmental body with responsibility for overseeing 53 member states across the region. 
It succeeded the Organisation of African Unity. Established in July 2002 it operates a framework for rights, overseen by the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights. The primary treaty is the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 
27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 whose guarantees are enforced by the African regional human 
rights court. The African system has specific rights guarantees for women (Maputo Protocol n 151) and children (the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 2005) CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
322 The League of Arab States, first formed in 1945, is the body with oversight of rights in the region. The League has established the 
Permanent Human Rights Commission as the main political body charged with the protection of human rights within the Arab League 
system, although it does not have a reputation for being effective. The primary treaty body is the Arab Human Rights Committee, with 
oversight of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (adopted 22 May 2004, entered into force March 15, 2008) The League has been 
working towards establishing an Arab Court of Human Rights, but international human rights bodies have cautioned against the League 
adopting the model currently proposed, as it falls well short of international human rights standards.  
323 In fact, the Asia Pacific region remains notably absent from this group, having not privileged any rights at all at a regional level so 
that no rights convention or system is in place in this region.   
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protection.324 The European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms entered into force in 1953 and is the most developed of all regional rights structures, 
having been in place for over sixty years.325 In an important contrast with the international 
system of human rights overseen by committees at the UN, the implementation of European 
rights standards is supervised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, or European 
Court), whose judgments are binding.326 The decision by the United Kingdom to leave the EU 
in no way equates to a decision also to leave the Council of Europe, or the European rights 
project, and the European Court continues for now to provide tangible judicial remedies for 
violations of human rights. 
 
Although equality between men and women might be described as a founding value of the 
European Union, the European treaty system does not contain any special provision for 
women’s rights, unlike the system overseen at the UN.327 In addition, while the Charter of 
                                                           
324 The ‘Brexit’ referendum as it was known took place on Thursday 23 June 2016, resulting in a 52% majority vote to leave the 
European Union. While the result is not legally binding, the United Kingdom invoked Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon 
Treaty) on 29 March 2017, formally activating the process of leaving the EU. 
325 The Council of Europe has also adopted the European Social Charter (Revised) (adopted 3 May 1996, entered into 1 July 1999) ETS 
163 to protect social and economic rights, establishing rights to housing, health, education and employment. Periodic monitoring of 
states’ compliance with the social charters takes place and is overseen by the European Committee of Social Rights who hear collective 
complaints and periodic, national reports. The Committee of Social rights is made up of 15 independent, impartial members who are 
elected by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers for a period of six years, renewable once thereafter. There is some small 
overlap in the nature of protection provided according to each system and the ECtHR and the Committee of Social Rights attempt to 
enforce the Convention and the Charter in a complimentary way.  
326 ‘ECtHR’ or ‘European Court’. The ECHR was formerly overseen according to a two-tier system comprised of the European 
Commission and the European Court, but this changed with the introduction of Protocol 11 in 1998. Article 46 requires the United 
Kingdom and other signatories to ‘abide by the final judgement of the court in any case to which it is a party’ so that the European 
Convention is binding on states and supervised by Committee of Ministers. The European Convention on Human Rights binds the 47 
Member States of the Council of Europe. The development of ‘margin of appreciation’ at the ECtHR has allowed European states some 
autonomy and discretion in behaving relative to their regional human rights obligations and where there is tension between the ECtHR 
and the state regarding a particularly sensitive issue, a margin of appreciation may be relied on to limit any human rights burden. The 
European Court of Human Rights and its application to Member States of the Council of Europe may be distinguished from the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, or ECJ, and its application to the Member States of the European Union. The ECJ oversees the actions 
of EU institutions and clarifies European law for Member States of the European Union. While the ECtHR remains the body with 
primary responsibility for enforcing human rights, the ECJ affords the ECHR ‘special significance’ as a ‘guiding principle’ in its own 
decision-making. 
327 Although there is no specific women’s rights treaty in Europe, in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (adopted 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009) 2007/C 
306/1 (TEU) confirmed once again the importance of gender equality in the European Union and equality between men and women 
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Fundamental Rights of the EU includes a right to asylum, it too is limited in application.328 
The ECHR does not contain any express reference to asylum or refugees and the Refugee 
Convention unquestionably remains authoritative in assessing the individual human rights of 
refugees.329 Despite these failings on the part of the European system, the ECHR still has the 
potential to offer individuals considerably more human rights protection throughout Europe 
than broad and less directly enforceable international human rights standards. Although the 
scope of rights at the European level is unquestionably more limited than in international and 
other regional systems, the ECtHR is self-professedly dynamic in its interpretation of rights 
under the ECHR, allowing the opportunity for the ambit of rights to develop as they need to, 
to adapt to modern circumstances.330  
 
                                                           
features amongst the common values on which the European Union is founded (Article 2, TEU). The European Commission has also 
produced the Strategic plan for engagement for gender equality 2016-2019 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/document/files/strategic_engagement_en.pdf> accessed 22 February 2017 and the Strategy for equality between women 
and men, set the framework for the Commission’s work on gender equality (2010-2015) (September 2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/strategy_equality_women_men_en.pdf> accessed 22 February 2017 
links available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/> (accessed 4 April 2017). EU gender equality is also an integral part of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (26 October 2012) 2012/C 326/02 which prohibits discrimination on any 
grounds, including sex, (Article 21) and recognises the right to gender equality in all areas and the necessity of positive action for its 
promotion (Article 23). The Council of Europe has also enacted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women 
and Domestic Violence Istanbul Convention (adopted 11 May 2011, entered into force 1 August 2014) CETS No 201 (‘Istanbul 
Convention’). 
328 Where national laws on asylum are regarded as implementing Union law, the Charter applies. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU means, in practice, that any act undertaken by the EU and members states when implementing EU law must  comply with 
the Charter, so that any provision of European or national law which breaches the Charter is invalid. For more information on the 
Charter and its relationship with asylum, see European Council on Refugees and Exiles ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; An 
Indispensible Instrument in the Field of Asylum’ (Report) (January 2017). 
329 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (n 327) Article 18 . The Charter is in reality a re-statement of existing rights, 
re-stating the right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the Refugee Convention. The Charter applies to EU institutions 
and laws, and was not signed or ratified by individual states.  
330 The principle of evolutive or dynamic interpretation, discussed in P Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the 
European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin’ (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal 57, 62-66; F Ost The Original 
Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights in M Delmas-Marty and C Chodkiewicz (eds) The European 
Convention for the Protection on Human Rights: International Protection Versus National Restrictions (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) 238-
318. The Court has confirmed this principle by saying “ … the Convention is a living instrument which … must be interpreted in light of 
present day conditions …[T]he Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in … the 
Member States of the Council of Europe …”, Tyrer v the United Kingdom (App no 5856/72) ECHR 25 April 1978. 
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Whether the ‘dynamic’ potential of European rights is always fully realised is another matter. 
In the refugee context, gaps in the European system have perhaps never been more significant 
than at the time of writing. While there are some EU and other agencies that have worked to 
provide humanitarian aid and emergency support to increasing numbers of people who are 
fleeing crisis, the scale of human displacement and global insecurity is unprecedented and the 
challenges are many. Although the Common European Asylum System suggests that states 
will have a joint approach in providing effective protection for refugees, in practice, state 
responses have been varied. Some states have been more welcoming than others, with those 
who have been the least well disposed towards refugees adopting repressive tactics to exclude, 
detain and deport people. European states who have responded in this way have not only 
displayed a shameful disregard for people who are fleeing failed states and civil wars, they have 
shown that states in Europe are able to do little to help those seeking refuge, with what 
amounts to complete impunity.331 This treatment of refugees by European states begs the 
question: how it is that not all humans have tangible humanity in a region with such apparently 
strong human rights protection?332 The inability of the regional human rights project—or what 
might more honestly be called a conscious denial of accountability by the European human 
rights system as well as by individual European states—to reconcile the abstract ‘human’ in 
treaties with the life of the human being in practice has been starkly evident. Refugees in 
Europe today continue to be denied meaningful access to human rights support so that, if they 
survive the journey to Europe, they often live half-lives, without many basic freedoms, 
detained or prevented from travelling, with little or no prospect of having any opportunity to 
seek and attain family unity.333 
                                                           
331 Since 1999, the EU has been working on a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and has introduced measures in an attempt 
to harmonise common minimum standards for migration. However, the European Commission has accepted the CEAS measures 
require updating to deal with the exponential rise in human movement in and around Europe and appears to be in the process of 
presenting proposals to improve the system in the future, and there is no doubt that European nations continue to take vastly different 
approaches to migration, as evidenced by the varying responses of Germany (with Chancellor Merkel expressing an ‘open door’ policy 
to welcome migrants) and Hungary (in resisting calls to welcome migrants and objecting to migrant quotas).  
332 Costas Douzinas ‘Human Rights for Martians’ Critical Legal Thinking (3 May 2016) 
<http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/05/03/human-rights-for-martians/> accessed 8 May 2017. 
333 Even though the European system does not offer either refugees a right to asylum, states are required to adhere to human rights 
standards in their treatment of both migrants and refugees once they arrive. Early case law established that the ECHR prohibits the 
return of someone to a country where substantial grounds exist for believing they will face ill-treatment (Soering v United Kingdom 




4.2.3 Domestic Human Rights  
 
In addition to the vast amount of international and regional human rights protections, states 
very often also adopt domestic human rights guarantees. Most countries have written 
constitutions or domestic bills of rights, or both, and the United Kingdom is no exception, 
with the Human Rights Act (HRA) providing important additional human rights protections 
in the domestic legal sphere.334  The HRA was enacted to ‘bring rights home’ in the words of 
the government of the time because of weaker constitutional rights guarantees and difficulties 
in accessing the European system in practice.335 Its most significant impact was to increase the 
protection offered to anyone with a human rights claim by giving rights a home-grown 
character and ensuring individuals were no longer forced to take cases to the European Court 
in Strasbourg.  Also since the introduction of the HRA, laws in the United Kingdom must be 
interpreted in so far as it is possible in a way that is compatible with the rights set out in the 
Act, wrapping a rights framework more directly around all other domestic laws.336  The Act 
also provides that any legislation in breach of its terms may be declared incompatible with 
rights standards, making a legislative rights breach more visible in the domestic sphere.337 
Although any inconsistency does not make the offending legislation void, a declaration of 
incompatibility acts as a signal from the courts to Parliament that the United Kingdom is 
breaching its binding, regional human rights obligations, thereby holding the government of 
the day directly to account. In addition, the obligations in the HRA apply to all public 
authorities and anyone carrying out a public function and although the Act is not applicable 
to the actions of private individuals or companies, public authorities can be subject to a duty 
                                                           
regarding detention, refoulement and family unity, despite the absence of direct protection for refugees. Note, the Dublin III 
Regulation is also relevant in this context, setting out criteria and mechanisms for determining Member States ’ responsibilities, known 
as the Dublin System, and applies to all 28 EU countries and four Schengen Associated States (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and 
Norway). The Dublin system has been particularly relevant, and controversial, in the current crisis for its part in defining the difference 
between a state where an asylum-seeker may physically be present and a state that has responsibility for that person.  
334 Human Rights Act 1998.  
335 Home Office ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ (Cm 3782, 1997) paragraph 1.14 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf accessed 22 February 2017). 
336 S 3 HRA. 
337 S 4 HRA. 
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to stop private actors from breaching human rights guarantees.338 Where a breach is 
established the court may grant a remedy, including an award for compensation.339 For these 
reasons, the HRA has undoubtedly brought enormous influence to bear in the domestic 
human rights context. Its place in the domestic legal sphere undoubtedly makes the pantheon 




4.2.4 The Future of Rights in the United Kingdom 
 
In spite of their promise and influence on rights in the domestic legal discourse in the United 
Kingdom, the status of neither the ECHR nor the HRA is guaranteed. Since the process of 
departure from the EU has now formally been activated, it is inevitable that Britain will part 
ways with the European political project. While any departure does not compel the United 
Kingdom to sever ties with the European system of rights, a new rights regime is possible, 
perhaps even likely given that the British government has previously expressed its intention to 
propose a ‘British Bill of Rights.’340 Those in favour of domestic rights that continue to be 
informed by current European standards are hopeful that, should a new regime be introduced, 
any future changes will not weaken human rights protections. However, a nagging sense of 
uncertainty remains at the time of writing regarding the future breadth and depth of domestic 
human rights.  
 
                                                           
338 S 6 HRA. This obligation doesn’t apply if according to the law the public authority could not have acted differently  
339 In addition to the HRA, in 2010 the introduction of the Equality Act boosted domestic anti-discrimination provisions by 
harmonising pre-existing law and introducing some small extensions of the law for example, in the context of gender reassignment. 
340 David Cameron, then Prime Minister, made this claim in the lead up to the 2015 election campaign, following up on a 2010 
Conservative manifesto commitment to repeal the HRA and restore parliamentary sovereignty, which he claimed had been diluted by 
the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the European Court. Calls for a British Bill of Rights, more obviously rooted in ‘British values’, have 
resurfaced more recently with the Brexit process. Perhaps more important in terms of predicting the British path of human rights, at 
the time she was Home Secretary, Theresa May (now Prime Minister) described the ECHR as being able to bind the hands of 
parliament, calling for Britain to withdraw from the European human rights project. While human rights campaigners have been critical 
of such suggestions, and there is much uncertainty at the time of writing about who may be at the helm of negotiations with Europe 
over Britain’s exit of the EU with the snap election due to be held on 8 June, it is likely that calls for a ‘British Bill of  Rights’ will not go 
away anytime soon.  
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The fear that rights protections will be diluted at the national level goes some way to elevating 
the importance of international human rights standards as an overarching system of rights 
guarantees. Whatever changes may be made to the framework and content of rights following 
the break with the EU, international laws remain a constant reminder of the United Kingdom’s 
obligations. International standards have the potential to assist in preventing a decline in 
domestic rights protections, providing an anchor for any future, domestic rights commitments. 
With that in mind, this chapter turns now to those individual international rights claims 
displaced polygamous wives might look to for assistance, to investigate their substance, as well 
as their efficacy in practice.  
 
 
4.3 The Efficacy of Rights 
 
This part asks simply, do human rights live up to their promise? Although the modern system 
of human rights arguably goes a long way to preventing persecution, it is far from perfect. 
First, in terms of their substance, it has been argued that they reflect limited norms. Criticisms 
of this nature allege that international rights do not speak with a broad enough voice and, as a 
result, do not reflect the experiences or cater to the needs of those who have less influence in 
the institutionalised space in which norms are created. According to this line of reasoning, 
when rights are devised those who are vulnerable to oppression are less likely to dominate the 
meaning of rights, despite the ever-broadening spectrum of rights guarantees. Instead, it is 
Western, white men (and latterly, women) who have largely dominated the process of rights 
definition and implementation.  This is reflected in the content of rights, which are less likely 
to represent the lives and needs of those who are the ‘other’. This omission has bearing on the 
utility of rights; as Navanethem Pillay, former UN Commissioner for Human Rights puts it:  
 
… the opposite of marginalisation, discrimination and neglect is not only equality 
in rights and opportunities, but also the ability to make one’s voice be heard and 
counted.341  
 
                                                           
341 Navanethem Pillay (then) UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘What are Human Rights For?’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta 
Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds) International Human Rights Law, (OUP, 2014) 4. 
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This suggestion goes to the heart of the promise of rights and also to the realisation of that 
promise in practice. To have real authority and effect, rights must reflect the lived experiences 
of all human beings. As this work will seek to confirm, concern that rights fail in this regard is 
becoming more audible.  
 
Human rights can also be criticised outside of their substantive limitations. While the 
recommendations of various human rights committees are considered highly authoritative and 
apply pressure on states to act responsibly, they are not binding or enforceable in the ordinary 
sense.342 Despite the promise of tangible rights standards, their effect can be limited in practice 
and states can—and do—ignore the recommendations of the committees.343 Aside from the 
limited extent of supervision, rights are also weakened by the slow speed of international 
oversight in responding to human rights crises because it is a system based on conventions, 
signature, ratification and reporting. More substantively, concern also exists over the growth 
of human rights standards, and the potential as a result for rights to become weak and 
uncertain, rather than strengthened, by their very breadth.344  While modern rights standards 
provide useful supervision and guidance, they have undeniable limitations. These limitations 
exist at the domestic level too. Despite the benefits offered by the HRA, it is not supreme law 
and cannot be used to strike down conflicting domestic laws. Neither is it entrenched; it can 
be repealed in the same way as any other statute so that parliamentary sovereignty is preserved. 
The appetite at the time of writing for exactly that type of repeal adds weight to the reality of 
this threat in practice, particularly following the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the 
broader European project.  
 
While it is not possible to canvass all rights on which displaced, additional wives might seek 
to rely, the following analysis tests the efficacy of specific, relevant rights protections, to see 
                                                           
342 The remit of each Committee is outlined in the relevant treaties, as amended.  
343 For a comprehensive catalogue of human rights violations since the ECHR, see Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Towards A New Legal 
Common Sense: Law Globalization and Emancipation (CUP, Cambridge 2002) 263-268. 
344 Since the adoption of the UDHR, the UN treaty system has grown exponentially with a vast body of human rights material, 
comprised of hundreds of declarations, conventions, recommendations and comments on a broad range of human rights topics from 
basic human rights guarantees to those which cater for specific needs of refugees, women, children, migrant workers, indigenous 
rights, disability rights and other matters, available at the United Nations Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/PAGES/Content.aspx?path=DB/titles/page1_en.xml> accessed 23 April 2017. 
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whether the voices of marginalised women are reflected in their content, and if not, why that 
is so.  
 
 
4.3.1 The Efficacy of Refugee Rights 
 
4.3.1.1 The Scope of Human Rights for Refugees 
 
The Refugee Convention forms the centrepiece of international refugee protection today.345 
In this regard, the Refugee Convention is premised on the basic understanding that all human 
beings should enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms, and that being forced to flee or located 
in a particular state ought not to limit an individual’s human rights. The claimant envisaged by 
this research is not necessarily herself a Convention refugee, but a woman whose husband has 
successfully claimed refugee status on one of the Convention grounds and who is now settled 
in the United Kingdom. For this woman, it is a right to family reunion which is sought—a 
right the Refugee Convention does not recognise.  
 
Avoiding family separation has been described by one well-known refugee law academic as a 
‘critical imperative’ for those who have been granted refugee status and who are living in 
relative safety. It undoubtedly means even more to those left behind in refugee settings, in 
much more precarious conditions.346 As already explained, in acknowledging the importance 
of the principle of family unity in the refugee context, the Final Act of the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries which adopted the Refugee Convention recommended that governments 
take the necessary measures to protect the family unit.347 Although not included in the final 
                                                           
345 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees gave the Refugee Convention universal coverage and ensure it was no longer restricted 
to refugees in need of assistance before 1 January 1951, or refugees only in Europe. The right of persons to seek asylum from 
persecution is contained in UDHR, Article 14 and ECHR, Article 18. Refugee Convention, Article 1. A nexus must be established between 
the persecution and the Convention ground. On the Refugee Convention generally, see Guy Goodwin Gill, The Refugee in International 
Law (3rd edn OUP, 2007), James Hathaway (n 313). 
346 James Hathaway (n 313) 533. Note there is actually also no specific right to settlement itself in the Refugee Convention, or any 
other human rights instrument. But states generally do allow for this. 
347 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons (25 July 1951 ) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/protection/travaux/40a8a7394/final-act-united-nations-conference-plenipotentiaries-status-refugees-
stateless.html> accessed 23 April 2017. The Conference agreed to take “… the necessary measures for the protection of the refugee’s 
 139 
draft of the Convention, this sentiment is also reflected in the UNHCR Handbook, which 
states: 
 
“If the head of a family meets the criteria of the [refugee definition], his dependents 
are normally granted refugee status according to the principle of family unity … as 
to which family members may benefit from the principle of family unity, the 
minimum requirement is the inclusion of the spouse and minor children … the 
principle of family unity operates in favour of dependents and not against them.348 
 
The suggestion from the Conference is also reflected in various UNHCR Executive 
Committee Conclusions on family protection for refugees, which underline the need for the 
family to be protected and stress that every effort should be made to ensure the reunification 
of refugee families.349 Other human rights treaties also affirm the central status of the family, 
                                                           
family especially with a view to …[e]nsuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is maintained.” The Conference also expressly 
affirmed the “essential right of the refugee” to family unity. Hathaway (n 313) 541 describes this as a “… powerful affirmation of the 
responsibility of states to avoid actions which might disturb the unity of a refugee’s family.’ He considers at 543 whether the 
Conference recommendation is customary international law, and concludes it may be, because it has inspired UNHCR resolutions and 
states have regularly affirmed the family as the fundamental unit of society, and a unit which should be respected. Hathaway continues 
at 545, saying there is little doubt there is ample material to support opinio juris for recognition of a customary legal norm to protect 
the family unity of refugees, although it is limited. No clear idea of what a family unity is exists and is more likely the state has an 
obligation not to interfere with family unity rather than an obligation to reunite families. This is also what state practice seems to 
indicate and support. The reference to the ‘right’ to family reunion referred to at (n 300) during House of Commons debates, (rather 
than it being a privilege) it remains difficult to say that there is a customary international law right to family unity. Even if that could 
be argued successfully, whether that includes polygamous families is doubtful.  
348 UNHCR, Handbook (n 295) 184, 185, 187. 
349 See in particular UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion ‘Protection of the Refugee’s Family’ (No 88, 8 October 1999) at 
paragraph (b)(iii) <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/3ae68c4340/protection-refugees-family.html> accessed 23 April 2017; 
UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion ‘Family Reunification’ (No 24, 21 October 1981) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/3ae68c43a4/family-reunification.html> accessed 23 April 2017; UNHCR Executive Committee 
Conclusion ‘International Protection’ (No 85, 9 October 1988)<http://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/3ae68c6e30/conclusion-
international-protection.html> calling on states to consolidate their procedures for family unity and reunification in a “… legal 
framework to give effect at the national level to a right to family unity for all refugees, taking into account the human rights of the 
refugees and their families.” UNHCR Resettlement Handbook (1996) at IV(12) “… there is virtually universal consensus in the 
international community concerning the need to reunite members of [the] family nucleus.” See also, United Nations Declaration on 
the Human Rights of Individuals who are Not Nationals of the Country They Live In (Adopted 13 December 1985, UNGA Res. 40/144) 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r144.htm> accessed 23 April 2017, Article 5(4) “Subject to national legislation and due 
authorization, the spouse and minor or dependent children of an alien lawfully residing in the territory of a State shall be admitted to 
accompany, join and stay with the alien”, so that any ‘right’ that might be claimed is subject to national legislation and the sovereign 
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and treaty bodies have alluded to a responsibility on the part of states to ensure the family 
unity.350  
 
As a result, most states recognise the chaos that is particularly prevalent in the refugee setting, 
often resulting in families being separated, and will honour the importance of family as a 
fundamental group which is entitled to some protection in the refugee context. The precise 
terms of reunion are usually determined according to domestic immigration provisions. As 
already explained, for polygamous wives reunion is limited in the United Kingdom by the 
Immigration Act and accompanying Immigration Rules, which restrict the number of wives 
who can be granted leave to enter and remain as the spouse of a sponsor.351 While, more 
recently, states have increasingly been willing to permit reunification for unmarried partners 
and gay spouses on the basis of their family relationship, the very same states that have 
extended their family reunification rules to incorporate a wider definition of ‘family’ have not 
inclined to do so with plural families.  
 
In the European Union, although the proposal prepared by the European Commission 
suggesting a Directive on family reunification expressly recommended that “…special 
attention” be paid to the situation of refugees so that they may benefit from “more favourable 
conditions” to be able to exercise their right to family reunification, most states are expressly 
prohibited from recognising polygamous families for this purpose by the EU Family 
Reunification Directive which states: 
 
                                                           
will. Also, the European Social Charter (Revised) (adopted, 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 1999) ETS 163, Article 19(6), states 
must “… facilitate as far as possible the reunion of family.” This version ignored and changed an earlier draft which suggested states 
should grant the right to family reunification.  
350 ICCPR, Article 17 and Article 23, which affirms the central status of the family; ICESCR, Article 10(1) affirming the same. The Human 
Rights Committee has said the ‘possibility of living together’ could be defined as extending to the adoption of measures by the state 
to ensure the unity of reunification of families, See UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment 19 ‘Article 23 (The Family) 
Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 7 (1990) at 149, paragraph 5. Still, 
none of these advocates for such a right for additional, polygamous wives. Even if a right to family reunification might be argued, the 
scope of the right is likely to be limited. 
351 S 2 Immigration Act 1988, paragraph 278-280 Immigration Rules.  
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In the event of a polygamous marriage, where the sponsor already has a spouse 
living with him in the territory of a Member State, the Member State concerned 
shall not authorise the family reunification of a further spouse.352 
 
While the United Kingdom has opted out of this particular Directive, creating the potential 
for domestic immigration law to take a more flexible approach to polygamous families, British 
immigration rules adhere to the same principle as the Directive.353 Additional polygamous 
wives are universally excluded and the prohibition on their entry to the United Kingdom is 
applied rigidly. Although NGO reports have suggested the United Kingdom be “flexible and 
responsive” in cases where family relationships are atypical, especially in cases where women 
and children are likely to be vulnerable to violence or exploitation in the refugee setting, 
resistance to understanding the ‘family’ as anything beyond a nuclear family remains firm.354 
This is deeply problematic in practice for a range of refugees whose families are not constituted 
in the traditional way. The exclusion operates without concern for the lived experience of 
wives who are left to face insecurity and danger, and whose living conditions day-to-day 
                                                           
352 ‘EU Family Reunification Directive’ Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] 
OLJ 251/12-251/18, Article 4(4). It also provides states with the freedom to limit the reunification of any children the additional spouse 
may have with the original Refugee sponsor. The Directive also states at paragraph 11, “The right to family reunification should be 
exercised in proper compliance with the values and principles recognised by the Member States, in particular with respect to the rights 
of women and children; such compliance justifies the possible taking of restrictive measures against applications for family 
reunification of polygamous household.” In Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2010] ECR I-117, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union confirmed the Directive must be interpreted in accordance with human rights (the right to a family life being the most 
obvious). This case did not consider the issue of polygamy directly, but rather, whether a family relationship which arose after the 
resident’s entry would be relevant for purposes connected with the Directive. For the earlier proposal recommending that refugees 
be treated more favourably, see Commission of the European Communities ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right to Family 
Reunification’ (1999) 638.  
353 The basis for the United Kingdom’s decision to opt out of the Directive on family reunification is not clear, but it has been attributed 
to a desire to ensure the United Kingdom is not obliged to comply with any EU law which is not in line with the United Kingdom’s own 
border policies, including any amendments to the Directive in the future. See Wright, Leila and Larsen, Christine, ‘European Migration 
Network  (EMN) Family “Reunification Report”: Small Scale Study IV (Report), 5. This is likely to appeal to a home audience with regard 
to concerns over immigration and the desire at least to give the impression of Britain being unfettered in its sovereign right to manage 
migration matters.  
354 Jacob Beswick, British Red Cross, ‘Not So Straightforward: The Need for Qualified Legal Support in Refugee Family Reunion’ 
(Report) (2015). The report recommends the Home Office be flexible and responsive for cases which were atypical (although 
polygamous marriages were not expressly included in the list) and recommended further the diverse needs of refugees’ families  ought 
to be acknowledged, including by standing by commitments to protect women and children who are more likely to be vulnerable to 
violence or exploitation in crisis settings. 
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arguably ought to provide a prompt for reconsideration. Despite that, when states are called 
on to make “every effort” to reunite families, polygamous families, be they refugees or not, 
do not benefit from that effort and the protection from harm it might otherwise provide.355 
 
4.3.1.2 The Trouble with Refugee Rights 
 
Given the absence of an express right to family reunification and the unity among Western 
states in limiting family reunion, including for refugees, it is perhaps reasonable to ask: why 
should human rights standards offer help to polygamous families who are denied family 
reunion? Given that the state is plainly able to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit in this 
regard, one might ask how excluding polygamous wives can be construed as a problem in need 
of fixing? 
 
At the centre of the United Kingdom’s treatment of polygamous families is a tension between 
the sovereign right to control immigration and the duty of each state to respect the human 
rights of all individuals, including those who are non-citizens. The particularly vulnerable 
position of refugees throws this tension into sharp relief. The importance of family unity to 
women who are much more likely to be exploited or abused by being left on their own 
highlights their need for the support of states and the human rights community. By rejecting 
these women on the basis solely of their marital status, states make a conscious choice to 
ignore their fate; a decision they are entitled to take entirely unhindered by rights obligations.  
 
Although the transnational abandonment of additional wives is effectively approved by 
international law, the impact on those affected provides a strong prompt to reassess their 
unconditional exclusion. By their very nature, the rights sought by those who are minorities 
and those who are ‘other’ are more likely to be controversial and therefore also more likely 
rejected by the officers of the majority, who act on their own notion of ‘rights’, and in this 
case, ‘family’.356 The idea that the law is neutral has long been questioned, however, and any 
recourse to rhetoric which simply cites the will of the majority, as expressed in overarching 
international legal principles and imposed by the dominant group on those who are in a much 
                                                           
355 The reference to ‘every effort’ comes from the UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 24 on Family reunification (n 349).  
356 Dworkin, R Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury, London, 1977) 204. 
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weaker position, must be challenged if rights are to remain credible.357 As one highly respected 
rights theorist has suggested, when the division between the will of those who are most 
powerful and those who have little power is most broad and deep—as it is with regard to the 
treatment of polygamy—this is precisely the time that the promise of the majority to respect 
the dignity and equality of the minority must be put to the test, otherwise the law will simply 
become “… a re-statement of the majority view of the common good”.358  
 
In responding to this elevation by Western states of their own conceptions of ‘family’, legal 
pluralists have recommended that those who govern take a ‘cross-societal’ approach where 
different communities co-exist.359 In this regard, Prakash Shah has noted the importance of 
considering why the law is expressed in a particular way (i.e. to exclude polygamous families), 
rather than simply accept what the law says.360 In his view, changing the focus in this way 
reveals invidious and deceptive local agendas. The judgment of non-Western marriages by the 
United Kingdom legal order and the failure of rights to offer any alternative is, according to 
Shah, inextricably intertwined with the historical dominance of Christianity and an idea of 
‘family’ which is distinctly Western. For these reasons, according to Shah, the legal treatment 
of polygamous wives might be described as a sort of lawlessness brought about administering 
the law on family reunion in a way which is tied to ‘acceptable’ notions of culture and which 
has no connection whatsoever with justice for those affected, an outcome which is all the 
more ironic in the context of human rights.  
 
The problem with the formal response to non-traditional families is illustrated by the Bibi case, 
a claim to the European Court of Human Rights by a daughter living in the United Kingdom, 
whose mother was prevented from enjoying family reunion because of the polygamous nature 
of her marriage to the girl’s father.361 In dismissing the applicant’s claim the Commission’s 
                                                           
357 Dworkin (n 356) 205, writing in 1977 says “The bulk of the law – that part which defines and implements social, economic and 
foreign policy – cannot be neutral.” In this regard, says Dworkin, the law is simply a re-statement of the majority view of the common 
good.  
358 Dworkin (n 356) 205. 
359 Lambert (n 299) 30, uses the term ‘cross-societal’ in the context of family. 
360 Shah (n 11).  
361 Bibi (n 192). Similar doors have been closed across Europe, including France (n 223) and Germany (n 75) and also in Italy where, 
as late as 2009, cases existed where the court had granted a right for a mother to enter and remain, including where a husband had 
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reasoning in this case speaks precisely to the concern expressed by Shah, with its emphasis on 
the ‘legitimate aim’ of preserving the Christian-based monogamous culture dominant in the 
United Kingdom.362 Similar doors have been closed across Europe, including France and 
Germany, which have already been discussed, and also in Italy where, previously as late as in 
2009, cases had existed where the court had granted a right for a mother to enter and remain, 
including where a husband had already settled with a separate wife.363 Although the family in 
Bibi were not displaced or seeking refuge, the judgment provides evidence more generally that 
efforts to deny polygamous families any right to reunite is heavily connected with the desire 
of the state to promote a Western, Christian and white agenda over the needs of individual 
claimants. In justifying the interference with the right to a family life, all states in Europe need 
do is effectively point to their preferred definition of ‘family’ as a legitimate aim, so that 
interference with polygamous family life is justified, despite the marriages which bind them 
being entirely valid. In this regard, the effect of human rights is to condone the state’s 
behaviour in denying family reunion for Muslim families, according to the Christian normative 
consensus that dominates in the region.  
 
The disjuncture between the universal rejection of polygamy in immigration and the 
recognition of polygamy in family and other domestic matters (as discussed in Chapter 2) adds 
some weight to the legal pluralist criticism expressed by Shah. If relative harm is considered 
domestically regarding the recognition of polygamous marriages, why are harms not balanced 
at all in immigration law, in particular as that is applied to refugees? If the law, and especially 
the law designed to protect refugees and promote human rights, does not assist those who 
evidently need it, and that failure can be contrasted with the treatment of the same category 
of people in domestic practice, such inconsistencies must at the very least provide a motive 
                                                           
already settled with a separate wife. (Corte di Appello di Torino, 18 apirle 2001, tribunale di Bologna, ord. 12 marzo 2003, Tribunale 
dei minori di Bari, 20 agosto 2002, Corte di Appello di Bari, decr. 31 dicembre 2001). Law n.94 15 July 2009 has subsequently closed 
that door.  
362 In justifying an interference with a right, states are not able to point to any aim they consider worthy in seeking to claim a 
‘legitimate aim’. In fact, the ECHR itself sets out parameters within the content of each right stated in the convention, including national 
security, public safety, the protection of health or morals, for example. In a similar case at the ECHR, the government of the 
Netherlands was entitled to exclude the child of an additional spouse on the basis doing so was in pursuance of a legitimate aim (EA 
and AA v the Netherlands (App. No. 14501/89) ECHR 6 January 1992 confirming the suggestion that states are not ordinarily required 
to guarantee Convention rights where doing so would interfere with their with their own legal order.  
363 France and Germany and Italy (n 361).  
 145 
for critical re-consideration. The disjuncture between the law and the limited value it very often 
provides to displaced populations in practice reveals a disregard for transnational families who 
become trapped in a socio-legal reality which does not acknowledge them. No express right 
to family reunification can be claimed by them and sovereign will, backed up by a discernable 
lack of international obligation on states to do anything differently, means the reality of daily 
life faced by polygamously married refugees is ignored. In this way, official decision making 
by the state and the international human rights community reinforces the ‘othering’ of certain 
categories of people.  
 
Shah uses the Singh case to highlight this ideological dominance in practice.364 In this case, an 
ethnic minority adoption was reinterpreted in terms of Western legal categories to make it 
valid, then rejected in the immigration context anyway, and—given the severity of the impact 
on those affected—subsequently challenged successfully using Western inspired human rights 
claims.365 The same sort of ‘othering’ and dominance undoubtedly also occurs in the formal 
treatment of polygamous wives. However, unlike the adopted child in Singh who eventually 
found relief in the form of rights, polygamous wives are doubly disadvantaged. Not only does 
domestic immigration law continue to deny them family unity, regardless of the impact, for 
them, universal rights offer no help at all. 
 
While the arguments made by Shah and legal pluralists like him are helpful in explaining how 
domestic laws and international human rights fail to protect the interests of women like those 
who are the focus for this work, the factors behind the relative positions of power in this 
context also require consideration.366 Here postcolonial critiques like that of Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos provides a historical reference point for the international system of rights, firmly 
locating their current content in a background of colonialism and dominance, as a kind of 
‘monument of Western culture’.367 In this connection, de Sousa Santos alleges that modern 
                                                           
364 Singh v Entry Clearance Officer, New Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075, discussed in Prakash Shah, ‘Diasporas as legal actors: 
Implications for established legal boundaries’ (2005) 5 Non State Actors and International Law 153. 
365 Singh (n 364). In this case, the Court of appeal considered that the immigration authorities’ refusal to recognise an inter-family 
adoption in India was an interference with Article 8, the right to a family life and violated the Human Rights Act 1998.  
366 De Sousa Santos (n 343) 257. 
367 De Sousa Santos (n 343) 257, 280.  
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rights discourse reflects a ‘legal orientalist’ perspective, which separates the West from the rest 
and confirms the superiority of Western nation states on the international stage. The legacy of 
legal orientalism, whereby a framework was constructed in the context of colonial endeavours 
to confirm the inferiority of non-Western legal systems, marginalising other societies, is an 
oppositional rhetoric that directly informs the development of national and international 
laws.368  According to this reasoning, the very concept of human rights relies on a specifically 
Western way of thinking and living which is distinct and which does not reflect other ways of 
life, or any other culturally different concept of ‘human dignity’. In support of his suggestion, 
de Sousa Santos stresses the importance of reconstructing the notion of legality to take account 
of locality, nationality and globalisation, pointing to the fact that founding human rights 
documents were drafted without equal participation by other peoples so that their contents 
privilege individual, civil and political rights over collective, economic and social rights shaped 
by the economic, political and cultural priorities of the West.369 As a result, he questions the 
rallying cry of universal human rights, which he refers to as, quite simply, a disguised, 
globalised, localism.370  
 
Both de Sousa Santos’ postcolonial critique and that of the legal pluralists reflect a perspective 
on the treatment of refugees that highlights the notion that law cannot be separated from 
society. Rather the law is shaped by culture, politics and economics, and, in a circular 
relationship, law shapes the epistemological foundation that informs culture, politics and 
economics thereafter.371 In that regard, because law is a ‘cultural artefact’, as the socio-legal 
academic, Eve Darian Smith, has described it, it is illustrative of cultural assumptions which 
are deeply embedded in any given society.372 It is self-evident, however, that those who make 
and enforce laws do not very often view law in this way. Instead, a positivist account is 
presented by those in power of law simply as an instrument to regulate and control society, 
constituted by an executive branch with a mandate to do so, for the purpose of protecting 
individuals and their property from harm. As Darian-Smith has suggested, such simple 
                                                           
368 Darian Smith, Eve, Laws and Societies in Global Contexts (CUP, Cambridge 2013) 50. 
369 De Sousa Santos (n 343) 271. 
370 De Sousa Santos (n 343) 271. 
371 Eve Darian Smith (n 368) 41. 
372 Eve Darian Smith (n 368) 41. 
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assumptions about the nature of the law have long seemed uncomplicated because societies 
and the laws governing them were generally uniform in nature. With increased globalisation 
and human movement (forced or otherwise), however, societies are increasingly diverse and 
such assumptions are no longer reliable.373 
 
Applying pluralist, postcolonial and socio-legal critiques specifically to experiences of the 
displaced women contemplated by this research, it is possible to construe their treatment in 
refugee law as something which is unjustified and deeply problematic, even if it might also be 
expected. By re-understanding the origins and impact of international law in this way, human 
rights can be seen as constitutive of on-going Western cultural assumptions. Previously 
invisible ‘orientalising structures’ become capable of being re-imagined so that their typical 
ignorance of certain categories of people becomes clear.374 Instead of viewing additional wives 
as victims or perpetrators of an unacceptable form of marriage who can legitimately be 
excluded whatever the cost, re-imagining the law makes it possible to see them instead as 
outsiders whose legitimate family arrangements do not meet requisite (Western) standards and 
whose needs are subordinated entirely to the priorities of the (Western) state.375 By switching 
from an ordinary perspective on the purpose and function of the law to one which privileges 
the relationship between law and culture, a fresh perspective on the lived experiences of 
additional polygamous wives is gained. The precariousness of their situation in fleeing the 
danger posed by one state while hoping for the generosity of another illustrates the problem 
of rights claims which may be made against the state, but which are also created, agreed to and 
granted (or not) by the state. The ambivalence of the United Kingdom towards the displaced 
women contemplated by this research, far from reflecting a reasonable sovereign response to 
an objectionable form of marriage, can be re-understood as the manifestation of an 
unforgivable bias. Here, women seeking refuge and by definition in need of the protection of 
the state are neglected by apparently universal human rights guarantees which treat them as 
                                                           
373 Eve Darian Smith (n 368) 42, quotes the World Migration Report which says in 2010 there were 150 million migrants and by 
2013 the figure had risen to 214 million as people flee conflict and insecurity, pursue jobs and hope for a better standard of living. 
The same report also suggests the figure could grow to 405 million by 2050.  
374 The term ‘orientalising structures’ comes directly from Eve Darian Smith (n 368) at 50.  
375 De Sousa Santos (n 343) 257.  
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4.3.2 The Efficacy of Women’s Rights 
 
4.3.2.1 The Scope of Human Rights for Women  
 
The recognition of women’s rights as human rights has been a recent phenomenon, 
representing the increasing scope and ambition of the human rights movement.377 Before 
addressing the impact of women’s rights, it is worth explaining the purpose in thinking of 
rights for women as something different from the general human rights project. Inherent in 
the nature of rights is their promise of universal protection without distinction, as expressed 
in the earliest international human rights conventions. So, what is the benefit in thinking 
specifically of the rights of women?  
 
The disappointing truth is that, despite the long existence of rights and non-discrimination 
guarantees, women continue to be subject to gender-specific inequality, abuse and 
oppression.378 They are less likely to hold positions of power in the public sphere than men, 
and their interests in the private sphere have historically not been the focus for those who 
draft domestic or international law. In practice, this means they are more likely to be denied 
equal access to a range of rights, including in education, employment and health care. 
According to one human rights academic, the “grim reality” is that women are generally still 
far worse off than men in relation to almost every indicator of social well being.379 Moreover, 
                                                           
376 De Sousa Santos (n 343) 257.  
377 Steiner, Alston and Goodman (eds) International Human Rights in Context; Law Politics, Morals (3rd Edition OUP, 2008) 175.  
378 Diane Otto ‘Women’s Rights’ in Moeckli, Daniel, Shah, Sangeeta and Sivakumaran, Sandesh (eds) International Human Rights Law 
(OUP, 2014) 345.  
379 Otto (n 378) 347. For an overview of women’s rights as human rights see Charlotte Bunch ‘Women's Rights as Human Rights: 
Toward a Re-vision of Human Rights’, (1990) Vol 12 No 4 Human Rights Quarterly 486, Gayle Binion ‘Human Rights: A Feminist 
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Citizenship Studies 3(3) 337. For a discussion on women’s rights and culture, see  Monique Deveaux, Gender and Justice in Multicultural 
Liberal States (OUP, 2009), Chapter 3 ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights’ 54. 
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women’s inequality is still more often thought of as ‘natural’ and in some cases, may even be 
perpetuated by the limited content of human rights themselves. As a result, there is an on-
going basis for articulating the idea of ‘women’s rights’ and the need specifically to promote 
women’s interests remains.  
 
In 1993 the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights saw the mobilisation of women’s 
rights activists to enlist formal support to promote women’s rights. Aiming to shine a light on 
women’s experiences, many of which have long been considered private and outside the reach 
of public international law, women’s rights campaigners successfully sought the 
acknowledgement of ‘women’s rights as human rights’. This ‘call to action’ was intended to 
acknowledge that women’s rights have not historically been prioritised, resulting in gaps in 
human rights protection.380 The conference identified tangible methods for placing women at 
the centre of human rights discourse like ‘gender mainstreaming’ to assess the implications of 
any proposed law or policy and ensure it reflects the diverse experiences of women and men.381 
The purpose was to address the historic ignorance of women’s lived experiences, so that the 
lives of women might have more influence in informing law and policy and reduce structural 
inequalities. In addition, the Beijing Declaration that followed the conference focused on 
twelve specific aims to implement women’s rights and achieve women’s empowerment, a 
significant achievement in articulating women’s rights as human rights.382 In this regard, the 
Beijing conference signalled a shift in the approach to women’s rights, laying a clear foundation 
                                                           
380 Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, ‘Women’s Rights are Human Rights’ (n 17). As First Lady, Hillary Clinton first 
described the call to acknowledge women’s rights as human rights in her speech at the Beijing Women’s conference; Hillary Rodham 
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for concrete methods to eliminate gender discrimination within the broad spectrum of the 
framework of international human rights standards.383  
 
The seminal commentary on the impact of international legal boundaries on women by 
Chinkin and Charlesworth also emerged around the same time. The foreword, by Elizabeth 
Evatt, a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee, reflects the general tone of the 
discussion on women’s rights, in suggesting that women had not been served well by laws 
largely shaped by men and which remain ignorant to women’s concerns.384 Chinkin and 
Charlesworth were among the first to apply this critical insight to expose a distinct and yet 
hidden gender bias in international law making. As Chinkin and Charlesworth pointed out, 
women form over half the world’s population, although they had historically had little to do 
with shaping the international legal order.385 In their view, legal standards continued to be built 
on a gendered platform, reflecting what they called ‘male priorities’ and leaving women and 
their concerns on the margins.386 Like feminist critiques in other areas of the law, theirs was 
largely a critique of inherent inequality, noting the absence of women in law-making roles and 
the effect of that absence in the vocabulary of the law. According to this reasoning, a deficit 
of women results in laws that have the appearance of being gender neutral, but which in fact 
reinforce gender stereotypes to ensure the continued exclusion of women from the content 
of law and its protection.387 At the heart of their assertion was the idea that; 
 
                                                           
383 Beijing Platform for Action (n 382). In general terms, in spite of this clear and strong commitment by the human rights 
establishment to privileging the concerns of women, subsequent reviews of women’s rights have confirmed that de jure and de facto 
equality between men and women has not been achieved in any country in the world to date , ‘Women’s Rights are Human Rights’ 
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384 Elizabeth Evatt, Member of Human Rights Committee, in the foreword to Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) where she refers to 
the fact the law has not always served women well and discusses how the legal system has been shaped by men, denying women 
basic rights. More recently, the most obvious examples of sexism have been removed (things like restrictions on voting rights, the 
introduction of legislation to demand equal pay, other employment rights for women and more gender sensitive approaches to rape, 
especially inside marriage, but she maintains, the law is still gender biased. 
385 Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) 1. Sex and gender matter in law and “… the absence of women in the development of international 
law has … legitimated the unequal position of women around the world rather than challenged it.” In their view, as a result, legal 
boundaries reflect this absence of women. 
386 Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) 19. 
387 Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) 49. 
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 … [The participation of women] in the development of international legal 
principles is minimal and the international legal order appears impervious to the 
realities of women’s lives.388 
 
Other well-known feminist critics also added their views to the gender assessment of human 
rights around this time. Perhaps the most well-known radical feminist academic and activist, 
Catharine MacKinnon, described the entire system of rights as predicated on the subordinated 
status of women, allowing their inequality to remain invisible, as though the ignorance of their 
lives and the marginalisation of their concerns was entirely neutral, and normal.389 In this 
regard, radical feminists joined with their liberal feminist counterparts to express their view of 
international human rights law as paradigmatic of gender inequality and male dominance.  
 
In effect, the arguments of both mainstream liberal and radical feminists amounted to the 
same thing in terms of women’s rights; rights have not only offered false hope to women, they 
perpetuate women’s inequality and subordination by neither recognising their lived 
experiences, nor including women in law making. Although the calls for action arising out the 
Beijing conference on women were naturally much less disparaging of human rights per se, they 
also demanded that the entire system of rights to consider and reflect the unique lives and 




4.3.2.2 The Trouble with Women’s Rights 
 
Despite the importance and wide acceptance of mainstream feminist suggestions regarding 
the re-framing of international human rights laws to better reflect women’s needs, critics have 
emerged, highlighting problems with traditional feminist involvement in governance and the 
scope of international law. While CEDAW has offered women more wide-ranging grounds 
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389 Catharine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (HUP, 2007) 149  “Largely beneath notice in [the 
rights] tradition has been the status of women … socially subordinated to men and excluded and ignored, marginalised ... Women’s 
enforced inequality has been a reality on which all these systems are materially predicated so seamlessly it has been invisible.”  
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for the protection of their interests, it has also been criticised both for not going far enough 
in defining women’s concerns, as well as marginalising women’s rights and allowing the 
‘mainstream’ human rights community to continue to ignore them. Apprehension over the 
universalised construction of ‘women’ and their oppression has figured prominently in this 
regard, as the movement to acknowledge ‘women’s rights as human rights’ has become 
representative for some of simply an alternative form of dominance, resulting in more 
entrenched oppression. Critics include Diane Otto, who has criticised women’s rights for 
being limited in that they still require a comparison with men, they assume married 
heterosexuality is the norm and they do not go far enough in acknowledging multiple and 
intersectional discrimination.390 She is also concerned at the limited focus on gender based 
violence. Although CEDAW can be considered a dynamic document which ought to be 
interpreted to allow for evolving women’s needs, it continues to be criticised today by some, 
for representing an out-dated urge to protect women’s interests rather than recognise their 
rights.  
 
In a similar vein, in an early critique of the momentum behind ‘women’s rights as human 
rights’, Inderpal Grewal writing in 1999 insightfully observed that such a call misrecognises 
the geopolitical context of international rights standards and the relationships of power that 
are sustained as a result.391 Describing the modern system of international human rights as a 
‘regime’ that has apparently come unequivocally to represent what is morally good and right 
for all, Grewal cautions against using the vernacular of human rights for women’s benefit, 
recommending the advantage in focussing on concepts of economic and social justice to 
achieve more productive outcomes for women.392 In this regard, Grewal expresses her deep 
concern at the use of: 
 
[H]uman rights as a tool for addressing oppression [so] …that to practice a 
critique of such discourses becomes amazingly difficult. Yet, feminist critique of a 
regime of knowledge that has been so naturalized is an urgent necessity, since it is 
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here that we can begin to dismantle the operations of power in relation to the 
[emerging] knowledge formation … 
 
Among those picking up on Grewal’s call for feminist critical engagement with the language 
and project of women’s rights are ‘governance feminism’ critics, or those who have expressed 
deep concern at the immersion of feminist ideals within human rights institutions so that 
feminists have effectively ‘come to power’ as part of the establishment. Critics of such 
establishment feminists allege that, immersed in their new-found status, those who promote 
women’s rights as part of the ordinary human rights movement very often fail to connect with 
the lives of women who are not like them. According to this suggestion, mainstream feminists 
in the corridors of power operate from a position of such privilege that women who are not 
part of the traditional feminist movement, those who are less powerful and less well-
represented, are unlikely fully to benefit from typical feminist engagement with law and 
rights.393 Adding insult to injury, both men and established dominant women are also accused 
of complacency about the extent to which legal standards reflect their own self-interest. As a 
result, as far as governance feminist critics are concerned, feminist knowledge has become a 
tool for the state, a convenient reference point that can be called ‘expertise’, which informs 
human rights and which can be used to justify the approach which best suits those in power, 
who rule on gender relations and gender equality.394 
 
Janet Halley, a leading advocate of governance feminist theory has, together with her close 
colleagues, identified two traditional feminist discourses which have been used by 
establishment feminists in shaping legal rules.395 The first is that of liberal feminism, that early 
branch of feminist thought which emphasises formal equality between women and men, so 
influential in human rights circles. The second is radical feminism, which privileges the part 
played by male domination and the prioritisation of male values and needs, advocating a simple 
break with male-orientated choices for women’s emancipation. While liberal and dominance 
feminist aims undoubtedly blazed a trail in unlocking the gendered door to international law 
by demanding that women be acknowledged and able to participate equally with men, the 
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governance feminist critique espoused by Halley and her colleagues also recognises the extent 
to which these more traditional feminist discourses have been adopted and absorbed by 
human rights institutions, at the expense of other concerns.  
 
This exclusion from the sphere of influence in international human rights of those women 
whose way of life doesn’t fit inside traditional liberal equality boundaries is illustrated well by 
the controversy over veil and headscarf wearing, which provides a useful example of 
governance feminism in action and its capacity to have a profound effect on the lives of less 
powerful women. Writing about feminist engagement and veil wearing in France, Maleiha 
Malik reveals the unintended consequences of the subjugation by establishment feminists of 
less dominant and more often non-Western women over whether veils ought to be banned. 
As Malik points out:  
 
…French feminists with greater social, economic and political power attributed 
‘autonomy deficits’ to less powerful adult Muslim women who chose Islamic veils 
and discounted the ways in which they may be able to exercise choice despite their 
structural disadvantage. The exercise of power on behalf of Muslim women rather 
than allowing them to speak in their own voice also had unintended consequence. 
It allowed French feminists to bifurcate the interests of women. On the one hand, 
the interests of French women who were a racial, cultural and religious majority 
were represented as a universal call for parité. On the other hand, the distinct claims 
by a smaller group of North African and Muslim women for accommodation of 
veiling were rejected as outside the acceptable frame of French feminist politics. This 
political strategy produced unintended consequences that are a recurring feature of 
feminist exercises of power that assume that they constitute progressive social reform 
on behalf of all women.396 
                                                           
396 Maleiha Malik,  ‘Governance Feminism in the French Republic: Veils, Parite and Feminists’ in Governance Feminism: Notes from 
the Field (forthcoming). Malik’s observations resonate in the context off the ECtHR and the veil and the headscarf, where a wide 
margin of appreciation has been offered to states who have argued that such customs are at odds with local values, so that th e veil 
may legitimately be banned and the wearing of the headscarf is restricted in certain spaces. Bans have been instituted in some cases 
in spite of human rights advocates being against doing so (in France, while the Stasi Commission recommended a headscarf ban in 
schools, the National Advisory Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) in France expressed its view, as have NGOs such as Amnesty 
International, of widespread bans as based on gender and religious stereotypes assuming all women who wear particular types of 
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The influence of governance feminism on the veil debate in France has been, according to 
Malik, to exclude Muslim women ever more from social, economic and political power, and 
not to encourage gender equality or provide marginalised women with better human rights 
protection.397 Echoing the concern expressed much earlier by Grewal and Otto among others, 
regarding the necessity for a universal ‘sisterhood’ of sorts, a human rights imperative which 
applies without exception across transnational, cultural and other boundaries, the head 
covering debate is useful in showing traditional feminist engagement with the law can be 
detrimental for some.398 It also highlights the corresponding necessity of the governance 
feminist critique in exposing the damage which mainstream discourse regarding women’s 
rights can cause to women—like those considered by this research—whose lives do not fit 
neatly inside traditional liberal boundaries.  
 
 
4.3.2.3 Women’s Rights and Polygamy 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2 the CEDAW Committee has stated plainly its view of polygamous 
marriage as contravening a woman’s right to equality with men. The Committee was so 
convinced of the detriment of polygamy for women that it went so far as to say that any state 
whose laws permitted polygamy violated Article 5 of CEDAW, by failing to take appropriate 
measures to modify social and cultural practices which enforced the superiority of men over 
women.399 In views which might be argued are reminiscent of the uncompromising harm of 
polygamy as expressed in early case law such as Reynolds, the CEDAW Committee has 
concluded that polygamy must always be discouraged.400 In a statement on marriage and family 
                                                           
dress are coerced to do so.). For a summary of relevant European case law see (n 63). The work of Diane Otto bears some relevance 
here, in pointing out that by selectively engaging in feminist discourse, states do not address the structural nature of inequality (Dianne 
Otto, ‘Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International Law through the UN Security Council’ (2010) 32 Austl Fem LJ 97). 
397 Malik (n 396).  
398 Grewal (n 379), 398 Otto (n 378). See also Choudhury ‘Empowerment or Estrangement’ (n 418) and ‘Beyond Culture’ (n 445). Also 
Ivana Radicic, ‘Feminism and Human Rights: the Inclusive Approach to Interpreting International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 14 UCL 
Jurisprudence Review 238.  
 
399 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 21 (n 152).  
400 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 21 (n 152) paragraph 14. 
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rights in CEDAW, the Committee recently reaffirmed its earlier view.401 Expressing a degree 
of institutional exasperation almost ten years on from its initial pronouncement on 
polygamous marriage, the Committee noted with concern the persistence of polygamy, 
pointing to the grave ramifications it has for women’s human rights and economic well being 
and calling again for its abolition.402 The body with responsibility for setting the tone of human 
rights more generally, the Human Rights Committee, has also described polygamy as 
incompatible with equal treatment and a violation of the human dignity of women amounting 
to unequivocal discrimination that must be abolished.403 Such forceful and absolute 
condemnation of polygamy by two of the main international treaty bodies with responsibility 
for the scope and implementation of human rights standards gives the appearance of a 
Western-oriented system of rights which views women in polygamous marriages as “… 
brutalised by their cultures, in need of rescue and rehabilitation by a civilising West.”404  
 
In the regional setting the disapproving tone taken in Maputo Protocol is also of interest. This 
regional human rights guarantee was formulated with wide participation from women’s NGOs 
across a continent where polygamy is much more prevalent than in the West.405 Although the 
final draft of the African Charter was watered down and its text does not condemn polygamy 
outright, it nonetheless provides additional evidence of a modern human rights document 
intended to protect the rights of women, and which expresses a clear preference for 
monogamy in women’s best interests. Crucially, applying a governance feminist critique, the 
Maputo Protocol arguably benefits from the fact that local women’s groups were heavily 
involved in bringing it to life. Far from being dictated to African women by the global North 
                                                           
401 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation on Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (2013) UN Doc C/GC/29. 
402 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation on Article 16 (n 401).  
403 UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Recommendation 28’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 10 (2000). It is perhaps hard to 
reconcile the state’s conflicts of laws obligation in international law to recognise perfectly valid foreign polygamous marriages, where 
the marriage is celebrated in jurisdiction which permits it and by citizens with no bar to doing so. Valid polygamous marriages are 
recognised by the United Kingdom government in non-immigration settings in part for this reason, where the harm caused by not 
recognising a marriage is greater than the harm thought to be caused by a polygamous marriage. This apparent contradiction, in 
international human rights law and the law of conflicts is interesting, but not within the scope of this thesis to discuss in detail. 
404 Ratna Kapur ‘Feminist Critiques of Human Rights’ in Rhona K M Smith The Essentials of Human Rights (4th edition OUP 2010) 133.  
405 African Charter (n 141) and Maputo Protocol (n 151). See also Fareda Banda (n 141) and Fareda Banda, ‘Blazing a Trail: The African 
Protocol on Women’s Rights Comes into Force’ (2006) 50 CLJ 72.  
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and West, the Maputo Protocol is a document intended specifically to promote women’s rights 
that was not only created in collaboration with local women’s representatives, but suggested, 
drafted and finalised by them, in conjunction with local, inter-governmental partners. 
 
 
4.3.2.4 Why Women’s Rights Get Polygamy Wrong 
 
The concern that Malik and other academics have expressed over mainstream and 
institutionalised feminists hijacking the veil is useful, however, in highlighting cracks in the 
women’s rights movement with regard to polygamy. While equality objections to the practice 
of polygamous marriage may appear undeniably reasonable, applying a governance feminist 
critical analysis these sorts of rights claims might instead be seen as simply legitimising the 
concentration of power in the hands of the most powerful groups.406 Rights institutions have 
keenly absorbed liberal and radical feminist thinking and no matter what the unintended 
consequences of unconditional prohibition on certain groups of women, the human rights 
stance on polygamy remains unchanged. Caution might even be advised in the African rights 
context, where women from the region were heavily involved in defining the human rights 
approach to polygamy in the Maputo Protocol. Before too much is assumed about power and 
participation it is worth noting the basis for the Protocol was the suggestion of local NGOs 
and the African Commission, prompted by their concern for the lack of will on the part of 
governments to recognise and enforce women’s rights. In this way, it bears some similarity to 
calls for action by international women’s rights activists and feminists in the West in being 
prompted, managed and negotiated by establishment actors, even if this time at a regional 
level. In Africa, organised networks of feminists operate locally, many of who will have donor 
funding arrangements that set the tone for the feminist activism.407 Such networks involve a 
web of relationships that use local resources to distribute global policies based on Western 
feminist ideological norms. In that connection, while local efforts to join the international 
                                                           
406  Grewal (n 379) at 339 quoting Adetoun Ilumoka ‘African women’s economic, social and cultural rights – towards a relevant theory 
and practice in RJ Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 
describing the concept of rights in the African context, comparing the struggle for civil rights by elites using the vernacular of rights, 
and the struggle for social justice outside rights frameworks in mass movements. 
407 Janet Halley and others (n 52). 
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movement to criminalise polygamy arguably represent an improvement on the simple 
imposition of global standards, it is possible to see how other local women, those with 
different priorities, may continue to remain unheard. Whether it is because they are less able 
to organise for economic, geographical or other reasons, or because they may not have known 
about the negotiations owing to a lack of available methods of communication, the unintended 
consequences of rejecting polygamy are likely to have had a greater impact on these women. 
For these reasons, while the Maputo Protocol gives the impression of being a document 
created by local women, for local women, given the constituency of those driving its 
implementation, it might also simply be another example of the lives of less dominant women 
being denied recognition in the rights context as ‘human’.408  
 
The content of women’s rights has undoubtedly expanded greatly thanks to the work of 
Chinkin, Charlesworth and many others who have demanded women’s involvement and 
influence on the corpus of international law and rights so they are more likely to reflect 
women’s lives and needs. In spite of the positive progress made in relation to women’s rights, 
however, the human rights approach to polygamy remains problematic for some women. The 
dim view of polygamy taken by rights advocates is especially problematic in the refugee setting, 
where the impact of unconditional prohibition and the pressing need for recognition appear 
to have gone unnoticed. This is despite the fact that UNHCR guidelines confirm that gender 
has an impact on women’s experiences of displacement, and that women are much more likely 
to suffer when they are isolated and alone.409 The ‘profound physical insecurity’ and a 
‘distressing frequency’ of gender based violence such as rape, abduction, sexual abuse, 
demands for sexual favours in return for ‘protection’ or for basic needs like food or shelter 
                                                           
408 The challenges for displaced women may also be further exacerbated by physical factors (such as pregnancy and breastfeeding) 
or cultural factors (such as being unable to seek employment outside of the home), all of which make women more prone to further, 
specific harm and exploitation. In addition, the Human Rights Committee has noted that “[W]omen are particularly vulnerable in terms 
of internal or international armed conflicts. States parties should inform the Committee of all measures taken during these s ituations 
to protect women from rape, abduction and other forms of gender based violence.” UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment 
28 ‘Equality of rights between men and women (Article 3) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/rev 1/Add 10 (2000). 
409 HRC General Comment 28 (n 408), paragraphs 30. “Discrimination against women is often intertwined with discrimination on 
other grounds such as race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,  birth or other 
status. States parties should address the ways in which any instances of discrimination on other grounds affect women in a particular 
way and include information on the measures taken to counter these effects.” 
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are immaterial when it comes to excluding additional wives.410 These women remain separated 
from their husbands and families and unable to avail themselves of domestic immigration law 
that excludes them solely on the basis of their marital status, and they remain largely invisible 
to the international community, too. When it comes to the scope and substance of rights 
protection, the lives of these women have little influence on the ideological aims of 
international human rights standards. In essence, by simply treating polygamy as a backward, 
non-European practice, the human rights movement does a dis-service to these women, a 
sentiment which has been expressed by one judge in the European human rights setting, where 
he warns against the “politico-ideological” discourse informing the majority view, suggesting 
plurality must be given more weight, and complaining specifically that legal analysis should 
not “… caricature polygamy … by reducing it to “discrimination based on the gender of the 
parties concerned.’”411 
 
The lack of assistance provided by rights in aid of displaced women in polygamous marriages 
provokes the question: why? Malik outlines the techniques through which French governance 
feminists kept the voices of Muslim women on the periphery of the discussion on the veil, 
articulating the methods by which feminists in power were able to act as ‘proxies’ for all 
women and illustrating governance feminism at work in this context.412 The techniques Malik 
outlines also resonate regarding the women’s rights approach to polygamy. While it is difficult 
to map specifically the governance feminist influence in the international human rights sphere, 
the historic adoption of traditional liberal and radical feminist approaches to rights is 
indisputable and the dominance of the liberal rights tradition in the development and 
implementation of human rights is clear. Despite the increasingly audible arguments 
demanding that feminists and women’s rights advocates consider race, culture and religion, 
international and regional human rights movements have largely been unwilling or unable to 
incorporate women like those in polygamous marriages into the category of ‘women’ who are 
protected by ‘universal’ human rights norms. 
                                                           
410 Ninette Kelly, ‘Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women’ (1993) 26 Corn Int L J 625.  
411 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v Turkey (app number 41340/98) ECHR 13 February 2003, Judge Kolver, in a concurring 
but separate judgment where he seeks to distance himself from some of the more ‘unmodulated’ findings in the presiding judgment, 
especially regarding sensitive issues like religious values. 
412 Malik (n 396).  
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Echoing in many ways the concerns of those who object to governance feminist influences, 
postcolonial feminists are also among those who add to the allegation that restrictive 
approaches to rights have failed to recognise many, less powerful women who remain on the 
margins because of a colonial past which continues to serve the needs of former dictators.413 
The tendency to essentialism in Western feminism is targeted by this discourse, which calls for 
more expansive aims than simply the elimination of sex discrimination, demanding an 
acknowledgement of the effect of gender, race and colonialism in the content of law and rights. 
Postcolonial feminists have in effect become transnational advocates of “feminism without 
borders”, problematising the ethnocentric universalism promoted by governance feminists 
and its impact on historically less powerful groups of women.414 In doing so, they object to 
the continued dominance of knowledge production by those in the ‘developed world’ and the 
presentation of that knowledge as neutral, while others are consigned to the role of passive 
recipient of whatever apparently universal knowledge is handed down.415 Concern over 
Western feminism being used as an irrefutable rhetoric that is blindly accepted and which 
becomes entrenched without question is summarised well by influential postcolonial feminist 
scholar, Inderpal Grewal: 
 
The hegemonic forms of Western feminism have been able, through universalizing 
discourses, to propose the notion of common agendas for all women globally, and to 
mobilize such discourses through the transnational culture of an international law 
that can serve the interests of all women globally. Human rights discourse emerges 
from such notions of law, relying on international treaties and instruments to set 
down universalized notions of what it means to be human and what rights 
accompany this humanity.416 
 
                                                           
413 Inderpal Grewal (n 379) 337. 
414 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism without Borders: Decolonising Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Duke University Press, 2003). 
415 Mohanty (n 414) introduces this idea at 48, in her discussion of the predominant representations of Third World women in 
knowledge production and its impact.  
416 Grewal (n 379) 340. Mohanty (n 414) at 17 ‘Under Western Eyes’ expresses her concern at the same sort of irrefutable rhetoric. 
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The strategic definition of a universal women that Grewal highlights—an already constituted 
group, all with the same needs irrespective of their lived experience—implicitly creates an 
image of others who surely must be ignorant and victimised (or just bad) not to share the 
dominant feminist view. Such women sit in stark contrast to Western women who are 
educated and who have choice that they exercise freely for the good of all women-kind. The 
‘other’ women are not only ignored, but derided, privileging the dominant group ever more, 
so that the views of Western, white, liberal feminists become—indisputably—the ‘norm’.417  
 
Turning again to Cyra Choudhury, she too laments the circular arguments that justify the rise 
of Western liberal aims, so that they have effectively become their own justification for 
continued imperialism by the West. For Choudhury, liberal feminism acts to promote a 
narrative of non-liberal societies (very often also former colonies and countries in the ‘third 
world’) as ‘developing’ and their women as ‘victims’, a description which resonates in the 
context of Muslim wives who are often assumed in the West to lack agency in choosing a 
plural marriage.418 In her strong critique of traditional feminist approaches to Islam, 
Choudhury suggests that what dominates Western feminism is a very specific idea of what it 
means for women to flourish. The force of this guiding principle makes it inconceivable to 
view Muslim women as anything other than directly or indirectly compelled to enter into 
practices that are considered inherently patriarchal and oppressive, like polygamy. The end 
result is to promote a way of thinking that militates for a particular version of progress, pushing 
‘other’ women towards the sort of values that are privileged in a liberal society, so that they 
may advance beyond their deviant history.419 Specifically with regard to polygamy and the 
postcolonial view on its regulation, Choudhury considers the prohibition on polygamy as an 
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University of Baltimore Law Reform 153, 155. 
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imperial act.420 In so doing, she refers directly to descriptions of polygamy as ‘barbaric’ and 
the self appointed role of the Court in Reynolds as a ‘civilising force’, expressing the firm view 
that decisions like Reynolds illustrate the manifestation of postcolonial oppression in the 
context of plural marriage.421  
 
Susan Moller Okin espouses precisely the cultural imperialist view postcolonial scholars so 
deride in her inflammatory essay on multiculturalism and its impact on women.422 Writing at 
a time when cultural relativism was a more prominent intellectual hook on which to hang a 
critical, liberal hat, Moller Okin pulls no punches when she says: 
 
In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a less patriarchal 
majority culture no argument can be made on the basis of self-respect of freedom 
that the female members of the culture have a clear interest in its preservation. 
Indeed, they might be much better off if the culture into which they were born were 
either to become extinct … or preferably to be encouraged to alter itself to as to 
reinforce the equality of women …423 
 
The ease with which Moller Okin apparently argues for the extinction of an entire offending 
culture—that is any culture that does not have the essential qualities which signify sufficient 
‘progress’—is not only astonishing, but from a postcolonial vantage point, also indicative of 
the on-going legacy of the colonial enterprise. In that regard, Moller Okin’s necessity for 
assimilation is all encompassing, not to mention, very often convincing in the West, as a 
justification to outlaw heretical cultural practices, a fact that is all the more chilling at the time 
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of writing with the renegade actions of a new President Trump.424 Keeping firmly to the view 
that other cultural practices such as veil-wearing, or for that matter, polygamy, are easily 
identifiable outward signs of women’s subordination, critics like Moller Okin leave no door 
open to the possibility that such practices might be linked to religious devotion, which she 
regards as generally hostile to women, or be a simple matter of choice.  
 
Postcolonial feminist discourse assists not only in articulating the problem with mainstream 
approaches like that of Moller Okin to non-Western practices like polygamy. It also provides 
a theoretical pathway towards an alternative conclusion about the lives of women in 
polygamous marriage by allowing for experiences of polygamous wives to result from factors 
other than assumed oppression and subordination. By applying a postcolonial approach to a 
practice dismissed as inherently unequal, it is possible to see the influence of privilege on the 
content of law and the response to polygamous marriage.  The benefit of this is that response 
might more honestly be questioned, all the more so in the refugee context where the reliance 




4.4 The Failure of Rights 
 
The lack of compliance with human rights by states, complaints about the substance of human 
rights guarantees, the want of impact in critical cases—all of these things and more have given 
cause for great concern over the efficacy of human rights since the introduction of the 
Universal Declaration in 1948.425 In the context of this work, the reality is that human rights 
fail refugee women seeking polygamous family reunion. It is not just the broad categories of 
refugee rights and women’s rights outlined so far which let down displaced polygamous wives. 
Other, more directly applicable rights neglect their needs, too. As already discussed, the clear 
                                                           
424 President Trump’s rhetoric and policies are well publicised. Among the policies he has attempted to bring into law is the ban on 
travel to the United States of America by citizens from six Muslim majority countries, a move that was blocked following legal action 
to challenge his Executive Order 13769 ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ 
425 Eric Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (OUP, 2014) 148 where Posner describes human rights treaties not so much as 
idealistic, but an act of hubris which have done little good for those who need them. 
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commitment to equality and the simplicity of the idea that everyone should be free from 
discrimination, for example, is measured on the basis of values which are assumed inherently 
to be good, as well as assumptions about a practice which is so often caricatured in mainstream 
discourse and reduced according to human rights standards as something which is inherently 
bad.426 These women find no relief in their right to equal treatment or their right not to be 
discriminated against, directly or indirectly. On the contrary; as explained earlier in this chapter, 
while polygamous marriage is not explicitly prohibited in any international or regional human 
rights instrument, the inherent gender imbalance in polygamy is elevated to as to trump any 
other violation of the right to equality for women in plural marriages.  
 
In addition, so far as marriage is concerned, the United Kingdom and other states that restrict 
entry for non-nationals according to marital status do so entirely in accordance with human 
rights as they stand today. States have no obligation to settle polygamously married husbands 
and wives, and the restriction on additional spouses coming to the United Kingdom under the 
Immigration Act and Rules is not vulnerable to any claim based on the human right to marry.427 
States’ ability to restrict polygamously married couples from being reunited is unfettered and 
the impact on anyone affected appears immaterial. Women—and it is almost always women 
who are those most detrimentally affected by this restriction in immigration—are not assisted 
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427 The right to marry appears in UDHR, Article 16; ICCPR Article 23; ESCR Article 10 (which requires free consent of the parties), ECHR 
Article 12.  
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by refugee rights, women’s rights or the notion of equality—and neither are they assisted by 
the more specific right to marry.428 
 
Similarly, the right to a family life offers polygamous families no relief. In Bibi, the interference 
with the Article 8 right was justified in accordance with the law and necessary to pursue a 
legitimate aim.429 Even allowing for the established principle of state sovereignty and the long-
standing reasonableness of border control, the outcome of this case in justifying the continued 
exclusion of polygamous wives does not sit comfortably with related considerations, like the 
importance of the right to a family life, the supposed universality of its application and the 
acknowledgement of polygamy for domestic family law matters. Despite this, additional plural 
wives find no relief in the right to a family life.430 
 
Lastly, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion has been described by the European 
Court as a vital component of the regional set of human rights protections, and one which is 
inextricably linked with the pluralism essential to a democratic society. Its ambit does not, 
however, extend to protecting every act motivated or influenced by religious belief.431 In that 
regard, the European Convention does not provide Muslim families with the unconditional 
freedom to manifest their religion in the form of polygamous marriage in prohibitive states 
like the United Kingdom. Particularly controversial in this regard have been the veil wearing 
                                                           
428 Rachel Young and Stewart Leech ‘Marriage, Divorce and Ancillary Relief under the Human Rights Act 1998: An Introduction’ (2001) 
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431 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v Turkey (app number 41340/98) ECHR 13 February 2003. 
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cases, already discussed, where a balancing exercise is carried out regarding the protection of 
religious freedom and the state’s sovereign right to limit the exercise of such freedom 
according to its own public policy concerns.432 The right to religious freedom is also 
particularly unlikely to be of assistance in immigration matters, where the state is often 
afforded an even broader margin of appreciation.433 
 
The failure of rights claims to offer any assistance to displaced wives in challenging their 
exclusion is explained here, not as a perfectly ordinary reading of the law and its boundaries, 
but an outcome which results from the striking failure of rights from two perspectives; that of 
universality and of culture.434 
 
 
4.4.1 How Rights Fail: Universality 
 
While the modern system of international human rights protection begins with the claim in 
the UDHR regarding the “inherent dignity” and the “equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family” those on the periphery of power have little say in how these 
aims are defined. For all the concern Moller Okin and others who share her views express not 
to let abhorrent cultural traditions and practices dilute rights, the truth is that rights are already 
culturally relative as a belief system requiring a moral and historical certainty that stems solely 
from a morality which originates in the West. As Mutua explains:  
 
… human rights, and the relentless campaign to universalise them, present a 
historical continuum in an unbroken chain of Western conceptual and cultural 
                                                           
432 The balancing act carried out by the Court in weighing up states’ restrictions on religious manifestation is discussed in Rex Ahdar 
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433 Jacobs, White and Ovey (eds) The European Convention on Human Rights (5th Edition OUP, 2010). 
434 Elizabeth Schnieder, ‘Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives form the Women’s Movement’ (1986) 61 NYU L Rev 589, 
regarding the failure of rights generally to effect change on their own. 
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dominance … at the heart of this continuum is a seemingly incurable virus: the 
impulse to universalise Eurocentric norms and values by repudiating, demonising, 
and “othering” that which is different and non-European.435 
 
Nowhere is the fiction of universality for those on the periphery of rights more starkly 
illustrated than in the case of refugees, a group for whom human rights are both critical and, 
very often, completely absent. By definition, refugees are no longer afforded the protection of 
their own state and look to other states for refuge as a result. It is commonly the case that they 
will have limited rights in the receiving state, and particularly of late, their economic and social 
impact may be feared by the local community. In this regard, refugees test the very idea of 
universal rights precisely because they are denied the same rights as citizens from the outset. 
The experience of refugees, stuck in a human rights ‘no man’s land’, may be prolonged and 
difficult. It highlights the importance of community membership to making a successful rights 
claim—a requirement that is hardly consistent with the notion of universality, exemplifying 
the idea of rights as:  
 
…what historically subjugated people's most need, [and also] … one of the cruellest 
social objects of desire, dangled above those who lack them.436 
 
In this sense, the experience of refugees shows that humanity is not always well represented 
by rights. In fact, human beings are classified when it comes to human rights protection, not 
according to need, but status. Here, the writing of Costas Douzinas is helpful in highlighting 
the impact of systemic pressures like capitalism and nationalism in certain groups being 
exempted from the “protective umbrella” of rights guarantees.437 According to Douzinas, the 
potential for good arising out of human rights is impoverished by social, economic and 
political structures, which limit their content and their utility, making them the “late capitalism 
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ideology of the middle classes.”438 In line with this reasoning, the limited practical effect of 
rights is noted, and it is suggested that they must respond to the interests of those who are 
less dominant to avoid being considered a meaningless, if prevailing, ideology; something 
owned and defined by powerful, neo-liberal groups. Otherwise, it becomes self evident that 
human rights do not belong to all humans, rather: “[human rights]…construct humans on a 
spectrum between full humanity, lesser humanity and the inhuman.”439 Where claims to 
universality and difference clash, it is the ‘other’ who must accede to the “civilising pedagogy 
[of the] universality represented in European values, and to confess the particularity of their 
own.”440 
 
This lack of credibility in the claim of universality is laid bare in the experiences of the 
“underclass” of immigrants, refugees and undesirables whose experience requires us to be 
interested not only in the discourse of human rights but its efficacy in practice.441 The needs 
of these people are not reflected in approaches to family reunification precisely because they 
are politically and economically weaker than most others. Instead, they are subject to 
“reactionary” nationalist voices, by those in power and in the media, where alarm is frequently 
expressed at the threat they pose, and they are most often described in pejorative terms.442 
This crisis of universalism, and its illustration in the refugee experience of rights, illustrates the 
critical need for change. To that end, one commentator has suggested all that is needed is an 
inclusive and respectful dialogue to achieve genuine understanding that is motivated by a 
commitment to the equal freedom and dignity of all.443 An admirable aim—and one that is 
also perhaps hopelessly optimistic. It reflects the core of the crisis of universality, however, in 
calling for the more broad inclusion and involvement of the ‘other’ in the rights movement 
for the sake of rights beneficiaries and the credibility and efficacy of rights themselves.  
                                                           
438 Douzinas (n 437) 68.  
439 Douzinas (n 437) 68. 
440 Sundhya Pahuja ‘Black Skin, White Masks? Training African Leaders in the Art of Universality (Blog post) (19 May 2017) < 
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2017/05/19/black-skin-white-masks-training-african-leaders-art-universality/> accessed 20 May 
2017. 
441 Douzinas (n 437) 57 
442 Douzinas’ concern is arguably reflected starkly in the dehumanising language used by David Cameron, in referring to a ‘swarm’ of 
refugees during a television interview in 2015 and in seeking to justify the use of that language, subsequently referred to his work to 
prevent refugees ‘breaking in’ to the United Kingdom (see report at n 10).  




4.4.2 Why Rights Fail: Culture  
 
In addition to the failure of universality, as this chapter has also sought to show, a related but 
separate problem is that rights do not reflect the values or beliefs of less dominant cultures. 
While the critique of universality might be described as one which is occupied with what the 
problem is, this critique has been concerned with understanding some of the reasons why rights 
fail certain groups, focussing on the hierarchical ordering of rights standards, which gives 
priority to the demands of historically dominant communities over less dominant groups.444  
 
Moreover, when less dominant groups demand a re-ordering of the rights hierarchy, they are 
defined as ‘culturally relativist’, a pejorative term for an unwanted departure from apparently 
neutral universalism. In an attempt to reconcile the potential for conflict between relativist 
and universalist approaches to human rights, a continuum of relativist approaches has been 
offered by one commentator, to assist in deciding on a range of permissible cultural 
variations.445 According to this categorisation, those practices that are less offensive on the 
cultural relativism scale might then be permitted and cultural deviations from human rights 
allowed.  
 
Such an attempt at reconciliation between the relativist and the universal is admirable, but 
inherently flawed. Rather than truly standing in the shoes of less dominant groups in 
considering rights, offering concessions of this type serve only to perpetuate the usual 
hierarchy because they originate from a position which is remarkably similar to that displayed 
by old imperial masters. What is offered is not equal partnership in responding to the conflicts 
between rights and culture but rather ‘tolerance’, with all of the power, pre-eminence and 
control that it implies. For all the accommodation of less powerful groups this proposes, this 
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sort of tolerance continues to operate from an assumed moral high ground, and does not 
equate to a “dialogue of equals.”446 Far from being helpful, this is a type of human rights name-
calling, which serves only to reinforce the stigmatisation of anyone who does not conform to 
a Western conception of human rights.447  
 
The failure of culture is perhaps no-where more visible than in conversations about the human 
rights of women, having become what one commentator has called the “go-to explanation” 
for all kinds of beliefs and practices which have an impact on women’s lives, as well a default 
justification for intervention.448 In that regard, criticism of the work of Moller Okin once again 
resonates, highlighting the possibility for harm arising out of dominant human rights feminists’ 
complicity in using culture to subordinate other women, whatever the outcome for their 
‘illiberal’ culture, in a destructive display of “civilisational superiority”.449 Such interactions, 
according to critical feminists, are anchored in colonial approaches to non-white, non-
Western, non-dominant communities. At worst, this is racist. At best, it is unproductive and 
destructive for feminist activism and collaboration, reducing its emancipatory potential for all 
women.450 
 
Preferable, then, to the adversarial ‘relativist versus universalist’ approach to difference and 
human rights is an approach to rights which doesn’t just take account of the ‘other’ but which 
involves all parties as equal partners from the outset in both the formation and the 
implementation of rights, an approach which is epitomised in postcolonial and TWAIL 
critiques. In combating the homogeneity required for human rights to be effective and to rid 
rights of their association with historical oppression, the postcolonial critical method of 
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redefining rights encourages involvement, and seeks to avoid the burden of a new imperialism 
in the form of international human rights standards, imposed from on high. Instead of 
providing a more modern platform for a very old type of prejudice, as recommended by one 
international law scholar, to be legitimate international human rights law must: 
 
… purge itself of hegemonic modes of thinking and accompanying practices. The 
legitimacy of an international rule of law is a function of its journey towards 
becoming a more plural construct, taking cognisance of cognate narratives in other 
cultures and civilisations.451 
 
Advocates of this view object to human rights as ‘moral imperialism’, buttressed by a pre-
occupation with false universality.452 Third world voices increasingly seek to expose the 
imperialist reality of rights and to deconstruct the rights project so that their voices are heard 
and their experiences inform the content of rights standards.453 The aim and purpose of 
postcolonial and TWAIL approaches to rights is summed up by one of the founding members 
of the TWAIL movement, Makau Mutua, in the following paragraph, which highlights the 
arrogance of the West in assuming sole responsibility for the meaning of rights: 
 
What is interesting are the parallels between [superior] Christianity’s violent 
conquest of Africa and the modern human rights crusade. The same methods are 
at work and similar dispossessions are taking place, without dialogue and 
conversation. The official human corpus, which issues from European predicates, 
seeks to supplant all other traditions, while rejecting them. It claims to be the only 
genius of the good society.454 
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Drawing a parallel between the dispossession caused by colonisation and human rights, Mutua 
expresses clear dissatisfaction with the impact of the rights project. Its exclusionary discourse, 
which bars the ‘other’—those who are often already dispossessed—from involvement in the 
human rights discussion, is evidence of an on-going effort by the West to ‘civilise the 
uncivilised.’455  
 
Another significant participant in the third world critiques of international human rights law, 
Antony Anghie, shares this view, describing international legal standards as a tool to legitimise 
conquest and dispossession. According to Anghie, human rights have been based from the 
outset on exclusions and discriminations. He insists that the non-European world must no 
longer be considered peripheral for human rights to have purpose. To consider those in the 
global south outside the core of human rights creation instantly confirms their status as 
inferior, as subordinates. More than that, doing so is a political act, under the cover of the 
claim of universal morality, and it allows the West to operate from an apparently never-
endingly righteous position.456 Postcolonial critics like Anghie point to the deception behind 
this exclusion of the other as the “mythical elevation of the human rights corpus beyond 
politics and political ideology” where deeply embedded political norms that are both European 
and liberal are apparently universalised by the human rights movement.  
 
Prompted by the criticism of commentators like Mutua and Anghie, a new human rights 
activism has emerged, which seeks to move beyond the binary relativist/universalist discourse. 
Those who are active in this new discourse elevate the relationship between history and power, 
and note the importance of that relationship in the human rights context. In a departure from 
the old rhetoric on culture and universality, the problem of long-standing inconsistencies in 
power distribution is privileged to question the legitimacy of rights, as well as point out the 
detrimental effect on less powerful groups. These critics of imperialist approaches to rights 
are insisting on a new definition of international human rights law which brings its historical 
foundations to the fore and which no longer demonises those outside the privileged inner 
circle. Precisely how the interests of this new activism might be met is less clear, although the 
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vision statement issued at the inaugural conference to promote third world approaches to 
international law makes some tangible recommendations.457 These include contesting the 
privileging of Western voices by providing tangible and imaginative opportunities for third 
world participation; formulating and disseminating a substantive critique which recognises that 
mainstream approaches to international law have fostered the reproduction of structures 
which marginalise and continue to dominate the global south and highlighting the 
relationships of power which constitute and which are constituted by the current world 
order.458 TWAIL approaches to international human rights law relate the modern domination 
of third world peoples by the content and efficacy of human rights to their historic domination 
more generally. Acknowledging history, such approaches seek to intervene and change the 
traditional dynamic of power as it informs the content of rights. In its critique of rights, this 
work has attempted to do each of these things, by privileging empirical accounts of polygamy 
and highlighting the role of history and power in the human rights narrative, so that rights can 
be seen for what they so often are: the property of the dominant culture, inextricably associated 
with imperialist roots.459 In the context of those women who are the focus for this research, 
postcolonial, TWAIL and anti-imperialist critiques help to ensure that “human rights hawk 
feminists” are not allowed to perpetuate the violence of colonial intervention by imposing a 
seemingly benign, but ultimately harmful, liberal rights “imperative to progress” which 
prevents rights from being truly universal.460  
 
 
4.5 The Future of Rights 
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This rather gloomy analysis of rights failures provides a basis for wondering whether or not 
there is cause for hope regarding the future of rights, or as Boaventura de Sousa Santos puts 
it:  
 
… whether the vocabulary or the script of human rights is so crowded with 
hegemonic meanings as to exclude the possibility of counter-hegemonic meanings.461 
 
The crucial question is then, might human rights be redeemed, or should we abandon the 
rights project altogether for its failures? A predictable first response to that question, given 
also the ease with which one might cite a range of catastrophic human rights failures since the 
UDHR, might be to say that there is no hope for rights and that they are unable to live up to 
their promise of universal protection.462 Another, more measured, approach might be to argue 
that rights are imperfect and contradictory and that on some occasions they are worth 
pursuing, while at other times, we must simply accept they are not.463 Taking this line of 
argument it becomes reasonable, in contemplating the future of rights, to acknowledge their 
failures, point to their value and to make suggestions for their improvement.  
 
The merit of upholding rights is clear. The promise of international human rights is that each 
human being exists with equal dignity, not contingent on their social group or physical 
location. Every one of us is the subject of global concern in the form of international human 
rights standards. To that end, rights remain capable of providing a common language for all 
human beings to advance their cause, and for governments to know the extent of their 
responsibility, to citizens and non-citizens alike. In this way, international rights act as a global 
moral compass, guaranteeing that the dignity of all human beings is honoured and respected. 
Even if there may often be a lingering discomfort with what rights are and how to implement 
them fairly, for many, rights are still a helpful—perhaps the only—yard-stick with which to 
measure the behaviour of states. Effectively, this approach requires contemplating a life 
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without international human rights standards, where states may behave with impunity in a 
dangerous vacuum; an outcome that is likely to be unappealing. For that reason, rather than 
abandon rights, it is better to work strenuously to hold them to account. 
 
In favouring an optimistic and inclusive response to the failure of rights, this work places faith 
in the idea that those who are subjugated still have something to gain from rights, despite their 
many imperfections. While challenges undoubtedly remain, as those who also criticise and 
support rights have already said, there is still much potential in the rights project.464 Moreover, 
for those women who are the focus for this work, the transnational context of legal restrictions 
on women and refugees necessitates the involvement of international human rights guarantees 
where those restrictions are called into question. How else might European and other states, 
including the United Kingdom, be convinced to reconsider their domestic laws on family 
reunification? Rather than abandon rights altogether, it is surely more sensible instead to 
abandon the idea that rights are a-historical, a-cultural and a-contextual.465 Knowing that there 
is no shame in a contested rights discourse, it is better to “tinker with the machine we have 
created” to give human rights the opportunity to achieve more than simply entrench the status 
quo.466  
 
This approach requires innovation, something which may not be natural for the human rights 
project, in all its vast and slow moving glory. That said, human rights are clearly not completely 
closed to change, having already evolved to include new groups not at first envisaged by early 
rights treaties.467 It is undoubtedly possible to envisage a conception of rights that is not 
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evangelically attached to the current collection of standards, allowing a refreshed approach to 
the interpretation and implementation of rights and at the same time demanding involvement 
by diverse groups to determine the content of rights standards from the outset. It is certainly 
worth trying. In the words of one advocate for change: 
 
… the long term interests of the human rights movement are not likely to be served 
by the pious and righteous advocacy of human rights norms, frozen and fixed 
principles whose content and cultural relevance is questionable.468 
 
In considering the future of rights, then, perhaps the most important factor is the extent to 
which they contribute meaningfully to the protection of those who need them, or at least, that 
they promise eventually to do so.469 Even this test does not require that rights must always 
triumph, however. Where they are not perfect, it is unfair to suggest that rights serve no useful 
purpose at all. Where they fail, instead of abandoning rights, it is still more productive to 
examine how they might best be put to use for those most in need. As Conor Gearty suggests 
in his work considering the very survival of rights themselves, by abandoning rights altogether, 
it is naturally inevitable that rights will continue to fail those who most need them.470 In that 
connection, although the criticism outlined here poses a challenge of sorts to the rights 
movement, this challenge has the potential to make rights standards stronger, rather than 
guarantee their downfall. There is benefit in questioning the apparently inherent authority of 
rights and viewing the modern system of protection as an evolving project whose value is 
undiminished by discussion and change.471 Allowing for the possibility of dispute over rights 
ought not to be an embarrassment to the rights movement. Rather, it offers the prospect of 
self-reflection and great improvement.  
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Proceeding with rights, the question becomes, which narrative regarding the foundation and 
authority for human rights ought we to believe, and why?  The reality is that, if we allow the 
possibility of a conversation on norm creation and the nature and scope of rights, it is likely 
to continue indefinitely so that no particular foundational argument ever ‘wins’ or dominates 
others ad infinitum. This on-going debate is constructive, allowing human rights continuously 
to be put to the test and amended by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ where rights are found lacking.472 
This way, rights are much more likely to benefit those in need of protection, as well as benefit 
the foundation for rights in the long run. Central to this suggestion, however, is involvement. 
That is, the participation of less dominant groups in the discussion on human rights, so that 
they have an equal voice in defining rights content (until perhaps they become the dominant, 
the powerful and the corrupt, themselves and a new ‘other’ demands a seat at the table). 
Without that participation, no meaningful challenge to the authority assumed by rights can 
occur. Human rights remain “vocal ejaculations” and “propagandistic manipulations” which 
disguise the power asymmetries quietly at work, which have long influenced their shape.473  
 
If rights are to be defended, however, it is still essential to consider the ontological 
commitment that requires. If the aim of this work is to disrupt the ordinary basis for rights, 
how would a re-imagined approach to human dignity and universality look in reality? What is 
it that would make that renewed approach work, both conceptually and in practice? In effect, 
this work has asked the reader to consider rights as liberal values that are covered in a 
legitimising cloak of universalism. It has sought to undermine liberal self-confidence in the 
human rights project by exposing as peremptory the influence of those who exert the greatest 
institutional power over the content of rights, albeit that power is exerted in an apparently 
mild and flexible way.474 This power, whether in state, NGO or inter-governmental form, 
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effectively preaches a new, liberal religion to which all must subscribe. In that sense, the 
coerced universality that acts as the fundamental basis for rights has been questioned, and any 
attempt to rely on rights going forward requires that something must fill that ideological and 
conceptual vacuum. Here, postmodern and postcolonial feminist theory has been used in an 
attempt to do just that. Keeping in mind the benefit of ‘world travelling’, the role of history 
and power, as well as the importance of agency and choice, this work has sought to rely on a 
more flexible set of guiding principles to strengthen the universality of human rights, both as 
moral claims and to make them more effective as guardians of human dignity in practice. In 
doing so it is hoped that the foundational principles for rights, as well as their claim to 
universality, are made stronger so that the value of rights is preserved.  
 
What, then, is the impact of all of this on women in refugee settings who are excluded from 
family reunification because of their polygamous marriage? The system of human rights plainly 
fails such women. Given they are alone, very often in an insecure environment without the 
protection of their home state or the state in which they reside, their emancipatory potential 
in the context of improving international human rights approaches seems necessarily 
restricted. There must surely be a limited extent to which anyone, let alone this group of 
women, might successfully challenge well established, pre-existing international human rights 
norms that have long been integrated into national systems around the globe. Further, those 
who oversee women’s rights in the international arena have made clear their disapproval for 
the practice of polygamy to such an extent that states are able to exclude polygamously married 
women with near impunity, whatever the impact. The exercise of state sovereignty is 
unaffected by human rights obligations, and—in contrast with the domestic legal treatment of 
polygamy—the effect is that polygamous marriages are never recognised in the United 
Kingdom for immigration purposes. Not only do human rights fail to provide displaced 
women with any support, the human rights project actually provides a firm basis for 
prohibitive states to maintain the status quo. The behaviour of the state cannot be questioned 
according to supra-national oversight. Whatever the impact on the individual, human rights 
seem to “… maintain their integrity by remaining normatively closed.”475 The impact of this 
human rights ‘blind eye’ is to continue to deny human dignity that might otherwise be provided 
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to a distinct category of women who, but for the plural nature of their marriage, would be 
considered worthy of joining their families. For displaced additional wives seeking refuge, 
rights are utterly disconnected with their human experience and instead, much more 
concerned with closed conceptions of human rights standards, generated by more influential 
groups who have long dominated rights discourse. In the treatment of these women we see 
that human rights have self evidently failed to recognise what it is, for some, to be human. 
 
Rather than accept that end, however, this work remains rooted in a firm commitment to 
human rights, while at the same time, seeks to expose the factors that have influenced their 
modern, institutionalised form. To that end, it asks that the human rights movement focus on 
more than one version of what it is to be ‘human’. As diverse populations continue to move 
in greater numbers, doing so is not only desirable but arguably also necessary for peace and 
security in the current climate. For this to be effective, international human rights law must 
once again re-define its boundaries and human rights advocates must be prepared to overcome 
their discomfort with a departure from Western-centric liberal values to change their entire 
way of knowing and engaging with other legal and social traditions.  
 
This new way of interacting, or process of ‘interlegality’, offers new a way of thinking about 
different legal orders not as separate, but rather as interactive so that they can be mixed as a 
need arises.476 As Mutua suggests so convincingly, it is this (rather than cultural relativism, or 
tolerance) that ought to be the overriding objective of any advocate for human rights, and for 
this to be possible, human rights must: 
 
… resonate in different corners of the earth, societies at their grassroots have to 
participate in the construction of principles and structures that enhance the human 
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dignity of all, big and small, male and female, believer and unbeliever, this race 
and that community …what the human rights movement must not do is close all 
doors, turn away other cultures, and impose itself in its current form and structure 
on the world.477  
 
It is this objective that drives this work, and which is picked up in the following chapter, where 
a method is offered for achieving greater rights unity among diverse groups, without undoing 





In the words of Susan Marks, a well known and highly regarded human rights academic, where 
once we imagined human rights as a romance, given their sometimes catastrophic failure, we 
are increasingly invited to imagine them as a tragedy.478 This sentiment resonates at the time 
of writing, when the future success of the modern system of international human rights is by 
no means guaranteed. Human rights standards face serious practical challenges and strong 
ideological objections. This is particularly so in the United Kingdom where the commitment 
to the European system of human rights is directly under threat. Imperfections in the system 
of rights have long allowed states to sign up to international human rights guarantees with 
reservations and state sovereignty has in the past been used as a tool to limit the protection of 
rights. All of this means that the value of rights in providing protection in practice and the 
idea of rights providing universal protection from mistreatment are already undermined. Far 
from securing human dignity, human rights may offer states the opportunity, through cynical 
manipulation, to secure their own interests instead of acting for the benefit of individuals.  
 
This chapter has privileged the problem of apparently neutral and universal rights that 
continue to be influenced by their history and the relationships of power which shape them 
and limit their effect. Whether it is the rights of refugees, or women, equality rights or rights 
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with a more intimate impact such as the right to marry, or the right to a family life, this chapter 
has sought to unmask a normative defect in rights with a very practical effect. As one academic 
has described it: 
 
The notion that modern liberals press only neutral, objective, and value-free 
arguments in favour of liberty and equality while [anyone who has a different view] 
trade only in prejudicial, subjective, and judgmental moral values now faces very 
strong epistemological headwinds.479 
 
Exposing the truth behind the universal rhetoric, the example of displaced additional wives 
has been used to show that humanity is ranked by the rights project, and that those at the 
‘bottom of the heap’ are excluded from having any influence on the content of rights, which 
affects both their lives and the efficacy of rights in practice.  As the example of polygamous 
wives in refugee settings has shown, human rights do not always speak with a diverse voice. 
Very often, under a cloak of universality, rights serve the interests of those already in power, 
with those who seek rights protection more often viewed simply as: 
 
… a largely passive identity, defined by suffering, and waiting for vindication 
through the heroic agency of the international human rights system.480  
 
As this chapter has attempted to show, for human rights to provide adequate protection and 
to survive, they must continually be re-examined and, where possible, improved. For the 
benefit of rights and the benefit of rights bearers, the normativity of rights ought not be 
embarrassed to appeal to a variety of considerations.481 With that in mind, this chapter has 
reviewed two broad categories of rights and offered two normative criticisms in reply, in 
proposing a refreshed approach to rights definition and implementation to address at least 
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some of the interrelated factors that lead to rights failures. In attempting to find a better way 
to understand, define and implement rights, it is better not to discard one of “… the great 
civilising achievements of the modern era” simply because of its imperfections.482 Rather, 
emphasis has been placed here on the potential for rights to protect those who may remain 
unseen, even if it is not just states but human rights themselves that sometimes turn a blind 
eye.  The purpose of doing so has been to plot a course through the territory where human 
rights and polygamy collide, and identify a role for rights that is both accepting and hopeful. 
In broadening the discourse on polygamy and family reunion in the refugee setting, 
postcolonial and anti-imperial activism on their own do not necessarily fully articulate the 
failure of rights, or solve the problem of human rights, however.  
 
While they challenge the hegemonic narrative of international human rights law, there is still 
an extent to which additional critical approaches are needed to confront entrenched principles 
and ensure that human rights become more normatively open. To that end, the foundation is 
now laid for a refreshed feminist analysis and reply to the criticisms of rights in this chapter, 
as well as the domestic immigration provisions that are the prompt for this research. It is this 
feminist reply that now follows, in the final chapter of this work.  
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Chapter 5  
The Reply: A Renewed Feminist Approach to 
Polygamy, Human Movement and Human Rights 
 
 
5.1 The Scope of this Chapter 
  
This work has interrogated assumptions about polygamy and harm, and considered the 
treatment of polygamy by domestic law and human rights. This chapter offers a renewed 
feminist evaluation of that treatment in response to the tension exposed in each setting, 
recommending changes to laws and rights. As a starting point, the analysis in this final chapter 
turns again to the feminist redrawing of international legal boundaries by Chinkin and 
Charlesworth.483 It takes up their early suggestion to reconsider laws and rights that have the 
appearance of gender neutrality and apply a feminist critique to reveal bias.484 In doing so, this 
analysis builds on their suggestion for a systematic deconstruction of the misrepresentation of the 
‘masculine’ as a neutral and universally applicable norm. It also adds to the core of their 
analysis by focusing more closely on the ‘dominant feminine’ norm as it applies specifically to 
polygamy.485 While Chinkin and Charlesworth suggest that laws fail women in large part 
because of their absence from the law making elite, this chapter will develop that narrative, 
relying on third generation feminist thinking to consider why some women are perhaps more 
excluded than others. Employing identity feminism, this chapter attempts to reinforce the 
suggestion that the justification for the treatment of polygamy rests more on a hierarchy of 
difference than on substantive good reason.486 To that end, this analysis is strongly rooted in 
Chinkin and Charlesworth’s suggestion that anyone who ignores sex and the gendered aspects 
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of law to deny that dominant norms are built into the structure and form of the law gravely 
misunderstands the nature of legal systems, adding that feminism has great potential to 
uncover the arbitrary nature of traditional reasoning.487 This privileging of feminism in 
international law was, at the time of Chinkin and Charlesworth’s text, both innovative and not 
without some controversy. This work aspires also to complicate well-established views about 
the law from a re-invigorated feminist perspective, albeit this time regarding the treatment of 
polygamy. As others have already done with regard to international law more generally, this 
final analysis seeks to deconstruct the legal order and re-cast the role of law and rights, by 
carrying out a feminist theoretical alchemy of sorts, to give a fresh and fluid quality to 
apparently inflexible legal and human rights boundaries which govern polygamous marriage. 
 
After deconstructing laws and rights on polygamy, this chapter takes up the further suggestion 
by Chinkin and Charlesworth for reconstruction, by suggesting ways that immigration and human 
rights laws might be revised to avoid on-going injury. Traditional approaches to polygamy will 
not simply be dismissed for the dis-service they do to certain categories of women. Instead, in 
reconstructing law and rights in the context of polygamous marriage, the “transformative 
potential” of a refreshed feminist analysis will be harvested.488  In prioritising not only women 
but, more precisely, particular groups of women who are traditionally less influential in 
informing the content of laws and international norms, this work will not only honour women 
as a class. It will use identity feminist reasoning to elevate those women who do not usually 
dominate legal and human rights discourse, with the hope of reforming laws and rights that 
amplify and perpetuate their subordination, even if they do so unintentionally.  
 
In suggesting that institutions reconsider polygamy and the impact of their attitude on specific 
groups of women, this work aims indirectly also to critique and to broaden the legitimacy and 
efficacy of immigration laws and human rights guarantees, so that their claims not to 
discriminate, to promote women’s rights and to reflect the principle of universality, might 
more readily be defended.  By asking the state and the international community to look again 
at feminism and re-imagine its influence on legal rules, this chapter attempts to loosen the 
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grasp of historically dominant perspectives on polygamy, particularly in the West. It 
encourages a new way of considering plural marriage, by raising awareness of the experiences 
of at least one group of typically less powerful women and laying a foundation for them and 
others like them no longer to be unheard and cast aside as an intolerable ‘other’ as those who 
govern make rules which seal their fate. This final chapter challenges that which may at first 
seem entirely certain; that is, the ordinarily incontrovertible epistemology that forms the 
foundation for traditional immigration and human rights approaches, or the ‘feminist’ 
standpoint against polygamy in support of women. It will challenge the fiction of gender 
neutrality that underlies polygamy prohibition and test the claim to fairness made by those 
wielding legal and human rights power over women in polygamous marriage. In doing so, it 
seeks to establish that not all women need speak with the same voice for women’s lives to be 
improved and women’s rights to be protected.  
 
Before embarking on that analysis, given the central focus in this work on Muslim polygamy, 
this chapter will carry out the preliminary task of dispelling some of the prevailing myths about 
Islam and its incompatibility with feminism so as to discount early on what are commonly 
held doubts about the relevance of feminist thought in the Muslim context.  
 
 
5.2 Feminism and Islam 
 
This section considers what might be described as the common association in the West of 
Islam with patriarchy. It investigates claims that Islam is authoritarian and discriminatory 
towards women, and questions whether feminism and Islam might ever be entirely compatible. 
While it is acknowledged that even asking these questions might be offensive to some, they 
are important to address in this discussion on the Muslim practice of plural marriage, given 
the frequent portrayal and common perception in the West of Islam as a religion which is 
perpetually in conflict with women’s rights and feminist aims. 
 
 
5.2.1 Western Feminist Concern 
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Western feminists have long been interested in the impact of religion on the personal lives of 
Muslim women, who have written of the ‘pre-occupation’ of Western feminists with historic 
patriarchy and discrimination in Islam and their seemingly unstoppable urge to change the 
apparently endlessly downtrodden and oppressed lives of their Muslim sisters.489 In a critique 
of liberal feminist aims in advocating for ‘progress’ for Muslim women, Cyra Choudhury 
quotes Sonia Kolhatkar, a Los Angeles based Director of the Afghan Women’s Mission and 
media personality, who expresses bluntly her exasperation regarding the ‘beneficent’ West, 
saying: 
 
Isn’t it imperative and a little bit obvious that when we speak of Afghan women 
and their rights, we must listen carefully to what they themselves have to say about 
it? As the admirable struggles of women of color, particularly in the Global South, 
come to the knowledge of the West, we must remind ourselves of the validity of 
their views and hopes over our perceptions of what they should say and do, how 
they should dress and whether or not their oppression stems from being able to have 
an orgasm.490  
 
In outlining her despair, Choudhury lists those aspects of Muslim women’s lives, other than 
sex, which often unnecessarily distract Western feminists. These include the veil, the headscarf, 
or not being able to drive a car. She might well also have added marital status, specifically 
polygamy; a practice which Western feminists and women’s rights advocates have long derided 
as inherently unequal and irredeemably bad. Choudhury has also documented the 
phenomenon of increasing transnational feminist activism emanating in the West that focuses 
on how best to ‘help’ Muslim women evolve to experiencing lives with unfettered access to 
human rights. This activism in Choudhury’s view is based on an assumption, a throw back to 
a colonial mind set, that Muslim women will eventually come to value the same things that are 
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valued by women in the West. Other Muslim women and feminists increasingly express similar 
frustrations, despairing over the unquestioning showcase of Western freedoms as ‘good’ for 
all, and the unilateral imposition of a Western version of what it is to be ‘free’.491 This urge to 
liberate Muslim women and the discourse which accompanies it is not only commonly 
presented by traditional feminists as the way to unshackle Muslim women from their 
oppressed lives, Muslim women themselves are also often considered too subjugated to 
contribute meaningfully to that debate. All too frequently, in the eyes of their Western sisters, 
Muslim women remain consigned to their categorisation as second class citizens, wedged 
between fundamentalist aims which are informed by a particular reading of Islam on one side 
and what has been described as a hyper-essentialised interpretation of a ‘good life’ for all 
women on the other.492 The effect is to lock these women in an ideological impasse where 
they are trapped by an epistemological ‘lose-lose’.493 Moreover, any attempt at deviation by 
Muslim women from traditional, liberal goals is met with another assumption, similarly rooted 
in imperialist notions, that what Muslim women require is the education which makes it 
possible for them to come around to the ‘right’ way of thinking so that they too can then 
benefit from the progress Western women have already made on their behalf.  
 
The problem with Western assumptions regarding Islam is illustrated well by the debate over 
Muslim veil wearing. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the political elite—largely non-
Muslim and white—has strongly supported bans on the veil in a range of jurisdictions.494 The 
introduction of apparently neutral laws banning religious symbols in French public spaces, 
which directly prevented women from wearing the veil, was justified in large part by reference 
to the fundamental French constitutional principle of secularism, or ‘laïcité’.495 In pointing to 
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the constitutional prioritisation of secularism to support veil bans, French feminist aims 
aligned comfortably with the aims of the French state, relying on old cultural and religious 
stereotypes to promote essentialist ideas about Islam and its impact on Muslim women. In this 
context, it has been argued that the mainstream French feminist movement imposed its 
version of feminism on Muslim women, denying legitimacy to the voices of large numbers of 
women, many of whom expressed their clear wish to wear the veil for a host of different 
reasons.496 
 
It is worth noting that there are, of course, also Muslim women and organisations that have 
taken the same view as the French feminist mainstream, expressing their opposition to the 
veil. Some women wish to wear a veil or headscarf to express their own complex identity, 
while others may resent being used politically by Muslim men to promote a pro-veil or 
headscarf agenda.497 As one might expect, Muslims in France have not all taken the same 
approach to religious head covering. Similarly, not all Muslim women support polygamy and 
the same range of views exists about its practice.498 However, the highly visible debate over 
whether Muslim women should be allowed the opportunity to choose to wear the veil is 
interesting in connection with the treatment of polygamy in part because it illustrates the urge 
to essentialise and eradicate such practices. In that vein, Muslim women who supported an 
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absolute ban were accused of promoting reductive, racist views of Muslim behaviour.499 
Moreover, there were some non-Muslims who spoke vehemently in support of veil wearing. 
One of the most notable supporters among this group was the well-known French feminist 
and writer, Christine Delphy, who wrote an explosive account of the misuse of feminism to 
disguise racism, expressing her alarm at the French government’s readiness to treat Muslim 
women as ‘others’ and ignore their views.500 In the context of the veil, Delphy expressed both 
her exasperation and anger at the principle of laïcité being used by the French government and 
mainstream women to disguise the real reason for the veil ban. In her view, the intended aim 
was always the derision and persecution of Muslim women, and not the pursuit of secular 
goals. Further, the effect of this has been, little by little, more and more, that Muslim women 
have become excluded from leading a free life, and as Delphy points out, somewhat ironically, 
this has all been required “… in the name of their emancipation.”501 
 
Others have been critical of Western feminists and women’s rights advocates for failing to 
understand the value ascribed by many Muslim women to their religious belief, resigning not 
only women but religion itself to the status of ‘other’—something both to be feared and 
excluded.502 Echoing Delphy’s concerns over the lack of agency permitted to Muslim women 
when discussing issues like the veil, in her article ‘Piercing the Veil’, Madhavi Sunder has 
addressed the divergence between dominant, negative, Western conceptions of veil wearing 
and the priorities which may very often shape the lives of those women who wear it. Sunder 
accuses the West of compartmentalising Islamic religious practices like wearing the veil as 
patriarchal, suggesting it would be more productive for the West to consider equality and 
freedom for Muslim women within the context of religion instead.503 Sunder warns that 
choosing to ignore Muslim women is done at great cost, both for women and for society more 
widely. In her view, where the state ignores the importance of religion and culture to those 
women who wish to wear a veil or headscarf, or who enjoy other religious practices, this serves 
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only to ignore their real concerns and strengthen the position of religious fundamentalists who 
pose a genuine danger, at the expense of feminist aims and women’s rights.  
 
 
5.2.2 Islamic Feminism from Within 
 
Feminists like Sunder, who defend the compatibility of Islam and feminism, herald the 
increasingly perceptible drive among Muslim communities to develop norms and strategies 
designed to confront genuinely oppressive practices and re-frame those which are 
misinterpreted outside of Islam. Sunder herself advocates a ‘New Enlightenment’, an approach 
to considering Islam which aims to pierce the veil of religious sovereignty, so that the parts of 
religious life that Muslim women enjoy and value may be preserved, (however illogical or 
harmful that may seem to liberal elites) and truly fundamentalist conceptions of Islam may be 
challenged.504 She and many others suggest that non-Muslims, and Western feminists in 
particular, should work harder to respect Muslim feminists and assist them in promoting this 
New Enlightenment. While Sunder is critical of Western, mainstream feminist judgment on 
Islam and its part in women’s lives, she, like others who make similar criticisms, nonetheless 
makes clear her view that she is not advocating for acts of violence against women in the name 
of religion to be tolerated.505 Sunder both acknowledges and condemns practices such as 
stonings, so called ‘honour’ killings and both rape and the death penalty being used to punish 
women for ‘crimes’ such as childbirth outside of marriage, all of which might be carried out 
according to traditional interpretations of Shari’a law.506 Rather, those who advocate for a New 
Enlightenment are suggesting it is better to consider closing the gap between fundamentalist 
conceptions of Islam and women’s rights to avoid the ‘religious baby’ being thrown out with 
the ‘patriarchal bath water’, so to speak, and so that violence done in the name of religion is 
not taken as providing a broad brush justification for condemning Islam and all Islamic 
practices. According to Muslim feminists, the West must acknowledge this urge for feminism 
from within, so that Islam is not written off as hopelessly oppressive and Muslim women are 
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able to exercise free agency, and the content of laws which govern the lives of Muslim women 
reflect their lived experience. 
 
Echoing Sunder’s call, commentators like Azizah al-Hibri use the Qur’an itself to dispute the 
legitimacy of harmful Islamic practices, arguing that many of them contradict more significant 
Islamic concepts.507 One troubling example of an obligation imposed in some Islamic 
jurisdictions is that of ta’ah, or the obligation of wives to obey their husbands, which can 
extend to a husband legitimately denying a wife the right to leave the family home without his 
express permission for fear of reprisal including lost financial support, or even divorce. Ta’ah 
has been described by one commentator writing on Islamic law and custom as:  
 
… perhaps the most degrading to the Muslim woman …[diminishing] her 
fundamental liberties as a human being worthy of equal status under the law.508 
 
 In al-Hibri’s view, ta’ah persists directly as a result of misuse of ijtihad and may be objected to 
not only because it denigrates women, but—vitally in terms of the compatibility of Islam and 
feminism—because it is fundamentally at odds with more important Islamic principles in the 
context of marriage, including self-discipline, collective organisation, and mutual respect and 
responsibility.509  
 
These views illustrate a growing movement among women from the global south to reject 
common, Western characterisations of their lives. In showing their increasing thirst for 
autonomy and acknowledgement, Muslim women urge Western feminists to re-consider the 
experiences of the ‘other’, to allow for the manifestation of an Islamic feminism, a vernacular 
which is critical of oppressive religious practices but which emerges from within Islam to 
dispute a narrow interpretation of the Qur’an. Instead of liberals seeking to impose a Western 
vision for Islam and its practice, damaging interpretations of Islam are more and more vocally 
being contested by Muslims themselves, who deny the legitimacy of conceptions of Islam that 
reflect an ethically questionable misuse of sacred texts. While some of these conceptions are 
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modern, many reach back into Muslim history for guidance, to a time when Islamic leaders 
were much less likely to allow the suppression of free thinking in an effort to undermine the 
nihilistic aims of extreme groups, or a governing patriarchy, and their habit of calling anyone 
who disagrees with them ‘un-Islamic’ to promote and secure power.510 The nature of this 
internal protest against male domination and violence committed in the name of religion is 
epitomised in the words of prominent Islamic writer and critic, Ziauddin Sardar, who, in 
recommending ways for classical Islam to engage with modernity has said: 
 
The mistake is seeing the Qur’an as the end of knowledge, rather than as a text 
that provides an ethical framework for the pursuit of knowledge.511 
 
This work has already touched on some of the sentiment in Sardar’s quote, outlining how, 
although firmly rooted in its historic sources, Islam is by no means static. Specifically with 
regard to women in the modern context, ever-growing numbers of Muslim feminist scholars 
are suggesting it is time to review personal laws in Islam, to develop refreshed ways of 
interpreting jurisprudential sources and to remove the patriarchal bias that continues to 
dominate many areas of Muslim personal life.512 As al-Hibri suggests, women are increasingly 
being encouraged to be open about patriarchy and its effect on their lives, and to use their 
experience and their knowledge to reshape Islamic jurisprudence, to expose and resist gender 
discrimination. Where those who object to Muslim religious practices stick to a reductive view 
of religion, women who practice Islam are denied any part in the mainstream discourse that 
regulates them. The isolation which flows from that approach serves only to reinforce the 
power of patriarchal forces which operate within religious ranks, as well as to silence Muslim 
women, and to subjugate their experiences and their voices, ever more. Increasingly, rather 
than presuming that their views cannot freely be held and insisting it is Islam which must 
change, Muslim women argue that it is the reconsideration of feminism itself which is needed, 
so that the views and the experiences of Muslim women become more influential in informing 
a feminist conception of Islam and Islamic practices.  
                                                           
510 Ziauddin Sardar ‘Start the Week’ BBC Radio 4, 16 January 2017 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b088b855#play> accessed 
16 January 2017.  
511 Sardar (n 510).  
512 al Hibri (n 489) 43. [List also Amina Wadud, Leila Ahmed, others?] 
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Turning specifically to the possibility of feminism from within and its approach to polygamy, 
the more traditional landscape of Muslim views regarding polygamous marriage has been 
mapped by Kecia Ali, who allocates justifications for polygamy to three broad, traditional 
arguments in support of its continued practice.513  Described as the “battleground in on-going 
contests about whether Islamic law can ever be fair to women” polygamy is sanctioned in the 
Islamic world because men are entitled, because men have naturally greater sexual desires, and 
finally because women are in need of men’s protection, a trifecta of reasons which hardly seem 
to privilege women at all, perpetuating the impression of Muslim plural marriage as completely 
incompatible with modern values and women’s rights514 
 
However, the typology of traditional support for polygamy in Islam that Ali presents is far 
from the final word on the rights, or wrongs, of Islamic plural marriage. As outlined before 
now, the application of an Islamic feminist dialogue, rather like the general discourse on 
polygamy itself, is far from settled, and varied perspectives exist on the nature of the benefits 
and detriments of polygamy for women. In this regard, Muslim feminist discourse—unlike 
traditional feminist or human rights discourse—allows for the possibility that women may 
choose polygamy over monogamy for a range of religious and other reasons. Unlike the 
traditional justifications presented by Ali, Islamic feminist discourse increasingly allows for the 
fact that Muslim women may willingly opt for polygamy, based not on patriarchal reasons, but 
a range of alternative arguments which come from Muslim women themselves.515 This 
sentiment is summed up well by Michele Alexandre, writing on the possibility of a feminist 
conception of polygamy in particular: 
 
…the desire to enter or remain in a polygamous union does not necessarily equate 
with a diminishment of [women’s] rights and privileges. For many Islamic women 
the desire for autonomy and equal rights is often coexistent with their commitment 
                                                           
513 Ali (n 100) 620. 
514 Ali (n 100) 622. Ali calls the three categories in her typology the defiant, polemical and paternalistic arguments which traditionally 
justify polygamy in Muslim jurisprudence. 
515 Azizah al Hibri ‘Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?’ in Cohen and others (n 116). 
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to Islam; a combination that, according to popular stereotypes of Islam, creates an 
untenable conflict.516 
 
What Alexandre suggests in order to navigate a way around old stereotypes is to ensure that 
women’s wishes serve as a foundation for religious practices like polygamy—something that 
she says is made possible because Islam is inherently concerned about justice, which must also 
encompass the aim of equality for women. This view of polygamy is one that is demonstrably 
ignored in domestic law and by the human rights establishment. The content of laws which 
exclude polygamy and the comments of committees who oversee human rights conventions 
provide tangible examples of mainstream norms which give the distinct impression that 
feminist accounts like that offered by Alexandre are irrelevant. Certainly, there is some 
disagreement mainstream and other feminists, with the effect that the views of some Muslim 
feminists on polygamy are ignored.  
 
The feminist engagement with polygamy may be analogised with the debates, highlighted 
earlier, over whether or not Muslim women should be prohibited from wearing religious 
symbols. Those, like many in the French feminist mainstream, who consider themselves 
supporters of women’s rights choose to present veiling as proof that Muslim women are un-
emancipated, with no influence over their appearance. This perception of the veil and even 
the headscarf reduces it to being a mere symbol of women’s oppression and makes: 
 
…[t]he women beneath the headscarves … silent symbols, where national 
and international politics are played out on their bodies, heads and 
minds.517  
 
Such perceptions ignore the voices of many Muslim women themselves, who disagree strongly 
with their depiction in the discussion on religious manifestation as oppressed, and who see 
themselves as exercising agency in electing to wear the veil or the headscarf as part of their 
                                                           
516  Alexandre (n 87) 5. 
517 Wing and Nigh Smith (n 495) 747. 
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complex and non-binary self-identity, rather than as victims of Islamic patriarchy.518 The 
appropriation by liberal feminists of debates on the headscarf and polygamy as well as other 
Islamic practices—very often while the varied views of Muslim women themselves are 
ignored—has been described by leading Muslim academic, Leila Ahmed, as symptomatic of 
the imposition of “…the Western narrative of the quintessential otherness and inferiority of 
Islam” which brings with it the potential for great harm.519   
 
Accordingly, a Muslim feminist jurisprudence is increasingly being promoted by Muslim 
women, who seek freedom and equality within the context of their religious beliefs, rather 
than the freedom to seek equality outside of them. Such women identify as feminists who 
celebrate their faith, grounding their feminist theory in Islam and the Qur’an, something they 
see as being entirely compatible with feminist aims, even if that is very often in contrast to 
their liberal feminist counterparts. In support of a feminist programme which originates from 
within, al-Hibri is clear that Islam need not be oppressive to women, assigning such 
assumptions either to mistake, or secular bias. In practical terms, regarding the likely success 
in achieving equality for Muslim women, she points to the futility in feminist aims which are 
defined and enforced by groups with no connection to Islam: 
 
The majority of Muslim women who are attached to their religion will not 
be liberated through the use of a secular approach imposed from the outside 
by international bodies or from above by undemocratic governments … 
The only way to resolve the conflicts of these women … is to build a solid 
                                                           
518 The application of Islamic feminist dialogue has brought similar thinking to bear in the context of mahr. Mahr are dowry payments 
made on marriage from a husband to a wife according to Muslim tradition, which have been criticised as reflecting the a husband 
‘buying’ wife. Pascale Fournier discusses this in some detail in Muslim Marriage in Western Courts: Lost in Transplantation (Routledge, 
2010) at [pinpoint] saying secular liberals condemn mahr as the sale of that part of a woman which is most prized, her vagina. From a 
traditional feminist standpoint, it seems difficult to present mahr as anything but unequal and entirely bad for women. However, 
despite strong arguments against mahr, Fournier explains how Islamic feminists have expressed their support, conversely presenting 
mahr as one of the first symbols of female empowerment. In support of mahr, such feminists argue the Qur’an is anti-patriarchal, 
offering as it did, departure from the early Arabic patriarchal customs which oppressed women. Alongside their support for mahr, 
they argue strongly for the right to define their own religious practices according to the Qur’an, rather than being subjected to an 
imposed, reductive definition of Islam, produced either by men, or Western women and which presents Muslim women as victims 
with no voice or influence whatsoever.  
519 Simonetta Calderini, ‘Women Gender and Human Rights’ in Rippin (n 168) 624, quoting leading Islamic feminist Leila Ahmed. 
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Muslim jurisprudential basis which clearly shows that Islam does not 
deprive them of their rights, but in fact demands these rights for them.520 
 
The view al-Hibri and other Muslim commentators like her increasingly express, that Muslim 
women must find their own way and have an equal opportunity to redefine patriarchal 
approaches to Muslim life, is a theme with great relevance to this work. Al-Hibri recommends 
that, while Western women have some role in this process, it is to support not dictate to 
Muslim women. It is precisely that support which is the aim of this chapter. By resisting the 
adoption of a typical, Western feminist stance towards polygamy, and offering instead a 
refreshed normative and theoretical pathway, anchored in a renewed feminist approach, this 
work seeks to re-imagine the practice of polygamy and its regulation in the specific context of 
family reunification for refugee women. Where ideological differences threaten to de-rail the 
prospect of a feminist vernacular which is rooted in the lived experience of polygamously 
married Muslim women, this work takes up the invitation from those Muslim feminists who 
have been featured here, to allow for the possibility that such differences do not simply reflect 
a long history of patriarchy and religious oppression, but rather, that they may be a legitimate 
expression of agency for some Muslim women.  
 
Having established that feminism and Islam are not mutually exclusive, this chapter seeks now 
to explain in more detail the basis for privileging feminism in the context of polygamy, human 
movement and human rights. 
 
 
5.3 A Reframed Feminist Approach to Polygamy 
 
                                                           
520 Pascale Fournier (n 518) 3 quoting al-Hibri. The comments by al-Hibri echo those made more generally by legal pluralists, like Pearl 
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of the Qur’an and Islamic practices such as veil wearing, mahr and polygamy, arguing in favour of a Muslim jurisprudence rather than 




5.3.1 The Basis for a Feminist Re-evaluation of Normative Neutrality  
 
The underlying feminist assumption is that gender is central to life experiences. Feminist legal 
theory applies this basic assumption, considering where a gender bias operates in the 
development and scope of laws so that women are ignored in law making and their 
subordination is reinforced. The broad function of feminism has been articulated as a: 
 
…practice of social change that seeks to transform those relations of power … from 
the production and distribution of wealth and the division of power to the 
construction of identities and ways of making sense of reality … [F]eminism 
rewrites not only our knowledge of but also our construction of society by inscribing 
gender in social relations—that is, by articulating the gender differences patriarchy 
requires but naturalises “as the way things are” and conceals in the illusion of 
universality.521 
 
In this way, feminism might be thought of as a movement, intent on exposing the fraudulent 
tools of mainstream society—tools such as inclusivity, justice, universalism and equality, for 
instance—to expose hidden power, and the exclusion and exploitation such clandestine power 
allows.522 This movement might also be referred to as “activating the other”, that is, the silent 
female participant who remains unseen because of “dominant modes of knowing”.523 The 
feminist activation that this work aims to ignite is variously described here as a ‘re-
understanding’, a ‘re-imagining’, or a ‘re-framing’—all different ways to describe the 
application of a refreshed perspective to one example of hidden power and its impact. The 
feminist re-imagining here is intended to expose the hypocrisy of those who oversee law and 
rights ignoring the harmful impact of prohibition on polygamous wives, while relying on 
concern over harm to justify their actions. 
 
                                                           
521 Teresa L Ebert, ‘The “Difference” of Postmodern Feminism’ (1991) 53(8) College English 888, writing in the context of postmodern 
politics and feminist theory.  
522 Ebert (n 521) 888. 
523 Ebert (n 521) 888. 
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To that end, this work has adopted the idea of ‘world travelling’ to review the content and 
impact of laws.524 This method of analysis shifts the balance of concerns regarding polygamy, 
insisting on an understanding of other women, who may not share all of the same values but 
whose experiences form the basis for a dialogue in the first place.525 It has substantial value in 
reducing the homogeneity required by law and rights in practice, confronting the tension 
between overarching standards and local experiences, and responding to that tension by 
acknowledging diversity and reflecting the day-to-day reality of less visible women.  
 
Eminent feminist scholar, Adrien Wing, has already recommended that precisely this 
methodology be used in connection with regulating polygamous marriage.526 Wing has 
recommended that polygamy is considered via the lens of ‘critical pragmatism’ to privilege the 
needs of groups who are traditionally subordinated to avoid the imposition of Western values 
which unthinkingly condemn and marginalise polygamy, without ever really considering in 
detail the consequences of doing so.527 Wing bases her recommendation on the possibility that 
we might: 
 
 … see ourselves as the ‘other’ might see us, and see the ‘other’ within her own 
complex cultural legal context.528 
 
This work has begun the task of world travelling and applying that ‘critical pragmatism’ to the 
regulation of polygamy, in Chapters 3 and 4, which have already challenged the apparently 
objective treatment of polygamous wives in immigration law and human rights.529  This critical 
                                                           
524 Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) 51, quoting Maria Lugones  “Playfulness, “world travelling” and loving perception’ 2 Hypatia 
(1987) 3 at 18. This is a method also adopted by Adrien Wing in her analysis of the headscarf ban (n 38) and polygamy (n 14). It was 
first proposed by Isabelle Gunning in ‘Arrogant Perception, World Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital 
Surgeries’ (1991) 23 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 189, asking in this context in 1991 what right does a Western feminist have 
to criticise the practices of an entirely different culture, and whether or not the law should be used to attribute ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. 
525 Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) 51, describe the rooting and shifting of European feminists. 
526 Wing, Polygamy (n 14).  
527 Wing, Polygamy (n 14).  
528 Wing, Polygamy (n 14) 813. 
529 Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) 60, where they quote Elizabeth Grosz, it’s a “veiled representation and projection of the masculine 
which takes itself as the unquestioned norm, the ideal representative without any idea of the violence this representational positioning 
does to its others.”  
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foundation will now be built on, using a range of feminist critiques to apply further pressure 
to the idea that the governance of polygamy is impartial, and to debunk the idea that laws and 
rights reflect some sort of objective feminist or other truth. Here, the disagreement among 
feminists is employed to reveal the importance of power structures, history and gender, which 
negate the impression of equality, neutrality and fair governance.530 The aim is to show that 
the law is already woven with the thread of gendered subjectivity, reflecting and reinforcing 




5.3.2 A Governance Feminist Critique 
 
However helpful a feminist lens, the exclusion of particular groups from the feminist 
vernacular is commonplace and gives cause for concern.532 More and more, critical 
commentators are pointing to disturbing and often unintended outcomes of feminist 
campaigning for certain groups of women.  Among those recently leading that critical 
discourse are ‘governance feminism’ critics, introduced earlier in the discussion on legal 
responses to veil wearing. Critics of governance feminism object not only to essentialism and 
‘othering’, but also the impulse among those feminists entrenched in powerful institutions to 
privilege what they consider to be socially acceptable practices, giving their own version of 
feminism credibility to the exclusion of other feminist discourses, regardless of the 
consequences for those who do not conform to the prevailing norm. The essence of the 
governance feminist critique is the institutionalised nature of feminist achievements, and the 
attitudes, priorities and relationships of power that inform the legal outcomes of feminist 
                                                           
530 Halley and others (n 65) 335. 
531 Chinkin and Charlesworth (n 39) 22 refers to Koskenniemi advocating acceptance of the framework of international law because, 
although flawed, it protects from subjectivity and political ideology. The response to that as Chinkin points out is that international 
law is already not objective, rather it is “… intertwined with a gendered and sexed subjectivity and reinforces a system of male 
symbols.” 
532 It is relevant to note that feminist scholarship does not in general require that only those who experience gender-based oppression 
may speak out against it. Rather, by listening carefully and closely to the experiences of women, and by carefully avoiding judgment 
of the speaker, it is possible for anyone to engage in and understand critical feminist debate. 
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action.533 Although credibility is attributed to those in power by an association with feminist 
aims, the critical approach applied here shows that their efforts have great capacity to make 
women with less influence much worse off because institutionalised feminist activism so often 
ignores large swathes of women-kind.534 
 
The insistence on prohibiting and excluding polygamy by states and the human rights 
establishment is one illustration of governance feminism in action. In a similar vein to the pre-
occupation of governance feminists with banning the veil, when it comes to regulating the 
‘deviant’ practice of polygamy, the goal of those who govern and who have institutional power 
is prohibition; a goal informed by traditional liberal and dominance feminist aspirations, which 
unquestionably provide the tangible hook on which human rights condemnation of polygamy 
hangs. It is liberal feminist discourse that informs the view of polygamy as inherently unequal, 
a view which is then reflected in public policy and the legal denial of family reunion for 
additional polygamous wives. Dominance feminism is also a strong component of anti-
polygamy rhetoric, and its occupation with patriarchy and men as the perpetrator of varying 
forms of injury to women in polygamous marriage. In this regard, feminist aims which 
associate men as the wrongdoer and women as the victim of their wrongdoing have become 
a sort of unchallengeable ‘wisdom’ when it comes to polygamy in the West, and prohibitive 
approaches to polygamy in law and rights are presented as the logical way regulate polygamy 
on behalf of all women.  
 
The systematic institutionalisation of equality and radical feminist aims in Western legal and 
human rights standards have effectively allowed a limited version of feminism to become the 
mainstream battle cry that rationalises the rejection of polygamy. As a result ‘feminism’ 
legitimises public policy that calls for the unconditional prohibition of entirely valid 
polygamous marriages in immigration, regardless of the effect in practice for those women 
directly affected. The same ‘feminism’ is relied on by the human rights establishment in 
universally privileging traditional equality aims and relying on them to denounce polygamy in 
human rights standards, with widespread transnational influence.535 In this way, the form of 
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feminism that is officially approved of by those who implement laws and rights is elevated to 
the status of an unquestionable epistemology. It is this feminist expertise which informs 
Western objections to polygamy as the, now irrefutable, Western feminist ideology is 
hardwired into the institutions with both hard and soft power over polygamous marriage. The 
effect is to wield great power over how things are understood, as well as what is done in 
relation to them.536  
 
The work carried out by Angela Campbell regarding Mormon polygamy provides evidence in 
support of the idea that the imposition of one feminist truth regarding polygamy is less of a 
victory for women, and more an example of governance feminism in action. Her empirical 
research with women from the Bountiful community in British Columbia is both intimate and 
revealing, providing a platform for women who are often invisible to have their say about their 
experience of being in a plural marriage.537 Professor Campbell’s work reveals wives of 
Bountiful who commonly express a strong preference for a more nuanced response to their 
marital status, one which doesn’t reach for simple objections to male domination or make 
assumptions about their inequality and lack of free choice to justify the criminalisation of plural 
marriage.538 Although her research doesn’t explicitly refer to the concept of governance 
feminism per se, her work with the women of Bountiful might be read as an indirect and 
informal governance feminist critique of sorts, highlighting a disjuncture between the pre-
occupation of those in governance with mainstream equality and prohibition, which contrasts 
with the interests of those women who are directly affected. Although Mormon polygamy has 
a long history of being seen in black and white terms when it comes to equality and harm, the 
documented conversations of Professor Campbell and others like her signal the purpose in 
establishing a more thoughtful regulatory path through the polygamy paradox by taking 
                                                           
536 Halley and others (n 52).The idea of governance feminism envisages both hard and soft aspects. For example punishment 
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537 Campbell, (n 6) ‘Bountiful’s Plural Marriages’ and ‘Bountiful Voices’ (2009) 183 where she describes the paper as a presentation 
of a ‘counter narrative’ to the popular depiction of a Mormon polygamous wife.  
538 Campbell, ‘Bountiful’s Plural Marriages’ and ‘Bountiful Voices’ (n 6). 
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account of the views of a more broad cross section of women if the aim is to achieve outcomes 
which are genuinely equal. 
 
Although this research focuses on Muslim wives in refugee settings, they, like their Canadian, 
Mormon counterparts are more often silenced by the aims of men and more powerful women 
who have a seat at the institutional table. It is difficult to locate the voices of Muslim women 
in refugee settings in shaping the content of domestic laws that govern Muslim family reunion, 
or the scope of international rights standards on polygamy. Instead, the influence of more 
dominant, liberal feminist aims is more obviously reflected in the civilising discourse that so 
often dominates the discussion around polygamy and its regulation. Campbell’s research 
highlights, in particular, the hypocrisy of criminalising polygamy when the harmful impact of 
doing so is considered. Her research notes that disjuncture by giving voice to the views and 
choices of polygamous wives themselves, noting that the harm caused by criminalisation and 
exclusion is frequently far greater and longer lasting for these women than any harm that might 
be associated with a polygamous marriage.539 The reality emerging out of Campbell’s 
conversations is that strictly enforced prohibitions on polygamy are likely to exacerbate all 
kinds of harm for women; a contention which is arguably all the more troubling in the refugee 
setting where vulnerabilities are intensified by extreme and often dangerous day to day 
conditions. While the state seeks to promote its role as a protector of women, what it is in fact 
doing in practice is engaging in a repressive form of governance which shows a complete lack 
of regard for women’s own lived experiences where they make choices which sit outside 
prescribed legal and human rights boundaries. 
 
By employing a governance feminist critique a tangible theoretical framework is provided to 
question what appears to be the entirely reasonable legal treatment of an offensive practice 
like polygamy. Those laws and rights that advocate for the complete prohibition of polygamy 
become capable of being seen as evidence of the rapid rise of a very Western legal feminism, 
                                                           
539 Campbell, Bountiful Voices (n 6) 50. It is relevant to note that, harm arises out of other types of marriage, too, and there have 
been practical suggestions for ways to focus on harm in plural marriage and regulate the relationship – like any other – rather than 
ban it. But those suggestions have not so far been taken up by the mainstream, either in the form of governments, international 
bodies, or feminists themselves for the most part, something Governance Feminist critics would link to those who dominate when it 
comes to institutional power.  
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rather than representative of reasonable and objective equality aims. Considering polygamy 
within the governance feminism critique, a ‘structural bias’ in law making is revealed, one 
which leads to perverse outcomes for those women whose needs are neglected by the 
governance feminists, sometimes with grim outcomes.540 A governance feminist critical 
vernacular highlights the exclusion of these women and others like them from the sphere of 
influence in both domestic and international law making, emphasising the profound effect that 
absence has in the shape and content of law and policy. As a result, rather than seeing absolute 
polygamy prohibition as soundly justified, it is capable of being re-imagined as the 
institutionalisation of a brand of feminism which best suits those in power. The value in doing 
is that which may previously have appeared beyond doubt may be challenged, so that 
international and domestic legal boundaries may—once again—be re-drawn.  
 
While this work supports the employment of a governance feminist critical discourse in the 
context of polygamy regulation, it is important to note that it departs from Halley’s particular 
approach because it does not seek to ‘take a break’ from feminism altogether.541 Instead, it 
aims both to evaluate the harmful cost of earlier feminist movements and suggest ways of 
moving forward which continue to reflect a broader, more inclusive, set of feminist aims.  The 
intention is to apply scrutiny to the unintended consequences of governance feminism, to see 
where the law may, however unintentionally, have done more harm than good.  In doing so, 
this work considers it entirely possible to work towards better outcomes for a wider range of 
women, while at the same time, offering critical reflections on the institutions and the laws 
which govern women’s lives. Far from abandoning feminist theory altogether, a feminist 
framework is suggested here which uses postmodern and postcolonial feminist methods that 
                                                           
540 A ‘structural bias’ thesis is outlined by Prabha Kotiswaran in ‘Dangerous Sex, Invisible Labor: Sex Work and the Law in India’ (PUP, 
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541 Halley and others (n 65).  
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honour local narratives, bringing a critique of feminism and activism together, under the 
umbrella of a renewed feminist reply.542  
 
 
5.3.3 A Renewed Feminist Reply 
 
As the Chamallas typology used in the introduction to this work illustrated, not all feminists 
investigate the law or apply feminist theory in the same way. Feminism is not static or fixed, 
but a dynamic collection of theories, so that different feminisms may emerge—a process 
which has become increasingly common, in fact, as distinct groups have developed their own 
feminist discourse in an attempt to mitigate the historic and substantive limits of more 
dominant feminist movements. It is these new feminist projects that strongly influence the 
method this work uses to question justifications for the treatment of polygamy in law and 
rights. Relying largely on postmodern and postcolonial approaches to feminist theory, this 
final feminist discussion challenges the imposition of a universalised feminism which demands 
that polygamy is excluded in immigration law and condemned by international human rights 
institutions, whatever the impact. Here, the indifference that is inherent in universal bans on 
polygamy is brought to the fore and the proclivity of governance feminism to de-legitimise 
considerations which sit outside the ordinary boundaries of concern for law and rights is 
discussed. The role of Western feminist concerns in elevating equality and dominance, while 
displacing other concerns like insecurity and family relationships, is examined with the aim of 
privileging the voices of ‘other’ women in feminist discourse. 
 
Providing an almost mirror image to day-to-day governance feminism, postmodern feminism 
encourages those who make laws and human rights to listen carefully to the views of other 
women, ensuring they have tangible relevance. Postmodern feminist discourse places 
emphasis on the contextualised nature of women’s lives, rejecting more general feminist 
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theories. The growth of postmodern feminism is illustrative of a general ‘fracturing’ of feminist 
ranks since the rise of critical legal scholarship in the 1990s, resulting in allegations by critical 
race feminists that any progress sought by women of colour was generally permitted only when 
it suited the white elite. Critical race feminist scholars were among the first not to accept law 
as neutral, pointing specifically to identity, manifested in race and gender, as the factors on 
which on-going oppression was based, laying the groundwork for a feminist movement 
completely independent from traditional equality aims to grow and requiring those who 
espoused liberal feminism to recognise its insular nature and limited scope.543 Postmodern 
feminism has evolved alongside critical race feminism with the more general aim of exposing 
bias in universalised standards to promote laws that protect more than one expression of what 
it means to advance women’s rights. Rather than simply expecting marginalised women to 
adopt current international and apparently universal values, laws and rights, postmodern 
feminism offers a way of unpacking the ‘othering’ of women in any context, including in the 
regulation of polygamy.  
 
In an early work presaging this more broad dissatisfaction with formal equality aims as a 
method of advancing the interests of women, Mary Joe Frug, writing in 1992, confirmed the 
existence of a blossoming scepticism about the benefit women might actually receive from 
simple equal treatment. In her article, simply titled ‘A Postmodern Feminist Manifesto’, Frug 
noted the rising importance of a more general differentiation in feminist thought as women 
began around this time to pursue what she called a ‘strategy of difference’.544 As postmodern 
advocates of the time explained, by focusing on the position of women relative to men, 
traditional feminist discourse consigned women to binary oppositions, neither of which 
necessarily improved women’s lives.545 The early work of postmodern scholars noted the 
beginnings of a general identity feminist movement, a ‘third way’ in feminist thought and 
advocacy; one that rejected a forced dichotomous choice or an essentialised experience. This 
                                                           
543 Adrien Katherine Wing (n 476) 446 and Wing, Adrien and Nigh Smith, Monica, ‘Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil? Muslim 
Women, France and the Headscarf Ban’ (2006) 39 UC Davis L Review 743 provide useful explanations of critical scholarship.  
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new strand of feminists were at pains to highlight the problem with reductive categorisations 
of women on the basis they erase differences other than gender as though they don’t exist, 
differences which include race, religion, sexuality, class, not to mention other, tangible 
differences which are directly relevant to this work, such as marital and citizenship status.546  
 
Professor Frug used the example of prostitution (and its regulation at the time she was writing) 
to illustrate this new, postmodern feminist thought in action. She pointed out that most laws 
relating to prostitution were gender neutral in that they made no distinction as to gender and 
applied equally to both sexes. Despite this, Frug confirmed her view that the laws governing 
prostitution still suffered from a ‘gender lopsidedness’ for the simple reason that most sex 
workers—the party criminalised at the time in the regulation of prostitution—were women. 
As a result, although it was entirely possible to argue that anti-prostitution measures were 
expressly disinterested in gender, in practice, their impact was very different. By targeting sex-
workers rather than clients, the prohibitions acted largely to criminalise women far more than 
men. Suggesting that a healthy dose of legal realism be applied to this situation and in seeking 
to understand the ‘reality of difference’ in this context, Frug saw the value in postmodern 
feminist scholarship to assist in challenging the essentialising impulse of laws and their 
disproportionate gender impact. In her example, applying a ‘difference feminist’ understanding 
to the regulation of prostitution called to account the role of the law in perpetuating the idea 
of the dominant (that is, in this example, male) as neutral.547  
 
Frug’s use of sexual conduct and the sexual lives of women to illustrate the gendered nature 
of apparently neutral laws is a theme also highlighted by Duncan Kennedy in his analysis of 
the legal regulation of rape. Kennedy’s reading of the relationship between the legal treatment 
                                                           
546 This recognition of different categories of discrimination arguably first manifested as the idea of ‘intersectional’ discrimination, 
comprehensively introduced and explained by Kimberle Crenshaw in her articles ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics and Violence Against Women of Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241 and ‘Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ Volume 1989 1 (1989) University 
of Chicago Legal Forum 139.  
547 Angela Campbell also considers the engagement of the law with sex work in Sister Wives, Surrogates and Sex Workers (n 6) in 
seeking to use empirical accounts of experience to inform the law on prostitution and noting the general failure of the juridical 
approach to sex work and its criminalisation to take account of nuance where morally ambiguous choices are involved, with sometimes 
severe implications for those women affected.   
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of rape and gender notes the stark difference between law in books and law in action, leading 
to his recommendation that—however good the initial intentions—the consequences of the 
law in practice are vitally important.548 One of the concerns Kennedy expressed in his complex 
discussion on the effect of the law, is that the law on rape essentialised the role of women in 
society, so that those who violated customary rules about the ‘right’ way to behave would fairly 
be subjected to the consequent risk of being raped. In his discussion Kennedy asks the crucial 
question: in whose interest is it that women have essentialised, traditional identities? He 
answers simply, men.  
 
Taking the concerns of Kennedy and Frug regarding the laws on rape and prostitution and 
applying them in the context of polygamy, it becomes possible to cast both men and dominant 
groups of women in the role of those who essentialise what it is to be an acceptable woman. 
Idealised feminist traits are required, ensuring that women who do not fit into that definition 
give up any hope of state support for their own identity. Such women include polygamous 
wives, particularly those consigned to remain alone in refugee settings, who forgotten for not 
being an appropriate version of ‘women’, and for whom immigration status and meaningful 
accessibility to human rights assistance is both conditional and denied. Like the women who 
have been punished by historic legal approaches to prostitution, or rape, governance feminism 
has played some part in informing the scope of the law so that polygamous wives are not 
considered the ‘right’ type of women to benefit from legal and rights protection. Further, the 
compartmentalisation of women in this way—as either victims who are oppressed, or women 
who are irresponsible and morally lacking, but either way, undeserving—denies them any real 
opportunity to challenge the dominant narrative.549  
 
The United Kingdom has argued the law that excludes additional polygamous wives in 
immigration is neutral.550 Citing the fact that it is drafted in a way which is targeted at the 
practice of polygamy itself and is not expressed directly to exclude those women who are in a 
                                                           
548 Duncan Kennedy ‘Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination’ (1992) 26 New England Law Review 1309.  
549 Angela Campbell, Sister Wives, Surrogates and Sex Workers (n 6) 193 refers to juridical analyses of practices like polygamy 
casting women who choose it as “… either helpless victims of oppression who require the state’s protection or as freedom warriors 
who break the law …” she says to really appreciate the tough choice these women have requires more nuance. 
550 Bibi (n 192) and Fairburn (n 240). 
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polygamous marriage, both the British government and the European Court of Human Rights 
have confirmed that they consider this regulation to be an entirely appropriate expression of 
state sovereignty.551 The European Court, in particular, has expressly confirmed the exclusion 
of additional wives is within the ‘margin of appreciation’ allowed to states when they are 
seeking to promote public policy aims which arise out of strong, historic links to practices like 
Christianity and the desire to prevent plural marriage which flows, at least in part, from that 
Christian background.552  
 
Despite official claims to objectivity, however, it is possible in practice to see the same sort of 
gender ‘lopsidedness’ in the treatment of polygamy that Frug complained of so much earlier 
with regard to prostitution. For plural marriage, although the state has successfully argued at 
a regional human rights level that the measures it has taken are just, the reunification 
restrictions on polygamous families have distinctly different impacts on men and women. The 
domestic prohibition on polygamy is framed expressly to exclude additional wives, resulting 
in distinctly different outcomes for polygamous husbands and wives. Whatever the lawmakers 
say about the neutrality of the law and their intended consequences in drafting it, the reality is 
that women’s experience of immigration restrictions on polygamous families is entirely 
different to that of men, a fact which is wholly ignored, and arguably even considered 
irrelevant. The abandonment of polygamous wives in this way and the treatment of these 
women as evidence of the harmful practice of polygamy, so tainted they must be entirely 
excluded from society, is problematic for two main reasons. First, because of the havoc it 
wreaks, especially in refugee settings where the impact of exclusion is isolation and family 
separation, with all of the risk to personal safety that will most likely bring to those women 
involved. Second, because of its gendered quality and the disproportionate effect it has not 
only on women compared with men, but also on marginalised, minority women.  
 
The universal exclusion of polygamy in immigration might also be criticised for the distressing 
irony it represents. Banning plural marriage to save women from harm ignores the fact such a 
ban will likely do women much more harm than good, particularly for women trapped in the 
                                                           
551 Bibi (n 192). 
552 Baderin (n 311) 231 for a discussion on the margin of appreciation, Islamic practices and human rights. 
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refugee setting. In this way, the regulation of polygamy bears some resemblance to the 
unsuccessful campaign by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin to have the state ban 
all pornography, a practice they considered irredeemably bad for women. After locating 
pornography at the centre of women’s subordination, MacKinnon and Dworkin insisted on 
the absolute destruction of pornography to further women’s interests and protect them from 
harm. So far, so much like the prohibition on polygamy and its normative basis, then. It is 
worth recalling, however, the attempt by MacKinnon and Dworkin completely to restrict 
pornography, rather than re-imagine regulatory approaches to it, was both controversial and 
in the end, entirely unsuccessful.553 Frug referred to the arguments of MacKinnon and 
Dworkin as typically being based on ‘hierarchical dichotomies’ which were destined to fail. 
That is, you were either with them (in opposing the oppressive practice of pornography) or 
against them (in supporting any other view) and any complexity or uncertainty regarding the 
impact of pornography, or the lives of those women who experienced it, was not permitted. 
As Frug put it rather plainly, the problem with MacKinnon and Dworkin’s absolutist position 
was that, “[N]ot all pornography is simply about women being fucked.” The same might be 
said of polygamy. Although a different practice, it too is presented as the enemy of all women, 
even if in reality it will not always be oppressive for every woman who experiences it. While 
the harm that occupies anti-polygamy advocates—like that which is often associated with 
pornography—is worthy of consideration, banning all polygamy including entirely valid 
polygamous marriages, with no consideration of context or women’s own preference, is 
unwelcome and unhelpful for some women.  
 
In addition to considering how liberal feminism dominates feminist discourse, it is helpful also 
to consider why “…power has clustered around certain categories [of women] and is exercised 
against others” as Kimberle Crenshaw has put it.554 Picking up the thread of the postcolonial 
discussion introduced in the previous chapter provides an explanation for the absence of 
certain categories of women in mainstream feminist and other discussions on law and rights. 
Those factors which have nurtured social and political hierarchies over time are directly 
                                                           
553 Frug (n 544) 1072. The comments by Shah (n 11), that banning polygamy doesn’t work, it just drives it underground and makes it 
potentially much more harmful, have some resonance here also. 
554 Crenshaw Mapping the Margins (n 546) 1297, exposing how discrimination is experienced on multiple levels for certain categories 
of women. 
 210 
relevant to the predicament that excluded wives find themselves in, explaining why certain 
groups of women are placed in subordinated categories. Postcolonial feminist discourse can 
be paired with its postmodern sister in providing historical insight into why the ‘othering’, 
which is complained of here, occurs. It also reveals the process of othering as a way of 
managing difference, which is seen as a threat to the ordinary international legal order.555 
 
Recent discussions on vulnerability and the legal subject are also helpful, in providing a 
framework to examine and articulate the lack of autonomy very often ascribed to women in 
polygamous marriage. According to this idea, it is simply impossible to imagine that any 
woman would choose freely to enter into a non-monogamous marriage, meaning those in 
power are entirely justified in providing the ‘protection’ offered by laws which reject polygamy.  
Considering the role of vulnerability and its relationship to privilege and disadvantage, Martha 
Fineman has questioned the nature of state responsibility towards the ‘vulnerable subject’ in 
an effort to redefine the parameters of state responsibility to give lived experiences and the 
human condition greater weight in law making and promote a more equal society.556 While 
this work does not aspire to ‘sidestepping’ the role of the state or the human rights 
establishment in considering polygamy, the work of Fineman might be used to challenge the 
false consciousness often attributed to women in polygamous marriages (itself an assumption 
which arguably arises at least in part out of colonial approaches to the treatment of non-
Western women, so strongly objected to in postcolonial feminist discourse.) In that regard, 
the lived experiences of the women who are the focus for this research are ignored, either 
because they are considered irrelevant, or because they are not believed.557 
                                                           
555 Otto (n 396), describes non-white, non-elite as the ‘subaltern’ who are considered a threat to the international legal order, rather 
than having dynamic or transformative potential.  
556 Martha Fineman ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale JL & Feminism 1 and 
Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation (Ashgate, Farnham 2016). Fineman considers the topic of vulnerability in the 
context of plural marriage directly in ‘Vulnerability and the Institution of Marriage (The Evolution of Plural Parentage: Afterword) 
(2015) 64 Emory Law Journal 2089, explaining that considering polygamy within the framework of vulnerability allows one to sidestep 
rights claims, an aim this work does not pursue, in part because of the fundamental commitment to the rights project. See also Marvel, 
Stu ‘The Evolution of Plural Parentage: Applying Vulnerability Theory to Polygamy and Same Sex Marriage’ (2015) 64 Emory Law 
Journal 2047 for a vulnerability insight into the role of children in plural marriages.  
557 The potential for empirical studies to reveal ‘hidden’ populations is noted by Angela Campbell in Sister Wives, Surrogates and Sex 
Workers (n 6) and it undoubtedly has the capacity to assist in highlighting the unintended consequences a governance feminist critical 
analysis seeks to highlight, as Campbell’s own empirical research with the Bountiful community attests.   
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Ultimately, what postmodern and postcolonial feminism and the focus on vulnerability all 
require is for the establishment to recognise the experiences of women from groups which 
exist outside the inner circle of rights activists and law makers. Those women who are denied 
family reunion are one group firmly banished to the periphery, facing a limited choice between 
forced assimilation or complete exclusion. It is hoped this discussion shows that, although 
that response to polygamous wives might seem reasonable at first glance, it is both 
unsatisfactory and unfair. Quite what the state ought to do in response to that revelation is 
what occupies the final part of this work. The paradox presented by polygamy is now 
considered in practice, as this work makes suggestions for improvements to immigration law 
and human rights which take account of the historic subjugation and the on-going segregation 
of less powerful women from polygamous, refugee families.  
 
 
5.4 The Outcome: The Polygamy Paradox and Reform 
 
5.4.1 The Basis for Law Reform 
 
This chapter has encouraged a move beyond the dominant polygamy narrative of patriarchy 
and gender inequality, which justify prohibition as a universal, beneficial to all women. It is 
hoped that the earlier analysis of polygamy has laid bare the shaky foundation for that 
reductive account of polygamy and exposed strictly prohibitive approaches to polygamy as 
problematic. The final task is to articulate how formal responses to polygamy might better 
reflect a more diverse form of equality and more readily take account of the day-to-day reality 
of different women in polygamous marriages. This work is premised on the position that such 
an approach to polygamy is possible in the immigration context without compromising on 
gender fairness or ignoring harm, which almost everyone who is concerned with the regulation 
of polygamy agrees ought to be at the centre of any regulation. It intends now to show how 
that might be done, in practice. 
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This idea of better regulating polygamy for the benefit of those who are in plural marriages is 
not of itself completely novel. The work of Adrienne Davis in shifting the debate on polygamy 
away from criminality and towards the possibility of regulation has been significant in this 
regard. Davis has reflected on whether the law is ‘up to’ regulating marital multiplicity, turning 
to areas other than family law for guidance to do just that. Enlisting commercial partnership 
law to address the essential elements of polygamous marriage—like ensuring fairness for 
multiple partners, governing entry, exit and the management of resources—Davis has 
proposed rules which make the regulation of plural marriage entirely plausible. In doing so, 
she also emphasised the evolution of a similar process regarding monogamous marriage, 
during which women increasingly demanded changes to the historic domination of dyadic 
marriage by men, forcing the introduction of legal rules which now govern marriage more 
fairly.558 Davis points out that, in fact, most of the complaints we now make about polygamy 
have historically also been made at one time or another about ordinary, monogamous marriage 
(including domestic violence, marital rape and civil subordination, for example) and notes that 
dyadic marriage wasn’t criminalised or abolished as a result. Although Davis acknowledges 
that gaps remain in her suggestions for the reform of polygamy, she is nonetheless perplexed 
as to why it is still so often impossible for more prohibitive societies to imagine the regulation 
of polygamy in practice. While polygamy continues to be linked with inequality and 
exploitation, Davis’ work is a reminder that these things are not necessarily inherent in the 
practice of polygamy, and it is perhaps more helpful to consider marriage regulation the 
solution, rather than the abolition of plural marriage altogether.559  
 
Professor Davis resists the common urge to adopt essentialist ideas of monogamous marriage 
as good, and plural marriage as bad. Instead she chooses a consequentialist approach, which 
prioritises whether or not the negative effects of plural marriage can be mitigated. She shows 
her support for a more inclusive feminist approach in doing so, saying: 
                                                           
558 See the discussion on the introduction of fairer legal rules in marriage in the United Kingdom at (n 95). 
559 Davis (n 9), 2036 “There is no good reason why we could not recognise and regulate polygamy to ameliorate many of  its illiberal 
aspects.” Davis talks about the myth of ‘heterodyadic’ marriage which is held up as being a exemplar of formal intimacy. It is worth 
noting here again the various feminist arguments in support of polygamy and that it can ‘cut both ways’, with numerous practical 
benefits to women. Emens (n 9) 333 says in terms of ‘cutting both ways, that traditional feminist concerns can’t be enough to object 
to plural relationships, unless they’re also enough to object to traditional monogamous marriage because it has long oppressed women 
and continues to do so. 
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Opposition to polygamy as intrinsically bad for women exposes a feminist 
longing for a universal, idealized feminist gender subject.560 
 
In this regard, Davis’ work is significant in offering a credible framework for the domestic 
regulation of polygamous marriage, which in turn is helpful in replying to those critics who 
allege polygamy is so irredeemably bad it must be excluded at all cost. Her work creates an 
opening for a more permissive approach to polygamy, an approach which is also suggested in 
this work.561  
 
Davis is also not alone in advocating for change. Martha Nussbaum has suggested the legal 
arguments against permitting polygamous marriage in the West are increasingly weak, even if 
she does qualify her blessing for polygamy on the basis it must always be ‘sex-equal’ by being 
available on identical terms to both men and women.562 Bailey and Kauffman, writing in the 
domestic Canadian context, also advocate for the expanded legal recognition of polygamous 
marriages. Although their recommendations differ from Davis in that they do not advocate 
the opening up of civil marriage to multiple parties domestically, as this work does, they see 
benefit in the broad recognition of marriages which are validly entered into abroad. 
Increasingly, others are also advocating for changes in the formal approach to polygamy. As a 
result, is fair to say that the arguments in favour of law reform regarding polygamy are, slowly, 
on the rise.563 
                                                           
560 Davis (n 9) 2038.  
561 It is perhaps important to distinguish Davis’ suggestions for the domestic regulation of polygamy and the aim of this work which 
has the much the more modest ambition of simply extending the current domestic recognition of valid, foreign polygamous marriages 
to family reunification for refugee families. While Davis supports legalising and regulating polygamy, the objective of this work is only 
to take what might be described as dipping a theoretical toe in the same intellectual pond. While the focus for this research has much 
in common with the matters raised by Professor Davis, this work does not go so far as to call for the legalisation of all plural marriages.  
562 Martha Nussbaum ‘A Right to Marry? Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Law, Dissent (Summer 2009) 
<https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-right-to-marry-same-sex-marriage-and-constitutional-law> accessed 17 March 2017). 
563 Michele Alexandre (n 87) who warns against western centered analysis within unique Islamic settings and recommends women 
should be able to decide for themselves whether polygamy is appropriate for them. Adrienne Davis (n 9) asks whether it is better to 
ban polygamy and punish anyone engaged in it, or whether it might be effectively regulated adapting commercial partnership rules. 
In this regard, Alexandre and Davis are respectively suggesting that the empowerment and protection of women within the framework 
of polygamous marriage is possible and even necessary, to reconsider traditional feminist views on polygamy and consider the 
possibility of its practice and who also advocate for the possibility of changing women’s lived consequences of polygamy women’s 
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In consideration of increasing calls for a more legally permissive stance towards polygamy, it 
is helpful to turn again to the work of Angela Campbell and her suggestions for practical 
guiding principles for policy development in this area. In considering the regulation of family 
lives, Campbell’s recommendations include prioritising respect and dignity for all, while at the 
same time considering the lived reality of those affected and the existence of diversity among 
women. In addition, she sets the goal of keeping families together where it is clearly beneficial 
to do so, especially for mothers and their children, to avoid triggering harmful outcomes which 
may devastate the lives of those affected.564 Although the focus for her suggestions is the 
domestic legal sphere in Canada, nonetheless, there is much merit in their broad application. 
Keeping her guidance in mind, this work now seeks to make recommendations for a more 
equitable and principled approach to domestic immigration laws and international rights 
standards, so that they respond more fairly and effectively to the needs of women who are 
displaced and who face family separation because of their marital status.  
 
 
5.4.2 Domestic Law Reform 
 
5.4.2.1 The Recognition of Polygamy in Immigration 
 
The law in the United Kingdom contributes to the norm of monogamy in many different 
ways, by criminalising bigamy, by not recognising purely religious additional marriages and by 
prohibiting valid polygamous marriages from family reunification rights for migrants. It is that 
final aspect of domestic law which occupies this work because of the deceit of its justification 
on the basis of harm, its inconsistency when considered in light of other domestic legal 
responses to valid polygamous marriages, and most importantly, its potential to cause great 
hardship to marginalised and displaced women.  
 
                                                           
rights. The work of Emens (n 9), Duncan (n 88) Sigman (n 78),  Faucon (n 66), Choudhury (n 175) providing support for the 
recommendations Campbell makes regarding polygamy in her Status of Women Canada Report (n 166) 36. 
564 Campbell Status of Women Canada Report (n 166) 36 for recommendations, under the headings Guiding Principles and 
Recommendations. 
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The current discourse on polygamy and immigration, which originated around the time of the 
introduction of the very restrictions this work challenges in 1970s and 1980s Britain, allows 
for scant consideration of whether or not people are fleeing war, poverty or disaster, 
experiencing great hardship along the way.565 Given the likely motivation for immigration 
policy is the repudiation of difference, rather than protection from harm, it is perhaps not 
difficult to see how domestic restrictions on polygamy have evolved to become: 
 
… [a] one size fits none behemoth that has left a trail of collateral damage 
for over one hundred and fifty years.566  
 
As a result, this work recommends the law on spousal migration be changed to allow for the 
possibility that polygamous families may be reunited and re-settled together in the United 
Kingdom, in particular where those families are displaced as a result of conflict, insecurity or 
for a reason connected with the Refugee Convention. This work does not advocate more 
broad recognition of polygamy, either in migration or domestically, choosing to distinguish 
those families for whom the issue of relative harm is significant. In the refugee setting, women 
who are denied reunion are much more susceptible to physical, sexual, financial and emotional 
hardships, outcomes which research shows are even more likely to be suffered by women who 
are alone. For this reason, the on-going prohibition on entry to the United Kingdom continues 
to inflict particular injury on a marginalised and already beleaguered group of women. As a 
result, this work recommends that immigration legislation and rules be re-drafted with 
sufficient flexibility so that the evaluation of harm carried out in the domestic legal sphere 
becomes a transferrable tool allowing entire polygamous refugee families to reunite. 
 
In recommending reform, this work does not suggest judicial activism, or even juridical reform 
as the primary way forward. First, because the specificity of the law relating to polygamy 
currently allows little scope for the sort of activism that Shah and other legal pluralists like him 
might hope for. Second, because constitutional challenges akin to those that have been made 
in Canada and the United States are not really possible in the same way in the United Kingdom. 
                                                           
565 As already discussed (n 26) polygamous wives may submit a claim for asylum in their own right, however, such claims involve 
additional hurdles. 
566 Sigman (n 78) 102.  
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The HRA is not supreme law and the only ‘remedy’ available would be a declaration of 
incompatibility, which may have only a very limited effect in practice. For these reasons, the 
path of reform preferred is policy and legislative change. This process might even be prompted 
by an updated Law Commission report on the interaction between the law and polygamous 
marriage, given the length of time since it was last considered. Whatever form legal change 
might take, in this process, instead of allowing what one commentator has referred to as 
‘imagined harms’ to inform the treatment of polygamy, it is hoped that empirical accounts of 
polygamy like those produced by Angela Campbell would be sought and given more weight.567 
Although Campbell recognises that doing so will not, of itself, necessarily reform the law, she 
points to the capacity that this sort of acknowledgement has to inform the law. Oversimplified 
perspectives on choice, harm, coercion and victimhood are able to be tested, and the agency 
of women who are ordinarily disenfranchised may be given voice.568 In this way, a practical 
paradigm is offered through which the damage done by governance feminist approaches might 
also be mitigated.  
 
One might well ask, does this paradigm for reform recommend turning to the very institutions 
this work has criticised? In one sense, yes, it does. However, it also requires that domestic 
agencies, NGOs and inter-governmental entities engage in reform via a process of ‘world 
travelling’ and that they avoid simplistic and distorted binary interpretations of additional 
polygamous wives as either victims or villains as they reconsider the formal treatment of 
polygamy. Should they do so, this sort of reform has the potential to benefit women whose 
lives and needs sit outside ordinary modes of knowledge production and practice, including 
the women contemplated by this research, who are overlooked within the ambit of 
immigration and human rights law. On the other hand, not doing so will inevitably perpetuate 
bitterly ironic, unfair and unproductive outcomes.  
 
 
                                                           
567 Sigman (n 78) 107 discusses the ‘disconnect’ between the empirical reality of polygamy and law and policy enforcement, which 
emphasises ‘imagined harms’. Angela Campbell in Sister Wives, Surrogates and Sex Workers (n 6) goes one step further in seeking to 
establish a framework which considers the experience of women who make controversial choices .  
568 Campbell, Sister Wives, Surrogates and Sex Workers (n 6)  
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5.4.2.2 The Bigamy Hurdle 
 
In contemplating domestic law reform, it is necessary to deal with criminal prohibitions on 
bigamy and whether or not they might exclude the possibility of changing immigration laws 
on polygamous marriage. Bailey and Kauffman address this point in their examination of the 
appropriate response to polygamy in the West, where they consider how it might be possible 
to reconcile the cultural and legal commitment to monogamous marriage with extending 
recognition to valid, foreign polygamous marriages.569 Like Bailey and Kauffman, this work 
has distinguished bigamy (the practice of entering into concurrent, civil marriages in the United 
Kingdom) from polygamy (including both valid, foreign polygamous marriages, and purely 
religious additional marriages entered into in the United Kingdom) from the outset. Given the 
very different nature of bigamous and polygamous marriages, the suggestion here to expand 
the recognition of polygamous marriage in the immigration sphere is not considered 
inconsistent with laws against the crime of bigamy. In fact, it is more appropriately described 
as being in line with the current legal treatment of entirely valid polygamous marriages in 
contexts other than immigration, which conflicts laws and public policy have long dictated 
ought to be recognised, especially where the interests of family members (most often, women 
as legal spouses) are better protected by doing so.  
 
 
5.4.2.3 The Public Policy Hurdle  
 
The question remains whether, by allowing polygamous families to reunite, the United 
Kingdom would be breaching its own public policy aim not to encourage the formation of 
polygamous households. The Law Commission, the body responsible for law reform in the 
United Kingdom, has itself confirmed that although public policy does not permit the 
promotion of polygamous households, as long as plural marriage is not legally permitted here 
and as long as no British domicile may contract a polygamous marriage abroad, the law cannot 
be regarded as encouraging polygamy.570 Using the Law Commission’s own reasoning, public 
                                                           
569 Bailey and Kauffman ‘Should Civil Marriage Be Opened Up To Multiple Parties?’ (n 8) 1747. 
570 Regarding public policy and its scope for determining reasonable restrictions on the recognition of polygamy for any rights and 
obligations, the Law Commission Report (n 250) 14, paragraph 37 discusses this, saying “…the law ought not to … encourage polygamy 
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policy does not provide a sound basis universally to reject polygamy in immigration, at least 
not without some pause for thought and further explanation by the state. In fact, the Law 
Commission’s views suggest is that it is entirely appropriate for an evaluation of harm to be 
carried out for migrants—just as it is for those already in the United Kingdom claiming rights 
on the basis of their plural marriage. Where women may otherwise be left to experience 
hardship far more damaging than any harm thought to be associated with the plural nature of 
their marriage, the importance of considering harm in the context of polygamy and 
immigration becomes particularly meaningful. For displaced women and refugee families, 
undoubtedly categories of migrants who are often those most at risk, the state’s obligation to 
reconsider the formal treatment of polygamy seems all the more pressing. Using the Law 
Commission’s own reasoning again, where the effect of the law is repellent to one’s sense of 
justice, for example because it causes more harm than good, it is wrong not to recognise that 
and provide some relief.571 In suggesting it is incumbent on the government to think more 
carefully about harm and public policy when it comes to laws which restrict polygamy, this 
work is suggesting it do no more (and no less) than it already does outside of the immigration 
sphere, where harm is taken into account and where rights emanate from polygamous 
marriages where it would cause more harm to the individuals concerned not to do so. 
 
The issue of public policy has been considered in some detail by John Murphy, writing on 
rationality and cultural pluralism in the recognition of foreign marriages, who examined the 
                                                           
… However, so long as English law refused to allow a polygamous marriage to be celebrated in England, and so long as a person  
domiciled in England cannot contract a valid polygamous marriage anywhere, English law cannot be regarded as ‘encouraging’ 
polygamy.” Using the Law Commission’s own reasoning, reasoning which formed the basis for changes to the law in the form of t he 
Matrimonial Causes Act and the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, the recognition of polygamy for immigration 
purposes does not conflict with the state’s stated public policy aim of not wanting to encourage the formation of polygamous house 
holds. The Commission goes on in the next paragraph to say that it is right “… that immigrants to Eng land are not in a privileged 
position and are expected to conform to English standards of behaviour.” However, as this work argues, provided the law targets such 
‘standards of behaviour’ rather than any given type of marriage, to the extent such standards may require no breach of the criminal 
or other laws, may still be achieved within the paradigm of a polygamous marriage, just as they may in a monogamous one. Bailey and 
Kaufman (n 8) 1752 ask how long can the history of recognising foreign valid marriage exist along side a commitment to monogamous 
marriage which informs the public policy considerations denying certain rights to those marriages? They go on to suggest that 
expanded recognition of valid foreign marriages is not inconsistent with the suggestion to keep plural marriage illegal domestically. 
571 Law Commission (n 250) cite the British Columbia case, Lim v Lim [1948] 2 DLR 353 saying “[T]he implications arising from refusal 
to recognise the plaintiff’s status for the purpose in question are so many and so repellent to one’s sense of justice that it is with regret 
that I come to the conclusion [not to recognise the marriage and provide relief]”.  
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location of public policy objections to polygamy in religious, cultural and general objections 
to social and economic harm.572 Murphy reasoned that the heavy reliance by the European 
Court of Human Rights on Christian heritage arguments made by the United Kingdom in the 
Bibi case were unconvincing given the more plural and secular nature of society today. He also 
dismissed the idea of more general cultural objections to plural marriage, calling references to 
culture an ‘out-dated yardstick’ to measure whether polygamy ought to be accepted, or not.573 
Pointing to the domestic recognition of polygamy in other contexts, as this work has done, 
Murphy was also highly critical of using the tradition of monogamous marriage to justify 
rejecting polygamy in immigration, alluding to it as a policy rooted in racism and which is 
untenable given it emanates from white, Western objections to a form of marriage practised 
more often by people of colour from Asia, Africa and the Middle East.574 Finally, with regard 
to social concerns and the economic cost of polygamy, Murphy suggests there is an absence 
of data to support these concerns, and in any event, there is a point of principle in the day to 
day impact of immigration restrictions which prevent women from reuniting with their 
families; a principle which ought to weigh more heavily in favour of women as competing 
needs are balanced. This final point undoubtedly resonates all the more strongly in the refugee 
context.  
 
Murphy’s views on public policy go directly against the reasoning of the European Court on 
states’ right to exclude polygamous families, and might be considered controversial for that 
reason alone. Despite that, there is certainly merit in his general belief that it is not enough for 
the state or anyone else simply to rely on a public policy discretion that provides the power to 
prohibit polygamous marriage, as though the basis for that prohibition is so obvious it requires 
no further analysis or explanation.575 This is particularly so in the current climate of increased 
insecurity, consequent human movement and the rise of nationalist and populist rhetoric. 
More than ever the state and courts must be called on to explain their reliance on general 
public policy justifications for immigration restrictions to avoid the accusation of cultural 
                                                           
572 Murphy, John,  ‘Rationality and Cultural Pluralism in the Non-Recognition of Foreign Marriages (2000) ICLQ 643.  
573 Murphy (n 572) 649.  
574 Murphy  (n572) 652.  
575 Murphy (n 572). 
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imperialism and irrational adjudication.576 In this regard, the concern Murphy expresses about 
the negligent reliance on public policy to exclude polygamous families challenges assumed 
values and seeks to highlight the silent, structural bias which works against marginalised groups 
because the values of the ‘other’ aren’t valued or even considered at all. Seen in this light, 
Murphy’s claim that the state must answer accusations of imperialism and racism with regard 
to the exclusion of polygamy on public policy grounds appears both familiar, and more 
reasonable. Such claims have been made more generally regarding the development of 
immigration restrictions for many years now, and are never more relevant and in need of being 
addressed than they are at the time of writing.  In addition, Murphy’s suggestion echoes both 
postcolonial and governance feminist critiques already adopted by this work, in challenging 
the existence of a self evident, universal notion of public policy which represents an accepted, 
dominant ideology. Rather like the criticisms of mainstream feminist approaches to polygamy 
mentioned earlier, the prioritisation of what Murphy refers to as a ‘low level’ principle (public 
policy) over the lived experiences (often to include gender based harm) of human beings shows 
a problematic disregard for human dignity in treating those affected as a ‘non-issue’, not 
worthy of further consideration. As Murphy explains, the source of the offence is not in the 
prioritisation of values of others because, according to him no balancing takes place, as the 
values of others are not considered at all.577 
 
In his strong criticism of public policy involvement in polygamy regulation, Murphy is 
primarily concerned to ensure those who are responsible for laws that exclude polygamous 
families are forced to articulate specifically the basis for their approach. In his view, doing so 
would ensure that decision making is more rational and less likely to be based on cultural 
imperialist assumptions. Murphy’s recommendations are reinforced by the more general 
concern for practicality, emphasized by Emily Duncan, who suggests there is also value in 
privileging practicality over vague notions of morality when it comes to making law.578 
Alongside Murphy’s preoccupation with making decision makers more openly accountable, 
Duncan derides any reliance they place on immorality alone, suggesting that the governance 
of marriage and immigration does a disservice to society by not privileging the practical impact 
                                                           
576 Murphy (n 572). 
577 Murphy (n 572).  
578 Duncan (n 88). 
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of the law instead. In this regard, Duncan outlines a scathing catalogue of practices commonly 
associated with polygamy, including incest, child abuse, physical and emotional abuse, 
domestic violence, underage marriage, limited educational and employment opportunities for 
women. Despite that, she goes on to recommend that public policy governing polygamy ought 
not to be overburdened by questions of morality, but rather, more concerned with practicality 
so that the regulation of polygamy is truly effective, and the state doesn’t reduce its ability to 
be effective by focusing on what might generally be considered ‘immoral’. In part, this is 
because in some cases that may change (she cites alcohol consumption and the prohibition 
which also drove that underground, as well as prostitution which has also experienced a change 
in formal approach to make it less harmful). She is also at pains to point out, not all of those 
men engaged in polygamy are abusive to their wives and children, and cites one study in 
support of this point, which says that the problems often associated with polygamy are really 
the function of those families which are particularly dysfunctional, and not actually 
representative of problems which are inherent to polygamy itself. For these reasons, Duncan 
recommends that emphasis be placed on the efficacy of polygamy policy by focusing on the 
negative practices that are sometimes associated with polygamy, instead of making polygamy 
itself a crime.579  
 
In this way, the work of Duncan and Murphy combine to provide convincing arguments for 
the reconsideration and redefinition of public policy when it comes to the regulation of 
polygamous marriage, a suggestion supported by this work. To promote credibility in formal 
decision making and in order to make more sound decisions, those who rely on public policy 
as a method of informing legal rules must resist lazily referring to policy justifications which 
are impractical, imperialist, and even, in the current climate, out-dated. Given the membership 
of society in Britain, the number of religious polygamous marriages which are said to exist 
here and the impact of non-recognition on those involved, formal resistance to polygamy on 
the basis of a particular religious or cultural heritage is no longer as convincing as it may once 
                                                           
579 Duncan (n 88) 334. Duncan quotes Bella Stumbo in the LA Times, who writes after interviewing polygamous communities in North 
America that it is unfortunate that the 1% of renegade polygamists stigmatise the other 99% who are peaceful and law abiding (Bella 
Stumbo, ‘No Tidy Stereotype; Polygamists: Tale of Two Families, LA Times May 13 1988, Part 1, at 1).  
 222 
have been, and the hypocrisy of relying on confused conceptions of harm to exclude 
vulnerable refugees is self evident.580 
 
One might argue that the recent rise in nationalist rhetoric among citizens and politicians alike 
weakens any suggestion for greater recognition of polygamy. In fact, it is more reasonable to 
argue that the rise of populism and hate speech against those who are ‘other’ serves only to 
reinforce arguments in favour of change. It is inherently dangerous to allow the state to use 
restrictions on polygamy to garner support from rising nationalist voter bases, all while it fails 
properly and more substantively to justify its policy on polygamy and ignores the impact of 
that policy in practice. Where the policy makers reject difference for its own sake, they must 
be required to provide a fundamental justification—authoritative good reason, ideally which 
is tied to the practice itself—for doing so. In the event the state does not review its response 
to polygamy, particularly in the context of displaced families seeking refuge, the United 
Kingdom’s treatment of plural marriage will continue to illustrate the paradox of polygamy in 
practice. That is, in hoping to protect women from harm, the state justifies the universal ban 
on polygamy on its assumption that prohibition provides the best protection, while in reality 
it is very often women who are most badly affected by an unqualified ban. As suggested before 
now, it cannot be acceptable for the state simply to rely on its own discretion in defining policy 
as though the concerns on which that policy is based are obvious.581  The paradox in this case 
makes it all the more essential that the state re-examine its formal treatment of polygamy, 
especially for refugee families, or provide a more detailed explanation of the reasoning behind 
the policy which results. Such a suggestion does not automatically result in the removal of the 
                                                           
580 The exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention, and in particular the criminality exclusion clause of Article 1F use, in part, a harm 
principle as a basis for excluding those who would otherwise meet the definition of a Convention refugee, on the basis of pot ential 
harm to the host country. While it is accepted that the host country should not be forced to bring harm upon itself by accepting a 
refugee (who by definition is at risk of harm in his host country) this rationale is only invoked in relation to serious criminals, war 
criminals, etc. making the resistance to the use of ‘harm’ as it has been discussed in this context, and as it might be referred to in a 
public policy sense, reasonable.  
581 Murphy (n 572), see also Joost Blom, ‘Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time’ (2003) 50(3) Netherlands 
International Law Review  373 regarding the meaning and purpose of public policy, as well as the evolution of values which inform 
public policy, over time. Public policy is also discussed in Bailey and others, ‘Expanding Recognition of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: 
Policy Implications for Canada’ in Campbell and others, ‘Polygamy in Canada’ (n 69) specifically with regard to recognising foreign, 
valid polygamous marriages where doing so does not violate Canada’s essential ‘public policy, concluding that such recognition would 
not imply endorsement of polygamy or the gender inequality ordinarily associated with polygamy.  
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public policy hurdle altogether. However, it does lower that hurdle to make space for the 
domestic legal reform this work recommends.  
 
 
5.4.3 Human Rights Law Reform 
 
Alongside recommendations for domestic law reform, this work seeks to address the injustice 
experienced by refugee women in polygamous marriage in the context of human rights. In the 
context of displaced women and polygamy, as the previous chapter explained, a variety of 
rights is engaged: refugee rights, women’s rights, the right to marry, the right to a family life 
and others. Rights balancing is inevitable. Many feminists have argued that, in working out 
which rights should prevail over others, it is women’s rights which inevitably suffer because 
of the structural patriarchy which already exists, meaning “… when rights compete, women 
lose out”.582 The real battle is that all to too often rights simply serve the status quo, so that 
they fail to privilege those most in need. The challenge to existing power bases by postmodern 
and postcolonial feminists, together with governance feminist critics, is useful in this regard to 
highlight the limited utility of liberal equality rights for marginalised groups of women. While 
‘human rights hawk feminists’ are allowed to dominate rights discourse, even where they are 
well intentioned, the needs of distinct categories of minority women are not being addressed 
by international human rights standards.583 As a result, it is necessary to re-examine the 
feminist credentials of human rights protections.  
 
This is crucial in the context of polygamously married, displaced women, for whom restrictive 
family reunion laws which exclude them will result in indefinite and very difficult periods of 
family separation, during which they are very likely to experience harm in excess of coping 
with the ordinary challenges of a refugee environment. For that reason, this work recommends 
that the human rights establishment reconsider its universal condemnation of polygamy and 
rethink international human rights standards so that differences among women are both 
recognised and catered for and the experiences of subordinated women have much more 
                                                           
582 Jill Marshall, ‘Feminist Reconstructions of Universalism and the Discourse of Rights’ (2009) International Journal of Law in Context, 
1.  
583 Choudhury (n 418) 155. 
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influence on the content and scope of human rights guarantees. This call for change may be 
considered radical, but it is necessary to address the quiet and pervasive enemy of patriarchy 
and cultural dominance in the human rights structure, so that international legal boundaries 
no longer entrench the subordination of less powerful women.584 
 
Calling for change in this way brings to mind again the idea of world travelling, useful in 
analysing the intersection of law and culture and advocated earlier in this work, with the aim 
of Western rights scholars and activists overcoming their default setting and showing empathy 
with those who are ‘other’. Eve Darian Smith has invoked the comparable idea of an 
‘interlegality’, whereby those who dominate in global legal terms treat other’s legal traditions 
as equal.585 This method arguably encourages an even greater degree of understanding than 
world travelling by not dictating a starting point. With interlegality, legal systems are not 
separate things that collide, rather they interact and mix together from the outset. Darian Smith 
doesn’t just suggest this method, she insists it is necessary for the very survival of human 
rights, pointing to: 
 
 …[an] emergent insistence among non-Western societies to acknowledge 
alternative legal conceptualisations and norms that may not easily 
correlate to what we in the West recognise as the rule of law and related 
notions of rights and justice.586 
 
Darian Smith’s suggestion that rights consider the context in which they work, as well as the 
effect that they have, is indirectly acknowledged by those who monitor rights themselves. As 
                                                           
584 A suggestion backed up by TWAIL scholars. See for example, James Thuo Gathii (n 40) at 44, quoting Mosope Fagbondgbe who 
has outlined her agenda as “… the formulation of human rights norms and the development of alternative strategies … to facilitate 
not a mere reformation but a radical overhaul of international human rights law for the benefit of the Third World and Third World 
Women in particular.” She argues for this to address the imbalances and the disproportionate poverty, need and deprivation of third 
world women. Gathii says the “… very important work TWAIL feminists have undertaken, to critique the patriarchal customary and 
religious norms and practices in the Third World and the manner in which the language of rights of often mobilized to entrench rather 
than end such norms and practices…”. 
585 Darian Smith (n 368) 47. Darian Smith describes the West as likely to continue to dominate globally for some time to come, and 
suggests an ‘interlegality’ approach. De Sousa Santos introduces this idea in his text at (n 343) at 97, where he describes it as a 
“phenomenological dimension of legal pluralism”.  
586 Darian Smith (n 368) p 47. 
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the Committee with oversight of CEDAW explains in one of its General Recommendations, 
the underlying causes of discrimination against women must be addressed by considering the 
lives that women lead in a contextual way. Measures must be adopted which amount to an 
effective transformation of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer 
grounded in historically determined paradigms of power and life patterns.587 The vision 
CEDAW espouses sits comfortably with postmodern, postcolonial, governance feminist and 
other critiques, which call on rights to consider context, whether that is historical, cultural, 
institutional or otherwise. While there is a growing consensus regarding the need for rights 
self-reflection, however, and even some acknowledgement of that by the human rights 
establishment, those with responsibility for rights implementation and enforcement repeatedly 
fail to take their own advice.  
 
Although there may currently be a consensus among human rights advocates that polygamy is 
a form of discrimination and a violation of international law, a wilful blind spot exists when it 
comes to considering what drives that consensus and whether or not it is the best overall 
approach to polygamous marriage. Human rights standards fail to reflect the different way in 
which women experience polygamy or displacement, and the human rights establishment does 
little to rectify that. The key to making rights protections more effective lies in identifying and 
accepting where they fail and instigating change. As Darian Smith points out, the law is a 
cultural artefact, reflecting deeply held cultural assumptions—assumptions that not only can, 
but must, change as societies change.588 The on-going, increasing movement of people around 
the globe is but one factor which may make any resistance to that change unsustainable. The 
requirement for homogeneity that entitles women to benefit from legal and human rights 
protection as members of an esteemed group is becoming increasingly difficult to defend and 
calls for rights to be more democratic and inclusive, particularly of women, are becoming more 
common.589 As Monique Deveaux comments: 
                                                           
587 UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘General Recommendation 25’ on Article 4, 
Paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on Temporary Measures, adopted 
at the Thirtieth Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2000), paragraph 10.  
588 Darian Smith (n 368) 42. 
589 Deveaux (n 379) 55 discusses attempts to limit, reform or prohibit cultural practices being perceived at best as unwanted 
intrusions, and at worst, as oppression. Deveaux’s observation goes on to echo that expressed by Shah (n 11), particularly regarding 
domestic polygamy, in that such measures very often serve only to strengthen the custom in question. 
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… proposals for the reform of cultural practices that are derived from the mere 
application of liberal principles (however laudable) risk misconstruing the actual or 
lived form of these practices; as such they may … perpetuate, or even worsen, the 
many forms of oppression faced by vulnerable members of social groups, such as 
women.590 
 
The problem, then, is not with rights, but rather the restrictions on who makes and defines 
them, and therefore, what rights have to say. Consequently, the solution is not to abandon 
rights for failing some women, but to develop a rights discourse which acknowledges this 
disparity in power and which redresses the balance.591 For these reasons, this work argues 
strongly for the full protection of human rights to be extended to women in polygamous 
refugee families. Rights still have a valuable role in advancing women’s equality, and they may 
be used to the advantage of all women.592 First, because rights universality requires that such 
individuals ought not to be excluded from having the benefit of rights protection simply 
because they are displaced and not citizens. Second, whereas the current approach to polygamy 
risks undermining human rights and harming vulnerable women, change which is led by 
marginalised groups will benefit them, and be more likely to promote the long term legitimacy 





This chapter has attempted to provide a renewed feminist understanding of formal attitudes 
to polygamy, in an effort to avoid automatically making traditional assumptions about the 
‘problem of polygamy’ and the most appropriate response. It has addressed the concerns of 
those who would argue Islam and feminism are mutually exclusive, providing evidence to 
                                                           
590 Deveaux (n 379) 20. 
591 Marks (n 478) 313; Chinkin (n 39) 212, quoting Patricia Williams. 
592 There is a growing feminist discourse which argues that rights can be used to women’s advantage and that despite the difficulties 
of rights, especially for women, there is some utility in using ‘rights talk’. Marshall, Jill (n 582) describes Mullally in Gender Culture and 
Human Rights: Reclaiming Universalism (Hart, 2006) as suggesting the human self simply needs re-defining and that way the 
universalist moral theory of rights does not have to rely on essentialist definitions of the human self. 
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challenge the view that Islam is universally oppressive to women. It has explored the opinions 
of Muslim commentators who have said such assumptions are based either on mistake or bias, 
rejecting what might be presented as paternalistic and misguided concern for the plight of 
Muslim women.593 Adhering to the call by some Muslim feminist scholars for a New 
Enlightenment of sorts, while inevitably anchored in my own perspective, it is also rooted in 
the idea that it is imperative for Muslim women to have an equal opportunity to forge their 
own feminist path.  
 
This chapter has undertaken not just to argue successfully in favour of that proposition, but 
also attempt to build a bridge from traditional condemnation of Islamic practices like 
polygamy to exposing the paradoxical nature of polygamy regulation, and find tangible 
theoretical methods for privileging the perspectives of other women. This is done in part 
precisely because Muslim women are very unlikely to feel liberated by feminism that is 
imposed from the outside.594 To allow for a more fluid approach to a practice that is much 
derided in the West, this chapter has applied a postmodern feminist understanding of 
polygamy, challenging what is considered ‘natural’ with regard to marriage and women’s rights, 
and re-presenting that as a view which is socially constructed and informed by power and 
dominance. By using a postmodern feminist vernacular this work has sought to re-frame the 
way polygamy is viewed without losing sight of marginalised women, and their rights, offering 
an alternative feminist discourse in support of those women affected by polygamy restrictions.  
 
The postmodern discussion in this work is multifaceted. It involves not just pitting mainstream 
feminist agendas against postmodern feminist aims, or traditional Muslim practices against 
those that are ordinarily considered more progressive and which seek to deny marital 
recognition in the name of emancipation. Rather, it requires the consideration of a much more 
complex set of evolving issues around domestic laws, rights, the nature of families and 
marriage, culture, religion, institutionalised power and women’s day-to-day lives.  
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594 Azizah al-Hibri (n 489) 3. 
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By turning the feminist lens to a different angle, this work has aimed to show that the 
domination of the discussion on polygamy, immigration and rights by white western women 
and their male colleagues has promoted a skewed agenda. It has sought to take up the 
suggestion by Chinkin and Charlesworth to challenge the what they call ‘privileged and 
historically dominant knowledges’ in order to counterbalance the impact of their reproduction 
and reinforcement by the establishment.595 Every effort has been made to reveal the detriment 
in defaulting to Western feminist ideals as a normative paragon for a civilised society; a 
revelation which demands that the legal human rights establishment move beyond traditional 
liberal feminist boundaries to consider factors they have previously ignored. This chapter has 
also argued that, in addition to its position of privilege and power, traditional feminism is no 
longer able to articulate or advocate adequately for women’s needs (if indeed it ever was), 
meaning those standards which have been informed by liberal feminist values ought no longer 
to have authority for determining women’s lives and rights. As Frug has said, it is perhaps only 
when ‘woman’ cannot coherently be understood that women’s oppression will be 
undermined.596  
 
In that regard, the discussion on governance feminism has sought to show a link between a 
dominant feminist liberal agenda and institutions that establish domestic laws and human 
rights standards, a link which has long been responsible for their content. The aim has been 
to de-marginalise those who practice polygamy and allow perspectives other than those that 
dominate in the West to influence the content of laws and rights which govern plural marriage, 
particularly concerning family reunification for refugee families. The purpose in bringing other 
voices to domestic and international discussions on polygamy has been to provide a fuller 
account of the lives of those who experience plural marriage in an abandoned transnational 
space, to include those women who have typically been ignored by governing institutions, 
whose needs have not been prioritised by governments or the international human rights 
movement. As women, Muslims and non-citizens they are situated firmly on the periphery of 
the corridors of power and any interaction they have with feminist aims ordinarily results in 
                                                           
595 Chinkin (n 39) 21.  
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the imposition of liberal values, rather than an acknowledgement of their experience or their 
capacity for agency. 
 
The aim, here, is to ask that the establishment recognise ‘other’ women and to call for a fresh 
perspective which results in better outcomes for a broader class of women. Inside that broad 
aim, this work has identified one issue among the many that are relevant. By applying a 
postmodern critical eye to the reasoning of the state and the international community in 
universally and unconditionally condemning polygamy, their stance is presented as resting on 
an unsteady foundation. The effective categorisation of polygamous wives as living, breathing 
evidence of the harmful practice of polygamy, so tainted they must be excluded entirely from 
society, becomes problematic. It is especially problematic when the outcome is indefinite 
family separation, with all of the risk to personal safety that brings, for women in particular.  
 
Some readers will undoubtedly still be sceptical about the suggestion that recognising 
polygamy may better for women, and will feel great discomfort at doing so. Where such 
concerns about the practice of polygamy persist, however, it remains important to consider 
whether it is right to punish those who practice it. Rather like the regulation of sex work, where 
laws impose a disproportionate punishment on women, even if regulation is not targeted at 
them directly, it is only fair to consider that impact and make changes as a result. In that regard, 
the approach recommended in this thesis aims to acknowledge the reality of women’s lives, 
seeking a fairer solution the necessary balancing act carried out by policy makers, legislators 
and human rights promoters when they are considering competing ideological priorities and 
practical outcomes as they define the content of laws and rights.  
 
Here, it is worth reciting again Eve Darian Smith’s reference to the law as a ‘dynamic artefact’, 
a quality she says must be recalled to promote long term co-operation, peace and security. This 
is one of the aims of this work, to suggest change not only for women, but for rights 
themselves and for the benefit of societies more broadly. As Darian Smith suggests, because 
culture is dynamic, so the law must be too, to respond to the constant process of change. This 
work aims to scratch beneath the complacent surface of what she calls the ‘veneer of national 
and international legal stability’ to face directly what lurks there and deal openly with it. Rather 
than allowing the fear espoused by rising nationalist rhetoric which seeks to exclude the ‘other’ 
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and preserve the cultural values of the majority, the reality of difference is faced head on in 
prescribing a path which balances majority view against the effects of that view on others.597  
 
With specific regard for the future of polygamy regulation, the challenge now lies in convincing 
the state and the international human rights community of the need to counteract the long 
influence of mainstream, more powerful groups, including feminists, and their role in reducing 
the legitimate jurisdiction of ‘women’ to a location with strict mainstream feminist borders. 
To that end this chapter has sought to make a practical contribution, however small, to 
transnational thinking on a subject with inter-jurisdictional challenges. The significance of 
doing so, although located in the experience of a relatively small group of women, ought not 
to be underestimated. Where law and rights are approached differently from the outset the 
transformative potential may be harnessed to benefit women, bolster the reputation of human 
rights and promote security and dignity for all. 
  
                                                           
597 Bailey and others, Expanding Recognition of Foreign Marriages (n 69) 27 refer to Patrick Parkinson ‘Taking Multiculturalism 
Seriously: Marriage Law and the Rights of Minorities’ (1994) Sydney Law Review. 16, 472, who has argued that “…the importance of 
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for cultural expression.” 
 
 231 




Given the litany of harm commonly associated with polygamy this work might be accused of 
being provocative in suggesting that polygamous wives should be entitled to family reunion in 
the United Kingdom. That accusation is rejected. Rather than being radical, in offering a 
reinvigorated feminist understanding of polygamy, law and rights, this work proposes a return 
to those values that the state and the human rights establishment already claim to respect and 
hold dear: universal dignity and honouring the humanity of the most vulnerable, such as those 
who are fleeing conflict and seeking refuge.  
 
The transnational abandonment of refugee women to a space outside the boundary of 
domestic and international assistance presents a problem. Not only does it have an impact on 
the lives of those affected, it highlights structural hypocrisy and contradiction. It also presents 
the problem of the liberal rhetoric which informs local laws and international rights, in that it 
is taken for granted as representing a universal truth which outlines that which is ‘good’ for 
all. While my own experience, anchored in precisely that liberal ideology, may continue to 
mean that I struggle to accept some of the facets of religious polygamy myself, I am certain 
that this analysis of the treatment of polygamous families remains fundamentally worthwhile, 
because the exclusion of displaced additional polygamous wives says so much about the values 
we choose to privilege and the effects we choose to ignore, individually and as a society. 
 
In that regard, the primary aim of this work has been to demand that, whatever we choose to 
exclude or promote, we do so consciously, without blindly following the ‘usual’ approach. 
Whether this is in relation to the regulation of polygamy, the creation of women’s rights or 
the treatment of refugees, this is vital; particularly in a rapidly changing and increasingly 
globalising world. However reasonable it might first seem to exclude polygamous wives, their 
exclusion might also be viewed as reflecting a form of modern day lip service to historic 
domination, with devastating outcomes for women and their families. Crucially, precisely 
because it is so often women whose lives have become the flash point for tension in 
multicultural spaces, applying a renewed feminist understanding to the treatment of polygamy 
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is also essential. It is vital not to settle for the ‘exhaustion’ and ‘disorientation’ that is so often 
now associated with feminist discourse.598 Rather, it is better for women, as well as likely to be 
more productive in changing societies, to establish a feminist approach to practices like 
polygamy which has no desire to reject, tolerate or coerce the ‘other’. Doing so will allow the 
‘polygamy question’ to move on from simply asking ‘how different is too different?’ to a more 
nuanced set of analyses like: who experiences that difference, in what environment is that 
difference experienced and how does that experience of difference manifest for this particular 
person?599 
 
Moreover, in the current climate of geopolitical insecurity and domestic uncertainty, where 
cracks appear in the foundations for laws and rights, it is likely to be more fruitful in the long 
term to repair those cracks, rather than paper over them and simply hope for the best. Building 
walls because we fear difference, whether the walls are physical, legal or ideological, is not 
likely to be productive. Doing so in the face of rapid globalisation and societal change, in 
particular, is likely only to undermine the foundation for law and rights, risking their very 
survival in the longer term. Not least of all because, in the context of this work, it is not just 
displaced Muslim women who are harmed by the treatment of plural relationships or the fact 
of globalisation which demand a refreshed understanding of other cultural practices. There 
are other groups among whom ‘poly’ relationships are growing. The fact is that the law will 
need to consider plural relationships as societies continue to change for a range of reasons, 
and different conceptions of ‘the family’ become more prominent. 
 
To that end, it is hoped this work has successfully interrupted what has long been thought of 
as ‘normal’ in the West with regard to plural relationships and their regulation. The formal 
treatment of polygamy has provided a useful vehicle for an ideological interruption because 
the harmful impact of the established epistemology regarding the ‘other’ is laid bare in the 
experience of rejected additional, Muslim wives. This work has attempted to unpack and 
complicate the ontological foundation that has informed the exclusion of these women, to 
reveal bias, hypocrisy and harm. In confronting this missing constituency in mainstream 
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feminism, human rights activism and domestic law making it is hoped that the voices of those 
who would resist the imposition of a pre-determined identity, morality and—in this case, a 
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